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CRAFTING THE TOOLS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE INVENTION, SPREAD, AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF PROBE MICROSCOPY, 1960-2000 
Cyrus Cawas Maneck Mody, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2004 
 This dissertation is an historical and ethnographic examination of the 
invention, replication, and routinization of scanning probe microscopy, a family of 
ultrahigh resolution surface characterization techniques found today in surface 
science, materials science, electrochemistry, biophysics, and nanotechnology, as well 
as in industrial reliability and quality control laboratories, in semiconductor 
manufacturing, in high school science fair projects, and even on the surface of Mars.  
The dissertation begins with the less-than-successful story of the Topografiner, a 
precursor of the scanning tunneling microscope (STM) at the US National Bureau of 
Standards at the end of the ’60s that failed to prove the concept of probe microscopy 
or win managerial approval.  The STM itself originated at the IBM Research lab in 
Zurich.  Its inventors committed themselves to a naïve experimental practice that 
allowed them to push past certain obstacles and to forge much-needed collaborations, 
particularly with surface scientists.  Surface scientists were the first to bring the STM 
to the big North American corporate laboratories at IBM and Bell Labs.  There, 
tunneling microscopy became a locus for training young researchers as well as for 
generating new surface scientific knowledge.  Simultaneously, the STM was adopted 
by a handful of academic groups in California, who cultivated a more freewheeling 
way of integrating pedagogy and microscope-building.  By 1990, building an STM 
had become easy enough that many people joined the community; this influx 
provoked a number of internal frictions, finally erupting in a controversy about 
whether the STM could atomically resolve DNA.  This debate was resolved partly 
through the intervention of microscope manufacturers associated with the California 
 
 
academic groups.  As these manufacturers grew, they faced the problem of keeping 
themselves distinct from, yet close to, the experimental cultures of their customers.  
The probe microscopy community changed radically after it became possible to buy 
instruments from these manufacturers.  Some of these changes have led probe 
microscopists to begin leading their community into the larger field of 
nanotechnology.  This accords well with some nanotechnologists’ vision of probe 
microscopy, but integrating the two cultures has proven difficult. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction to Probe Microscopy 
 
 In the summer of 1998, I began an ethnographic study of a small research 
group in the Materials Science and Engineering department at Cornell.  This project 
continued, off and on, for almost three years before it became subsumed within my 
study of scanning probe microscopy.  Although this ethnography began with an open-
ended purview (I think my original vague intent was to examine interactions between 
different kinds of sub-disciplinary knowledge in a group researching composite 
materials), it very quickly focused on issues of dirt, contamination, purity, and (later) 
sound in the materials science workplace (Mody 2001; forthcoming-b).  But I was also 
fascinated by the ways these materials scientists coordinated their use of 
instrumentation with their preparation of materials and their practices of interpreting 
data.  In particular, their work entailed putting the “same” materials (their sameness 
diminished by the work of preparing them to be examined under different instruments) 
through two very different kinds of microscopes – the transmission electron 
microscope (TEM) and the atomic force microscope (AFM) – and using images from 
those microscopes to generate new knowledge and inflect future specimen preparation. 
 Because of my focus on contamination and purity, I was especially struck by 
how those issues surfaced in the differing practices of TEM and AFM.  TEM is a very 
“dirt-aware” instrument – the microscope is housed in its own room, which is kept 
dark when it is running, with the door closed and a special curtain covering the door to 
keep out light and noise; the operator and any spectators must whisper and keep still, 
to avoid knocking the microscope console; there is a phone in the room, but the ringer 
is turned off to prevent jarring sounds; the sample is kept in a high vacuum, which 
takes half an hour to pump down; and, even so, most samples degrade very quickly, 
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and the operator is in a constant battle with time and contamination to salvage a good 
image.  On the other hand, the AFM was, at least among my informants, a very dirt-
indifferent tool – the door was kept open, the lights were kept on, the noise of pumps 
and air conditioners was loud and constant, the sample was exposed to the air, and our 
habitus, as operators and spectators, was much more relaxed.1
 These were the kinds of observations that initially drew my attention to the 
AFM.  My interest in it as a dissertation topic, however, arose from other features.  I 
was struck by: (A) how commonplace and useful it was, a quintessential tool of “small 
science”; (B) how surprising that routineness was, given that it was only thirteen years 
old at the time; and (C) how surprisingly invisible it was to historians, philosophers, 
and sociologists of science, given how remarkably, and rapidly, successful it was.  I 
knew of some excellent histories of electron microscopy, especially Nicolas 
Rasmussen’s Picture Control (Rasmussen 1997), and of Ian Hacking’s marvelous 
explication of light microscopy in Representing and Intervening (Hacking 1983), but I 
had never even heard of the AFM before my ethnographic work, although I was aware 
of its more glamorous cousin, the scanning tunneling microscope (STM). 
 As I began to look more closely at the issues surrounding the AFM, I saw that 
it was, indeed, an exemplary case study of a modern laboratory technology.  By 
studying a laboratory artifact like the AFM, I could work at what I saw as the rich 
intersection between the sociology of science and the sociology of technology.  That 
is, I could analyze both the material practice of science, in which knowledge is made 
through the manufacture of “epistemic things” (Rheinberger 1997) housed inside 
highly specialized pieces of equipment; and I could analyze the technological 
                                                 
1 See Douglas (1966) for the classic study on dirt and social organization.  See Bourdieu (1990) for an 
explication of the concept of habitus. 
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marketplace of science, in which lab equipment is invented, developed, traded, 
bought, sold, and tinkered with by a variety of actors. 
 Thus, this dissertation was originally undertaken as a case study of a “typical” 
instrument, and much of the analysis here is likely to be relevant to understanding the 
development of other laboratory techniques.  In taking a second glance at the AFM, 
though, I learned that this particular instrument had special features that made its story 
important on its own merits.  First, I learned that the AFM was merely the most 
common member of a very large family of “scanning probe microscopes” – a family 
of thirty or forty different instruments each only slightly varying from the others, yet 
each with its own domain of samples and practitioners.  From an earlier project (Mody 
2000), I was interested in technological variation and hybridity, and I saw probe 
microscopy as an opportunity to explore this theme further. 
 Moreover, the oldest member of the probe microscopy family, the STM, had 
an intriguing history that invited analysis.  Although, as we will see, it was not the first 
microscope to resolve individual atoms, it was the first to make images of the atom 
publicly notorious (particularly Don Eigler’s manipulation of xenon atoms to spell out 
“IBM” – see Figure 1-1).  It was, in some sense, atomic resolution that secured the 
1986 Nobel Prize for the STM’s inventors, Gerd Binnig and Heini Rohrer (along with 
one of the inventors of the transmission electron microscope, Ernst Ruska).  Yet the 
exact sense in which atomic resolution was important was, on closer inspection, 
elusive.  There was, as we will see, a story about the relationship between 
instrumentation and disciplinary community that underlies the simple notion, much 
loved by philosophers of science, that the STM can see atoms. 
 This is all the more apparent in contrasting the STM and AFM.  Though Gerd 
Binnig was central to the invention of both instruments, he won the Nobel Prize for 
the STM, and philosophers and pop historians of physics and nanotechnology give 
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Figure 1-1: "IBM" in atoms.  Don Eigler’s famous use of a low-temperature 
STM to position and then image individual xenon atoms on a nickel substrate to
form the letters “IBM.”  From Eigler and Schweizer (1990). 
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much more epistemic weight to the STM.  Yet there are thousands more of the lower-
resolution AFM at work today, across a much wider range of research disciplines and 
industrial settings.  By studying the full spectrum of probe microscopes, in both 
academic and corporate contexts, I hoped to say something about how scientific 
instruments take root – and to show that the routine utility of the AFM is at least as 
epistemically interesting as the atom-resolving éclat of the STM. 
 Indeed, probe microscopy has had an enormously complicated journey from 
maverick, Nobel Prize-winning basic science, to corporate and academic research at 
the elusive boundary between science and technology, into shoe-string garage start-up 
companies, and finally into the multimillion dollar worlds of both semiconductor 
manufacturing and nanoscience research.  In trying to do justice to this complex story, 
this dissertation will follow the STM and AFM into all of these contexts; indeed, it is 
one of the distinguishing hallmarks of this study that it traces a laboratory technique 
not just through the traditional stages of invention and replication, but on to the 
equally intriguing phases of routinization and commercialization.  Moreover, the rapid 
diffusion of probe microscopy into a variety of sectors offers interesting insights for 
both the sociology of science and technology.  As we will see, the diffusion and 
routinization of a technique is not an undifferentiated process.  Because probe 
microscopy has been taken up (and, in some cases, spurned) by so many communities, 
its story nicely demonstrates that different subcultures have different ways of judging 
and appropriating instruments, and that instruments often need to be reinvented in 
order for routine use to go forward in new contexts. 
Relevance to Nanotechnology 
 Finally, one reason why the probe microscopy story merits special attention 
did not emerge until I was well into my study.  When I began my ethnographic work 
in 1998, neither I nor my informants had much inkling of the changes soon to be 
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wrought on the AFM community by the advent of coordinated governmental support 
for nanotechnology.  The AFMers I knew did occasionally interact with local nano 
institutions – they would, for instance, occasionally prepare samples in the clean 
rooms at the Cornell Nanofabrication Facility – but they did not consider themselves 
nanotechnologists, even though most of their work centered on nanoscale features 
(i.e., features with characteristic dimensions on the order of 1-100 nanometers or 10-9 
to 10-7 meters).  Moreover, the leading nanotechnologists at Cornell were not probe 
microscopists, and most of the probe microscopes on campus were not paid for, 
managed, or even used under the “nanotech” umbrella. 
 After the Clinton administration’s founding of the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative in 2000, though, it became more difficult for my informants (and myself) to 
be unmindful of the nanotechnology phenomenon.  AFMers at Cornell began to vie 
for NNI funding, they became more vocal in the organization of nano research on 
campus, and, most interestingly, research groups with a marginal interest in probe 
microscopy nevertheless began sharing AFMs and using the instruments to coordinate 
their work so that their joint projects would more closely resemble the NNI’s vision of 
interdisciplinary nanotechnology.  As I began supplementing my ethnographic work 
with oral histories of old-time STMers and AFMers, I found that almost none of them 
had had any engagement with nanotechnology discourse before the very late ’90s, yet 
by 2001 many of them were clearly gearing up to become nanotechnologists, even if 
they were also quite skeptical about what nanotechnology was. 
 At the same time, in reading some of the early writings of nano-visionaries like 
Eric Drexler and interviewing some of the leaders of the NNI, as well as meeting some 
of the first historians and philosophers of science to engage with nanotechnology, I 
learned that no instruments were more symbolically crucial to this highly instrumented 
field than the STM and AFM.  Probe microscopes were the tools people like Drexler 
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and Mike Roco pointed to in heralding the coming of this “next industrial revolution” 
(Anonymous 2002).  Clearly, STM and AFM were enormously important for nano, 
and nano was becoming enormously important for STMers and AFMers.  There was, 
though, an unusual time lag of almost 15 years in making the interests of the nano and 
probe microscopy communities mutual. 
 Almost all of this study focuses on events before or during the onset of that 
time lag; thus, nano is largely an off-stage presence in this story.  Readers will find 
characters making occasional gestures toward nano – talk of nanometers, Nanoscopes, 
nanotubes, NANO Conferences – but these made for very loose ties between the nano 
and probe microscopy communities until the turn of the century.  There are, however, 
important lessons to be drawn about nano throughout this work.  Readers who are 
interested in nanotechnology should take this as a history of an important family of 
nano instruments; and, as I will make clear in the epilogue, the way the probe 
microscopy community approaches nano has much more to do with its own 
complicated history than with any self-evident relation between SPM work and 
nanotechnology.  That is, seen from within the probe microscopy community, nano is 
only an obvious direction to pursue because it has become a convenient device for 
easing frictions brought on by the commercialization of the instruments and the 
segmentation of STM and AFM research. 
 More generally, nanotechnology provides a fascinating case study in discipline 
formation, and the story of STM and AFM provides insight into how nascent 
disciplines incorporate or appropriate instrumental subcultures.  We do not often have 
the chance to watch a large social movement in science get underway, particularly one 
that, like nanotechnology, proceeds by patching together numerous pieces of “small 
science” to form a “big science” undertaking.  In many ways, nanotechnology is more 
a community of communities than a discipline.  In this, it resembles other postwar 
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transdisciplinary constellations, some of which (e.g. materials science) eventually 
became disciplines, and others (e.g. cybernetics) did not.2  The role of instruments and 
other laboratory artifacts in seeding disciplines and catalyzing scientists’ professional 
identities is still in need of analysis, and this dissertation seeks to contribute to 
discussions of these processes.  Thus, though nanotechnology is only implicitly 
important to much of this text, the need to understand the role of STM and AFM in the 
formation of communities (including nano communities) and technical identities 
(including researchers’ identification as nanotechnologists) has strongly shaped this 
study’s methodology and analytic frame. 
Methodology and Analytic Perspectives 
 This dissertation was carried out in a Department of Science and Technology 
Studies, so the tools and questions I have used to understand the development of probe 
microscopy are those most closely associated with the S&TS community.3  Three 
strands of work in S&TS, though, were most influential in guiding what questions I 
asked and what methods I used to answer them.  The first is the actor-network theory 
(ANT) framework associated with Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law, Madeline 
Akrich, and others (Latour 1988b; Callon 1986; Akrich 1992; Law 1987).  ANT 
pictures a world in which knowledge and credibility are generated through the 
construction of densely interconnected networks of people and things (or, collectively, 
“actants”).  To understand science and technology, Latour says, analysts must “follow 
the actors” through these networks.  Thus, this study attempts to follow a large number 
of the actors relevant to probe microscopy through a wide cross-section of the settings 
in which STM and AFM have taken form. 
                                                 
2 For some analyses of other postwar umbrella disciplines, see Reardon (2001); Bensaude-Vincent 
(2001); Pickering (1995). 
3 For a more or less comprehensive review of the field in the early ‘90s, see Jasanoff, et al. (1995).  For 
more recent compendia of, respectively, the science and technology sectors, see Biagioli (1999) and 
Mackenzie and Wajcman (1999). 
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 Although Callon and Latour always regarded humans and non-humans as 
equivalent agents in their networks, the version of ANT presented in Science in Action 
leaves room for agnosticism about non-human agency.  Indeed, some science studies 
scholars outside the ANT school only realized much later how central non-human 
agents were to Callon and Latour’s vision.4  Later instantiations of ANT (Latour 1996; 
1999b) have put more epistemic weight on the theory of non-human agency and the 
politics of “things”.  This dissertation concerns itself much more with the 
methodological recommendations and ontological ambivalence of Science in Action.  
One way to do so, I believe, is to read ANT in the light of the work of Michel 
Foucault.  Though it is problematic to lump Latour uncritically with Foucault, the 
aspects of ANT that are most relevant to this dissertation are those shared with the 
Foucault of The Order of Things (1994b), The Birth of the Clinic (1994a), and, 
especially, Discipline and Punish (1977a).  Latour’s idea that scientific knowledge is 
accredited through the transformation of non-laboratory settings into laboratory-like 
fields is akin to Foucault’s notion of the “capillarity of power,” in which regimes of 
discourse and knowledge propagate through ever more physical spaces, molding ever 
more of the behavior, thought, and self-conception of knowing subjects within those 
spaces. 
The diffusion of knowledge and artifacts is a central concern of this 
dissertation, and I have looked at this process in terms of the Latourian “enrollment” 
of actors whose interests are manufactured to intersect with those of network-builders; 
and I see this as a simultaneously Foucauldian process of manufacturing and 
disciplining subjects whose technical identities (Haring 2002) take their shape from 
the networks of things and people surrounding them.  We will closely follow actors 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, the debate in Collins and Yearley (1992a); Callon and Latour (1992); Collins and 
Yearley (1992b), as well as Bloor (1999) and Latour (1999c). 
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around the networks of probe microscopy as they attempt to enroll each other for 
various projects; we will also watch as the circulation (Latour 1999a) of materials and 
people through networks helps to transform “ideas” into “facts” and idiosyncratic 
experiments into black-boxed instruments.  This story is not incompatible with, but 
does not explore, the non-human ontology of ANT; if readers wish, they may see 
certain kinds of probe microscopists as acting as “proxies” (Callon 1986) for the 
microscope in advancing its interests within the network.  Certainly, probe 
microscopists do occasionally speak of the microscopes as having a will of their own 
that bends human action around them. 
 The second S&TS framework implicit in my methodology draws on Peter 
Galison’s work on so-called “trading zones” (Galison 1996; Galison 1997).  I take the 
trading zone to be a setting where different types of actors (often people from different 
disciplines) come together and create knowledge not by generating “facts” that are 
acceded to by all, but by allowing their various knowledge sets to remain 
differentiated yet generatively overlapping.  Members of a trading zone find ad hoc 
pieces of knowledge, practice, and materiel that they can exchange, without needing to 
arrive at a fully mutual understanding of the tokens of exchange or even the exchange 
event itself.  Rather, they hammer out “pidgins” and “interlanguages” that suffice to 
allow their local mix of cultures to remain coherent.  With time, this local mix may 
even become structured enough that its pidgin will become an autonomous “creole,” a 
patois which new members can learn without knowing any of the parent dialects. 
 The trading zone concept can, at times, be abstractly metaphorical in ways that 
invite analytical misuse and allow it to stretch to encompass an unmanageable number 
of situations.5  For these reasons, I have tried to offer criticisms where appropriate, and 
to supplement the concept with tools from other S&TS literatures, particularly works 
                                                 
5 E.g. Fuller (1996). 
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in the philosophy of technology and instrumentation (Ihde 1991; Baird 1993; Hacking 
1992; Dupré 1993), especially with respect to the relationship between laboratory 
artifacts and embodied knowledge, and the history and sociology of engineering 
(Layton 1971; Constant 1983; Kline 2000a) with regard to the autonomous ways of 
knowing of artifact-creating subcultures.  The basic trading zone idea, though, can be 
enormously fruitful, especially in describing the modes of instrument development 
seen with STM and AFM.  Some local cultures within the probe microscopy 
community (particularly those described in Chapters Five and Seven) seem to be 
tailor-made trading zones; indeed, as the STM and AFM gradually moved out of 
academic labs and into small start-up manufacturers, the once metaphorical “trading” 
zone underwent an exquisite literalization. 
 Thus, the methodology of this study was structured to make features of local 
trading zones conspicuous, and to take advantage of distinctive features that would 
nuance the trading zone concept.  I have tried to pay attention to the disciplinary 
backgrounds of many of the actors in this story, and the traditions of experimentation 
and instrument-building in which they were trained; but I have also highlighted what 
Galison calls the “thick border regions between disciplines,” places where disciplinary 
identity is important but where it is also constantly being remade.  Two such settings 
are most important to this study: pedagogical environments, where the creation of 
knowledge is inextricably tied to the creation of new knowing subjects (Kaiser 2002; 
2000); and contexts of commercialization, where participants eagerly throw different 
kinds of actors together in order to expand the reach of their trading zones. 
 Finally, this dissertation has most been influenced methodologically and 
analytically by the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) tradition and its variant, 
the social construction of technology (SCOT) program (Bloor 1991; Collins 1981; 
MacKenzie 1990; Bijker and Pinch 1987).  SSK views the formal, symbolically 
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encoded, textbook knowledge beloved of positivist philosophers of science as an 
incomplete picture of the knowledge generated by and used in scientific settings.  
Formal knowledge is only intelligible when it is accompanied by some local, 
embodied, “tacit” knowledge that cannot be entirely symbolically encoded (i.e. written 
down) and which is judged less by “correspondence to reality” than by the standards 
of communities of practitioners.  In particular, the brand of SSK associated with Harry 
Collins focuses on the replication of scientific experiments, using Wittgensteinian 
epistemology to show that there is no absolute standard for deciding whether an 
experiment has been correctly replicated, but only standards that are infused with the 
sociological understandings of the participants.  Indeed, as Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer show, the social order of a “core set” of experimenters emerges along with 
the knowledge generated by the experiment (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). 
 The SCOT program takes the model offered by SSK and applies it to 
understanding how the shapes of various technologies come to seem as intuitively 
“factual” as most scientific knowledge.  As with SSK, SCOT zeroes in on variations in 
artifacts that are presented as solutions to the “same” technological problem and 
shows how various “interpretations” of a technology (its design, its use, who should be 
using it, what kind of social organization should be arrayed around it) are associated 
with relatively homogeneous “relevant social groups.”  With time, processes of 
negotiation between (or disenfranchisement of) the various relevant groups winnows 
down the viable interpretations of a technology, until, as in SSK, “closure” is achieved 
and the basis for the outstanding technology is usually reconstructed as the rational, 
practical one, rather than a matter of contingent and socially constructed negotiation. 
 Thus, both SSK and SCOT find the best sites for their analysis in moments of 
dispute, uncertainty, negotiation, and transition.  Since such moments are hard to catch 
in the act through ethnographic methods, the historical case study has been one of the 
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mainstays of this style of sociology.  Yet because the features that SSK and SCOT 
emphasize are intangible, unformalized aspects of practice, an ethnographic sensibility 
is often necessary.  While such a sensibility can be maintained even in studies which 
rely exclusively on textual materials and archival records – Shapin and Schaffer’s 
Leviathan and the Air-Pump being the best example – most practitioners of SSK and 
SCOT choose to highlight the role of interpretive flexibility and tacit knowledge by 
interviewing participants in relatively recent scientific and technological controversies, 
and by achieving a comprehensive, actors-eye understanding of the relevant technical 
material, often through participant-observation and other ethnographic techniques.6
 Several of the core concepts of SSK and SCOT serve as benchmarks for the 
analysis in this study.  Above all, this dissertation takes seriously the analytical 
connection between SSK and SCOT.  I will try to show that researchers whose work 
revolves around scientific instruments are very skilled at pushing their work 
practically and rhetorically back and forth between “scientific” and “technological” 
registers.  Also, tacit knowledge is an almost inevitable phenomenon in any discussion 
of probe microscopy – both for analysts and, intriguingly, for the actors themselves.  
Previous studies in SSK and SCOT have shown the importance of tacit knowledge in 
the transmission of scientific knowledge and the diffusion of technological artifacts.  
This study aims to elaborate some of the mechanisms of transmission and diffusion 
and the consequences of those mechanisms for the communities involved.  Finally, 
this study supplements the project in both SSK and SCOT of deconstructing the 
boundaries between production and consumption.  As we will see, “audiences” for 
scientific knowledge, and “users” of laboratory technologies strongly shaped the 
production and development of facts and artifacts. 
                                                 
6 Again, though this kind of participant-observation is usually occasioned by studies of recent science, it 
is not strictly limited to controversies that took place within living memory.  See Sibum (1995). 
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 This dissertation will use these three analytic perspectives to frame one central 
question: how do some laboratory technologies go from being idiosyncratic, home-
built tools used by a small group of researchers to being mass-produced devices 
indispensable to the work of researchers and manufacturers throughout the world?  
The language of actor-network theory, with its vocabulary of “networks,” “enrolling,” 
and “black-boxes,” particularly lends itself to thinking about the standardization and 
diffusion of artifacts. In this case, artifacts embody knowledge made at one node in a 
network, carry that knowledge to other nodes, and by so doing require the new nodes 
to reproduce the work of the original.  The trading zones concept, too, contains an 
inherent notion of diffusion (signaled by the very metaphor of “trading”).  Actors 
within trading zones necessarily impart some of their intellectual and material wealth, 
which then can move far from its original context.  Importantly, this kind of diffusion 
necessarily involves the reworking and transformation of the tokens of trade as they 
are appropriated by new communities – as we will see, diffusion is not a simple matter 
of “technology transfer,” but a complicated process of adjusting a technology and the 
practices surrounding it to local circumstances (and vice versa).7  Finally, SSK and 
SCOT have been fascinated by diffusion from the beginning.  This dissertation will 
particularly use Harry Collins’ (1974) analysis of “tacit knowledge” (i.e. knowledge 
that cannot be fully written down or encoded formally) as a starting point for 
examining the spread and routinization of probe microscopy.  Interestingly, we will 
see that (as might be expected from the trading zones literature) replication and 
diffusion of laboratory technologies is accomplished through a two-way exchange of 
tacit knowledge, and that (as might be expected from actor-network theory) a few 
                                                 
7 For this reason, Kaiser (forthcoming-a) and Jordan and Lynch (1992) prefer the term “dispersion.”  
Diffusion, as Latour (1987) argues, can carry the unintended connotation of an inexorably physical 
process (like smoke diffusing through a room) in which the item being diffused is unchanged by its 
spread.  Readers should know that this is not the interpretation I assign to “diffusion.” 
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“centers of calculation” (or, here, centers of experimentation) are vital for regulating 
the simultaneous flow of instrumentation and tacit knowledge. 
 In addition to demonstrating the cogency of existing treatments of diffusion 
and tacit knowledge, I will use the probe microscopy case to supplement and critically 
reëxamine these widely-used concepts.  Take, for example, the concept of the “black 
box” that is central to many analyses (including Latour’s) of the diffusion of 
technology.  We will see in Chapter Eight, for instance, how notions about black 
boxes are not just analytical tools that allow us to make sense of what probe 
microscopists do; a version of that very concept is a subject of enormous debate 
among probe microscopists themselves.  Laboratory technologies are not inexorably 
transformed into black boxes; rather, the possibility of black boxing is a political point 
of contention among researchers, which accompanies and affords their efforts to draw 
particular kinds of internal and external social boundaries.  In Chapter Seven, we will 
see how the process of commercializing instruments offers some new twists on the 
traditional notion of the trading zone; we will examine how a particular kind of 
commercializer of instruments (the figure I have called a “boxwallah”) inhabits 
dynamic trading zones.  In order to live at this margin, the boxwallah must learn not 
just one interlanguage, but rather dozens of ‘pidgins’ – the partly overlapping 
‘languages’ of materials science, electrochemistry, biophysics, molecular biology, 
mineralogy, catalysis, electrical engineering, etc. (not to mention even more arcane, 
and sometimes proprietary, jargons of various industrial processes).  Finally, 
throughout the dissertation, we will see that the original conception of a “relevant 
social group” that is so central to the SCOT approach is too ‘flat’ to account for the 
diffusion of many technologies; particularly the kind represented by the family of 
probe microscopes discussed here.  All social groups are internally differentiated, and 
those grouped around technologies are no different; indeed, the complex array of 
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members’ roles within a social group can give a technology its form and enable it to 
diffuse.  We will encounter social groups that include members who are also affiliated 
with external communities (some of which become ‘internal’ communities); often, 
these people are brought in specifically to manufacture the relevance of the 
technology to their home communities – that is, not. or not only, helping with the 
concerete manufacture of technological components, but also forging links and 
weaving together ‘languages’ and skills in an extended community; thereby thickening 
ties between groups that allow for the spread of the technology.  Indeed, not only the 
relevance, but the social group itself, must sometimes be molded into existence in the 
course of hammering out the form of the technology.  Groups are not simply there to 
take up a technology; rather, groups and subgroups (e.g. “AFM-using biophysicists” 
or “STM-using electrochemists”) take shape with the technology, and change form as 
the technology matures. 
 I will also develop a number of novel themes and analytical that will 
supplement these three bodies of S&TS literature and further strengthen the relation of 
those literatures to this study of the diffusion of laboratory techniques.  Chapters Two 
and Three will focus on canonical materials and their importance in making lab 
technologies viable; one of the fastest ways to make a technique relevant to a new 
community is to link it to the epistemic materials considered  interesting and 
generative.  Chapter Three introduces a particular  notion of naïveté that was an 
important vehicle for developing and diffusing probe microscopes; science and 
technology studies have long been concerned with performances of expertise (Collins 
and Evans 2002; Jasanoff 1992) in the accreditation of knowledge, but performing a 
naïve style can be just as crucial in aligning support for a technology.  Chapters Four, 
Five, and Seven trace the importance of pedagogy in the creation of new knowledge 
and techniques; I will show that the production of new microscopes was rarely 
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separated from the task of training new microscopists.  Chapters Six and Eight follow 
the often-neglected disruptions and anxieties that can attend the successful diffusion of 
a technique.  When an instrument moves too far too far it can induce an experimental 
vertigo that results in controversy; and when it has been too successfully routinized it 
can provoke role anxieties among its adherents.  Finally, the entire dissertation is 
concerned with the nexus of commerce and science in all its forms.  Commercial 
interests are sometimes thought of as sullying the “purity” of knowledge-making; and 
at other times, commercial interests are thought of as rationally selecting from the 
fruits of research to produce better (more cost-effective, efficient) technologies.  I will 
show that neither of these pictures applies to probe microscopy.  Rather, we will see 
that commerce is not a foreign, impure instinct for researchers, nor is it a way to 
rationally maximize profit.  Rather, it is usually a way to solve exigencies brought on 
by the local culture of experimentation; throughout I will try to illustrate these local 
cultures and show how commercialization of research could be a culturally viable 
adaptation. 
 In explaining the mechanisms of diffusion, I have adopted a methodology 
inspired by actor-network theory and the notion of trading zones, but which most 
closely resembles those of classic studies in constructionist SSK and sociology of 
technology.  To begin with, I drew on my ethnographic acquaintance with users of 
AFMs to come close to an actors’ competence in the operation of these instruments.  
Indeed, I was aided in this by the fact that no participant in the wider probe 
microscopy community can demonstrate full competence across the astonishingly 
wide range of uses of these instruments; there are simply too many variants, too many 
different modes, and too many different kinds of samples particular to too many 
different “communities of practice” (Wenger 1998) for anyone to fully comprehend 
them all.  In trying to accommodate my analysis to this fact, I took as my model key 
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kinds of mediators in the probe microscopy community – such as grant officers, 
postdocs, microscope builders, and instrument manufacturers’ representatives – whose 
jobs entail quickly coming to terms with local variations on the design and use of the 
microscopes. 
 Next, I began interviewing long-term participants in the probe microscopy 
community, trying to draw out thick actors’ descriptions of the mechanisms of 
transmission and diffusion, the operation of trading zones, and the building of 
networks.  These were semi-structured, face-to-face oral histories, revolving around 
the interviewee’s personal experiences working with the microscopes and being a 
member of the probe microscopy community.8  By digging through the literature, I 
was able to isolate a few key locales which had been instrumental in the early 
development of the STM and AFM – the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, the Naval Research Lab, Stanford University, the University of 
California at Santa Barbara, Digital Instruments, Park Scientific Instruments, Bell 
Labs, and the IBM research labs at Almaden, Yorktown, and Zurich – and I put those 
interviews at the top of my list.  For any given excursion to see people who had been 
involved early on with the STM or AFM at those places, though, I also had many 
opportunities to talk with people who had come to probe microscopy much later, or 
whose involvement with it centered much less on design and engineering and much 
more on routine use.  The former group provided the richest oral histories; but the 
issues that interested me focused not on one group or the other, but on the sites in 
which each were thrown together (or sought each other out), the ways in which they 
                                                 
8 A list of interviewees is in the Appendix.  Throughout the dissertation, interviews will be referenced, 
in square brackets , by the alphanumeric code given in the Appendix plus the date of the interview – 
e.g. [VE1, 3/20/01], unless interviewees have asked that their names be withheld (in which case a rough 
descriptor of the interviewee will be supplied with no date– e.g. [DI executive]).  Some of the 
interviews will be publicly available in the near future.  Readers interested in reading transcripts should 
contact the author. 
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traded representations of the instruments, and (as I came to realize) the types of people 
who catalyzed interactions between the two. 
 I also managed to fit in some more participant-observation at key sites, such as 
lab groups at Cornell that used the AFM, training courses for users of industrial 
AFMs, and big professional conferences for the probe microscopy and nanotech 
communities.  These dimensions of my research were most relevant to the closing 
chapters of this study; for earlier chapters, which focus on participants who are more 
difficult to locate or whose memories are fading, I supplemented my interviews with 
archival research, particularly at the National Archives, the Smithsonian, and the 
American Institute of Physics.  Other textual materials – journal articles, 
advertisements, email listservs, manufacturers’ applications notes, manuals, and lab 
notebooks – were also crucial in making sense of my interview data. 
Ethnographic Scene-Setting 
 In order for my readers to similarly make sense of the narrative presented here, 
it may be useful for me to describe what a probe microscope looks like and how it is 
typically used.  There is, of course, no “average” SPMer – indeed, the variations 
among probe microscopists, across time, discipline, and setting, are what drives this 
story – but the practices of most STMers and AFMers bear enough of a “family 
resemblance” that it is worthwhile picking out some of the distinctive features of the 
clan.  One important characteristic is that most of the practice of using a probe 
microscope takes place away from the instrument itself.  Many users spend most of 
their time preparing samples to then quickly “characterize” with the microscope.  
Indeed, both in academic and industrial settings, sample preparation is the experiment 
at stake; users only turn to the STM or AFM when they believe the instrument can 
inform them about the results of a change in sample preparation procedures – does a 
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new process step created the desired nanoscale properties, does it make the surface 
hotter or bumpier or stickier, does it introduce new kinds of defects, etc.9
 Indeed, for many users their STM or AFM may be just one stop in the “career” 
of the samples they prepare.10  My informants at Cornell, for instance, had a kind of 
peripatetic epistemology – they would move from spot to spot around campus, using a 
variety of tools to prepare and characterize their samples, hoping in the end to 
coordinate data generated from different characterization tools in order to learn 
something about the effects of different sample preparation techniques.11  Other probe 
microscopists – especially surface science STMers – tend to do sample preparation 
close to the microscope itself (often in the same vacuum chamber).  In general, sample 
preparation is the part of probe microscopy most specific to the practitioner’s 
discipline – it is usually the product of a long tradition in their community or 
institution of manufacturing materials in order to make them amenable to the gaze of 
the microscope, ways of carving out specific entities from the sensible flux of the 
world in order to generate particular kinds of knowledge about them.12  The types of 
practices involved in specimen preparation vary widely, but they include things like 
cleaning or heating materials, exposing them to various chemicals, or growing crystals 
or biological specimens under specific conditions.  For probe microscopists working 
in industrial laboratories, “specimen preparation” may refer to the practice of bringing 
                                                 
9 Although most SPMers use the microscope as a characterization instrument, some also use it to 
manipulate samples – i.e., to “intervene” as much as to “represent.”  SPMs are unusual among 
microscopes in that the same mechanism that allows a user to look at a surface can also allow them to 
modify it – to drag tiny objects (even atoms) around, or to scrape and inscribe features (like a nano-
chisel) into the sample. 
10 I draw on Becker (1963, 25ff.) and Goffman (1961, 125ff.), as well as conversations with Mike 
Lynch, for the notion of the “career” of a sample. 
11 An instance of what Bruno Latour has called “circulating reference” – i.e., the generation of a 
correspondence between object and knowledge through the movement of objects and inscriptions 
around a network (Latour 1999a). 
12 The notion of unrefined reality as “sensible flux” comes from James (1996).  I draw heavily on 
Rheinberger’s notion of “epistemic things” (Rheinberger 1997) in analyzing how research communities 
appropriate particular materials and rework them to make them more amenable to generating 
knowledge. 
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in defective or randomly selected products and examining them to understand 
whether/why they are broken, or how experimental process steps affect them. 
 Once specimen preparation is done, probe microscopists bring their samples to 
the microscope itself.  Since an AFM is (relatively) cheap – about $200,000 for one 
with most of the bells and whistles – and relatively easy to learn, even many small 
academic research groups (at least in Western Europe, Japan, and North America) 
have their own microscope.  Others share one with one or two other groups, or send 
their students and/or samples to campus microscopy centers.  Also, unlike an electron 
microscope, an AFM is quite small – the microscope “itself” is only about the size of a 
coffee can, although it is often surrounded by more bulky apparatus for shielding it 
from vibrations.  Often, vibration isolation equipment is home-made from unusual 
materiel – a message on a widely-read list-serv describes pails of sand, blank 
headstones, disused refrigerators, old acoustic hoods for noisy dot-matrix printers, 
inner tubes, and, probably the most popular, bungee cords or surgical tubing, used to 
hang the microscope from the ceiling or a stand or even the legs of an upturned table 
as possible ways of protecting a microscope from stray vibrations.13
These can give the microscope a messy, cobbled-together appearance, and 
SPMers sometimes express disbelief that such an ad hoc system can “see” nanoscale 
features.  In more high-end laboratories, particularly in industrial settings, AFMs are 
often kept on very expensive optical tables or housed in special vibration isolation 
shields supplied by the instrument manufacturers; to the casual eye, such microscopes 
have a much more polished appearance.  Also, STMs are generally not as exposed as 
AFMs.  Most STMers are electrochemists or surface scientists, and keep their 
microscopes in bulky electrochemical cells or ultrahigh vacuum (UHV) chambers.  
Most STMers work in universities or do basic research at corporate and national labs, 
                                                 
13 From R. McLeary, 11/26/95, on the spmlist@di.com listserv. 
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though, so their microscopes have much the same ad hoc look as academic AFMs – 
especially among surface scientists, who have a penchant for covering key parts of 
their UHV chambers in wadded-up pieces of aluminum foil. 
In general, this ad hoc-ness has decreased over time.  The earliest STMs and 
AFMs were ramshackle devices connected to enormous racks of electronics with an 
ever-expanding array of knobs, dials, and switches [BH1, 5/9/01; BD2, 10/18/01].  
Later, companies that manufacture STMs and AFMs saw it as their duty to eliminate 
many of the stray wires, (literal) rough edges, and proliferating knobs and switches 
and to present a cleaner, ostensibly more user-friendly interface [DB3, 4/3/01].  Some 
SPMers who built microscopes back in the ’80s complain that this cleaning up has 
eliminated certain kinds of subtle, virtuosic control of the instrument, though most 
ordinary users of commercial AFMs feel they have all the control they can handle.  
Also, both for the instrument manufacturers and people who build their own 
microscopes, most of the clumsy interfaces and electronics associated with the older 
STMs and AFMs are now packaged inside sleek, compact personal computers. 
When an AFMer today goes to use their microscope, they first put the sample 
into a small holder, then place the holder inside the microscope “head.”  Then, after 
some fiddling with the head to align lasers and cantilevers and so forth, they turn their 
attention away from the microscope “itself” and concentrate on a personal computer 
(often with two monitors) that they use to control the microscope.  With the wonders 
of software, many of the tricky parts of operating an STM or AFM are today 
automated, though in the past it took a great deal of embodied skill and tacit 
knowledge to get a microscope to begin working properly.  Once the microscope 
begins scanning and producing images, the operator has the somewhat monotonous 
task of monitoring outputs (today in dialog boxes on the computer monitor; in the past 
on an oscilloscope or voltmeter), adjusting parameters (today by typing in numbers on 
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the keyboard; in the past by adjusting various dials and knobs), and watching as 
images form (today, images unveil themselves in real time on the computer screen; in 
the past, much cruder representations would have appeared on oscilloscopes, chart 
recorders, or even TVs) while making tactical decisions about where the image looks 
“good” or “interesting,” whether to zoom in or out or reposition the probe, when data 
is valuable enough to save and analyze later, and when the data is so bad that the 
machine must be fixed or the sample must be scrapped.  A microscope “run” lasts for 
as long as the operator can pay attention or the sample stays clean or the probe/tip 
stays in good condition – usually two or three hours. 
After data has been taken, it must be digested and communicated.  Again, this 
task looks very different today, when images are stored on a computer as electronic 
files and can be quickly and radically processed using software sold either separately 
or with the microscope.  There is some debate about how much rendering is permitted, 
but SPMers today can very easily produce images of their samples as seen from all 
kinds of angles, in all kinds of colors, with all kinds of filters and exaggerated or 
processed features.  Once the images have been massaged sufficiently, they are stored 
permanently on a disk or printed out on a color printer (in the past, they would have 
been stored on video tapes, or a Polaroid would have been taken of the image on an 
oscilloscope).  Once printed out, images become Latourian “immutabile mobiles” – 
objects that help make facts simply by being durable as well as transportable (Latour 
1988a).  SPMers paste them into lab notebooks or put them into three-ring binders, 
email them to colleagues or manufacturers’ representatives for advice, put them on 
overheads and discuss them in group meetings and conferences, and eventually insert 
them into journal articles and textbooks and advertisements, spinning elaborate 
interpretations that connect these images to local and disciplinary debates. 
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Technical Prologue 
 So how do SPMers think these images are being made, and what kinds of 
information do they think they provide?  Basically, probe microscopes operate on a 
very simple principle, often analogized to that of a finger reading Braille or a 
phonograph needle riding over a record.  That is, SPMs work by bringing a small, 
solid probe down very close to a surface and allowing the probe to skim along 
recording variations in the height of the surface.  In order to obtain ultrahigh 
resolution, the parts of the probe that actually interact with the surface should be 
roughly the same size as the smallest distinguishable features on the surface – this is 
the same as saying that a finger is much larger than a Braille dot, but because the 
finger has very fine papillary ridges that are smaller than a single dot, one dot can be 
distinguished from another.  Similarly an STM or AFM probe may be quite large 
compared to the features of a nanoscape, but if the probe ends in one atom or a 
handful, then the microscope will be able to see features in the 0.1 to 10 nanometer 
range.  This is extraordinarily fine resolution – the diameter of a hydrogen atom, after 
all, is only about 1 Angstrom (0.1 nanometers). 
 The Braille analogy is a little limiting in that it implies that the probe can only 
sense heights if it is actually pushing against the surface.  This was, indeed, the case 
for a predecessor to the AFM known as the stylus profilometer, invented in the 1950s, 
that worked by scraping a sharp probe over a sample and recording how the sample 
pushed back on the probe.  The diversity of the probe microscopy family is made 
possible, though, because probes can interact with surfaces in a variety of ways and 
feed back off of any number of properties without having to be in contact with the 
material.  Again, a macroscale analogy to the “ways of the hand” (Sudnow 1978) may 
be helpful.  If you brush your hand over a piece of paper, you may be able to tell 
where on the paper there are Braille dots; but if you move your hand a few inches 
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above a stove, you can also tell where on the stove the burners are without touching 
them.  If you move your hand a few inches above an air hockey table you can tell 
where the vents are, and if you move your hand a few inches away from a stereo 
speaker, you can tell where the speaker cones are.  The key in all of these examples (as 
in probe microscopy) is moving your hand (the probe) down close enough to the 
surface to sense whatever properties interest you, and then moving your hand around 
the surface to build up a spatial map of those properties. 
 The STM (the oldest probe microscope) and the AFM (the most common) will 
be our primary interest in this study, so their modes of operation bear special 
explanation (see Figures 1-2 and 1-3).  The tunneling microscope works by bringing a 
sharp metal probe to within a nanometer (10-9 meters) of a metal of semiconductor 
surface, placing a voltage difference between probe and sample, and measuring the 
number of electrons that this voltage causes to “tunnel” between sample and tip.  
Tunneling is a quantum mechanical phenomenon that defies many of our intuitive 
understandings of the macroscale, yet which can be quite common at the nanoscale.  
In rather esoteric terms, tunneling allows for the movement of a particle across an 
energy barrier in ways that are forbidden by classical physics.  That is, electrons at the 
surface of a metal or semiconductor are bound to the material in various empty or 
filled energy “bands.”  The interface between the surface and the vacuum or air 
beyond presents a large energy barrier to the electrons – they “want” to remain bound 
to the material rather than to move off into empty space. 
 A common macroscale analogy for the electron’s situation is that of a lion 
sitting in a room surrounded by a very high brick wall.  Classically, the lion has little 
chance of scaling the wall and freeing itself unless someone comes to its aid by 
offering a ramp or creating a hole in the wall.  Yet quantum mechanics says that 
because both the lion and the electron are simultaneously particles and waves, there is 
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Figure 1-2: Scanning tunneling microscope.  Diagram showing the design and 
operation of the scanning tunneling microscope.  In the lower part of the diagram,
the piece labeled “L” is the so-called “louse” used for coarse positioning by 
walking the tip down toward the sample.  “S” points to the sample; “X”, “Y,” and
“Z” are the three orthogonal piezoelectric scanners.  The inset labeled “a” shows 
how atomically rough both the tip and surface are, and why this allows almost all 
of the tunneling to go through the outermost atom on the tip (thus giving atomic 
resolution of the surface).  From Binnig and Rohrer (1984).  
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Figure 1-3: AFM with STM detection.  Diagram of an early atomic force 
microscope.  Early AFMs put an STM on the back of the cantilever to detect the
cantilever’s deflection (i.e. the height of the surface).  This image shows the 
cantilever in so-called “contact mode” (i.e., with the tip touching the surface).  
From Binnig, et al. (1986a). 
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a finite (though very small) probability that their wave functions will creep over the 
barrier (or “tunnel” through) and they will suddenly stop being on one side and start 
being on the other – the electron will fly off into empty space and the lion will be free 
to gobble up zoo-goers.  With regard to the electron, this process can be made more 
likely by, for example, lowering the temperature of the system or putting a very high 
voltage on the surface, or by putting a smaller voltage on the surface and offering the 
electron someplace to tunnel to – e.g. a metal probe with its own energy bands where 
the electron can take up residence. 
 In the latter case, the number of electrons that actually tunnel from the surface 
to the probe (or vice versa if the voltage is reversed) is exponentially dependent on the 
distance between probe and surface – thus, extremely small variations in the tip-
sample distance will result in enormous variations in the tunneling current.  This 
allows a tunneling microscope to resolve the height of features on a surface very 
accurately.  It also allows the microscope to distinguish closely-spaced lateral features 
on the surface.  Because of the distance-dependence of the tunneling current, virtually 
all the current goes through the outermost bit of the probe; and because most materials 
are somewhat rough at the nanoscale, that outermost point is likely to be only one 
atom wide.  Thus, the stream of tunneling electrons is less than an atom wide, meaning 
that the STM can “see” where individual atoms are on a surface – imagine that if your 
fingertip ridges were only an atom wide, you could read atom-sized Braille. 
 Thus, tunneling electrons can be used to let the STM “see” very small features 
on a surface.  The trick is bringing the probe down close enough to a surface to allow 
electrons to start tunneling, and then to move it around in a controlled way to build up 
a spatial map of the surface, all without letting the tip crash into the sample every few 
nanometers.  This necessitates a mechanism for precisely controlling the position of 
the probe, and moving it in very fine increments in all three dimensions.  Controlling 
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its height above the surface (the z dimension) is often thought of as a separate problem 
from controlling it laterally (in the x and y dimensions).  Also, both vertical and lateral 
movement is separated into two components, coarse motion and fine motion.  
Vertically, there is a need to bring the probe down to the point where electrons begin 
tunneling, using “large” enough steps (coarse motion) that the “approach” process 
takes place in a reasonable amount of time.  Today, the approach is usually automated, 
but in the past STMers would first eyeball the probe to within a micron of the surface, 
then delicately bring the tip into the “tunneling regime” manually, using differential 
screws and levers that would take small finger movements at one end and de-amplify 
to translate the probe by much smaller increments at the other end [BD2, 10/18/01]. 
 Once the probe is close enough that tunneling starts, it needs to be controlled 
much more finely in all three dimensions.  Usually this is done with materials called 
piezoelectric crystals.  Piezoelectrics are crystals that emit an electric current when 
they are put under pressure (as, for example, in the sensors in the door opener at a 
grocery store that signal for the door to open when someone steps on the footpad).  
Conversely, if a voltage is put on a piezoelectric crystal, it will change its shape; by 
very finely controlling the voltage (something which is easy to do), one can control the 
dimensions of the crystal at the atomic scale (something which is very hard to do by 
other means).  Piezoelectrics have been known for a long time (the Curies did much of 
the original research on them) and are easy to obtain (for example, sugarcane is a 
common piezoelectric; many early STMs and AFMs used piezos from doorbell ringers 
bought at Radio Shack [BJ2, 6/27/01]).  Early probe microscopes worked by having 
separate piezos for each axis, stacked orthogonally to each other – one to lower the 
probe, one to scan in x, and one to move linearly in y.  This allows the probe to 
“raster” back and forth, forming an image (in the same way pixels are lit up on a TV 
 
 30
or computer screen), while the probe quickly changes its height to avoiding hitting 
features on the surface. 
 The actual image is formed by sensing how the tunneling current changes as 
the probe changes its position in x and y; this tells the STM (via a feedback circuit) to 
adjust the voltage being fed into the z-piezo so that it will be at the right height.  The 
voltage on the z-piezo is then fed into the imaging mechanism, whether a computer 
program or an oscilloscope.  In computerized renderings, a color or grayscale scheme 
matches different z-voltages (corresponding to different heights) with different shades; 
usually lighter colors for higher features and darker ones for lower features (which 
gives a nice shadowing effect if there is a trench or dip in the surface). 
 Thus, the basic ingredients of a probe microscope are: a way for the probe to 
sense one or more properties of the surface; a way to move the probe around the 
surface in a controlled way; and a way for the probe to tell the microscope where it is 
and output a map of the surface.  Of these, only the first significantly varies from one 
type of SPM to another – motion and imaging are fairly standard between types.  In 
the AFM, the probe feeds back not on tunneling electrons, but on the strength of the 
interatomic forces between the probe and surface.  These can be repulsive forces if the 
probe is in contact with the surface; or they can be attractive forces such as 
electrostatic or van der Waals forces that cause the probe to be pulled toward, or even 
stick to, the surface.  To sense these forces, the AFM uses a small, flexible cantilever – 
a thin strip of silicon nitride or (in the early days) aluminum foil that bends in 
proportion to the strength of the interatomic forces.  Usually, there is a small pyramid 
of material at the end of the cantilever that provides most of the mass that interacts 
with the sample; AFMers try to make this tip as sharp as possible, but even under the 
best circumstances the strength of the interactions between tip and sample are more 
blurry and less distance-dependent than in an STM.  Thus, in general, AFM has a 
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lower resolution than STM; the only exceptions are high-end AFMs, custom-built by a 
handful of academic researchers.  Some of these instruments can actually make out 
subatomic features such as dangling s-orbitals jutting out of a silicon surface (Giessibl, 
et al. 2001). 
 Most other members of the probe microscope family build out from the STM 
or the AFM, whether by using a cantilever made from materials that sense particular 
properties (as in magnetic force microscopy) or by tweaking the movement of the 
cantilever or reading different kinds of information out of its motion (as in friction 
force microscopy) or by using an AFM or STM as the feedback mechanism to keep 
the probe close to the surface (as in near-field scanning optical microscopy).  Some of 
these variants (such as magnetic force microscopy) have their own dedicated 
communities and markets, some (such as friction force microscopy) are just operating 
modes (“bells and whistles”) included with a standard microscope, and others (such as 
near-field scanning optical microscopy) are still only associated with a handful of 
people doing basic research.  The diversity of designs and users in probe microscopy 
makes for an extraordinarily complex (and colorful) social organization. 
Outline of Chapters and Themes 
 In detailing the co-construction of this community with the development of 
instruments, designs, and practices, we will follow the relevant actors through a range 
of settings (primarily in Europe and North America) over four decades.  Along the 
way, we will see three major themes play out.  First, the invention, replication, and 
routinization of probe microscopy took place in an unusual historical moment in 
which large, regulated-monopoly capitalism, typical of the early to mid-twentieth 
century, slowly gave way to a more segmented, deregulated, globalized economy 
(Chandler 1977; Castells 2000).  The practice of science and engineering were deeply 
implicated in this transformation, in both academic and industrial settings; the story of 
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STM and AFM provides an unusual lens on these shifts.  The actors in this story faced 
many challenges in adapting themselves and their microscopes to the shifting demands 
and audiences of corporate and academic research. 
 Secondly, there is a long tradition of seeing academic research as “pure” or 
free from aberrations brought on by the commercial imperatives of corporate science.  
Deconstructing this conception has been one of the major achievements of the science 
and technology studies tradition.  Recent works have taken the opposite tack, and 
described corporate research as more intellectually free and less disciplinarily 
hidebound than academic science (Rabinow 1996; 1999).  I have tried, however, to 
remain agnostic about whether and where truly “free” research can be done.  Instead, I 
take disciplined and undisciplined practices (and representations thereof) as their own 
research site.  Some STM and AFM work, in both corporate and academic settings, 
was chaotic, personal, and loosely structured.  Other work was seen as contributing 
positively to disciplined bodies of knowledge, and was constructed to accord with 
stricter communal standards.  Crucially, switching between these registers at key 
moments was an important mechanism for diffusing probe microscopy. 
 Finally, we will explore one other set of registers relevant to the development 
of probe microscopy: those of “science” and “technology.”  In their earliest days, the 
STM and its predecessor, the Topografiner, were envisioned as industrial surface 
characterization tools; they were seen as technologies necessary in the manufacture of 
goods like ball bearings and integrated circuits.  Almost immediately, though, 
tunneling microscopy migrated into fields whose members pictured what they were 
doing as “basic research.”  In Chapter Two we look at the invention of the 
Topografiner and its relationship to the new discipline of surface science at the 
National Bureau of Standards in the late 1960s.  In Chapter Three, we shift to IBM, 
where the inventors of the STM forged a local experimental practice that they 
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represented as “relaxed” and undisciplined; at the same time, they saw the need to 
draw on the practices, knowledge, equipment, and audiences supplied by more 
disciplined communities in order to popularize their microscope.  In looking for the 
right community to foster the STM, they eventually forged more lasting ties with 
surface science. 
 Chapters Four and Five examine the first replicators of the STM in North 
America; Chapter Four looks at young postdocs and junior staff scientists at IBM and 
Bell Labs trying to make the STM part of surface science, while Chapter Five tells the 
story of academic microscope builders in California who took the STM as the starting 
point for the development of a whole family of instruments.  By 1991-2, the efforts of 
both corporate surface scientists and academic instrument-builders had expanded the 
probe microscopy community dramatically, resulting in the frictions and controversies 
that are detailed in Chapter Six.  In the corporate labs, STMers had to make their work 
interesting both as basic research, relevant to the wider surface science discipline, and 
as potentially relevant, on a long time scale, to the technological interests of 
companies like IBM and Bell Labs.  As these institutions fell on hard times in the 
early ’90s, these STMers found they needed to radically shorten the horizon of that 
relevance, and recast what they were doing as more overtly “technological.” 
 Academic STMers and AFMers, meanwhile, always tacked skillfully between 
repertoires of “science” and “technology” – any piece of work could be represented 
one minute as “scientific research” and the next as “technology development.”  In 
particular, when their scientific claims were occasionally questioned, these early 
academic probe microscopists could fall back on the position that they were 
innovating the technology and inspiring further work by more disciplined 
practitioners.  This way of doing things worked extraordinarily well through the 
1980s, but with the disputes of Chapter Six, and the commercialization of the 
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microscopes detailed in Chapter Seven, this style became more difficult to sustain.  
Yet even after the commercialization of the instruments, probe microscopists still 
needed to switch fluidly between repertoires of “science” and “technology.”  Chapter 
Seven details the many different ways various microscope manufacturers dealt with 
this dilemma; while Chapter Eight examines the changes in role experienced by probe 
microscopists after commercialization, and the ways they have adapted the registers of 
“science” and “technology” for the post-commercial world.  Finally, I end with an 
epilogue on the relevance of STM and AFM to nanotechnology (and vice versa).  
Probe microscopy has been crucial symbolically for the emergence of 
nanotechnology; and nano is a peculiar proto-discipline in that it fuses the scientific 
and technological repertoires to an unusual degree.  Nano is all about making things, 
but also about generating a new kind of knowledge to surround those things.  Given 
these qualities, and their own post-commercial role dilemmas, probe microscopists are 
beginning to make nano their home, though not without frictions.  Hence, as we will 
see in the epilogue, we can use the emergence of nanotechnology as a way to once 
again highlight and understand many of the processes of social organization at work in 
this complex community.
 
 
Chapter Two 
Surface Science and the Topografiner 
 
 Today, the scanning tunneling microscope and the atomic force microscope are 
the multimillion dollar darlings of the nanotechnology boom.  The glamorous STM is 
central to basic nano-oriented surface physics and provides the spectacular images at 
the imaginative core of nanotechnology; while the workaday AFM is in a variety of 
academic science and engineering laboratories, in industrial reliability and quality 
control labs, on the process line in semiconductor fabs, and even on the surface of 
Mars.1  In a field fascinated by instrumentation, no instruments have been more 
symbolically crucial than these scanning probe microscopes. 
 Slowly, scholars in science and technology studies are realizing the importance 
of these instruments in the constitution of nanotechnology.  Yet the spectacle of probe 
microscopy, especially STM, often diverts scholarly attention to a narrow range of 
topics.  In particular, the STM’s ability to “see” and manipulate atoms makes it a 
golden goose for philosophers and historians of science.2  The atom’s long journey 
from Democritus to Dalton to Bohr is a central story in histories of physics and 
chemistry; and its transformation from a fictive heuristic of fin de siecle positivism to 
an undisputedly “real” particle signposts the past century’s upheavals in philosophy of 
science.3  The story of microscope development, too, is often taken as a paradigmatic 
                                                 
1 For an explication of the centrality of the STM to the mythology of nanotech, see Baird and Shew 
forthcoming. 
2 I am thinking in particular of Buchwald (2000); Barad (1999); Hacking (1992).  The latter has been 
enormously influential on this dissertation.  All three of these pieces, though, treat the STM only in 
passing, taking its lessons for science studies as self-evident and as deriving primarily from the ability 
to see atoms. 
3 See, for example, Pullman (1998); McDonnell (1991); Heilbron (1981). 
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narrative of science’s inexorable approach to the minute fabric of reality.4  So the 
STM, in seeing atoms, lies at a tempting intersection for philosophers and historians. 
 Seeing single atoms is fascinating, and that fascination did stoke the rapid 
growth of STM in the 1980s.  Yet to concentrate on the atom or the STM or even 
imaging is to miss the complex array of practices surrounding probe microscopy.  This 
dissertation will present STM and AFM as multi-dimensional artifacts whose intricate 
story is bound to a diverse cast of people, institutions, and communities.  Imaging 
(including imaging atoms) is part of this story, but so are practices of tinkering, 
playing, presenting, marketing, and teaching.  Above all, we will examine how STM 
and AFM are not simply means for seeing the very small, but also foci for training 
researchers, establishing enterprises, and growing communities. 
The rest of this dissertation details how the STM and AFM achieved such 
success.  This chapter, though, will examine an alternative reality in which imaging 
atoms aroused little interest and the STM’s forerunner – the Topografiner – died an 
unnoticed death.  This is partly an historical curiosity, but it also elucidates the 
institutional and disciplinary transformations that fostered STM in the early ’80s.  The 
Topografiner did not evolve directly into the STM, yet the context in which the 
Topografiner withered did evolve directly into the environment that nurtured the STM.  
To understand where the STM came from, and why its success was context-
dependent, rather than an inevitable outcome of seeing atoms, we need to examine the 
milieu and life story of its predecessor. 
Electron Physics and Field Ion Microscopy 
 As far as is known, the first microscopic images resolving single atoms both 
vertically and laterally were produced in Erwin Mueller’s physics group at Penn State 
                                                 
4 See Wilson (1995); Ruestow (1996); Rasmussen (1997). 
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in 1956 (Mueller 1956).5  Despite this claim to fame, the instrument that achieved 
atomic resolution, the field-ion microscope (FIM), is virtually unknown to historians 
and philosophers of science.  Its compelling images did not capture the scientific or 
public imaginations in the way the STM has, nor has FIM become central to any “big 
science” like nanotechnology.  Yet Mueller and the FIM community did indirectly 
influence the birth of STM.  Though the two instruments’ imaging mechanisms are 
quite different, the physics behind them is related; also some FIMmers contributed to 
the invention and development of STM, and the early STMers saw FIM researchers as 
a crucial resource and an analogous community. 
 Mueller came to Penn State from Germany, where he studied under Gustav 
Hertz at the Technical University in Berlin, specializing in electron physics.6  This 
subfield descended from studies of cathode tubes by J.J. Thomson and others leading 
to the discovery of the electron at the turn of the century; by the time of Mueller’s 
training in the ’30s, though, electron physics also took its inspiration from solid state 
physics, metallurgy, and crystallography.7  Electron physicists were interested not just 
in the electron per se, but in using its properties to characterize crystals.  For instance, 
before Penn State, Mueller pioneered the field emission microscope.  In FEM, a high 
voltage is placed on a sharp metal (usually tungsten) emitter, causing electrons to 
tunnel out of the emitter into the surrounding vacuum (a process known as field 
emission).  A phosphorescent screen is placed near the emitter so that field-emitted 
electrons light up patches on the screen.  Different parts of the emitter – corresponding 
                                                 
5 The resolution of a microscope is a much-contested term of art.  For the purposes of this dissertation, 
the handy definition of “atomic resolution” is the ability of a microscope to distinguish two adjacent 
atoms as distinct entities, rather than present them visually as a continuum.  It is important to 
distinguish lateral and vertical resolution.  Under certain conditions, an optical microscope can image 
single atomic steps on a crystal (vertically resolution), but cannot distinguish two atoms in the same 
monolayer (lateral resolution).  Thus, lateral resolution is generally a much more difficult proposition. 
6 For biographical details about Mueller and the FIM and FEM, I draw on Melmed (1996) and Melmed 
(2003). 
7 See the pieces in Buchwald and Warwick (2001). 
 
 38
to, for instance, different grains in the tungsten – emit more or fewer electrons.  This 
yields an indirect, lensless image of the emitter on the phosphorescent screen.  Thus, 
through FEM, electron physics can be used to answer crystallographic questions about 
the size of grains or the diffusion of adsorbates. 
 One canonical figure of this kind of electron physics was the American 
chemist Irving Langmuir.  Langmuir’s style of mixing basic and applied research set 
the tone for the subdiscipline, particularly in North American corporate and national 
laboratories (Reich 1983; 1985).  Leonard Reich shows that Langmuir carved a space 
within General Electric for doing basic research that won him the Nobel Prize; yet 
Langmuir’s “basic” work took its inspiration from the technologically oriented 
artifacts and materials with which he was familiar from his commercial research.  
Even when the most esoteric questions were at stake, the materials and artifacts used 
to answer those questions gestured toward or mimicked commercial technologies like 
light bulbs and vacuum tubes.  By the ’50s, this entanglement of commercial, 
technological means with basic electron physics problematics could be seen in, for 
example, the research leading to the transistor at Bell Labs (Riordan and Hoddeson 
1997) or the mutual development of electron microscopy and television at General 
Electric (Kunkle 1995; Strick 1998). 
 Mueller’s lab at Penn State focused on using the classical geometries of 
electron physics to develop instrumentation to probe the microscopic properties of 
metals.  The central character of this chapter is not Mueller, however, but one of his 
graduate students, Russell Young.8  Young arrived in Mueller’s lab in 1953 on the 
heels of Mueller’s invention in 1951 of the field ion microscope (for a diagram of the 
FEM and FIM apparatus, and a comparison of their images, see Figures 2-1 and 2-2).  
                                                 
8 Young’s colleagues at NIST have been assiduous in writing about the history of his work.  This 
chapter draws especially on Villarrubia (2001). 
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Figure 2-1: Field emission and field ion microscopy.  A schematic of the field 
emission microscope (FEM) and the field ion microscope (FIM), both invented by 
Erwin Mueller.  A sharp metal emitting filament is kept at low temperature, in a 
vacuum, with a high voltage placed on it.  This causes electrons or ions (depending
on the sign of the voltage) to fly away from the emitter toward a phosphor screen, 
where they light up bright patches.  These patches correspond to points of 
extremely high voltage on the emitter (i.e. corners, atoms, grain boundaries, etc.).  
From www.nims.go.jp/apfim/FEM.html  
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 Figure 2-2: FEM and FIM images.  A field emission microscope image (left) and
a field ion microscope image (right) of the same sharp nickel tip.  The point of the 
tip is at the center of each image.  The bright patches in the FEM image are the 
grain at the end of the tip.  The small bright dots in the FIM image correspond to 
individual nickel atoms.  From www.nims.go.jp/apfim/FEM.html.  
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Like FEM, FIM consists of a sharp emitter, high voltage, and phosphorescent screen 
in a vacuum chamber.  The major difference is that in the FIM, the voltage on the 
emitter is positive, so ions rather than electrons provide the imaging mechanism – as 
the ions left in the vacuum chamber approach the emitter they accelerate away from it 
toward the phosphorescent screen. 
This provides higher resolution than FEM, because the wavelength of the ions 
is smaller than the electrons.  Indeed, even with the first FIM experiments the 
instruments achieved a limited ability to “see” single atoms.  The secret to atomic 
resolution lay in the non-continuous nature of the emitter.  At sharp corners, edges, 
and points, the electric field at the surface of the emitter is much higher than the rest of 
the material, meaning ions will preferentially accelerate away from those areas.  
Within a corner, edge, or point, the electric field will be even higher around individual 
atoms; ions accelerating away from the emitter will be so narrowly confined that they 
when they hit the screen, the points of highest electric field (atoms at a corner or edge) 
can be picked out.  Thus, as can be seen in Figure 2-2, individual atoms at the apex of 
the emitter show up on the phosphorescent screen as bright spots. 
 Atomic resolution would seem to be a holy grail of microscopy.  Popular 
histories of microscopy present its development as progressively leading to higher 
resolutions.  Yet, pragmatically, resolution is rarely the only, or even primary, factor 
for a user – contrast, perspective, ease of use, the presence and type of “artifacts” 
(distortions or spurious phenomena in the image), sample damage, and other 
considerations can all be more important than resolution.  Most importantly, a 
microscope is only relevant to some scientific subculture if it can be made to tell 
something about the “epistemic things” (Rheinberger 1997) of that subculture.  If 
features on the materials of a technical subculture are too large to be elucidated by a 
new microscope, then the microscope will face many challenges being adopted by that 
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subculture.  Even if the new microscope is adopted, lower resolution microscopes can 
still generate knowledge about the subculture’s epistemic entities.  Thus, optical 
microscopes continued to be used in many disciplines even after the arrival of electron 
microscopy, FIM, FEM, STM, and AFM, and instrument development is as intense as 
ever for certain kinds of optical microscopes. 
 Also, when new microscopes are first developed, they often have a lower 
resolution than instruments already in use.  Microscope builders dedicate themselves 
to the proposition that, whatever its current defects, their instrument’s capabilities will 
improve over time.  For instance, the first transmission electron microscopes 
developed by Ernst Ruska and others were bulky and temperamental, destroyed 
samples, and yielded blurry low-resolution images; yet TEM’s inventors pressed on, 
eventually developing instruments that outstripped optical microscopy in terms of 
resolution.  This is a common theme in history of technology.  To take examples from 
aviation, Ed Constant shows that early jet engines were, in most ways, technically 
inferior to propellers, yet jet proponents fostered a paradigm shift in which 
disadvantages of propellers counted against that technology, but drawbacks of jets 
were seen only as growing pains of a new technique (Constant 1980).  Similarly, Eric 
Schatzberg shows that an “ideology of progress” surrounded metal airplanes; thus, 
resources were provided for developing all-metal planes, while they were diverted 
from improving knowledge about wood construction, leading to a retrospective 
evaluation of metal as the better material (Schatzberg 1994; Mody 2000). 
 Likewise, during development microscope builders can find themselves in an 
“iron cage of resolution,” where resolution is the most important rationalized, means-
ends measure of progress.9  In looking for potential users, though, builders must attach 
                                                 
9 Weber’s ideas about rationalization and routinization (1992) are a largely implicit but central 
ingredient of this dissertation’s argument. 
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high resolution to the needs of other technical subcultures.  In this, FIM met limited 
success.  Mueller did grow a community of FIMmers, largely by graduating students 
who founded their own FIM groups.  Yet, partly because Mueller was a strong 
gatekeeper of this community, few users from other communities became FIMmers 
[CD1, 10/30/03].  Also, Mueller’s electron physics community was evolving at this 
time.  As we will see, FIMmers eventually formed their own insular subdiscipline well 
apart from the surface science community that succeeded electron physics. 
Young and the National Bureau of Standards 
 While at Penn State, Russ Young became familiar with FIM and FEM, but his 
own thesis work did not deal directly with microscopy.  Instead, he measured the 
energy distributions of electrons emitted from surfaces to much greater accuracy than 
had been done before – work that both illuminated the properties of field-emitted 
electrons and could be used to probe the characteristics of metal surfaces (Young 
1959).  In 1961, Young left Penn State for the National Bureau of Standards in 
Washington, DC.  The Bureau, founded in 1900, was the United States’ metrology 
institute, the equivalent of the German Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt or the 
French Bureau des Poids et Mésures.10  Its mandate was to keep and calibrate national 
standards of mass, length, time, etc.; to measure more accurately fundamental physical 
constants; and to develop codes for products such as fire retardant building materials.  
Also, the Bureau supplemented this mandate with work typical of any national 
laboratory – i.e., a mixture of basic and applied research oriented to national needs. 
 The Bureau was heavily involved in military applications in World War Two, 
and afterwards it benefited from the dramatic expansion of the physical sciences that 
swept American universities and national and corporate labs.  In the 1950s, a large 
                                                 
10 Some institutional histories of NBS/NIST are useful: Cochrane (1966); Passaglia (1999); Schooley 
(2000). 
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fraction of the Bureau’s people and resources were dedicated to basic research not 
obviously related to standards or measuring fundamental constants.  This was 
especially true in the Atomic Physics Division where Young worked.  Young entered 
the APD’s Electron Optics group, led by Ladislaus Marton and noted both for its 
prestige in electron microscopy and for its cultural isolation from the rest of the 
Bureau and the Bureau’s customers.  From the start, Young worked at the periphery of 
Marton’s fiefdom, since his research was only tangentially related to the group’s main 
focus, improving the resolution of electron microscopy of biological samples [RY1, 
6/29/00; BG1, 6/11/02]. 
 So Young carved his own niche, in which he returned to the intersection of 
electron physics and the solid state.  This meant measuring the work functions of 
metals like tungsten to new levels of accuracy (Young and Clark 1966).  The “work 
function” is a solid-state term referring to the energy needed to move one electron 
from the Fermi level of a material an infinite distance from the material.  The Fermi 
level is the highest occupied band of electrons in the material.  Basically, then, the 
work function is a measure of the ease with which electrons can be stripped out of a 
material – think, for example, about how easy it is to use a balloon to strip electrons 
out of your hair and make it stand on end.  As a characteristic constant, the work 
function is useful in understanding the electrical and optical properties of a material.  
Though this work rarely connected with the rest of the Electron Optics group, it began 
gaining recognition from outside researchers, which allowed Young to help recruit a 
cadre of fresh Ph.D.s similarly interested in the intersection of electron physics and 
material properties –Bill Gadzuk, Cecil and Ward Plummer, Ted Madey, and others 
[BG1, 6/11/02]. 
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Surface Science 
 As they arrived, these people spread out across the full range of the Bureau’s 
divisions.  Their common research interests, though, sparked decades-long formal and 
informal collaborations.  The mid 1960s were an exciting time to be doing this work.  
In forming a local community organized around their topic, they both contributed to 
and exemplified a larger trend in which traditional electron physics morphed into a 
new subdiscipline known as surface science.  Various technical traditions have, of 
course, been concerned with surfaces for centuries: almost all chemical reactions 
happen at a surface or interface, most mechanical engineering is affected by friction 
and adhesion between the surfaces of moving parts, optical components gain many of 
their characteristics from their surfaces, rust and corrosion begin at surfaces, etc. 
Yet the study of surfaces, as a scientific rather than a craft community, was 
marginal before the 1960s.  Notably, the new surface science adopted many of the 
same forebears as the electron physics community had.  For instance, Irving 
Langmuir’s Nobel Prize-winning work came to be seen as the study of electron 
emission from surfaces, and his work on Langmuir-Blodgett films came to be seen as 
the study of self-assembled monolayers on surfaces.  Similarly, Clinton Davisson and 
Lester Germer, Bell Labs researchers who won the Nobel Prize for studies of electron 
diffraction, now came to be seen as the pioneers of low energy electron diffraction, a 
technique in which electrons lightly graze a material and interact only with the surface 
(Gehrenbeck 1978).  Also, surface science embraced the same institutions and ethic as 
electron physics – in North America, the forefront of surface science was located in 
large corporate and national laboratories and focused on materials and systems which 
bore a resemblance to commercially relevant artifacts [JM2, 7/6/00; JM2, 7/8/02; 
CD1, 10/30/03]. 
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 Even with such institutional support, surface science in the early ’60s was a 
marginal activity.  Most physicists and chemists viewed surfaces as a chaotic, 
unintelligible, disordered mass, in pointed contrast to their view of bulk crystals as 
ordered, pure, and hence amenable to study.  In general, surfaces and interfaces 
present boundary conditions that defy the assumptions needed to make solid-state 
theory workable.  Moreover, surfaces are more prone to contaminants, impurities, and 
“dirt” than bulk solids.  These difficulties with surfaces, and the social marginalization 
that attended them, provoked a creative double bind (Bateson 1956; 1962) for early 
surface scientists at large corporate and national institutions like Bell Labs, IBM, GE, 
and the Bureau of Standards.  On the one hand, these organizations had enormous 
financial stakes in technological problems to which surface science could address 
itself.  By the 1960s, for instance, both AT&T and IBM had pinned their futures to 
semiconductor chip technology for communications relaying and mainframe 
computing (Morris 1990, 86).  Even from the time of the invention of the point-
contact transistor at Bell Labs in 1947 (often taken as the event and the institution that 
founded surface physics), it was clear that surface phenomena were key to making 
semiconductor devices that could work reliably in electronic signal processing and 
logic circuits (Riordan and Hoddeson 1997).  Transistors are essentially signal 
amplifiers; a very small change in voltage or current at one junction creates very large 
changes in the voltages at the other junctions.  The amplifying characteristics of a 
transistor are best utilized (in, for example, repeating a long-distance connection so 
that there is no loss of signal) if it can work with very small input voltages or currents.  
The pioneers of semiconductor electronics saw, though, that this required using a very 
small volume of semiconductor crystal.  This could best be achieved (as in early 
junction transistors) by building the semiconducting part of the transistor out of an 
extremely thin crystal, where the relevant physics are those of a surface (with very 
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different assumptions made about boundary conditions and path lengths) rather than a 
bulk crystal. 
Also, transistors depend on bringing together two different types of 
semiconductors – a p-type (which donates “holes” or positive carriers) and an n-type 
(which donates electrons or negative carriers to the flow of current).  Usually these are 
crystals made from the same material (e.g. silicon), but “doped” with different trace 
amounts of other materials like phosphorus.  To create a current with the proper 
characteristics, the p and n regions must be close enough that carriers with very short 
penetration depths can move from one region to the other.  This means there must be 
an interface between them – a region where, again, the physical properties of the 
material must be approximated with very different boundary conditions than a bulk 
crystal.  Since carrier charges often congregate near surfaces, and since a surface 
offers much more tractable approximations in modeling than an interface, surface 
scientists moved in the ’60s to incorporate the study of interfacial layers in their work. 
Finally, after the invention of the integrated circuit in 1959, surface science 
began to take on new importance.  The first integrated circuits were planar transistors 
– devices made by growing very thin successive layers of semiconductor, insulator 
(usually the semiconductor’s native oxide), and metal interconnects in intricate 
patterns (Zygmont 2003).  It quickly became clear that improving the reliability of 
such devices depended on surface physics and chemistry.  Surface physicsists began to 
study the myriad crystalline defects (dislocations, twins, pinholes, and other 
disruptions to an orderly, smooth crystalline lattice) that could impair the flow of 
carriers.  Surface chemists began to study ways of more reliably growing such layers 
on top of each other and of “capping” or “passivating” surfaces to keep them clean, so 
that contamination would not cause the characteristics of devices to vary too widely. 
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The double bind arose because, in making their expertise relevant to these 
technologically important materials, surface scientists saw a need, and an opportunity, 
to professionalize their community and develop a disciplined body of practices and 
knowledge.  Yet, while professionalization accorded well with the entry of surface 
scientists into place like Bell Labs and the Bureau of Standards, it also made demands 
that cut against the technological imperatives of those institutions.  In particular, the 
contamination and disorder to which surfaces were prone made building a positive, 
disciplined body of knowledge difficult – experimenters struggled for years in the ’40s 
and ’50s to make surfaces clean enough that results would be reproducible [JM2, 
7/6/00].  This drove surface scientists to study only material systems that could be kept 
ultraclean and hence would yield more reliable experiments and mesh better with 
theoretical approximations.  The problem was, such clean systems diverged greatly 
from the messy, real-world devices surface scientists’ employers had staked their 
businesses on. 
Institutionally, therefore, surface scientists had to find ways to combine 
corporate citizenship with professionalization.  One way was to follow Langmuir and 
alternate basic research with work on technological artifacts.  Surface scientists could 
contribute to engineering projects that often involved processing the same materials 
that they researched part-time in the new surface science idiom; their basic research 
might not directly forward their engineering work, but it generated prestige for their 
employers, it enriched their intuitive understandings of how to handle and prepare 
technologically relevant materials, and, occasionally, it opened serendipities that had 
immediate applications.  Also, surface science became a training ground for young 
researchers; the rise of surface science coincided with the postwar expansion of the 
role of the postdoctoral position in American science, and many postdocs passed 
through basic surface science groups at corporate labs on their way to joining 
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engineering groups within those corporations.  One prominent surface scientist sums 
up all these ways of contributing: 
 
CD: The science of semiconductor surfaces has to best of my knowledge had 
zero impact on the microelectronics industry....  The semiconductor industry’s 
process steps were empirically determined.... 
CM: What did a company like Bell Labs or IBM see itself getting out of 
semiconductor surface science? 
CD: Training people....  Young Ph.D.s from a university would come and work 
with your basic science group and they’d work there for maybe two or three 
years and it would become clear that they needed to move on....  It was 
basically an elaborate recruiting and socialization scheme....  The people who 
ran these groups were people who made their living from delivering 
technology to the company.  For them, science is an avocation.  As an 
industrial scientist, I did my basic science on the side.  I delivered technology 
options for my job, and the company was delighted to let me have a couple 
postdocs and to do my science on the side because they could hire the 
postdocs.  My postdocs populate this place [Xerox Research]....  Doing science 
was a hobby.  Delivering the next generation of some kind of technology was 
your job.  Students come into that world and they .... can see that if they want 
to stay around they’re probably going to do one of these more applied things. 
[CD1, 10/30/03] 
As we will see, surface scientists’ oscillation between basic research and more 
technologically-relevant work, as well as their use of basic research to train protégés, 
profoundly shaped Russell Young’s work at the Bureau and, later, the adoption of the 
STM at North American corporate and national labs. 
 Experimentally, surface scientists solved their double bind by building their 
expertise around systems that resembled technological artifacts, but which had been 
transformed in various ways to make them more amenable to disciplined research.  
This is an interesting wrinkle on old debates about the relationship between “basic” 
and “applied” science (Layton 1971; Kline 1995; Leslie 1993, 61ff.).  In many ways, 
basic surface science research followed after, and was inspired by, engineering work; 
yet it rarely contributed directly to new products or applications with anything shorter 
than a several decade horizon.  Instead, surface science contributed indirectly to 
applied work, through the generation of cultural capital, through pedagogy, and 
through the maintenance of a surface community that included corporate, national, and 
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academic scientists and engineers, funding agencies like the Office of Naval Research 
and the National Science Foundation, and instrument and/or equipment manufacturers. 
 Interestingly, surface scientists made their preoccupation with cleanliness, and 
the production of more theoretically tractable materials, central to the growth of this 
community.  Three contaminants were particularly relevant – impurities in the bulk 
that migrate to the surface; contaminating particles in the atmosphere that adsorb to 
the surface; and a ubiquitous layer of moisture covering almost every surface exposed 
to air.  The consciousness of these contaminants affected the organization of surface 
science institutionally, communally, and practically.  Practically, it led surface 
scientists to use vacuum chambers to eliminate contamination (Duke 1984).  Vacuum 
technology had been integral to electron physics, since light bulbs and vacuum tubes 
depend on a low vacuum for their properties.  In surface science, though, vacuum 
became a fetish.  As improvements in solid-state theory made surface calculations 
more tractable, vacuum technology became the means to produce “well-defined” 
surfaces that meshed with theory more adequately.  Vacuum made theory easier to 
produce, and it allowed experimentalists finer control over materials so they 
resembled the entities of theory. 
Thus, communally, vacuum became a shibboleth.  For theorists, vacuum 
defined the limits of discourse; vacuum at the surface was an axiomatic 
approximation.  For experimentalists, building and operating vacuum technology 
became a mandatory part of graduate education.  This meant familiarity with vacuum 
chambers, manipulators, pumps, and airlocks, an understanding of how to 
accommodate instrumentation to the vacuum environment, and how to prepare 
ultraclean, “well-defined” materials.  Vacuum is an extremely demanding environment 
– materials behave in different ways, experimenters have limited bodily access to 
equipment, and the time to bring materials into and out of a good vacuum significantly 
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slows the pace of experimentation.  Surface scientists made possession of arcane, 
disciplined knowledge about vacuum and contamination a central part of the 
construction of their field.11  Aspersions of contamination or unfamiliarity with 
specimen preparation and vacuum techniques became easy repertoires for policing the 
internal structure and external boundaries of their community. 
This fascination with vacuum also shaped surface scientists’ search for an 
institutional home.  For those who came to surface science from electron physics or 
solid-state research, a natural move was to create a surface science section within the 
American Physical Society.  The APS, however, still saw surface science as a 
marginal, technology-oriented area and insisted that surface scientists remain within 
the existing solid-state section [JM2, 7/6/00; CD1, 10/30/03].  Many surface scientists, 
though, were already members of the American Vacuum Society, and in the ’60s these 
researchers swelled the ranks of the AVS, eventually taking over its leadership 
positions and much of its identity and making it the professional society of surface 
science (Schleuning 1973). 
For the AVS, this influx brought rewards and drawbacks.  The Society started 
as a small craft association, the Committee on Vacuum Technique, in 1953.  Its 
members were engineers, technicians, and inventors from companies that made 
vacuum equipment or products with evacuated components.  The CVT grew rapidly, 
and by 1957 it changed its name to the American Vacuum Society, with founding 
members from science and engineering, universities and national labs, medium-sized 
firms and giants like General Electric.  This was an exciting time for vacuum.  Just as 
higher resolution is a rationalized measure of progress in microscopy, lower pressures 
                                                 
11 See Douglas (19660 and for the classic analysis of contamination and social structure.  See Mody 
(2001) for an extension of Douglas’ work to lab culture. 
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can be a yardstick for vacuum technology – and the late ’50s saw the advent of 
ultrahigh vacuum or UHV. 
The resolution of three reverse salients (Hughes 1987) crystallized the UHV 
revolution (Steinherz and Redhead 1962).  First, new diffusion pumps allowed reliable 
generation of lower, cleaner pressures.  Second, the vacuum community moved away 
from traditional glass bell jars to metal flanges and chambers, encouraging a wider 
range of auxiliary equipment (airlocks, manipulators, pressure gages, specimen 
preparation and characterization tools) within or at the boundary of the chamber.  
Curiously, the most vital contribution was the invention of better gages for measuring 
ultralow pressures.  As early as the ’30s practitioners were achieving UHV conditions, 
but without a gage to measure those pressures that ability was useless.  For surface 
scientists, gages were key both to obtaining UHV, and to knowing how long a 
specimen in UHV would stay “well-defined”; the higher the remaining pressure in a 
chamber, the greater the number of contaminant atoms that, over time, would impinge 
on a surface, stick to it, and make the surface less and less resemble its theoretical alter 
ego and make experimental results more difficult to reproduce reliably. 
The ’50s and ’60s also saw improvements in lab technologies that surface 
scientists wove together into a mutually-constituting “instrumentarium” (Hacking 
1992).  Above all, practitioners came to better understand and reliably build low 
energy electron diffraction (LEED) instruments.  The realization that LEED provided 
information about the topmost layers of atoms on a material, and that the structures of 
those layers differed significantly from the underlying bulk, opened new vistas of 
investigation.  Also, through the ’60s, advances in computing power made it more 
tractable to provide theoretical analysis of LEED patterns.  Thus, institutions with 
access to high-end computers and an interest in surface science – Bell Labs, IBM, and, 
to a lesser extent, Xerox and the Bureau of Standards – steered the field [JM2, 7/8/02].  
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This made LEED indispensable to surface science; as new technologies were 
developed, such as specimen preparation tools and an alphabet soup of spectroscopies 
and other analytic techniques, they were laboriously coordinated with LEED – for 
instance, a new specimen preparation technique could only be seen to be affecting the 
structure of a surface if it produced a change in the LEED pattern.  Finally, as one 
participant has noted, the efficient use of these techniques, and the rapid growth of a 
surface science community, was aided by the commercial availability for the first time 
of large single crystals of the materials surface scientists were most interested in 
(Duke 2003).  That is, one of the requirements for being a surface scientist – 
possession of the community’s epistemic things – could now be had via catalog. 
Thus, evidences of surface science’s professionalization appeared in short 
order through the ’60s.  By 1960, the AVS’ ranks swelled with enough people whose 
interests were wider than “vacuum technique” that it started a Vacuum Metallurgy 
Division, then a Thin Film Division in 1965 and a Surface Science Division in 1968.  
The creation of divisions was caused by the scientization of the society’s membership.  
By 1970, the old vacuum engineers that founded the Committee on Vacuum 
Technique had become such a minority in the AVS relative to surface scientists that 
the Society formed a Vacuum Technology Division – i.e., a division with the same 
mandate as the original society (Schleuning 1973).  Many of the surface scientists in 
this influx, by the late ’60s, took leadership positions in the Society.  Also, throughout 
this period the AVS repeatedly tried to become a member society within the American 
Institute of Physics (the umbrella organization led by the American Physical Society) 
but was turned away.  Only when prominent surface scientists – especially Charles 
Duke, later president of the AVS – took the lead in the early ’70s did the APS finally 
admit the Vacuum Society [JM2, 7/6/00; CD1, 10/30/03].  One reason the AVS sought 
membership was to have the AIP publish a journal of vacuum research, another mark 
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of professionalization.  By 1964, though, pressure for a journal became so great that 
the AVS began publishing under its own auspices the Journal of Vacuum Science and 
Technology.  An independent journal, Surface Science, also started in 1964.  In 
addition, the editor of JVST, Franklin Propst, was the founding vice-chair of the 
Surface Science Division – i.e., surface science considerations were foremost in 
editorial policy.  Notably, from the beginning there were complaints from the old 
vacuum technology crowd that JVST catered exclusively to basic surface science 
research rather than the technical fundamentals of vacuum equipment. 
Surface Science and Precision Engineering at the Bureau 
 In forming a surface science coterie at the Bureau of Standards, Young and his 
colleagues were in tune with the times.  Moreover, their work, particularly in field 
emission, became central to development of surface science spectroscopies over the 
next decade.  Several Bureau researchers – Young, Ward Plummer, Ted Madey – took 
leadership positions in the AVS and/or received the AVS’ most prestigious career 
awards.  Madey’s description of the coalescence of this group nicely captures the era: 
 
The first people whom we would recognize as UHV surface scientists hired at 
NBS were all field emission microscopists, and it’s logical because in those 
days field emission was the only technique where one could reproducibly and 
reliably generate clean surfaces.  Russ Young was hired in electron physics, 
Ralph Klein was hired to establish the surface chemistry section, and then 
Allan Melmed [another Mueller student] was hired to do corrosion research....  
Ralph was also responsible for an interesting and important cultural activity at 
the Bureau of Standards.  In the early ’60s he had a weekly lunch bunch meet 
in his office, the “field emission lunch bunch” to talk about exciting 
developments in field emission microscopy.  Well, within a few years as more 
surface scientists came on board with different interests than field emission 
microscopy, this evolved into a surface science lunch bunch that was 
coordinated for many years by Russell Young....  This group is well-known for 
lots of lively and interesting discussions and being supercritical about issues 
and scientific topics, and it was occasionally a dismaying experience for 
visitors to be exposed to this group, but it was really kind of an exciting and 
exhilarating time. (Madey and Kendall 2001)12
                                                 
12. See also King (1994) for a description of the lunch bunch and surface science at the NBS. 
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This quote exemplifies the changes I’ve detailed: surface scientists’ obsession with 
cleanliness, familiarity with UHV as a credential for membership, the early 
importance of electron physics at the core of the new subdiscipline, and the expansion 
of the community beyond electron physics in the ’60s.  One other characteristic 
emerges in Madey’s story – an ethic of stringent, disciplining criticism performed 
semi-privately in institutional settings, rather than publicly through articles and 
conferences.  In the 1980s, this characteristic of the new surface science would shape 
the designs of STMs and AFMs and the organization of the probe microscopy 
community as STM integrated into surface science. 
 So what did surface scientists at the Bureau work on?  At the start, little 
distinguished this research from traditional electron physics.  Even people in the 
Electron Optics group with little interest in surface science, like Arol Simpson and 
Chris Kuyatt, contributed studies that helped develop surface spectrometry (Kuyatt 
and Simpson 1967; Cashion, et al. 1971).  With time, though, traditional electron 
physics faded into the background.  The experimental materials and geometries of that 
field – nickel and tungsten filaments and tips, kept in moderate vacuum – were geared 
to the instruments, theories, and technological applications of the ’30s and ’40s.  In 
surface science, semiconductors – especially silicon – became more prominent, 
particularly at IBM and Bell Labs.  Also, as integrated circuits entered production, 
semiconductor researchers became more interested in the large, flat, clean silicon 
geometries needed to make ICs.  This meshed well with the new emphasis on LEED, 
which was believed to operate best with a large, flat, clean sample. 
 Moreover, since LEED gave atomic-scale information, surface science 
oriented itself more strongly to atomic-scale phenomena.  There are some larger-scale 
things that can be learned from LEED (e.g. growth patterns of adsorbed layers or the 
abundance of atomic steps), but, in general it offers clues to how electrons are 
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deflected by individual atoms on a surface.  When LEED showed that atoms are 
organized differently at the surface than in the bulk – especially for semiconducting 
materials – these “surface reconstructions” became the defining problematic of surface 
science.  As new spectroscopies appeared, they were expected to contribute to this 
problematic by explaining how bonds between atoms in a reconstruction affect the 
surface’s electronic signature.  Reconstructions were useful organizationally to surface 
scientists because they were one of the best indications that surface phenomena were 
ordered (and hence amenable to study that other physicists would see as disciplined – 
i.e. capable of being represented through elegant equations and models), yet clearly 
different from bulk properties.  Reconstructions were obviously a crystalline feature 
(because they yielded orderly, reproducible diffraction patterns), so they could be 
tackled using many of the basic tools and terms of crystallography. 
Surface scientists built their paradigm from the basic building block of 
crystallography – the unit cell.  In a perfect bulk crystal, the entire crystal can be 
represented as an infinite repetition of one cube containing 8, 9, or 14 atoms that is the 
characteristic “unit cell” of that material.  Crystallographers use a three digit vector 
notation to describe the placement of atoms in the unit cell – (111), for example, is the 
vector pointing from one corner of the cube to the corner farthest away from it.  
Surface scientists also use this notation, but to describe the plane within the unit cell 
along which the crystal terminates to form the surface.  For instance, (100) describes a 
crystal that simply terminates along one of the edges of its unit cell; a (110) surface 
bisects the bulk unit cell diagonally; and a (111) surface cuts along a plane that 
diagonally bisects three adjoining faces of the unit cell.  Notably, surface scientists 
concentrated almost entirely on these three kinds of surface cuts – called “low-index” 
surfaces.  Higher index surfaces like a (12-1-1) generally result in rough, complicated 
surfaces that are hard to produce and difficult to picture theoretically; thus, they have 
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been almost completely neglected in surface science discourse until, very recently, the 
advent of nanotechnology has made rough surface features more interesting. 
A unit cell in a bulk crystal is surrounded on all sides by other unit cells; so the 
atoms in one unit cell can form energetically favorable bonds with atoms in the 
adjoining cells.  At the surface, though, some atoms will be left without partners.  In 
air, or in a low vacuum, atoms with “dangling bonds” will simply pair up with 
contaminants, yielding a highly disordered surface.  In ultrahigh vacuum, though, 
certain metals and many semiconductors will actually reorder their surfaces so that the 
number of dangling bonds will be minimized; this yields an ordered structure that is 
different from that of the bulk material.  Since this new surface unit cell sits on top of 
the bulk crystal, it is usually an integer multiple in size of the bulk unit cell.  The size 
and orientation of this surface unit cell is given by low energy electron diffraction, and 
provides the basic notation used for describing all surfaces.  Take, for instance, 
Si(100)2x1.  This is a (100) cut of silicon, where one surface unit cell forms a 
rectangle that is two bulk unit cells long and one bulk unit cell wide.  Thus, its area is 
equivalent to that of two bulk unit cells. 
In this way, LEED in UHV provided the starting point for surface science 
discourse.  Importantly, though, LEED only describes the outline of the surface unit 
cell; it tells very little about how atoms are arranged within that cell.  Some materials 
have very simple surface reconstructions that look just like terminated bulk unit cells; 
other materials, especially semiconductors, have intricate, beautiful surface structures 
that look very different from the bulk.  Figuring out these reconstructions became one 
of the most dynamic and most organized activities of the new surface science.  In the 
’60s and ’70s, surface scientists began supplementing LEED with a long series of new 
spectroscopy tools, leading to an “alphabet soup” of available instruments.13  Building 
                                                 
13 I will describe surface spectroscopy in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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new kinds of instruments, and bringing them into coordination with LEED and other 
tools, became one of the central experimental activities of the field. 
One hallmark of surface science was the use of canonical “test objects.”14  As 
the field matured, it segmented into various subfields.  In each of these, most work 
was referenced to one or two material systems that were thought to be key to 
understanding all the surface systems relevant to that subfield.  Semiconductor people 
used something called the silicon (111) 7x7 (Ridgway and Haneman 1969; Best 
1975); for those interested in putting metals on top of semiconductors, the silver-on-
silicon (111) √3x√3 was a priority (Barone, et al. 1980; Gaspard, et al. 1980); and for 
those interested in molecules adsorbed on metals, articles about CO on nickel flooded 
the journals (Davis, et al. 1980; Sargent, et al. 1980).  Again, we see here that these 
canonical materials were inspired by technologically-relevant systems, but that surface 
scientists transformed them to be more amenable to disciplined study and hence less 
directly relevant to engineering applications.  Carbon monoxide research was easy to 
sell in the early ’70s, given new auto pollution laws, but research on CO on nickel was 
only indirectly related to understanding CO’s behavior in ceramic catalytic converters; 
metal on silicon research was vital in the era of integrated circuits since metals form 
interconnects between chip features and are used to protect chips, but silver was rarely 
used in this way; and silicon itself was the material of the moment, but the (111) 7x7 
was a completely different reconstruction and crystalline orientation from the (100) 
2x1 usually used in integrated circuit manufacturing.  The (111) is easier to make, and 
the 7x7 was seen as more scientifically interesting (it was the “Rosetta Stone” of 
reconstructions [CD1, 10/30/03]); while the (100) is more difficult to make, but it is 
easier to use acids to etch it into technologically-important shapes. 
                                                 
14 My thanks to Mike Lynch for the term “test object” and discussions on this subject. 
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Also, the new surface science, with its emphasis on reconstructions and other 
atomic-scale phenomena, moved away from microscopy.  Since no optical or electron 
microscope (or FEM) of the day could image individual atoms, surface scientists 
found these instruments difficult to integrate into their new practices.  The field ion 
microscope, with its atomic resolution capability, declined more slowly in popularity.  
Indeed, when the AVS began offering the Medard Welch career achievement prize in 
1970, Mueller was its first recipient.  FIM, though, relies on a limited number of sharp 
geometries and a small number of metals, none of which fit squarely within surface 
science.  Surface science theory in the ’60s became geared toward ultraflat geometries, 
whereas FIM uses sharp spikes and filaments.  Under Mueller’s gate-keeping, the FIM 
community became more autonomous and overlapped less and less with surface 
science.  For surface scientists, FIM came to seem extraordinarily limited, while for 
FIMmers it remained a system with enough unexplored corners to maintain a dynamic 
research program.  This kind of technological incommensurability – where one group 
sees an instrument as generative for endlessly ongoing body of work, and another 
group sees it as narrowly focused around uninteresting questions – will reappear again 
as we follow the STM and AFM.15
At the Bureau of Standards, Young began to find his own work diverging from 
the practical and intellectual core of surface science for complex institutional reasons.  
Under Marton, the Electron Optics group was repeatedly criticized in external reviews 
for being cloistered and uncommunicative with researchers both inside and outside the 
Bureau [BG1, 6/11/02].  After Marton’s retirement, his successor, Arol Simpson, 
refocused the group’s electron optics work while pushing Young to help overcome its 
deficit of contacts with other parts of the Bureau [RY1, 6/29/00].  In particular, he 
                                                 
15 This type of “interpretive flexibility” is one of the basic observations of the social construction of 
technology literature.  See Bijker and Pinch (1987); Bijker (1995a). 
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suggested Young make a foray into precision engineering.  Like electron optics, this 
area of metrology was felt in the mid-’60s to be one of the Bureau’s weaker areas, and 
Young and other researchers were imported to bring in new ideas.  This was very 
different work from surface science and electron physics; where surface scientists 
were interested in the atomic structure of reconstructions or the vibrational energy of 
bonds in an adsorbed molecule, the Bureau’s precision engineers were trying to find 
ways to standardize and calibrate industrial gears or measure the roughness of paints, 
varnishes, and surface finishes.  The questions, length scales, and materials relevant to 
these subcultures were, at the time, incommensurable.16
 Nevertheless, Young tried to think of ways electron physics could aid 
metrology of industrially-relevant artifacts and surfaces.  Calibration of a gage block, 
gear, ball bearing, or diffraction grating (standard objects of metrological practice) 
involves having a known reference height and checking the distance between that 
height and a surface along a line or array of points; the greater the deviation from the 
mean distance between surface and referent height, the rougher the surface.  There 
were some standard instruments – especially stylus profilometers – that could do this 
measurement in the ’60s (by scraping a spring-loaded stylus – rather like a 
phonograph needle – across a surface and measuring the deflection of the spring).  
Notably, in metrology quantitative measurements are paramount, so electron 
microscopy (even today a largely qualitative technique) was marginal to this effort at 
the time [TV1, 6/29/00].  In analyzing the calibration problem, Young realized that, in 
theory, more sensitive measurements could be made using concepts from electron 
physics.  Since the Fowler-Nordheim equations governing the field emission of 
                                                 
16 It might seem odd to speak of length scales as “incommensurable”; after all, lengths should be easily 
interconvertible.  Yet surface scientists were accustomed to thinking of the atomic scale through LEED, 
which gives images in reciprocal (or frequency) space; the trick of LEED is exactly that frequency 
space is not directly convertible to real space – one must apply an enormous amount of theory, 
calculation, and guesswork to approximate the conversion. 
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electrons contain strongly distance dependent terms, they could be used to measure 
very small changes in distance – surface roughnesses, for example.  Young saw that if 
he used a sharp tip capable of measuring the flow of field-emitted electrons coming 
out of a surface, then very small changes in the gap between this probe and the surface 
would result in large changes in the measured current. 
 This led Young to his “field-emission ultramicrometer” (see Figure 2-3).  As 
an institutional gadfly, Young had few resources to devote to the idea, so he attempted 
a crude proof of concept to win backing for further work.  This consisted of a small, 
hand-blown, evacuated glass envelope containing a sharp tip (the field emitter) and a 
metal plate (a stand-in for the “sample” that would be calibrated by a fully-realized 
micrometer) (Young 1966).  Young could put a voltage between the emitter and the 
“sample” and record the current of field-emitted electrons; but, since the emitter was 
stationary and the sample sealed in the envelope, this data was relatively useless.  
Certainly, no “calibration” of height could be done this way.  Young realized, though, 
that he could change the temperature of the system and calculate how the gap between 
emitter and sample changed with temperature.  Thus, he could correlate two indirect 
ways of calculating the distance between tip and sample and show that field emission 
was a sensitive measure of height. 
The Topografiner 
 In 1966 Young published these results in the Review of Scientific Instruments 
with suggestions for how to use and improve the ultramicrometer.  Nobody outside the 
Bureau followed up on this work, though.  Ultramicrometer work became an un-
funded sidelight that Young saw as a labor of love but his managers began to see as a 
distraction.  By 1968, he was ready for another try, and approached his managers with 
a proposal to radically improve on the ultramicrometer [RY1, 6/29/00; BG1, 6/11/02].  
Young had realized that he could generate topographic images of a sample using field 
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Figure 2-3: Field emission ultramicrometer.  The first metrological device 
designed by Russ Young at the Bureau of Standards that used principles from 
electron physics.  Shown is a sharp metal tip (the “emitter”) enclosed in an 
evacuated glass envelope; the tip field emits electrons that strike a flexible metal 
strip (a substitute for what would be a gear or ball bearing in a real micrometer).  
The strength of the current of field emitted electrons striking the “sample” indicates
the tip-sample distance.  From Young (1966). 
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emission.  If the emitter were moved over the sample in a regular way – say, scanned 
laterally in the x-direction and moved linearly after each scan in the y-direction in the 
same way a television or scanning electron microscope builds up an image – then at 
each point in the scan the emitter could measure the height of the sample.  By 
presenting this data graphically, one could “see” the sample at high resolution.  In 
proposing this design, Young has come retroactively to be seen as formulating all the 
essential ingredients of a scanning probe microscope: a piezoelectric scanning system, 
a sharp solid probe, and a means of monitoring, feeding back off of, and displaying the 
interaction between the probe and a sample (Villarrubia 2001).  Young’s managers, 
though, obviously had no way to see his contribution in this perspective.  To them, the 
ultramicrometer mock-up had been an unconvincing demonstration of the value of 
field-emission height measurements in metrology, and the instrument Young proposed 
now – which he called the Topografiner (see Figure 2-4) – seemed much more 
complicated with few advantages in return. 
For instance, Young calculated that the Topografiner’s resolution was limited 
by the radius of curvature of its emitter (i.e., how sharp the point of the tip was); this 
made the average vertical resolution 3 nanometers (best projected resolution 0.3 nm) 
and average lateral resolution 400 nanometers (best projected resolution 20 nm).  That 
is, the Topografiner’s resolution would be little better (if at all) than existing 
instruments, yet only would have reached that resolution after years of costly 
development.  Young had vague ideas about improving the Topografiner’s resolution 
by operating in the tunneling, rather than field emission, mode, but this seemed even 
wilder and less certain.17
                                                 
17 In tunneling mode, the voltage between emitter and sample would be smaller, the tip closer to the 
sample, and electrons would tunnel directly from the emitter into the sample rather than tunneling from 
the emitter into vacuum and then ballistically striking the sample.  The distance dependence of the 
tunnel current would be even greater than that for field emission, meaning the microscope would have 
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even better resolution vertically.  At the time, though, it was believed that tunneling would not 
significantly improve lateral resolution. 
Figure 2-4: The Topografiner.  A schematic of the Topografiner showing the 
three orthogonal piezoelectric scanners, the specimen, the probe (here called the 
“emitter”) and an electron collector for forming an image from secondary electrons. 
From Young (1971).  
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 Moreover, for Young’s managers, the Topografiner seemed divorced from 
industrial metrology and changes at the Bureau.  In the late 1960s, the largesse for 
fundamental research that floated the Bureau in the immediate postwar period was 
drying up.  The change in presidential administration and looming economic downturn 
forced Bureau management to push researchers in more industrially relevant 
directions.  Congressional overseers, for instance, began to demand that the Bureau 
accommodate industry to a much greater extent (Passaglia 1999; Schooley 2000).  In 
particular, an embarrassing backlog of calibrations for industrial customers in 1970-1 
became the focus of Congressional pressure.  In this context, Young’s proposal 
seemed out of step.  After all, the Topografiner could only work in a relatively high 
vacuum – a major inconvenience for an industrial instrument – and could only operate 
with clean metal samples (where most industrially relevant surfaces are either non-
metallic or have a contamination layer rendering them non-conducting in air).18  
Moreover, Young’s talk of operating the instrument in tunneling mode made it sound 
to his managers more like a chase after one of the holy grails of electron physics than a 
program to develop a reliable metrology tool.  After all, no one had even seen vacuum 
tunneling, much less used it to try to image things like gears and ball bearings.  
Besides, if the concept of tunneling/field emission metrology were significant, they 
figured, someone would have picked up on Young’s initial ultramicrometer articles. 
 By going over their heads to an external review board, though, Young won 
from his managers a grudging two years of funding to prove the Topografiner concept 
[RY1, 6/29/00; BG1, 6/11/02].  His first priority was to show he could bring a tip into 
the field emission regime and scan it to produce relatively low-resolution images; at 
                                                 
18 The Topografiner could also have worked with semiconducting samples, but, crucially, I can find no 
mention of anything other than metals in any of Young’s lab notebooks or published articles.  I draw on 
the “Field Emission Ultramicrometer” and “Topografiner” notebooks from 1965-1970 that Young 
kindly let me copy. 
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the same time, he also worked to show that a stationary tip could be brought into the 
tunneling regime, the hope being that these efforts could combine to make a scanning 
tunneling microscope.  Initially, Young put his efforts into the scanning field-emission 
microscope – only as the difficulties building a fully-fledged Topografiner became 
apparent and his managers’ opposition to the project became more pronounced did 
Young turn to tunneling as a way to salvage results.  Today, with the success of the 
STM, Young credits the Topografiner’s demise to the limited and often second-rate 
resources available to him.  It is, indeed, difficult to deny this was a shoestring 
operation.  Characterizations of resource-poverty can play both ways, though.  If a 
phenomenon is “known” to exist, but cannot be produced with a certain instrument, 
then it is “known” that the group that built the instrument did not have access to the 
resources they needed; on the other hand, if the instrument does produce the effect, 
then it is “known” that the group has good “hands” and can overcome material 
deficiencies with bricolage and ingenuity.  The appropriateness of resources available 
to build an instrument is co-produced with knowledge generated by the instrument. 
 In the Topografiner’s case, the most important reputed shortage was a lack of 
good vacuum equipment.  Young hoped the Topografiner would eventually work in 
air, since this would make it more palatable for metrology and precision engineering, 
so whenever he was able to secure a spare technician that person was assigned to 
experiments in air.  As a first try, though, Young believed vacuum was necessary to 
make the signal clean enough to demonstrate the Topografiner was working.  For 
surface scientists, this was the era of ultrahigh vacuum, an environment that demands 
complex, dedicated equipment.  The Topografiner, though, operated in a less stringent 
vacuum; still, Young could not buy or borrow a vacuum chamber for the project, and 
instead, found a used naval gun barrel and converted it into an ad hoc chamber [RY1, 
6/29/00; BG1, 6/11/02]. 
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 From the first, this chamber made worse one of the most demanding problems 
facing any probe microscope – vibration.  When a probe is brought within nanometers 
of a surface, the most difficult thing is to keep the tip from jostling and “crashing” into 
the surface.  Ambient vibrations couple through the tip-sample system, causing them 
to move relative to each other.  If the average amplitude of that relative movement is 
greater than the intended separation between tip and sample, then the tip will crash 
continuously.  Vibration isolation is important for many scientific instruments (see 
Collins (1975) for descriptions of the exquisite care taken to guard gravity wave 
sensors from stray vibrations), with an array of standard solutions.  One expensive 
option is to buy a specialized, air-supported optical table; a cheaper route is to support 
the vacuum chamber on a low-tech combination of hard materials that filter out low 
frequency vibrations (e.g. concrete pillars) and pliable materials that filter out high 
frequency vibrations (e.g. inner tubes).  All that is only a partial solution, though, if 
air-borne vibrations still impinge on the vacuum chamber, especially if the vacuum 
chamber amplifies those vibrations like a drum (as, apparently, the gun barrel chamber 
did).  Thus, Young took special precautions to minimize sounds in the laboratory – by, 
for example, moving himself and his assistants and even the chart recorder used to 
display the Topografiner’s output into an adjoining room. 
 Other shortages also bedeviled the project.  Young was always chronically 
short of assistance, and he had to rely almost entirely on one technician, Fred Scire, 
for work that the early STM groups a decade later divided amongst two or three 
people.  Late in the project, Young started taking work home to tinker with in his 
garage, where he enlisted the assistance of some of his daughters.  Because of his 
shortage of personnel and shoestring budget, Young had to outsource some projects to 
local artisan; in some cases, such as the construction of the feedback circuit, this 
compromised the quality of the design. 
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Audience, Proof, and Afterlife 
 Though these shortages obviously contributed to the demise of the 
Topografiner, they were by no means determinative.  Instead, to understand the 
Topografiner’s short life and complicated afterlife, we need to see what various 
audiences made of it.  Young had several audiences in mind, as can be read off from 
his design, use, and explanation of the instrument.  For instance, he chose diffraction 
gratings as his first sample of choice (the clearest Topografiner images he published 
were of gratings – see Figure 2-5) since he was aiming at the precision engineering 
community (where gratings were a canonical test of precision) and at his managers 
(one of whom, Karl Kessler, was a spectroscopist used to dealing with gratings [RY1, 
6/29/00; BG1, 6/11/02]).  He played to much the same audience in his articles (Young 
1971; Young, et al. 1972), where he described possible uses of the Topografiner on 
engineering surfaces (ball bearings, gears, surface finishes) and metrological materials 
(e.g. gage blocks – see Young and Scire (1972)), and gave a detailed account of how 
the Topografiner would complement, and scale down from, existing microscopes.19
 This last point was also meant to make the Topografiner relevant (or at least 
palatable) to electron microscopists, including, of course, Young’s immediate 
manager, Simpson.  The Topografiner’s origins in electron physics, and its intended 
relevance to electron microscopists, can be read in other details as well, such 
asYoung’s labeling of the probe as the “emitter” and occasional references to the 
sample as the “anode.”  Most notably, he positioned an electron-collecting horn next 
to the sample as an attempt to gather secondary electrons from the probe-sample 
interaction.  In the ’60s, secondary electrons were tremendously important to electron 
                                                 
19 “Traceability” of measurements from one length scale to a smaller one via overlapping instrumental 
regimes is the key concept of length metrology.  For the Topografiner to find metrological applications, 
it had to overlap, and be coordinated with, instruments like profilometers and light and electron 
microscopes.  For an analysis of the concept of traceability, see O'Connell (1993) and Lezaun (2003). 
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Figure 2-5: Diffraction grating.  This was the most complete Topografiner image 
Young was able to make.  It shows two different lines in a diffraction grating (a 
material with precisely ruled lines in it that cause incident light to diffract and 
separate into its constituent wavelengths).  Because the spacing between lines must
be exact, diffraction gratings are a traditional material of precision engineering.  
From Young (1971).  
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microscopists (particularly at the Bureau); a better understanding of how to collect 
secondary electrons and turn them into an image was central to the rapid rise of 
scanning electron microscopy (as opposed to the older transmission electron 
microscopy).  Young thought it might be possible to form a similar image from 
secondary electrons associated with the Topografiner, and that such an image might 
interest Simpson and other EMers.  Notably, this is the one feature of the Topografiner 
not present in later STMs, and, indeed, is only beginning to receive attention today. 
 Finally, there is one audience conspicuous by its absence – surface science.  
Given Young’s ties to surface science, he might have been expected to sell the 
Topografiner to that community.  Indeed, after the success of the STM, the American 
Vacuum Society awarded him its prestigious Gaede-Langmuir award for his invention 
in 1992.  At the time, though, there was little to attract surface scientists to the 
Topografiner.  Young concentrated almost exclusively on metals, rather than the more 
fashionable semiconductors; his samples of choice were all engineering materials like 
gratings and gage blocks, rather than the ultra-clean single crystals valued by surface 
scientists; the applications he talked about were metrological rather than fundamental; 
and the best resolution he thought he could get was hundreds of times larger than the 
atomic scales surface scientists had become preoccupied with.  Moreover, surface 
science was exactly the kind of “high science” Young’s managers discouraged him 
from following; to go in that direction would have curtailed the project even faster.  
Ironically, as we will see in Chapters Three and Four, when STM flashed onto the 
scene in 1983, it did so because its inventors made a lasting alliance with surface 
science.  That alliance was the product of shrewdness, luck, and curiosity, rather than 
a natural conclusion from the instrument’s capabilities; the fact that someone as 
central to the formation of surface science as Young could not convince that 
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community to take up tunneling microscopy in the ’70s shows how illogical and 
unlikely such an alliance appeared at face value. 
 Young believed that if he made sufficient progress in a short time, he could 
demonstrate the relevance of the Topografiner to various communities for his 
managers, and they would let him continue work on the instrument until it could be 
turned into a reliable part of those communities’ toolkits.  He worked to describe to his 
managers signposts along that road that he had achieved, and future signposts toward 
which he was working.  For the Bureau management, facing budget cuts, scandalous 
backlogs for industrial customers, and increasing congressional pressure, the road to 
routinization of the Topografiner was simply too long.  They viewed Young’s work as 
a proof of concept that such an instrument could work, a proof various communities 
outside the Bureau could follow up on [RY1, 6/29/00; BG1, 6/11/02].  More 
importantly, they saw the Topografiner effort as “proof” of the technical and 
management capabilities of Young himself.  On a shoestring budget, against the 
(friendly) opposition of his managers, Young took an esoteric idea from electron 
physics and demonstrated that it could, down the road, have significant industrial and 
metrology applications.  In an era when the Bureau was turning away from basic 
research, Young’s managers felt it was important to move someone with his expertise, 
management ability, and familiarity with precision engineering into a more applied 
area; since the best way to get someone off a project is to promote them, they told 
Young he could quit the Topografiner and accept a promotion or leave the Bureau.  
Thus, Young moved up to head the Bureau’s new Precision Engineering Division and 
never resumed work on tunneling microscopy until after his retirement in 1981. 
 Curiously, at the time practitioners outside the Bureau read the decision to halt 
Topografiner work in the light of Young’s and the Bureau’s past accomplishments 
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rather than their then-current difficulties.  As these corporate surface scientists (one at 
Xerox and one at Ford) put it: 
 
CD: If you look at the people who do the good experimental stuff [in surface 
science], they all still build their own [instruments]....  The good stuff is home-
made.  You’ve got a group of people who really knows how to do good 
electron optics, and they do high resolution energy loss spectroscopy, they may 
do LEED, and they may do core level spectroscopy, but these are really 
specialty tools....  Not more than five or six people in the world can do this 
well.  The vast majority of university types worked with bought gear.... 
CM: If people found the Topografiner work interesting why didn’t anyone 
replicate it? 
CD: [long pause] Well I think the real answer is that if you look at what was 
required to build that experiment, this was one of these homemade 
experiments.  If the NBS group didn’t do it, who else could do it? ...  The 
people who built equipment were fairly rare by that time.  These guys had all 
had their heyday 20 years, 15 years earlier.  The NSF wasn’t sponsoring any of 
this stuff.  They weren’t going to pay for people to build their gear.  So the real 
answer is that the skill set had moved on in America. [CD1, 10/30/03] 
 
A number of people tried [vacuum tunneling] and didn’t have very much 
success.  I think the Bureau of Standards made the most elaborate attempt at 
doing it....  But they didn’t quite get as far as anything really exciting because 
all they were able to do was build a machine that did topography, and that was 
on a relatively coarse scale....  You could build [a vacuum tunneling system] in 
the ’60s.  If you think about it, what’s so conceptually difficult about it?  But it 
wouldn’t be easy.  It’d be very expensive and hard and I don’t think anybody 
conceived that it would work.  The Bureau of Standards experience seemed to 
prove that out.  They worked very hard and they put a lot of effort into it....  I 
figured if the Bureau wasn’t able to accomplish anything more than that with 
all their resources well I sure couldn’t. [BJ2, 6/27/01] 
Potential replicators did not see the Topografiner’s few accomplishments as an 
invitation to continue the work; rather, they believed that if even as experienced and 
renowned an experimentalist as Young, given the resources of an institution like the 
Bureau, could not get the Topografiner to work reliably or produce images at better 
resolution than existing instruments, then no one could.  Their folk sociology of the 
Bureau, and of Young’s place in it, led them to interpret the situation in exactly the 
opposite way from Young and his managers.  This was trivially true of practitioners in 
industrial precision engineering, who would have been unlikely under any 
circumstances to follow up on as esoteric and unreliable an instrument as the 
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Topografiner except at the largest and most basic research-oriented companies like 
Bell Labs and IBM (where, indeed, the Topografiner concept was transformed into the 
STM a decade later).  The “proof” of the unworkability of the Topografiner was 
probably most influential, though, to a subfield that Young had only tried to enroll 
very late in the game – the electron tunneling community. 
 From the earliest days of quantum mechanics, it was obvious that, given a high 
enough voltage and a small enough distance, an electron could be made to tunnel 
through a vacuum from one metal surface to another.  Indeed, when theorists pictured 
the tunneling process, the imaginary apparatus they used to think through the problem 
usually consisted of two infinitely wide metal plates with only a (vacuum-filled) gap 
of less than a nanometer between them.  For three decades, though, metal-vacuum-
metal electron tunneling remained a theoretical certainty but an experimental 
nightmare.  Because of the same vibration problems that plagued the Topografiner, no 
one could keep two metal plates separated by such a small distance.  Finally, in the 
late ’50s and early ’60s, Leo Esaki at Sony (later IBM) and Ivar Giaever at General 
Electric came at the problem in a new way.  What if the two surfaces were kept apart 
by a solid spacer rather than a vacuum?  Since electrons were thought to interact only 
weakly during tunneling, the solid spacer would approximate nicely to the much more 
theoretically tractable vacuum, yet would be much easier to build (Giaever 1974). 
 From this insight, Giaever and Esaki founded a community centered on the 
metal-oxide-metal (or “sandwich”) tunnel junction.  To make a sandwich tunnel 
junction, they first deposited (inside a vacuum chamber) a thin strip of metal.  Then 
they carefully grew a thin (one or two atomic layers thick) oxide film on the metal 
strip – usually the metal’s native oxide.  Finally, they grew another layer of metal on 
the oxide.  By putting a voltage across the two metal strips, they could induce 
electrons to tunnel across the oxide from one strip to the other.  At first, this work was 
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especially prone to false positives – if the oxide layer had any pinholes in it, the two 
metal strips would meet and electrons would conduct directly from one to the other.  
As a result, when newcomers entered the tunneling community in the late ’50s and 
early ’60s, many reported “miraculously” clear spectroscopic signatures that later had 
to be retracted.  Eventually, Giaever developed a test for the integrity of a junction 
involving detection of the superconducting band gap of the metal strips [BJ2, 6/27/01; 
CT1, 6/28/02].  This, in turn, led to a quick and reliable way of accrediting newcomers 
to the tunneling community. 
 By the late ’60s, sandwich junctions became the focus of a routine, if arcane, 
body of practice.  Tunneling experts had a thriving business generating spectroscopic 
signatures for more and more combinations of metals.  Yet the idea of true vacuum 
tunneling still piqued the interest of many in the field, and it was not unusual for 
dabblers to make quick tries at solving the problem.  In the last days of the 
Topografiner effort, Young turned his attention to these people by building a 
stationary apparatus to bring a probe down into the tunneling regime.  Indeed, he 
published current-voltage (I-V) curves that purported to show just that (Young, et al. 
1971).  Yet he was never confident of these curves, and those in the mainstream of the 
tunneling community who knew about the Topografiner interpreted their poor quality 
as meaning that if even Young could not crack vacuum tunneling then no one could.  
For those in this mainstream, sandwich tunnel junctions offered a generative path of 
experimentation that would last for many years; and with such an extensive and 
specialized body of practice surrounding their experimental system, they saw little 
need to latch onto something as limited and unreliable as the Topografiner. 
 For those at the margins of the sandwich junction community, though, vacuum 
tunneling was a way to cut through to the center of the field.  This was the case for 
Clayton Teague, a graduate student at North Texas State University.  Teague was 
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trying to grow a tunnel junction using bismuth, but ran into trouble because of 
bismuth’s lack of a native oxide [CT1, 6/28/02].  Having chipped away for several 
months with little progress, he ran across Young’s articles on the Topografiner and 
vacuum tunneling and realized such an apparatus might offer a solution.  In 1972 he 
contacted Young and came out to the Bureau, at first for a few weeks and then 
permanently, to complete his dissertation research by building a vacuum tunneling 
assembly.  The instrument he built was a radical simplification of the Topografiner.  
Instead of using a tungsten emitter and a flat metal sample, Teague made two solid 
droplets of metal that he could both mechanically (with a differential screw) and 
piezoelectrically bring into the tunneling regime (see Figure 2-6).  After fruitless 
attempts to form droplets of bismuth, he moved away from the original project and 
chose a gold-vacuum-gold system instead (gold is chemically inert and thus easy to 
keep clean).  Also, unable to make the piezos work at the liquid helium temperatures 
necessary to observe the superconducting energy gap (a litmus test within the tunnel 
junction community), Teague decided to observe tunneling at room temperature 
instead.  Indeed, as Young had done with the ultramicrometer, Teague used controlled 
temperature variations to adjust the size of the gap between the two droplets and 
thereby affect the tunneling current. 
 It is difficult to overstate how marginal this effort was.  As with the 
Topografiner, Teague’s work was done on the side, with a limited budget, and 
managerial skepticism directed at both Young (who was overseeing the work) and 
Teague (who was working part-time, then full-time, for the Bureau on other matters).  
Moreover, anyone who knew what they were doing in the tunneling community was 
not interested in metal-vacuum-metal systems; in fact, as it turned out, Jaklevic and 
Lambe (two premier tunnelers at Ford) eventually managed to make an ordinary 
sandwich junction with the same oxide layer on bismuth that had stymied Teague.  
 
 
 
76Figure 2-6: Teague's vacuum tunneling apparatus.  A diagram of the vacuum 
tunneling instrument developed by Clayton Teague at the Bureau of Standards in 
the mid-’70s.  The device worked by putting a voltage across two gold spheres 
(indicated by the number 2) and bringing them together using a differential screw 
and piezo set-up until electrons could tunnel from one sphere to the other.  Teague 
discovered that as the spheres approached, interatomic forces between them 
distorted their shapes and added an offset to his tunneling measurements.  This 
observation was later helpful in the invention of the atomic force microscope by 
Binnig, Quate, and Gerber.  From Teague (1986).
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Here and there isolated researchers were interested in metal-vacuum-metal systems – 
most notably Bill Thompson at IBM and U. Poppe at the Forschungszentrum in Jülich, 
as well as an even more obscure group in Russia that, it emerged later, had reported 
vacuum tunneling in 1966 (Thompson 1976; Poppe 1981; Lutskii, et al. 1966).  Very 
few people, though, found vacuum tunneling worthy of notice; with the decline of 
electron physics and its splintering into surface science, field-ion microscopy, 
andsandwich tunnel junctions, no one found the “discovery” of vacuum tunneling 
exciting.  What they wanted was tunneling that told something about a system – 
tunneling that could indicate the bond strengths of molecules placed in the oxide layer, 
for instance.  This kind of information was seen as easy to obtain with a sandwich 
junction and difficult to obtain with the Topografiner. 
 Thus, when Teague reported his findings at meetings in 1975, he generated 
tepid interest, and so, other than his dissertation, his only published write-up of the 
experiment languished until well after the first STM publications (Teague 1978; 
Teague 1986).  Not that it probably would have made much difference had he 
published before then; though the STM’s inventors date its birth from their first 
(probably unwitting) replication of Teague’s effort in 1981, their reporting of vacuum 
tunneling met exactly the same indifferent response (Binnig, et al. 1982).  Tunneling 
per se was not the source of the STM’s success; rather, an adventitious combination of 
institutional and disciplinary factors (strikingly similar to, yet crucially different from, 
those surrounding the Topografiner) fostered the STM.  Curiously, once the STM 
began to spread, Teague’s work enjoyed a rebirth.  The inventors of the STM – despite 
their great openness –often had difficulty communicating all the essential instrument-
building knowledge to their replicators.  Thus, people like John Clarke and Cal Quate 
who built STMs in the mid ’80s unearthed Teague’s dissertation as a practical guide to 
constructing a tunneling apparatus.  Indeed, copies of the dissertation circulated 
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widely, especially in California, and some of Teague’s comments on the force 
interactions between his gold droplets instigated the crucial insights behind the atomic 
force microscope [CT1, 6/28/02].20
Conclusion 
 Thus, this chapter is largely a counterweight to the story of the invention of the 
STM told in Chapter Three, a story that can sound inevitable and triumphalist.  The 
STM and the Topografiner were grown in similar media, yet it was the subtle 
institutional, disciplinary, and interpretive differences between these instruments that 
contributed to their dissimilar careers.  Still, the Topografiner was not merely a failed 
STM.  Its proponents saw it in the ’70s as a success, although one that, for institutional 
reasons, was not properly capitalized on; nor, indeed, would they have envisioned that 
capitalization as at all resembling what happened to the STM.  The Topografiner is 
instructive as a comparison to the STM; but it can also offer some lessons of its own 
about the role of invention, institutional context, and disciplinary community at the 
boundary between instrument engineering and scientific experimentation. 
 The first lesson of the Topografiner is that a technology – what it looks like, 
what it can do, how it should be used – is often woven from the yarn of institutional 
imperatives.  The Topografiner came into being because of a very complicated 
constellation of personnel, political pressures, discipline formation, and institutional 
evolution at the Bureau of Standards between 1965 and 1975.  The basic conceptual 
and material components of the instrument – the field emission and tunneling 
equations, feedback circuitry, vacuum technology, and piezoelectric crystals – were all 
available for decades.  The basic demand for the Topografiner to calibrate engineering 
surfaces was also around for a long time, though demand increased in the late ’60s; 
indeed, given the institutional framework of the Bureau, it was that increased demand 
                                                 
20 As referenced in, for example, Quate (1986) and Binnig, et al. (1986). 
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that led the Topografiner to be put on the back burner.  At the same time, what made 
the Topografiner possible was the generative intersection (through individual 
researchers) of the Bureau and various technical subcultures (particularly surface 
science) at various stages in their own institutionalization.  The Topografiner could not 
have come about based on the demands of the Bureau alone; it needed also to be part 
of various ongoing, wider communities. 
 Second, materials and the problematics associated with them – things like 
single crystals of silicon (111) or metal-oxide-metal sandwich tunnel junctions or 
diffraction gratings – anchor such technical communities.  A new instrument exists by 
the grace of such problematics; if canonical materials, material-centered questions, 
and instrumentation cannot be molded to each other, then most of a community will 
lose interest in the instrument.  This was the critical mass that Young never quite 
assembled – there were no materials upon which the Topografiner could either close 
or open up questions that were of interest to any community, especially not in a way 
that was not already possible with existing, more reliable instrumentation.  As we will 
see in the next chapter with the scanning tunneling microscope, an instrument can stay 
in this state for a while if it is hidden and/or it is an individual obsession, but it will not 
be replicated or routinized unless it captures some wider imagination.  Curiously, this 
provides a space for technologies to live on in unusual ways.  The Topografiner, for 
instance, was able to provoke new lines of inquiry and new lines of development at the 
margins of established communities.  Later, when the questions and materials of 
various communities had changed, and new private obsessions had been sparked by 
the STM, the Topografiner could be reinterpreted as being part of a new kind of 
problematic.
 
 
Chapter Three 
Naïveté and the Invention of Tunneling Microscopy 
 
 Apart from Clayton Teague’s work on vacuum tunneling, the Topografiner 
died childless.  Those who might have found a use for it – surface scientists, precision 
engineers, the tunnel junction community – found nothing in the Topografiner to make 
them move away from the more proven instruments with which they were already 
working.  The termination of Russ Young’s project had “proven” to them that such an 
investment in this immature technology would only end in failure.  Though in 
conception and design the Topografiner prefigured the basic elements of later probe 
microscopes, it never formed the kernel of a growing and innovative community. 
The instrument that did form this kernel was the scanning tunneling 
microscope (STM), invented at the IBM Zurich research lab in 1981-2 by Gerd Binnig 
and Heini Rohrer.1  This chapter will examine the local culture of innovation that grew 
up around Binnig, Rohrer, and the STM.  By exploring both the institutional and 
individual characteristics of this culture, we can understand why Binnig and Rohrer 
succeeded in cultivating an STM community where Russell Young had not.  
Importantly, we will see that willfully turning a blind eye to past attempts at tunneling 
microscopy – indeed, a general embracing of naïveté and even ignorance – aided the 
Zurich team in pushing past the failure of Young’s proof of concept. 
Tunneling microscopy began as an auxiliary technology, rather than as a 
project in its own right.  IBM Research – particularly the Zurich lab – was embroiled 
in the ’70s in an effort to build a revolutionary new high-speed computer based on 
superconducting Josephson junctions, the kind of large-scale, all-or-nothing, high-
stakes effort only a behemoth like IBM could envision, fund, and attempt to carry out.  
                                                 
1 For a brief history of IBM Zurich, see Speiser (1998). 
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Josephson junctions are based on the theories of Brian Josephson, a British physicist 
who shared the 1973 Nobel Prize with GE’s Ivar Giaever and Sony’s (later IBM’s) 
Leo Esaki, the founders of the tunnel junction community that we met in Chapter 
Two.  Josephson observed in 1962 that a tunnel junction made from two 
superconductors separated by a very thin insulating layer would have interesting 
properties when kept at superconducting temperatures.2  If no voltage drop were 
placed across the two superconducting layers, a current would actually flow between 
them; and if there were a voltage drop, then it would induce a very fast alternating 
current between the layers.  By the late ’60s, IBM researchers had become attracted by 
the speed and sensitivity of such “Josephson junctions” to try and incorporate them 
into an ultrafast supercomputer.  IBM Research had put much of its money, reputation, 
and talent into the Josephson project in the late 1970s, in the hopes Big Blue could 
produce a computer that would leap-frog semiconductor-based micro-processors and 
alleviate competition from Silicon Valley firms like Intel.  Thus, much of the future of 
the Research Division, and the company as a whole, rode on the outcome of the 
Josephson effort, and any employees whose expertise could be made relevant to 
Josephson computing found themselves contributing to the project. 
 The problem was, IBM Research began to find that Josephson junctions were 
an extremely finicky technology.  Building one or two junctions to demonstrate 
Josephson’s theory and perform very simple logic operations was easy enough, the 
kind of proof of concept IBM scientists excelled at.  Scaling up from there to a full-
fledged computer with hundreds of individual junctions, though, was the kind of task – 
at the interface between the manufacturing and basic research arms of the organization 
– that, as Russ Bassett has shown, IBM had problems with (Bassett 2002). 
                                                 
2 Superconductors are materials that lose all resistance to electrical current below some (very low) 
critical temperature. 
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One difficulty, as with most ultrafast computers (such as the Cray-1), was with 
heat.3  Since the superconducting materials of the day only became superconducting 
within a few degrees of absolute zero, all the Josephson logic elements had to be 
packed together in a bath of liquid helium, an expensive and finicky material.  Peculiar 
to the Josephson project, though, were reliability issues in making the junctions 
themselves.  The insulating film between the two superconducting layers must be 
extremely thin (on the order of a nanometer – in order to allow tunneling), yet it must 
also be perfectly homogeneous.  In particular, there must be no “pinholes” that will 
allow the two superconducting layers to touch and short-circuit the junction.  Even 
experts in the tunnel junction community had to use a whole tool-kit of arcane, tacit 
skills to make just one such junction; yet IBM was proposing to mass-produce chips 
with hundreds of junctions, all with no pinholes, at close to 100% reliability rates. 
Ultimately, these issues might have been solved, and low-level research on 
Josephson computing is still continuing.  At the time, though, a Josephson computer 
could only have been meant as a mainframe or (more likely) a scientific 
supercomputer.  Yet as the IBM PC burst on the scene in 1981, the big computer 
market began to soften, ultimately resulting in Big Blue’s disastrous losses and 
reorganization a decade later.  Thus, in 1983, the plug was pulled on the Josephson 
project after only a few chips had been built.  The quagmire of the Josephson effort is 
important for our story because it triggered the early development of the STM and also 
set the tone for the Zurich lab.  The Zurich IBMers were heavily invested in the 
Josephson work, and its cancellation led to a period of uncertainty and low morale.  
Yet within a few short years, two separate Nobel Prizes, awarded to four different 
                                                 
3 For some analysis of the technical challenges of making and selling supercomputers, and the 
competition between Cray and IBM, see Mackenzie and Elzen (1996).  Seymour Cray’s appropriation 
of the role of “charismatic engineer” is similar to the charismatic inventorship of Binnig and the 
instrument builders we will meet in Chapters Five and Seven. 
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employees, had been spun off from the Josephson effort.  One prize, in 1986, went to 
Binnig and Rohrer for the STM; the other went to Georg Bednorz and Alex Mueller in 
1987 for their discovery in 1986 of high temperature superconductors.  Bednorz and 
Mueller’s interest in unusual superconducting materials in the early ’80s has to be seen 
in the context of the technological problem of making reliable superconducting 
Josephson junctions that could operate at higher (hence cheaper and more reliable) 
temperatures.  Similarly, while the STM could be interpreted as arising from Gerd 
Binnig’s interest in basic questions about vacuum tunneling, Binnig was “interested” 
in an almost infinite number of “basic” research questions.  In fact, his development of 
technologies to explore these basic questions came about because he saw a way to 
attach them to the Josephson effort and receive institutional support for his work.  
Indeed, early on Binnig and Mueller collaborated on the search for superconductivity 
in oxides, though, as Bednorz puts it, “Gerd then lost his interest in this project and 
with deep disappointment I realized that he had started to develop what was called a 
scanning tunneling microscope” (Bednorz and Mueller 1993).  Both high Tc 
superconductors and the STM, though, survived the demise of the Josephson project in 
part because they were at the margins of the effort; in an organization as large and 
complex as IBM Research, small groups could carve out and maintain niches long 
after their original reason for being had vanished. 
 The original basis for the STM cropped up in 1978, as the Zurich Josephson 
team began to realize the importance of pinhole defects in their insulating layers as a 
cause of junction unreliability.  Thus, one part of the team set out to perfect a process 
for growing defect-free films.  To do so, though, they saw they needed a better way to 
characterize films to better understand how different growth processes affected the 
size, shape, and quantity of defects.  They asked a senior scientist/manager at IBM 
Zurich, Heini Rohrer, to explore various ways of characterizing thin films (Binnig and 
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Rohrer 1987).  Rohrer saw this as a perfect assignment for a junior scientist, so he cast 
around for a recent Ph.D. to hire and oversee.  Eventually he settled on Gerd Binnig, 
who was just completing his dissertation work on tunneling and superconductivity.  
Rohrer knew Binnig’s thesis adviser, had seen Binnig present at conferences, and 
believed the film characterization project needed someone with Binnig’s particular 
expertise.   So he brought Binnig out to Zurich for a visit, explained the project to him, 
and together they discussed the ideas that germinated in the STM. 
 The core of their initial conception was the need for a device with an extremely 
localized sensitivity to electrical properties.  The pinholes in the oxide films were very 
small, yet they significantly affected the electrical characteristics of the whole film.  
To understand how defects were being created, and what processes might ameliorate 
them, Binnig and Rohrer needed to see exactly where and how big the defects were 
and how they were disrupting the Josephson effect.  There were traditional methods – 
e.g. electron microscopy – that could tackle part of this problem, but, in their view, no 
technique could give the whole package of spatial resolution and electronic 
characterization.  Their brainstorming led them to ask: what effects are so highly 
localized that they could probe the electrical characteristics of the pinholes?  Before 
long, they focused their discussions on tunneling, probably because both of them had a 
background in that area.  Both realized that, under the right conditions, tunneling can 
be extremely localized – the cross-section of a tunneling event is less than an angstrom 
wide – and that a tunneling current coming out of an area covered by oxide should 
look quite different from that coming out of a pinhole [GB1, 9/26/00; HR1, 11/13/01].  
The instrument they envisioned, therefore, would bring a sharp metal probe close 
enough to the film to witness electrons tunneling between surface and tip.  The tip 
could move around the surface, finding locations where the strength of the tunneling 
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current indicated the presence of a pinhole.  From this, statistics about the number, 
location, and size of pinholes could be obtained. 
 A comparison between this instrument and the Topografiner is instructive.  
Both instruments were initially seen as highly applied, industrially relevant tools; both 
emerged from large, corporatized laboratories, where their inventors worked to 
insinuate them into the larger projects of the organization.  Crucially, both tried to 
finesse themselves into a niche that overlapped older, more proven instruments.  The 
resolution of Binnig and Rohrer’s device was, like the Topografiner’s, calculated to be 
highly dependent on the radius of curvature of the probe; thus, the two instruments 
should have had resolutions roughly comparable to an electron microscope.  When the 
Bureau of Standards ran into financial and organizational difficulties, therefore, it 
dropped the Topografiner on the grounds that it could do little that other instruments 
could not do.  When IBM Research ran into similar difficulties with the Josephson 
project, on the other hand, it pressed ahead with Binnig and Rohrer’s instrument. 
 This is emblematic of the cultural differences between the organizations.  
Where the Bureau of Standards was a government institution, constructed to serve and 
be responsible to the public, IBM Research was responsible (tenuously) only to Big 
Blue’s stockholders.  The Bureau stood on the razor’s edge of public scrutiny (during 
the Topografiner period, the NBS had to deal with budget cuts and harsh 
Congressional oversight), whereas IBM Research lived off the fat of the land (the 
company made it a point of honor to plow 10% of its budget into research - see 
Speiser (1998)).  Big Blue’s huge size and market dominance meant (A) it could pour 
copious money and resources into any project, particularly a make-or-break one like 
the Josephson effort; and (B) its near-monopoly in its field meant it had to develop 
technological solutions for problems no one else would face.  As Bill Leslie and others 
point out, in certain technological areas (such as chip manufacturing), IBM and 
 
 86
companies like it (particularly AT&T) developed idiosyncratic technologies and 
progressed down culs-de-sac no one else could imitate, yet which served the needs of 
these giant organizations (Pugh 1995; Leslie 2001; Knowles and Leslie 2001; Bassett 
2002).  The Bureau of Standards needed to develop technologies that a wide variety of 
companies and industries could draw on; whereas IBM spent enormous amounts to 
develop technologies only IBM would use. 
 Thus, at first no one flinched at the idea of Binnig and Rohrer focusing their 
efforts on making an instrument that would offer only marginally better information 
than devices that could be bought off the shelf.  IBM was willing to pay for any extra 
advantage to help the Josephson effort; and, besides, this kind of innovation was at the 
core of the corporate research mission.  So, exactly the kinds of obstacles that blocked 
the Topografiner in the culture of the Bureau made Binnig and Rohrer’s instrument 
plausible at IBM.  Plausible, but not probable –vacuum tunneling was something that, 
as far as anyone at Zurich (probably) knew, had never been done even in a highly-
controlled laboratory environment, much less in the highly-applied industrial context 
Binnig and Rohrer envisioned.  Many of Binnig’s colleagues found his boldness 
foolhardy for a young, unestablished researcher: 
 
When we started they were very skeptical and people approached me, – I was a 
youngster here, I had just started – they said “are you crazy, just starting with 
such a risky project right from the beginning?  That’s very dangerous.  I 
wouldn’t do that.” [GB1, 9/26/00] 
Binnig, though, cultivated an image of himself as a “crazy” maverick who 
pursued directions others “knew” would not work.4  As he puts it, “will and self-trust 
are important.  Sometimes naïveté does not hurt.  When one knows too much, one can 
become dispirited” (Binnig 1989, 89).  Importantly, though, Binnig has almost always 
worked as part of a team, where he could position himself in a maverick role within 
                                                 
4 Much has been written about the cultivation of scientific persona in the past few years.  Most useful 
for me are Shapin (1991); Browne (1998); Biagioli (1993). 
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the group in such a way that, collectively, the group could sow enough disciplined 
expertise in with the naïveté in order to succeed.5  On the few occasions when Binnig 
has worked alone, or as part of teams that could not support his maverick role, he has 
come off as marginal and out of his depth.  When he has been part of the right kind of 
team – as he was in the early years at Zurich – he has seemed more like a brilliant and 
inventive, if off-beat, researcher. 
 This can be seen in the make-up of the original Zurich STM group.  Binnig 
tended to be the idea man, and the gifted, if makeshift, experimentalist.  A technician, 
Christoph Gerber, supplied much of the technical know-how and meticulous craft 
work to realize many of Binnig’s ideas (another technician, Eddie Weibel, was also 
involved early on).  Rohrer, meanwhile, gave the project occasional guidance and 
acted as a mediator between Binnig and Big Blue.  As a group manager, Rohrer could 
shape the group’s efforts so they would be seen as contributing to IBM Research’s 
overall aims; but he could also disguise the group’s work and make it invisible to 
senior management when Binnig’s goals and those of IBM were too hard to reconcile.  
This soon proved to be the case with the team’s contribution to the Josephson effort. 
 Originally, Binnig and Rohrer thought their instrument would take readings of 
the tunneling current at one spot, then another, then another, yielding statistics about 
the frequency of pinholes [GB1, 9/26/00; HR1, 11/13/01].  Within a few weeks of 
sketching out this idea, though, Binnig realized that a sufficient density of such 
samplings would yield a real-space image of the film.  By scanning the probe in the x-
direction while feeding back on the tunneling current, the instrument could give line 
traces of the electrical characteristics of the films; and by translating the probe in the 
y-direction after each scan, a set of such traces could be collated together – much as 
                                                 
5 This echoes Howard Becker’s observations about how mavericks such as Charles Ives need more 
mainstream helpers to facilitate the acceptance of their “discoveries” (1982).  For an application of 
Becker’s ideas in science studies, see Fujimura and Chou (1994). 
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rastered pixels in a television or scanning electron microscope form an image on the 
screen.  The size and location of pinholes could be made visible. 
 As we saw with the Topografiner and with Clayton Teague’s tunneling 
apparatus, making an instrument that could tunnel seemed difficult enough to most 
experimentalists; yet quick calculations showed that that that was a much simpler 
prospect than making one that could tunnel and scan.  The mechanical instabilities 
involved in keeping a probe that close to a surface while also moving it around in x 
and y would cause the probe to continually crash.  Building such an instrument could 
have seemed like an enormous and fruitless investment of time, people, and resources 
– especially since its original inspiration, the Josephson project, was coming to an 
unsuccessful end.  Thus, Binnig and Rohrer shaped their work to combat skepticism of 
the science and economics of the instrument (which by then they were calling the 
scanning tunneling microscope or STM).  First, after some initial attempts at building 
a full-fledged STM, Binnig and Gerber decided to tackle the much simpler, more basic 
problem of tunneling without scanning.  By building a stationary apparatus they could 
prove that a vacuum tunneling current was possible, without incurring the extra 
mechanical difficulties of scanning.  Second, since the Josephson effort could no 
longer be used as a pretext for their work, Rohrer arranged to partially hide what they 
were doing.  He assigned Binnig and Gerber to other tasks on which they could be 
seen to be making progress, but which would be easy enough that they could pursue 
their STM work part-time. 
 
CM: What was the STM group at Zurich like? 
OM: What it was?  Hidden.  As far as I know Gerd Binnig was hired officially 
at least to do mixing cryostat measurements in the millikelvin range.  There 
was actually a cryostat like that.  Well, he always was pretty impatient....  
Heini Rohrer was working [on STM], let’s say on a 10% basis probably at that 
time.  Gerd Binnig probably on a 60% to 70% basis. [OM1, 11/16/01] 
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From one perspective, Rohrer was giving Binnig the space to pursue an interesting, if 
esoteric, problem.  From another perspective, though, he was drawing resources away 
from work that could more directly contribute to IBM’s aims.  The latter can be seen 
as the view of managers at the center of IBM Research in Yorktown Heights, New 
York (just down the road from corporate headquarters). 
 
I was kidding one of the research managers whom I know pretty well from 
Yorktown Heights and said “here IBM Zurich is just this little operation of a 
research lab, to what do you attribute the fact that they’ve come up with two 
Nobel Prizes over the past two years?”  He said “poor management.”  At the 
National Bureau of Standards, where Young had better management the 
project was stopped, and at IBM Zurich where they were pretty much leaving 
those people alone it went ahead and they made these important discoveries. 
[DH1, 2/28/01] 
Binnig and Rohrer, though, saw themselves as at the periphery of IBM.  Indeed, much 
of their work displays a distrust of corporate supervision of research and a willingness 
to subvert directions from Yorktown.  This, of course, plays well to Binnig’s careful 
construction of persona, and over the years he has carved out a niche as the colorful 
maverick who dances around the fringes of the buttoned down corporate world.6
As with the Topografiner and Clayton Teague’s tunneling apparatus, vibration 
isolation appeared to be the greatest hurdle to building a successful STM.  Here, 
Binnig’s Rube Goldberg-like imagination came into play.  Over several generations of 
STMs, he devised a variety of complicated, bulky, esoteric systems for vibration 
isolation – eddy-current damping, instruments levitating in bowls of superconducting 
helium, four stage spring systems surrounded by intricate, beautifully hand-blown 
glass scaffolds, etc. (see Figure 3-1).  Arne Hessenbruch has written about this period 
of STM development as a time when Binnig and Rohrer faced great skepticism from 
their colleagues within the Zurich lab.7  He shows that these complicated, high-physics 
                                                 
6 This is, surely, a well-worn trope.  We can see it, for instance, in Paul Rabinow’s (1996) evocative 
descriptions of Kary Mullis’ antics at Cetus. 
7 Some of this argument can be found in Hessenbruch (2001).  My thanks to Arne for conversations that 
elaborated his argument in more detail. 
 
 90
 
Figure 3-1: The Zurich STMs.  The first four generations of STMs in the IBM 
Research lab at Zurich, differing mostly in their vibration isolation systems.  The 
first levitates the STM by putting it on a bowl of helium-cooled superconducting 
lead; the second and third use complicated multi-stage spring suspension systems. 
All three also use eddy-current damping, with permanent magnets placed in an 
electrical field, in which they resist movement.  The fourth is the “pocket STM.”  
From Binnig and Rohrer (1986). 
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solutions to the vibration problem were a way to display to those colleagues that the 
STMers’ results could not be written off.  Just as important, though, is the role of these 
solutions in helping Binnig carve out a maverick scientific persona.  Each of these 
systems constituted a possible avenue for development that would display Binnig’s 
inventive genius and might prove more interesting than the STM itself. 
The Ethic of Naïveté 
Thus, both because of the need to disguise the STM work and because of 
Binnig’s tendency to rebuild much of the device on completely new principles every 
few months, progress came extremely slowly.  From the first conception in 1978, it 
took three years to get a well-defined vacuum tunneling signature (Binnig, et al. 
1982).  Another reason for the slow development, though, may have been the team’s 
steadfast refusal to learn from other groups working in the same area.  Not only did 
Binnig radically revise his own work every few months, but he repeatedly reinvented 
technical solutions that were readily availabe in the relevant literature.  For him, 
everything about the STM was unprecedented and novel.  This was made easier by a 
cultivation of blithe unawareness of Teague and Young’s work at the Bureau of 
Standards, not to mention the Soviet vacuum tunneling work in the mid-’60s.  At this 
early stage, Binnig and Rohrer seem not even to have paid special attention to, much 
less contacted, people in the tunnel junction community such as Bob Jaklevic and Paul 
Hansma.  The one partial exception, for institutional reasons, was Bill Thompson, a 
researcher working on squeezable vacuum tunnel junctions at Yorktown – here again, 
though, what might have developed into a lasting collaboration fizzled early, and 
today Binnig and Rohrer have difficulty even remembering Thompson existed [GB1, 
9/26/00; HR1, 11/13/01]. 
My point is not some Mertonian normative (Merton 1972; Mitroff 1974) claim 
that they should have sought out precedents and collaborations.  Rather, I’m making a 
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descriptive claim that insouciance about such precedents was a central part of the 
Zurich STMers’ construction of a local experimental culture.  Later on, Binnig and 
Rohrer had no difficulty collaborating with other groups and using the STM to 
develop a wide and heterogeneous network.  These collaborations, though, were done 
to expand the STM’s range of applications, and Binnig and Rohrer’s partners were 
from fields that could in no way be seen as precedents for probe microscopy.  People 
whose work could be seen as a precedent – Russ Young or Bill Thompson or the 
surface profilometry community – were kept outside the group’s ken.  This “ethic of 
naïveté” was both generative and problematic for the group.  Not knowing about 
precedents allowed Binnig and Rohrer to see the STM as a blank slate, an instrument 
with an unknown array of attributes.  Not knowing allowed them to be unaware of 
what others had found to be “impossible,” which in turn allowed them to proceed as if 
everything were possible (and push through the same “impossibilities”).  Not knowing 
allowed them to be unaware that forerunners such as Teague or Young had sparked 
little or no interest in the communities to whom they presented their results.  By not 
knowing, Binnig and Rohrer could represent their work as novel, rather than as the 
replication of something no one else thought needed replication. 
Not knowing became problematic, though, when the STM made its way into 
the wider world.  Some people who heard about the Zurich instrument in the early 
’80s did know about its precursors, and questions arose about how much Binnig and 
Rohrer owed to their forerunners.  In Binnig and Rohrer’s writings about their 
invention process they often use phrases like “after we were done we encountered the 
similar work of” X or Y.  This way of putting things could seem disingenuous, and 
some, especially Russ Young’s friends at NIST, made it a personal project to point out 
Binnig and Rohrer’s citational lapses and criticize what they saw as misrepresentations 
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of the field’s history.8  These lapses became even more acute when the Zurich team 
started patenting STM innovations.  Their first application for an American patent in 
1979, for instance, was rejected (in 1980) on the grounds that almost all of their claims 
were mere replications of what Young had done.  This pattern became typical for 
Binnig – a brilliant idea, a quick implementation, followed by the belated and half-
hearted acknowledgement of forebears, resulting in a botched patent application. 
In general, this naïve style of work at Zurich was centered on Binnig’s 
experimental persona; Rohrer and Gerber seemed to have enjoyed Binnig style of 
work at times, and to have provided much-needed structure at other times.  It is 
difficult to tell when exactly Binnig evolved this naïve approach to research; it is clear, 
though, that by 1984, his collaborators and emulators in North America were already 
commenting on his maverick persona and his refreshing, if sometimes undisciplined, 
experimental style.  For the period covered in this chapter, we need to be more 
circumspect in thinking about naïveté; it is possible that the Zurich team were not 
quite as naïve as they remember being.  Certainly, there are reasons (given the 
questions of priority surrounding the invention of the STM) why it might be more 
comfortable, post-Nobel Prize, for the Zurich team to look back on their early work as 
isolated, undisciplined, and naïve. 
Yet what can be pieced together of Binnig’s early career at IBM Zurich – his 
tendency to lose interest in projects and move on to new ones, the designs of his 
STMs, the samples he characterized, etc. – shows that, from the beginning, he was 
working in a way that could easily be represented as a naïve style.  Indeed, the ethic of 
naïveté should be seen as a way of doing things that incorporates a tendency to 
broadcast representations of itself as a way of doing things.  Binnig, more than anyone 
                                                 
8 For instance, when Cal Quate published his history of the invention of the STM, Bill Gadzuk at NIST 
fired back an angry letter to the editor accusing Quate, Binnig, and Rohrer of intellectual dishonesty 
(Quate 1986; Gadzuk 1987). 
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else in the probe microscopy community (except perhaps Virgil Elings, whom we will 
meet in Chapter Seven) is known widely as a character, someone about whom there 
are a variety of eccentric stories that circulate widely.  Most of these stories traveled 
down through the same network as the STM in the period when the tunneling 
microscopy community was expanding.  Even before then, though, the Zurich team 
was using representations of its naïve, insouciant style in order to navigate the 
institutional politics of corporate research; and it was crafting its work to make those 
representations easier to create.  For instance, embracing naïveté pushed Binnig and 
Rohrer toward a more playful, undisciplined style of work.  As they say at the start of 
their Nobel lecture: 
 
We present here the historic development of Scanning Tunneling 
Microscopy....  Our narrative is by no means a recommendation of how 
research should be done....  However, it would certainly be gratifying if it 
encourage a more relaxed attitude towards doing science....  For scanning 
tunneling microscopy, we brought along some experience in tunneling and 
angstroms, but none in microscopy or surface science.  This probably gave us 
the courage and light-heartedness to start something which should “not have 
worked in principle” as we were so often told. (Binnig and Rohrer 1987) 
Binnig, especially, developed a working style in which he tried not to be overly 
informed on a subject when he started to tackle it, to leave a subject when he found he 
knew too much about it, and to jump from one project or technical approach or idea to 
another playfully and quickly.  This dovetailed nicely with his self-presentation as an 
outsider and maverick.  In his autobiographical moments, Binnig describes how “I had 
always the feeling when I talked to people that I’m the only one who thinks like I 
think, or the others seem to think differently” and, hence, he often ran afoul of more 
disciplined institutions such as the military and mainstream university physics. 
 
While studying physics, I started to wonder whether I had really made the right 
choice.  Especially theoretical physics seemed so technical, so relatively 
unphilosophical and unimaginative.  In those years, I concentrated more on 
playing music with friends in a beat-band rather than on physics....  [U]nder 
Dr. E. Hoenig's guidance I realized that actually doing physics is much more 
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enjoyable than just learning it. Maybe 'doing it' is the right way of learning, at 
least as far as I am concerned. (Binnig 1993) 
The ethic of naïveté, therefore, should be seen as a Švĕjk-like means for Binnig to 
subvert such institutions by appearing unaware of their rules. 
 This may sound like a psychological description of Binnig’s persona and, 
indeed, there may well be psychological explanations of maverick behavior.  Binnig’s 
wife is a psychologist, and he often references her as the only person who, through her 
training and affection, can understand him.  Later, after Binnig tired of STM, he began 
writing in a more psychological tone about creativity (Binnig 1987; 1989a; 1989b; 
1995).  Yet we should not lose sight of the social coordination of this role.  Locally, 
Binnig needed the help of Rohrer and Gerber in supporting his maverick style of work.  
Rohrer provided managerial cover for Binnig’s unorthodox ideas, and, as Binnig says, 
“his humanity and sense of humor fully restored my lost curiosity in physics;” while 
Gerber brought instrumental form to Binnig’s more undisciplined ideas, and 
circumvented the ethic of naïveté to bring in outside knowledge at key points (Binnig 
1993).  Also, Binnig’s style was so closely associated with the STM that it was often 
replicated along with the instrument.  As other groups (particularly those in Chapter 
Five) built their own STMs, some of them also adopted the ethic of naïveté as a useful 
tool in instrument-building. 
 Thus, through personal contact, through published articles such as their Nobel 
lecture, and through word of mouth stories about Binnig’s maverick exploits, the ethic 
of naïveté was crucial in building a network around the STM.  It was most important 
in the early process of filling in the STM’s array of attributes.  By presenting the 
instrument as completely novel, and themselves as ignorant about what it could do, 
Binnig and Rohrer were able to draw in more disciplined collaborators who brought 
with them key knowledge that could be made relevant to tunneling microscopy.  
Having shown that their stationary apparatus could produce a vacuum tunneling 
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current, Binnig and Gerber built a new machine with scanning capability; the question 
now was, what to look at with it?  For this, they needed samples – the actual, physical 
specimen they wanted to look at – and they needed knowledge about those samples.  
Housed, as they were, in one of the largest corporate research organizations in the 
world, they quickly found they could obtain both from their local colleagues. 
Binnig and Rohrer needed two things from early collaborators.  Unlike many 
of the instruments classically analyzed in science studies, the STM was not purpose-
built for any particular scientific problem.  Its ostensible reason for being, the 
Josephson project, evaporated as a pretext as the years went by.  By 1981, Binnig and 
Rohrer had a tool, but no idea of what to use it for – the STM was an instrument in 
search of a problem.9  Thus, the STMers looked for samples central to open scientific 
debates.  Early on, though, it was also important to find samples to tell something 
about the microscope, rather than the other way around.  Binnig and Rohrer sought 
samples with known, unusual properties that, in theory, would appear distinctive in the 
STM and could be used as a metric of its capabilities.  Thus began a series of 
ephemeral and often fruitless collaborations between Binnig and Rohrer and various 
IBM colleagues who supplied them with samples and knowledge.  Here, we see the 
beginnings of a division of labor that would crop up repeatedly in the history of probe 
microscopy – a division between microscope builders with the expertise to construct 
and operate an STM and sample providers with the expertise to choose and prepare 
specimens that might generate useful STM images.10
 
The first sample was simply chosen because Dick Gambino, was visiting for a 
year from IBM Yorktown.  He was a materials scientist, he had this calcium 
iridium tin 4....  It was very shiny.  The hope was, since it’s already shiny [i.e. 
flat and clean], we can do something....  [On that material] we just saw the 
[atomic] steps.  And the steps were in line with what you would expect from a 
                                                 
9 My thanks to Mario Biagioli for comments that were helpful in this section. 
10 Much the same dialectic is present in Nicolas Rasmussen’s (1997) account of the entry of electron 
microscopy into biology. 
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step.  You needed to calibrate the piezos – the calibration was different from 
all the numbers you got because the numbers you had were usually the 
numbers for applying large voltages. [HR1, 11/13/01] 
 
[One early sample] was a material built by Hans-Jörg Scheel in our 
department.  He’s a crystal grower and he said “this is a good material, it’s 
very inert so you should see the atomic steps, and the atomic steps are 
relatively high so you should resolve them very nicely....”  If you have huge 
terraces of steps, then you actually can see them with an optical microscope....  
“Take this sample, if your instrument really works you will see atomic steps,” 
that’s what he said.  We tried it and we saw the atomic steps. [GB1, 9/26/00]11
More important than calibrating the instrument, though, Binnig and Gerber were 
accruing tacit knowledge about how to operate an STM.  Just by looking at something 
(particularly something with an ordered surface), they could tell when they were and 
were not getting images, what kinds of operations improved the images, and what 
kinds of operations resulted in STM “accidents” (accidents which they could begin to 
assign labels, such as “crashed tip” or “gunk on tip” or “sudden reversal of contrast”) 
[GB1, 9/26/00; CG1, 11/12/01].12
Moreover, they were learning intuitive facts about what STM landscapes 
looked like and how to interpret them.  Interestingly, despite their corporate affiliation, 
Binnig and Rohrer manufactured their STM images entirely without the aid of 
computers.  As part of Binnig’s construction of himself as a maverick within IBM 
Research, and as part of the whole group’s representation of itself as quietly defying 
the received truths of the American corporate center, both Binnig and Rohrer 
dismissed computers as useless [GB1, 9/26/00; HR1, 11/13/01].13  Visualization was 
accomplished by analog means.  Individual line traces were outputted to an x-y 
recorder or an oscilloscope, one trace at a time.  Binnig and Gerber learned to “see” a 
three-dimensional image by collating these line traces in their heads; or, it is more 
                                                 
11 Results of characterizing this sample are in Scheel, et al. (1982). 
12 There is a nice resonance here with Polanyi’s discussion of the blind man’s probe and the gradual 
transition from “knowing how” to “knowing what” (1962, 56). 
13 For an article that chronicles part of the entrenchment of scientific computing at IBM, see Akera 
(2002). 
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accurate to say they learned how to interpret line traces as indicative of “features” and 
sites of interest on the surface.  Occasionally, they used a storage oscilloscope (which 
could keep more than one trace visible at a time) to build up crude pictures of the 
surfaces by off-setting a collection of line traces; and, on one famous occasion, they 
physically collated a collection of traces and sculpted together a three-dimensional 
representation of the surface (see Figure 3-2): 
 
The data acquisition was via chart recorders.  That’s nice, it works fast, but if 
you have to analyze the data later on, that’s a problem.  It got aggravating 
when the results really got good....  I mean IBM is a computer company – can 
you just present chart recorder data with nothing else?  So for this PRL paper 
on the 7x7 ... they took the chart recordings, copied them 50 or 60 times, and 
then Christoph Gerber had to cut out the first sheet of paper for the first line, 
the second sheet of paper for the second line, and so on.  He was gluing 
cardboard on the back so that the things would stand and then everything was 
packed together in the right arrangement, put on a piece of wood, and then 
fastened with nails. [OM1, 11/16/01] 
Binnig (especially), but also Roher probably saw computers as representative 
of a more bureaucratic, formal kind of research – indeed, we shall see in Chapter 
Three how it allowed the bureaucratization of certain aspects of STM.  In 
counterpoint, the Zurich team offered themselves as representatives of a more 
artisanal, craft-like science.  STMs that were digitally controlled and had computer 
outputs produced large amounts of data quickly; whereas the Zurich machines 
produced data monstrously slowly, each image a hand-crafted jewel of a result.  
Binnig and Rohrer departed very far from the initial idea of building an industrial 
surface characterization tool.  Instead, they were doing self-consciously exploratory 
research, wandering around picking off the low-hanging fruit. 
Surface Science and the 7x7 
The problem was, no one was interested in that fruit.  Binnig and Gerber had 
acquired a feel for the STM’s habits, and cultivated an ability to read its almost 
indecipherable real-time images, but they had not seen anything in those images that 
 
 99
 
Figure 3-2: Binnig and Rohrer's 7x7.  The famous cardboard model of the 7x7, 
built by Christoph Gerber by taking a series of line traces from a chart recorder, 
cutting them out, gluing them to cardboard, then gluing the cardboard together.  
Two whole unit cells are visible as the two diamond-shaped structures pointing 
toward the upper right.  Individual adatoms are visible within the unit cells as large
raised bumps.  The corner holes of the unit cells are visible as prominent 
depressions at the vertices.  From Binnig, et al. (1983b). 
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sparked anyone else’s imagination.  After the first stationary tunneling results in 
March 1981, though, the group began talking to surface scientists at Zurich.  The 
STMers wanted samples that were easy to prepare, would stay clean, had properties 
that would be readily visible in an STM, and about which surface scientists already 
knew a great deal but wanted to know more.  One material the surface scientists 
recommended was gold, because it is well-understood, chemically inert (i.e. easy to 
keep clean and “well-defined”), and readily available.  STM trials with gold revealed a 
landscape of “rolling hills” typical of low-resolution STM images.  After a while, 
though, Binnig and Gerber were able to find spots where they could see the 
corrugation (the wave-like rows of atoms at the surface – see Figure 3-3).  From this 
they produced a rather wrought extrapolation from the images to a model of the 
surface reconstruction of gold (Binnig, et al. 1983a). 
It is difficult to overstate how little notice this article attracted.  It was 
published in Surface Science, a highly regarded journal; and, as later events indicated, 
it crossed the desks of surface scientists around the world [DH1, 2/28/01].  Yet no one 
seemed interested.  Gold was already a well-understood material, but not one in which 
surface scientists took any special interest at the time.  One feature of the study of 
surfaces was the tremendous amount of work generated by certain favorite, yet 
recalcitrant, reconstructions; and gold was not part of this canon.  Surface scientists 
could bring their battery of experimental and theoretical machinery (their “alphabet 
soup” of different spectrometers, microscopes, and diffractometers) to bear on favorite 
reconstructions for years, providing material for generations of dissertations, without 
ever settling on a model.  Some models were excluded in the process, but as theorists 
sharpened their skills they simply added more variations, all fitting the data. 
Because of their bond structure, surface reconstructions are more common and 
dramatic in semiconductors than metals; most metals have a configuration at the 
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Figure 3-3: Gold (110).  The first STM image purporting to show atomic 
resolution, along with a proposed model for the gold (110) 2x1 reconstruction.  The
image was made by off-setting line traces on a storage oscilloscope, then outputting
to a chart recorder.  Note the extra margin placed at the bottom to make it look as 
though the image shows the surface at a slight angle to the viewer (my thanks to 
Jochen Hennig for pointing this out).  This image is remarkable for being 
unremarkable; though surface scientists knew of it, few were interested and none 
were roused by it to replicate the STM.  From Binnig, et al. (1983a).  
 102
surface that is more or less a cut off version of the bulk structure.  Thus, surface 
reconstruction work tended to concentrate in the big corporate research labs – Bell 
Labs, IBM, Xerox – where semiconductors were of more interest, and where the 
computing power to solve them was easily available.  For researchers interested in 
metals, reconstructions were a low priority, although the few reconstructions that had 
been “solved” by the early ’80s were mostly metals, since the reconstructions were 
simpler.  Nevertheless, a few metals remained, including the gold (110) 1x2.  Thus, 
Binnig and Rohrer’s surface science colleagues initially recommended they look at 
this reconstruction.  Yet because the gold 1x2 was not the center of any ongoing 
debate, their results attracted virtually no attention. 
 Much more dramatic than gold, though, was a reconstruction known as the 
silicon (111) 7x7.  This was one of the first reconstructions to have become familiar to 
surface science in 1950s, when the field was first starting to coalesce and when the 
phenomenon of reconstruction first attracted attention.  It’s difficult to pinpoint 
exactly why the 7x7 became so central to researchers in this area.  True, silicon is a 
technologically important material.  Yet the (111) is not the cut of silicon used in 
making integrated circuits (ICs are made with (100), usually in the 2x1 
reconstruction).  Rather, the 7x7 became the “fruit fly of surface science” [RT1, 
2/23/01] because it allowed for a variety of ongoing work and debate in spectroscopy, 
diffractometry, and theory  – there were many stakeholders in the 7x7, and their stake 
continued over time. 
 Instrumentation and specimen preparation were key to the 7x7’s status as an 
epistemic thing.  Most reconstructions have small unit cells – 2x1, √3x√3, 2√3x√3, 
perhaps as large as 2x8 – i.e., two or three times the size of the bulk unit cell.  The 7x7 
was 49 times the size of the bulk unit cell, and dwarfed almost all other 
reconstructions.  Moreover, it was clear that however the 7x7’s atoms were positioned 
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in the unit cell, their organization was exceedingly complex.  This complexity yielded 
a low energy electron diffraction pattern of tremendous delicacy, even beauty [JG2, 
2/20/01], compared to LEED patterns of other reconstructions.  Since LEED was the 
key instrument in solving reconstructions, and since it was the primary instrument in 
determining what reconstructions are present on a crystalline surface, the importance 
of the 7x7’s LEED pattern should not be underestimated.  Not only did it present the 
most intriguing problem known to LEED practitioners, but it was also one of the most 
familiar and easily recognizable – the complexity of the 7x7 meant that its LEED 
pattern could be identified almost instantly. 
 This, in turn, meant that methods and recipes for preparing samples of the 7x7 
were much more finely developed than for other reconstructions.  There were, by 
1980, many different recipes for preparing the 7x7, and learning a few of them was 
one of the first steps in training students in specimen preparation methods.  The 
recognizability of the 7x7 also offered a way to train up instrumentation – LEED 
manufacturers, for instance, usually included a 7x7 sample with their devices so that 
customers could quickly check that they had purchased a working system [CD1, 
10/30/03; FH1, 5/9/01].  Similar checks of 7x7 samples could be used over time to 
make sure LEED instrumentation was being maintained properly.  This made the 7x7 
attractive in developing other kinds of instrumentation.  Since LEED could check very 
quickly that a sample was a good, clean specimen of the 7x7, that sample could then 
be treated as a “well-defined,” known system to characterize via other diffraction or 
spectroscopic techniques.  Thus, through the ’70s, LEED and the 7x7 started to be 
used more in conjunction with many new types of instrumentation. 
 In turning to the 7x7, Binnig and Rohrer were treading a path that other kinds 
of surface scientific instrumentation had been down before.  As it turned out, the 7x7 
was fortuitous in taking advantage of the STM’s capabilities; but Binnig and Rohrer 
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were also extremely skillful in making the most of their successes.  Getting to that 
point, though, was difficult.  None of the STMers had experience with or knowledge 
of surface science; they knew nothing about how to prepare the 7x7, what they should 
be using the STM to look for, or how to make their results credible to the surface 
scientists.  Received truths surface scientists would never have questioned were 
unknown to the STMers.  For instance, where surface scientists insisted on preparing 
and characterizing a sample in the same vacuum chamber, Binnig’s STM design did 
not accommodate sample prep technology.  Instead, he and Gerber prepared samples 
in one chamber, then took them out of vacuum and walked them over by hand (in air) 
to the STM.  Later, when Binnig and Gerber got images from samples prepared in this 
way, they took it as a point in favor of their maverick, outsider sensibility – if you 
could see something on samples that had been exposed to air, then the surface 
scientists’ fetish for cleanliness was worth challenging [GB1, 9/26/00; CG1, 
11/12/01].  For surface scientists, though, the long period when Binnig and Gerber 
could not generate images from such samples was an indicator they were doing 
something wrong. 
 Similarly, the STMers had trouble learning surface scientists’ recipes for 
sample prep, yet they eventually turned their difficulties into a vindication of the ethic 
of naïveté.  After months of trying to prepare a 7x7 and finding only “rolling hills” and 
“gunk” indicative of low-resolution STM images, they began to lose faith.  But a final 
consultation with a surface scientist, Franz Himpsel, who was visiting Zurich from 
Yorktown, put them onto the right track toward producing more amenable samples. 
 
I was at IBM at Yorktown Heights when at IBM Zurich the STM was 
invented, so I ... was involved a little bit in helping them.  Just before they got 
... the 7x7 silicon surface data, I was at Zurich ... for a talk....  They were 
looking for some good science demo that they could use the STM for and they 
had tried already that silicon surface because that’s a real classic.  The fact that 
it has a very large unit cell and a complicated structure was known for 25 years 
or so at the time but nobody knew the structure, and people have been making 
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models for years and years.  So they thought that would be a good test case to 
show how powerful their new method was.  But they were still having 
problems cleaning their samples, this business of getting a real clean, well-
ordered surface.  I’d been working on that problem separately for my 
photoemission so I gave them a few hints and they managed to then get some 
of their data. [FH1, 5/9/01] 
With Himpsel’s help in sample preparation, and the tacit knowledge Binnig and 
Gerber accumulated in STM operation, circumstances become favorable for the team 
to generate ultrahigh resolution images of the 7x7.  They were aided in this by the 
7x7’s very large unit cell large, which ensured that any feature within the cell 
appeared regularly in an STM image at a relatively large repeat distance.  Binnig was 
still the only person who believed the STM could achieve atomic resolution, but back 
of the envelope calculations of its resolution based on the radius of curvature of the tip 
showed it should be able to see features at scales close to the repeat distance of the 7x7 
unit cell.  As it turned out, the 7x7 unit cell contained one very obvious feature per 
unit cell that could be seen easily even without atomic resolution – a large hole in the 
middle of a ring of adatoms (see Figure 3-4).  Thus, with practice, Binnig could coax 
the STM to where he could see areas with a regularly repeating depression at a scale 
close to that calculated for the 7x7 unit cell. 
 Along with their ambiguous resolution of the gold 1x2, “seeing” this “corner 
hole” on the silicon 7x7 – however indistinctly – was a turning point.  Binnig and 
Gerber now had a feature they could use to fine-tune the STM down to even higher 
resolution.  After this, Binnig became engrossed by the instrument, spending late 
nights and developing an extreme proficiency at subtly controlling its operation.  
Interpretation of images also required subtle skills.  Since the STM was not generating 
images as such, Binnig and Gerber had to use every cue they could to understand its 
output [GB1, 9/26/00; CG1, 11/12/01].  By watching the oscilloscope electronically 
trace out the tunnel current, and also listening to the chart recorder that generated hard 
copies of the line traces, they became proficient at recognizing patterns that recurred 
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Figure 3-4: 7x7 corner hole.  The silicon (111) 7x7 unit cell is extraordinarily 
large and has a very complex structure.  One feature of that structure that aided 
early STMers is a distinctive “corner hole.”  This figure shows a model of the 7x7
unit cell (the so-called dimer-adatom-stacking fault model) overlaid on an STM 
image.  The bright white spots are adatoms sitting on top of the surface; the large 
black spots surrounded by a circle of six adatoms is the corner hole – a deep 
depression at the vertices of the unit cell.  Early STMers could see this depression
even when they could not resolve the individual atoms of the 7x7.  From Demuth 
(1988).  
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in a series of line traces (showing that the traces were registering some repeating 
“signal” rather than just random “noise”); and by becoming familiar with the sights 
and sounds of such traces over time, they could tell that the STM was registering very 
similar patterns on the 7x7 from day to day.  As they describe it now, they probably 
“saw” the atoms of the 7x7 many times this way, but it took them a long time to 
develop the familiarity and confidence to find a good set of line traces, turn them into 
a publishable image, and present it to their surface science colleagues. 
 So, one day when they heard the chuk-chuk-chuk of the chart recorder scribing 
out regular, ordered line traces, they saved, collated, and handed them to Gerber to 
turn into an image.  Gerber pasted each chart recorder strip to a piece of cardboard, cut 
out the trace, and glued all the pieces of cardboard together in order to form a three-
dimensional, solid representation of what the STM had “seen.”  Hand-made models of 
this sort have a long history in science, of course, but are rare in microscopy.  Surface 
scientists were used to ball-and-stick molecular models, and most still have such kits 
in their offices, often arranged to represent popular surfaces like the 7x7.  The hand-
crafted sculpture of the 7x7, though, was outside their ken.14
Surface scientists, despite the name, are interested not just in the top layer of 
atoms at a surface, but in all the layers that make up the transition between interface 
and bulk; this can extend 5, 6, even 10 or 20 layers deep.  Moreover, when surface 
scientists talk about the structure of reconstructions, they mean the electronic and 
bond structure of the reconstruction as well as the placement of atoms within the unit 
cell.  The STM “image” of the 7x7, on the other hand, only showed the very topmost 
layer of atoms, and told nothing about bonds or electronic structure.  For some surface 
scientists, therefore, the Zurich team’s style of presentation engendered confusion and 
even hostile skepticism.  Audience members at their presentations would get up and 
                                                 
14 For an excellent article on models and representational conventions, see Francoeur (1997). 
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leave or ask pointed questions about the credibility of their images [GB1, 9/26/00; 
HR1, 11/13/01; CG1, 11/12/01; JG3, 2/28/01].  A few times, well-known researchers 
visiting visiting Zurich came into Binnig and Rohrer’s lab and attacked the 7x7 
“image” as fraudulent.  Some surface scientists claimed, for instance, that Binnig and 
Rohrer had simply labeled the axes of their images so they would appear to have 
atomic resolution, rather than ascertaining that features within the images actually 
corresponded to atoms; others charged that the Zurich team was trying to pass off 
computer simulations of the 7x7 as images obtained from a microscope. 
In fact, such outright skepticism did not last long, and no surface scientist 
developed a critique of the STM or Binnig and Rohrer’s 7x7 results that was technical 
enough to make it into print.  When questioned directly about their 7x7 image, Binnig 
and Rohrer based their reply on aesthetic considerations.  On the one hand, they 
reasoned that the complexity of the pattern in their image could not be artifactual; only 
the unit cell of the 7x7 could have such an intricate arrangement of its constituents, 
and therefore it was reasonable to conclude that the STM was achieving atomic 
resolution.  On the other hand, they constructed their three-dimensional cardboard 
representation in such a way as to defuse the notion that it was a simulation – the 
image is so obviously homemade and messy that it bears little resemblance to 
something cooked up inside a computer.  Controversy about the 7x7 faded quickly, 
particularly as Binnig and Rohrer and a variety of surface scientists sought ways to 
integrate the STM into the discipline.  Yet a certain incommensurability of style 
between the Zurich team and some in the wider surface science community lingered 
on, much of it sparked by Binnig’s willful naïveté about disciplinary conventions.  The 
7x7 image, for instance, simply did not accord well with how surface scientists 
thought visually about atomic structure.  They were used to thinking in terms of three-
dimensional ball-and-stick models or viewed-from-above maps (usually generated by 
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theorists).  Binnig and Rohrer’s cardboard representation was more of a landscape or 
even a diorama than a map, and surface scientists found it difficult to integrate it with 
their theoretical understandings.  It’s notable that Binnig and Rohrer never again 
resorted to transforming line traces into sculpture in this way, nor did their replicators.  
Most later STMers, particularly in the corporate labs, quickly moved to computerized 
imaging which accorded much better with surface scientific modes of representation.  
Even for STMers who stuck with analog imaging, the standard way of publishing an 
STM image for the next decade was to take a Polaroid of the line traces on a storage 
oscilloscope. 
So the Zurich team was clearly aiming for something novel and creative with 
their first public rendering of the 7x7.  While it unnerved some of their audience, it did 
capture the imagination of many researchers – many more than had ever paid attention 
to the STM or the Topografiner before.  There is something about the sculpted 7x7 
that proclaims the new-found tangibility of atoms, and almost all early STMers speak 
breathlessly of the excitement of “seeing atoms” for the first time [RF1, 5/2/01; DE1, 
10/11/01].  As they put it, 
 
[We went away and] wrote the paper on the 7x7.  We returned convinced that 
this would attract the attention of our colleagues, even of those not involved 
with surface science.  We helped by presenting both an unprocessed relief 
model assembled from the original recorder traces with scissors, Plexiglass and 
nails, and a processed top view; the former for credibility, the latter for 
analysis and discussion.  It certainly did help, with the result that we practically 
stopped doing research for a while.  We were inundated with requests for talks 
(Binnig and Rohrer 1987). 
The STM, though, was not the first instrument with atomic resolution – the field-ion 
microscope had been generating images of atoms since the ’50s, and souped-up 
transmission electron microscopes could do so in the ’70s.  The sculpted 7x7 
demonstrated the novelty of the STM and the skill of its makers, but this hardly 
accounts for the tremendous significance of Binnig and Rohrer’s first 7x7 article. 
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What does account for this significance, I think, is the way the Zurich team 
skillfully insinuated their image of the 7x7 into the context of an ongoing debate about 
that reconstruction within surface science – a debate that, fortuitously enough, was 
beginning to reach a crisis.  Binnig and Rohrer headlined their first 7x7 article with the 
hand-crafted sculpture (the emblem of their maverick artisanry and ethic of naïveté), 
but they also coordinated that image with inscriptions (Latour 1988a) that credentialed 
their work as making a significant, disciplined contribution to surface science.  By 
enrolling their local surface science network into the project, they learned what 
features of the 7x7 question were under discussion in the surface science community, 
and what questions their image could help answer.  Thus, in their first 7x7 article, they 
carefully interpreted their image for a surface science audience, transforming it into 
the abstracted, bird’s-eye representations (see Figure 3-5) favored by surface 
scientists, and then pointing to salient features that could contribute to the 7x7 debate. 
In doing so, Binnig and Rohrer elicited a curious but highly effective audience 
response.  Demonstrating the relevance of their image to open questions about the 7x7 
allowed surface scientists to take the Zurich team seriously.  On the one hand, surface 
scientists now looked at the STM as an instrument that could say something to surface 
science and should be replicated.  On the other hand, the Binnig and Rohrer article still 
presented significant gaps in interpretation and by no means resolved the 7x7’s issues 
[CD1, 10/30/03; FH1, 5/9/01].  Yet, because the STMers could be taken seriously, 
surface scientists welcomed the gaps as an opportunity for them to appropriate and 
remold the STM.  Even if the STM was only an adjunct in solving the 7x7, many 
surface scientists took it to be revolutionary because it provided atomic-scale, real-
space images of materials central to the practice of the field.  As noted, both the FIM 
and the TEM could give atomic resolution under special circumstances, but the 
materials they could image were seen as too marginal to surface science to be really 
 
 
 
111Figure 3-5: Bird's-eye view of the 7x7.  In their first article on the 7x7, Binnig and 
Rohrer tried to show surface scientists that they could make STM data about 
surface reconstructions speak to the discipline’s conventional ways of thinking 
about structure models.  They did this partly by pairing a bird’s-eye version (left) of 
the same data presented earlier as a three-dimensional sculpture (see Figure 3-2) 
with a proposed model for the structure of the 7x7 (right).  From Binnig, et al. 
(1983b). 
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interesting; whereas the STM had demonstrated its applicability on one of the jewels 
in the surface scientific crown.  Surface scientists began to see it as a radical shortcut 
through the laborious, inconclusive morass of LEED patterns and structure 
calculations.  Indeed, in the long run the rise of STM coincided with a loss of prestige 
both for LEED and for the whole game of solving reconstructions (Lagally 2003). 
Encouraging Replication, Averting Resistance 
Binnig and Rohrer foresaw some consequences of the success of STM, and, 
though they had little love for FIM or LEED, they wanted to avert the view of STM as 
an unwelcome substitute for more traditional techniques.  Thus, as Arne Hessenbruch 
points out, Binnig and Rohrer worked to show that, in application and resolution, STM 
complemented and only marginally overlapped, rather than subsumed and replaced, 
SEM, TEM, FIM, and light microscopy (Binnig and Rohrer 1982).  To the extent this 
strategy was meant to forestall resistance, it seems to have largely succeeded.  Though 
early on some FIMmers and LEED people opposed the STM publicly and harshly, 
after the publication of the 7x7 this hostility waned.  If, on the other hand, Binnig and 
Rohrer were trying to make the point that practitioners of other techniques should join 
the STM bandwagon, they largely failed.  FIMmers never cottoned to STM, and well-
known LEED people such as Franz Himpsel or Max Lagally did not take it up for 
almost a decade; early on, surface scientists who were already established in some 
other technique allowed a younger generation of postdocs and newcomers to replicate 
and adapt the STM for use in their discipline.  Electron microscopists, too, largely 
ignored STM, even though Binnig and Rohrer clearly expected them to be the first 
wave of researchers to attempt replication. 
The group of replicators that did coalesce around Binnig and Rohrer was a 
more eclectic lot who often had experience building other kinds of instruments but felt 
ready to switch subfields.  Most had some local link to the Zurich lab, often European 
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academics with long-standing ties to IBM whose students would get jobs at Zurich, or 
who spent sabbaticals there [TB1, 11/19/01; DK1, 11/15/01; HG2, 11/8/01].  Rohrer 
was the most successful recruiter of early European replicators.  As a senior manager 
at the lab he could shape research within the institution and attract other IBM 
researchers at Zurich to the instrument; thus, people like Dieter Pohl, Urs Dürig, Jim 
Gimzewski, Giorgio Travaglini, S.F. Alavarado, Bruno Michel, and others started to 
form a substantial STM community within IBM Zurich.  By all accounts, Rohrer was 
the most expansive and personable personality in the original three-man group, and his 
openness and friendliness both attracted newcomers and set the tone for how the 
nascent community of STMers would be organized.  As one very early academic 
STMer (whom we will meet again in Chapter Five) puts it: 
 
We all know of Gerd Binnig’s genius for building instruments, though I think 
Heini Rohrer’s profound contributions to the field have been underestimated.  
From the beginning he was the most open, sharing guy....  He always wanted to 
help others, accepting their ideas while encouraging them to explore new areas 
and to try different things.  He would have been the natural person to set 
himself up as the leader of microscopy, who defined what were good projects 
and what were bad projects and who was doing good work and who was doing 
questionable work, but he was never like that. [PH1, 3/19/01] 
Interestingly, Binnig and Rohrer looked to the history and social organization of other 
microscopy fields as a way to frame their own conception of the STM field – by, for 
example, taking electron microscopy’s move into biology as a model, and treating the 
field-ion community as a straw man for how not to organize. 
 
We started to think a little broader.  I started for instance operating the STM on 
DNA,... and we cooperated with people from other universities and completely 
different fields and we talked to chemists and we talked to biologists....  So we 
started very early to talk to very different disciplines....  All kinds of 
microscopes can be used in all kinds of fields, like optical or electron 
microscopes.  Electron microscopy had its first big success in biology.  So then 
it’s obvious that you can use STM for other fields besides surface science.  
And we talked very early to these people, what would be interesting....  So we 
created a little bit of a culture [of openness] in this community already right 
from the beginning.  Which was more open than, for instance, the community 
of field-emission or field-ionization people who tried to be closed.  We tried to 
be open and bring things out instead of protecting. [GB1, 9/26/00] 
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Of course, Binnig and Rohrer’s attempt to keep their community “open” and to 
minimize clashes with other instrumental communities accorded well with the ethic of 
naïveté.  That is, they encouraged the growth of a community where everything would 
be treated as novel and exciting and a possible avenue for further discovery.  
Discouraging a culture of criticism and boundary maintenance – hallmarks, as they 
saw it, of the field emission and surface science communities – also averted potential 
priority disputes and questions about the STM’s unrecognized antecedents. 
 
In the first years I don’t know anybody who was not very open and didn’t 
publish openly. Of course once an area develops then the competition aspect 
comes in.  For a while it’s the achievement aspect which is much much more 
important than the competition aspect.  You want to achieve something, but 
that has nothing to do with the competition aspect, that’s the scientific spirit of 
achievement.  It is achievement for achievement’s sake which advances 
science, not competition.  Unfortunately, later you always have this 
competition coming in when you fight for recognition.  But all these things 
were not I would say in the heads of all these guys at the beginning....  The best 
counterexample, that’s the field ion microscopy and field emission.  That 
stayed a closed community around Mueller....  That’s why it never really 
spread.  But the STM I think that was one of our merits, we kept it open. [HR1, 
11/13/01] 
Binnig and Rohrer worked hard in the early years to lower barriers to entry for 
newcomers – though, in the climate of corporate research, there were some 
newcomers (especially at Bell Labs) with whom they had to be circumspect.  Building 
an experimental culture in which newcomers would neither be turned away nor 
criticized harshly, however, was not enough to attract replicators.  To do this, Binnig, 
Rohrer, and Gerber developed a three-pronged strategy.  First, they continued 
developing the technology, making it more flexible, easier to use, cheaper, etc.  
Second, they began demonstrating the STM’s relevance across a variety of 
applications, training it on specimens of interest to a diverse cross-section of 
disciplines.  Finally, they started to investigate and explain more carefully how the 
instrument worked and what its results meant.  Once again, they relied on their 
group’s division of labor, skill, knowledge, and style.  For instance, routine instrument 
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development (engineering work that Binnig did not find novel and exciting) often fell 
to Gerber and other auxiliaries.  It’s easy to see why Binnig shied away – polishing 
down the STM’s rough edges generally did not, per se, generate new discoveries or 
clarify the instrument’s attributes, but it did make it less of a virtuosic challenge to 
operate the microscope.  Thus, this kind of STM innovation played against both the 
ethic of naïveté and Binnig’s construction of the STM as a site for maverick artisanry. 
Interestingly, instrument development became a way to induct younger 
members into the STM team.  A Swiss undergraduate named Othmar Marti, for 
instance, worked summers at IBM Zurich, sharing a lab with Binnig and building 
circuits for the STMers [OM1, 11/16/01].  Eventually Rohrer arranged for Marti to 
seek a graduate degree under Rohrer’s old thesis adviser; for his dissertation Marti 
built one of the first low-temperature STMs, doing most of his experimental work at 
IBM.  Marti’s significance, though, extended beyond his low-temperature design; his 
dissertation (Marti 1986) circulated widely and became a kind of handbook for many 
early STMers.  In their articles, Binnig and Rohrer thinly referenced literature that 
could be seen as preceding and relevant to the STM; moreover, their descriptions of 
how the instrument actually worked lacked much detail that might have been useful to 
a replicator.  Marti’s dissertation, on the other hand, included a long discussion of the 
history of tunneling, a thorough examination of STM theory, and explanation of 
practical details such as feedback circuitry, vibration isolation, and tip preparation. 
Marti also had expertise in electronics and software, an area the STMers 
struggled with.  In building his low-temperature instrument, he often put together 
complicated, problem-specific circuits and electronics modules that he shared with 
Binnig and Gerber.  Eventually, he was asked to develop a more or less standardized 
package of modules to circulate among the STM groups at Zurich.  This package (the 
“Blue Box”) was the first attempt to automate the tip-sample approach and make life 
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easier for the operator.  Moreover, the Blue Box could interface the STM to a 
computer for the first time.  Until the Blue Box, “data analysis” could really only be 
done by Binnig and Gerber, since they were the only people with enough experience 
to develop a sense for what squiggles on the oscilloscope meant.  Now, data could be 
stored in a computer and made portable; “seeing” an STM image could become a 
routine, non-artisanal skill. 
Digital storage encouraged the Zurich team to develop digital methods for 
presenting and analyzing images.  Again, this task fell not to the computer-averse 
Binnig, but to a junior researcher named Erich Stoll.  Stoll worked with both theorists 
and experimentalists at Zurich, developing simulations based on the theorists’ models 
and processing algorithms to enhance the experimentalists’ images (Stoll and Marti 
1987; Stoll and Baratoff 1988).  Interestingly, this could be seen as pushing Binnig 
and Rohrer closer to the corporate center – after all, computing was what IBM did 
best, and groups at IBM Yorktown were working on similar ways of controlling the 
STM and processing its images.  Instead, the reception of Stoll’s work indicated some 
unease about the Zurich style among American IBMers.  Some at Yorktown believed 
Stoll was over-processing images, filtering to produce spurious high resolution in a 
way that could, they worried, damage the credibility of the whole STM community. 
 
[At the first big STM conference in 1985] the Zurich group ... had this one guy 
[Stoll] and he started doing some pretty heavy image processing, taking data 
that was really borderline and massaging it to get something out of it....  That 
was not very well received.  Obviously that had not been done in the early 
Zurich data, and everybody knew that the data was just fine.  Nevertheless, 
there were a few outsiders, totally unfamiliar with the field, that had expressed 
skepticism about the whole thing, said it was all made up....  I mean, [Stoll’s] 
results were probably fine, but that’s what happens – they had nice data on all 
sorts of things but at some point of course you’re so busy getting Nobel Prizes 
you stop taking data and then somebody ends up analyzing the stuff that 
normally you would have set aside and re-acquired with greater quality. [RF1, 
5/2/01] 
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Interestingly, most of the post-7x7 Zurich innovations that were taken up by 
Yorktowners were developed by Gerber.  In particular, Gerber’s answer to the 
bedeviling issue of vibration isolation became a widespread modification.  Gerber was 
entrusted with modifying portions of the Zurich STM from generation to generation, 
adapting it for specific projects.  Often this meant modifying the microscope to make 
it more relevant to some technical subculture – surface scientists, electrochemists, 
tunneling experts, etc.  One modification centered on getting electron microscopists to 
take notice.  Gerber made an STM small enough to fit inside the chamber of an 
electron microscope.  This would allow the same sample to be imaged almost 
simultaneously by the two instruments, over a much wider range of resolutions than 
either could provide on its own (Gerber, et al. 1986).  This would appeal both to 
metrologists and to people interested in looking at a sample at low resolution and then 
swooping down on one or two spots (a typical practice in biological microscopy). 
In making the instrument small, though, Gerber stumbled on something of 
much wider significance.  Remember that the first few generations of STMs had large, 
bulky, complicated, esoteric vibration isolation systems.  Suddenly, Gerber found all 
these were more or less unnecessary – simply by making the microscope small, one 
could cut out a very large range of vibrations.  The mechanics of this are fairly simple 
– think of how a one-story house behaves in an earthquake or a high wind relative to a 
twelve-story construction.  The taller building must be built much more massively 
than the smaller one in order not to topple; if they were built the same way, the taller 
building would sway more widely and unpredictably than the smaller building.  The 
“mechanical path” from the ground to the top of the edifice is much longer for the tall 
building than the small house.  In an STM, the mechanical path is the distance from 
the sample through the sample holder, the microscope base, the scanner, and the tip.  
Gerber shrank this path by an order of magnitude, giving the tip less play with respect 
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to the sample.  This obviated the high frequency vibrations impinging on the STM.  To 
deal with the low frequency vibrations, meanwhile, Gerber found a UHV-compatible 
rubber called Viton that could be set in layers underneath the scanner. 
This “pocket STM” (see Figure 3-6) with its compact base and scanner, an 
inch or two on each side, and three or four layers of Viton and metal sandwiched 
underneath, caught on like wildfire.  People who were already in the field quickly 
understood the value of a small mechanical path, and raced to build smaller 
microscopes [GB1, 9/26/00; CG1, 11/12/01].  One European academic, Karl Besocke, 
for instance, developed the “matchbox STM” and would go around conferences 
showing his tunneling microscope inside a matchbox (Besocke 1987).  Others, such as 
Cal Quate, looked forward to etching STMs directly into silicon wafers – the “STM on 
a chip” detailed in an NSF grant entitled “Microfabrication of the Scanning Tunneling 
Microscope.”  Within IBM, small microscopes with Viton spacers became the semi-
official look of Big Blue’s STMs – with both Zurich and Yorktown producing batches 
of such microscopes for internal use, the design spread quickly.  Moreover, as new 
people came to STM they were introduced to the field through designs for the pocket 
STM – thus, the look of Gerber’s instrument began to crop up in very distant places. 
After the 7x7 
 I want to close by looking at where each member of the Zurich team went and 
what they did after the 7x7 – both because their contributions in the wake of the 7x7 
were significant, but also because this phase of their work tells us a great deal about 
their interpretation of the STM and their construction of scientific personae in an 
expanding technical community.  Discovering the 7x7 is remembered as a momentous 
event personally for Binnig, Rohrer, and Gerber.  Its reception radically changed what 
it meant to be an STMer.  In a relatively short span, their fringe, hidden side bet 
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Figure 3-6: The pocket STM.  This very compact version of the STM, with its 
distinctive layering of metal plates and Viton spacers was developed by Christoph
Gerber and spread rapidly through the STM community because of its improved 
vibration isolation capability.  From Gerber, et al. (1986).  
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became the center of attention and praise.  Being the inventors of the STM, far from a 
somewhat irrational career choice, was now the grounds for fame and glory. 
 In the immediate post-7x7 period, Rohrer became an ambassador, smoothing 
the reception of the microscope into new communities, offering advice to STMers who 
sought it, contacting people whom he thought should take up the instrument, and 
managing some of the STM groups at Zurich.  “Elder statesman of STM” was an easy 
role for Rohrer to fill as a senior researcher and manager, and his avuncular 
personality set the tone of the community.  Others looked to him to fill this role as 
well – Cal Quate, for instance, asked him to represent IBM Zurich at the first informal 
STM workshop in 1984, in which a small group of replicators sought his guidance; 
and IBM Europe asked him to organize the first big STM conference in 1985.  When 
prominent STMers today discuss the modern version of the STM conference, they 
speak of Rohrer’s original vision of the conferences with the respect and admiration 
due a founder of the field [PH1, 3/19/01]. 
 Gerber, meanwhile, continued work on projects related to microscope design.  
In the ’80s, Gerber’s work tended to be tied to Binnig’s; when Binnig’s wanderlust 
took him on sabbaticals, Gerber was usually posted to the same place.  Later, when 
Binnig drifted away from probe microscopy, Gerber took on a more leading role, 
eventually splitting his time between Zurich and H.-J. Güntherodt’s group at Basel, 
while managing his own effort in AFM-based chemical sensing.  Of the three original 
STMers, Gerber seems to have been the most steadfastly committed to probe 
microscopy, and the most willing to stake his career and his technical identity (Haring 
2002) on it.  Indeed, in conversation Gerber evinces much more fascination with, and 
willingness to pitch, the technology than either Binnig or Rohrer [CG1, 11/12/01]. 
 Where Gerber has attached himself to probe microscopy, Binnig, until the late 
’90s, gradually drifted away from the field he started.  Binnig’s career is characterized 
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by a series of transitions into new fields, and he has oriented himself more to starting 
new things than to steadily plying a routinized technique.  This exemplifies the 
scientific persona he has cultivated.  Boredom and impatience with familiar tasks were 
central components of the ethic of naïveté; by definition, a technique that had become 
routine was one about which too much was known, and hence no longer a site for 
untutored creativity.  Thus, after the 7x7, Binnig only briefly continued looking at 
samples of interest to surface scientists, and the little surface science work he did was 
framed more as a suggestion for what other researchers could do than as a rigorous 
investigation of a particular material.  For instance, experience with the vagaries of the 
STM taught him that different tunneling voltages yielded very different images; with a 
few simple experiments he demonstrated that this fact could be used to turn the STM 
into a powerful spectroscopy tool to investigate how tunneling over a range of 
voltages could illuminate the bond structure of the surface.  As we will see in Chapter 
Four, though, he left the work of rigorously transforming the STM to others. 
 
[Yorktowners and Almadeners] came here and visited us to learn about this 
technique.  We were the first who started with this STS [spectroscopy] 
technique but actually I have to admit ... the Yorktowners and people from Bell 
Labs did it much nicer....  I never published our spectroscopy results very 
carefully – just in a conference proceedings....  It was a more or less 
preliminary result and ... they both knew about these results because they were 
present at the conference – they probably were stimulated a little by this, but 
then they did an excellent job in solving real problems.  We just did something 
to see whether it works. [GB1, 9/26/00] 
Once STM broke into surface science, therefore, Binnig let more disciplined 
practitioners adapt, transform, and promote it.  He began instead to look for new 
collaborators and networks through which STM could propagate. 
The first of these was in electrochemistry [DK1, 11/15/01].  Like surface 
scientists, electrochemists are interested in how physical forces and chemical reactions 
change the structure and electronic characteristics of metal surfaces; in fact, some of 
the surfaces the Zurich team had already looked at – especially gold – were canonical 
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electrochemical materials.  Also, like surface scientists, electrochemists were used to 
approaching surfaces through indirect means (by using current-voltage curves to 
describe how changes in the voltage of an electrochemical cell affected the 
microstructure of the surface).  Thus, when Binnig found electrochemists to talk to he 
analogized their field as “underwater surface science” and made the first steps toward 
incorporating the STM into their practice (though, again, the real work of making the 
STM an electrochemical tool would be left to others) (Gomez, et al. 1986). 
Next Binnig became interested in biology, and an extensive bio-STM effort 
began at Zurich, first in collaboration with a visiting Spanish physicist, Niko Garcia, 
later in Giorgio Travaglini’s group under Rohrer’s supervision, and finally several 
years later in Binnig’s own group at Munich.  Clearly, bio-STM offered wide scope 
for the ethic of naïveté – no one in the original Zurich team knew anything about 
preparing biological samples or interpreting STM images of those samples.  Moreover, 
the turn to biology was inspired by two historical analogies.  On the one hand, the 
twentieth century saw any number of gifted, maverick physicists take to biology – 
Schrödinger, Feynman, Gamow, etc.  On the other hand, taking a new microscope and 
adapting it to look at biological samples was a well-trodden path both for optical and 
electron microscopy, and the biology community made those instruments much more 
successful than physicists could have on their own. 
Still, as novel as bio-STM was, it did not keep Binnig’s attention forever.  As 
we will see in Chapter Six, in 1990-2, bio-STM entered a phase of intense controversy 
that ended in the almost complete disavowal of STM as a biological tool.  Binnig 
played an important part in this debate, but his taste for dispute, and for STM, 
diminished significantly.  Even before then, in the period after the 7x7, his duties as 
inventor of a newsworthy instrument were beginning to pall on him; he traveled 
extensively through 1983-4, spreading news about the technique at conferences and 
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visiting replicators to help them build their machines [CG1, 11/12/01; JM1, 3/15/01].  
He also wrote widely about the instrument in a general tone as part of IBM’s effort to 
help secure the Nobel Prize for him and Rohrer (an effort that succeeded in 1986).  
The almost inevitable result, given Binnig’s self-presentation, was that he became 
even more disaffected with the technique and with the routine in Zurich. 
When Cal Quate, one of the first North American replicators, invited Binnig to 
come to Stanford for 1985, therefore, the offer was hard to resist.  Binnig agreed to 
take a sabbatical in Quate’s lab while spending part of his time at IBM Almaden 
(outside San Jose), while Big Blue reassigned Gerber to Almaden for the year with the 
understanding that he would occasionally assist Binnig and Quate in Palo Alto.  
Gerber was assigned to bring the Almaden STMers up to speed, travel to academic 
labs to help other replicators, and tinker with the design to make the STM more 
reliable.  Binnig’s goals for the year were less clear-cut.  Having become “tired” of the 
STM, he wanted to find some area where he could bring his experimental prowess 
(and the ethic of naïveté) to bear on an outstanding physical problem. 
Initially, he lit on gravity wave physics as an area where conventional 
experimental solutions had proven uninformative and an untutored, maverick attempt 
might succeed.  By the mid-’80s, gravity wave physicists were leaving behind the era 
of small, home-made detectors and focusing on large (kilometer-long) detectors built 
and managed by huge teams of researchers and engineers.  Binnig saw an opening to 
use STM technology to counter this trend and turn gravity wave physics back into a 
“small science.”15  There were features of Quate’s group that led Binnig to this topic – 
he envisioned using a low-temperature vibration sensor, similar to a low-temperature 
                                                 
15 For gravity waves’ vexed journey from small science to big science, see Collins (1975; 1992; 1999; 
2003).  Perhaps most interesting here is Collins (1998), with its discussion of “open” and “closed” 
communities.  We can also see Binnig here as trying to short-circuit some of the imperatives of “big 
science” with a small-scale gravity wave detector; see also Galison (1985). 
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acoustic microscope Quate built in the ’70s – but it seems equally likely that, like 
vacuum tunneling or the 7x7, gravity waves were simply an appealing unsolved 
mystery.  Interestingly, the foray into gravity waves also confirmed some of the 
problems with the ethic of naïveté: 
 
[With vibration isolation] we were very naïve.  We first thought if you levitate 
something on top of a superconductor that’s the best thing....  But this was 
stupid....  We also had this eddy current damping then in the beginning.  This 
worked very nicely.  Then we had multistages....  Actually people from gravity 
waves, they knew things like multistages very well.  We should have just 
studied their literature a little bit more carefully we would have learned a lot.  
But you see I’m not a guy who likes to read literature, so I didn’t do much in 
this respect.  But I learned that later then when I studied the literature about, 
because I wanted to use the AFM for gravity wave detection....  I realized 
hmmm, these people, they already knew many of our vibration isolation tricks 
long before we developed them.  So, we just could have taken those ideas from 
these people. [GB1, 9/26/00] 
As it turned out, though, he spent relatively little time on the gravity wave detector, 
although he continued to play around with it until the early ’90s [GB1, 9/26/00; MK1, 
10/12/01; FG1, 11/16/01]. 
 Instead, he used his year in California to create the atomic force microscope 
(AFM), which, today, dominates the probe microscopy field.  From the standpoint of 
the ethic of naïveté, one of the great failings of the STM was that it could only image 
conducting samples.  For surface scientists, this was not much of a concern, since their 
materials of choice were metals and semiconductors; but for Binnig, whose 
experimental style privileged moving from one class of sample to another, this 
limitation was onerous.  Thus, when he arrived in California, he intended to leave 
STM behind and move into gravity wave physics.  The Quate group, though, had a 
long history of doing non-destructive microscopy (i.e. techniques where, unlike in 
electron microscopy, the sample is not destroyed in the process of looking at it) on all 
kinds of samples, and by 1985 were working hard to expand the capabilities of STM; 
in this atmosphere Binnig became more reluctant to leave microscopy behind.  
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Instead, he thought about ways to let STM image insulators and thus expand its range 
of imageable samples. 
 One solution was to coat the sample with metal and do STM on the metallic 
replica, a technique tried at Zurich and elsewhere, particularly for biological samples.  
Binnig saw, though, that a more non-destructive approach might be to scrape a small, 
flexible strip of metal over a surface and feed an STM back on the strip, rather than 
the surface itself (see Figure 1-3).  If the spring constant of the strip were smaller than 
the force holding together the atoms of the sample, then little or no damage would be 
done to the sample during imaging.  Where the STM’s mode of feedback had been the 
exchange of tunneling electrons, the new microscope would depend on the strength of 
the atomic forces between tip and sample – hence, the “atomic force” microscope 
(Binnig, et al. 1986a).  The invention of the AFM shared many characteristics with the 
STM.  For instance, once again the ethic of naïveté clouded Binnig’s awareness of a 
variety of relevant predecessors.  Binnig happily cites one source within the STM 
community that pointed him toward the AFM – work by John Pethica at Cambridge 
using STM to study adhesion and interatomic forces – but other forebears (such as Urs 
Dürig’s work on adhesive forces using STM at Zurich, or Clayton Teague’s discovery 
of the role of tip-tip force interactions during his vacuum tunneling research) are less 
visible in his descriptions of the initial AFM work [GB1, 926/00; UD1, 11/12/01; 
CT1, 6/28/02].  Yet, clearly, given Quate’s involvement in the non-destructive testing 
community and ties to semiconductor manufacturing, he must have been aware of, for 
example, surface profiling techniques that strongly resembled the AFM and which had 
been in existence since the ’50s. 
As with the STM, though, the ethic of naïveté allowed Binnig to find new 
perspectives on old problems.  For instance, he identified more imaging modes, and 
ways to image less destructively with higher resolution, than could have been 
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imagined by the surface profiler community – by thinking in terms of atomic forces as 
a feedback mechanism, Binnig showed that the AFM could operate both with the 
probe scraping the surface (“contact mode”) and with it wiggling above the surface 
(“non-contact mode”).  As before, though, the ethic of naïveté created problems in 
patenting Binnig’s work.  IBM had arranged that products of Binnig’s sabbatical year 
at Stanford would be patented under Big Blue’s aegis, so the papers for the AFM 
patent list Binnig, Gerber, and IBM as the patentees, even though the original paper 
announcing the AFM was authored by Binnig, Quate, and Gerber.  Moreover, the 
patent neglects mention of technologies audiences might deem relevant such as 
profilers [MK1, 10/12/01; SM1, 3/13/01].  IBM has spent considerable money and 
energy trying to collect on the AFM patent, especially once the instruments began to 
be commercially produced.  Other AFM patents have generated millions of dollars for 
holders such as the University of California system; yet the Binnig patents yielded 
very little.  As with STM, AFM benefited Big Blue by generating prestige but not 
direct revenue; again, it proved difficult to reconcile Binnig’s maverick role with the 
exigencies of corporate profit. 
 A similar problem dogged the other major innovation to come out of Binnig 
and Gerber’s year in California.  Recall that earlier designs had used three 
perpendicularly stacked piezo crystals to control the fine movement of the probe – one 
pointing in (and controlling) the x-direction, one for the y-direction, and one for the z-
direction (height).  Binnig and Gerber, in the course of helping both the Stanford and 
Almaden teams devise more rugged and reliable STMs and AFMs, saw that one stack 
of piezos could control fine motion in all three directions.  The piezoelectric crystal, 
after all, could change shape in any direction so long as it experienced a voltage drop 
that pointed in the right way.  By gluing electrodes pointing in all three directions, you 
could make a single crystal change shape any way you wanted.  The old piezo stack 
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design had bedeviled STMers because the piezos were thin and brittle (and hence 
easily broke off), and because the process of gluing them together (and keeping them 
glued) was laborious and unreliable.  The new piezos (called a “tube scanner” because 
the piezo piece was usually a hollow cylinder) were thicker and hence less brittle, and 
it proved easier to glue electrodes onto one piezo than to glue three perpendicular 
piezos together.  Again, as with the pocket STM, this innovation spread rapidly 
through the STM community, and the ease with which a tube scanner could be 
constructed induced many people to begin building STMs.  Yet, as with the AFM, the 
naïveté that guided the invention of the tube scanner also made it impossible to patent 
– Binnig and Gerber’s application was rejected on the grounds that it replicated a 
design from the ’50s for a phonograph needle assembly. 
These patent difficulties were symptomatic of a slippage between Binnig and 
IBM that widened in the years after he returned from California.  Having received the 
Nobel Prize in 1986, he was a valuable commodity for a research organization that 
prided itself on its international reputation and clutch of prize-winning scientists.  Yet 
Binnig’s ennui with probe microscopy, and his self-consciously marginal style of 
science, made his superiors uneasy and left him dissatisfied with Zurich.  Thus, in the 
late ’80s IBM allowed him to set up “IBM Munich” – an outpost consisting of Binnig, 
Gerber (part-time), and a student and/or postdoc.  With resources to do what he 
wanted, and no management to constrain him, this could well have been the high point 
of Binnig’s career.  Yet the teamwork that made him so successful in Zurich and Palo 
Alto was missing in Munich; and, though he proved adept at picking and training 
postdocs, his own vision lost focus.  Thus, the IBM Munich crew first worked on the 
gravity wave detector, then bio-STM, and finally non-contact UHV AFM [WH1, 
11/14/01; FG1, 11/16/01].  Binnig himself attended to these projects, but his own 
interests slid further away from probe microscopy until, in the early ’90s, he turned to 
 
 128
chaos theory and fractal mathematics.  Binnig the experimental genius now became 
Binnig the programmer and, interestingly, Binnig the writer.  Indeed, it is in Binnig’s 
popular – yet strangely opaque – writings on chaos theory and creativity that we find 
some of his clearest expressions of the ethic of naïveté.  In fact, he opens with a 
statement that sums up this attitude, and which his closest colleagues and collaborators 
often cite as exemplary of his experimental style: 
 
I admit, it is really presumptuous of me to write about the theme of creativity: I 
have until now never engaged scientifically with this theme, nor have I studied 
the literature on it.  But possibly this is just the right method to go at a 
relatively new theme (Binnig 1989a). 
 One other piece of Binnig’s analysis of creativity nicely rounds out our story.  
For Binnig, creativity is a fractal phenomenon.  That is, each new element is built 
from smaller ones, and each new piece of creativity is synthesized from smaller bits of 
creativity in particular domains.  Moreover, creativity is an evolutionary process – 
complexity increases as growth unfolds over time in a random (yet constrained) 
process.  Thus, in Binnig view, replication is fundamental to creativity.  It is only in 
reproducing an idea or an element that new bits of complexity creep in. 
 In the next two chapters, we will see how creativity and replication came about 
for the STM and the AFM.  Interestingly, these two chapters reproduce the tensions 
surrounding the ethic of naïveté, but on a much larger scale.  At the corporate labs of 
Chapter Four, there was little place for Binnig’s path of naïveté and creative failure.  
Instead, the values of experiment were centered more on personal and instrumental 
success, and on the positive accumulation of new knowledge and techniques within a 
disciplined framework.  Creativity was still present, but in a more competitive, more 
scrutinized form.  In Chapter Five, we again see something like the ethic of naïveté, 
for Binnig’s way of building microscopes accorded well with the experimental culture 
of academic STMers in California.  Binnig himself spent time with people like Cal 
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Quate, and reproduced in California the innovative drive that fueled the invention of 
the STM in Zurich.  Over the long run, though, Binnig’s style of work proved 
unsustainable, both for him and his followers.  The STM came into being in a 
remarkable shower of naïveté and optimism; but it survived and prospered by 
opportunistically tacking back and forth between naïveté and more disciplined 
skepticism.
 
 
Chapter Four 
American Corporate Labs and Replication of the STM 
 
It seems likely that the STM could have been invented in many places.  It was, 
in some sense, already invented at the National Bureau of Standards before its 
appearance in Zurich.  Binnig, Rohrer, and IBM, however, spent much time and 
energy ensuring that it was seen as a product of Big Blue research.  This meant that 
when it eventually crossed the Atlantic it became enmeshed in the world of the 
American corporate research laboratories.  Indeed, integration of the STM into North 
American corporate research was a natural result of IBM’s desire to have the new 
instrument recognized as a newsworthy scientific achievement.  This chapter examines 
the introduction of STM into the big American research laboratories.1  Two of them 
dominated the STM community for much of the 1980s – IBM Yorktown Heights in 
the Hudson Valley region, and Bell Labs in rural/suburban Murray Hill, New Jersey – 
but other corporate and national labs also made significant contributions: IBM 
Almaden, in the hills outside San Jose; Philips Research, on the bluffs of the Hudson 
near Sleepy Hollow; Ford Research, outside Detroit; Lawrence Berkeley National 
Labs, in the Berkeley hills; and the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(formerly the NBS) on a woody site in suburban Maryland. 
These picturesque environs might not seem germane to the story of the STM, 
but, as Ross Bassett and Bill Leslie have both shown, the big postwar corporate (and 
national) research labs were purposefully placed in semi-remote locales as a way to set 
                                                 
1 The early years of the big corporate labs (particularly GE, Westinghouse, and Bell) have been well-
documented.  See Wise (1985); Reich (1985); Kline (1992); Reich (1983); Hoddeson (1981); and Wise 
(1996).  The postwar labs have been written about less.  Interestingly, the now somewhat dated 
movement in S&TS to examine postwar “big science” largely by-passed the big corporate labs.  See the 
contents of Galison and Hevly (1992).  There are, I think, important parallels between “big” postwar 
corporate research and “big” postwar government-sponsored programs. 
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off and highlight the importance of the work done there, while insulating researchers 
from the distractions of the urban and commercial world (Bassett 2002; Knowles and 
Leslie 2001; Leslie 2001).2  This had the perhaps unintended consequence of shielding 
scientists from their own companies, leading to problematic disjunctures between 
research, development, and manufacturing.  IBM and AT&T were so large, and had 
such powerful grips on their markets, that they tended toward involuted, idiosyncratic 
solutions to sociotechnical problems, rather than solutions that might be useful outside 
the local setting.  We will see here how the institutional and locational seclusion of 
surface science at Bell and IBM encouraged a particular style of STM, and trace the 
development of that style up to the recession of the early 1990s, when the corporate 
research world turned upside down. 
The focus of this chapter will be the people in these labs who first replicated 
the Zurich work, then dramatically expanded the capabilities of the STM and 
integrated tunneling microscopy into surface science.  Crucially, most of these people 
were in the early phases of their careers – many were newly-minted Ph.D.s taking up 
their first positions as postdocs or staff scientists.  Molding the STM to the discipline 
of surface science, while becoming disciplined corporate researchers themselves, was 
their way of navigating an often harsh institutional environment.  Three characteristics 
of the early corporate STMers’ positions within these labs most influenced their 
experience, and the design and use of their microscopes: time, competition, and 
community.  Time, as Sharon Traweek has pointed out (Traweek 1988), is not on the 
side of postdocs and early-career researchers – they must accomplish a great deal in 
                                                 
2 Another take on postwar “suburbanization” of science is Kaiser (forthcoming-c).  Seclusion is a major 
theme in several historical studies of the location of science.  See Hannaway (1986); Browne (1998); 
Shapin (1988).  One of the most relevant here is Simon Schaffer’s (1998) analysis of science in 
Victorian country homes.  It would quite fair to characterize IBM’s research facilities as Thomas 
Watson, Jr.’s “country homes” for science; indeed, one lab (in Vermont) was chosen for its proximity to 
his ski chalet. 
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the 12 or 24 months before their positions are reviewed.  Success building an STM 
and publishing several articles in reputable journals within that time allowed postdocs 
to continue on as full-fledged scientists.  Often, in the semi-closed economy of surface 
science, postdocs at IBM stayed on at Big Blue or migrated to Bell Labs; an equal 
number flowed the other way, from Murray Hill to Yorktown or Almaden.  A few 
went to the national labs, especially the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (where the surface science legacy of the Bureau of Standards was still 
strong) or academic posts (an option exercised more frequently as corporate research 
shrank in the ’90s. 
Thus, corporate STMers milked every last bit of time for valuable results, as 
evidenced in this former Bell and IBM postdoc’s reminiscences: 
 
I went and worked for Don [Eigler at IBM Almaden] in the spring of 1988 .... 
and spent exactly a year to the second.  Half the time that I was there we spent 
waiting for this one translator to be fixed; we sent it out four times for repair.  
Then, when things were working we had this rule – never leave a working 
microscope.  So we would just crank in the lab, it was really fun....  My last 
four days were spent imaging and manipulating xenon atoms; we got two or 
three papers out of those few days....  I was late to my going-away party 
because I’d gotten these clusters of xenon down.... I remember laying the 
images out on Don’s car and saying “look at this! I can move Xe around with 
the tip.  Get this party over so we can go back to the lab!...”  Roslyn [Don’s 
wife] threw a birthday party for me ... and my wife and kids and in-laws were 
already there and I thought I got vibrational spectra 20 minutes before the 
party....  I called up Don, I go “I think I got it here”, he goes “what are you 
going to do?”  “I’m not leaving, are you?”  So we spent all night and we blew 
off the party.  It was really bad; we spent all night taking data and it turned out 
to be nothing.  We both went home to changed locks on the doors and oh it 
was so bad <laughs>....  [When I was at] Bell Labs, the kind of surfaces, 
pressures I worked with, you could take data for the morning, and then the 
crystal was too dirty to be useful.  You had to shut down, go to lunch, come 
back, prepare the crystal again, take data for the afternoon, and again the 
crystal would be too dirty.  You would go home, have dinner with the family, 
if you’re gung ho you would come and go through two more cycles at night-
time....  That all went away at low temperature [at IBM] because ... in a month 
you wouldn’t see any time-dependent contamination.  You could just keep 
taking data, which we pretty much did whenever anything worked....  We’d do 
stupid things while we did that, we got this 5 pound bag of Jelly Bellies and 
the two of us sat there all night and we polished them off, so in the morning 
even when we it was time to go, nothing was working anymore, we couldn’t 
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even move – and then, you’d think we learned our lesson, but a couple weeks 
later we did the same thing with 5 pounds of gummy bears. [PW1, 5/3/01] 
As we will see, one acknowledged solution to such time pressures was to cleave 
closely to the body of surface scientific knowledge – to draw as much as possible on 
the surface science framework to choose materials, questions, and interpretive 
frameworks in order to move quickly from experiment to experiment. 
 The tradition of fierce competition within the surface science community at 
these labs both intensified and complicated these time pressures.  Competition raged at 
all scales: among individuals, among research groups, and among corporations.  Bell 
and IBM competed for glory, for Nobel Prizes, and for the right to pick up the most 
promising graduates from the best academic surface science programs.  Indeed, the 
rivalry between these surface science superpowers fueled IBM’s cultivation of an 
STM community, and drove Bell to overcome a perceived STM gap.  As this 
Yorktowner describes it: 
 
I was on staff at that point at Research.  You have this hierarchical structure 
and the director of Research has a staff that sort of advises him, or maybe it’s 
sort of training people.  People typically after your fourth or fifth year here go 
and report directly to the director of Research and advise.  That’s actually 
when I heard about [the STM].  This was an accomplishment, something they 
were bragging about....  One of my most terrible faux pas was, I had to have an 
opinion on this accomplishment and I said something facetious like “this is one 
of the few times that the Bell Labs guys are copying us instead of the other 
way round”.  And Ralph Gomory was not amused <laughs>.  In fact he wanted 
me to go off and talk to people and ask if that was really the way we felt, that 
we were sort of second, following Bell Labs all the time. [JK3, 2/22/01] 
Within these institutions, various research groups competed for personnel, resources, 
space, prestige, and remuneration.  Indeed, at IBM Yorktown such competition 
officially structured pay scales – different research groups were set to work on similar 
projects, and their members were reviewed and paid based on their success relative to 
their competitors [DB1, 2/26/01; JF2, 3/14/01].  Similar, though less formal, systems 
prevailed at Murray Hill.  Newcomers to these labs had to navigate the politics of this 
competition; as we will see, borrowing too much of knowledge or STM design from 
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one group could risk drawing the suspicion of that group’s rivals.  These newcomers 
also experienced competition at the individual level – in order to survive the review 
process they had to stand out from their peers.  This generated a creative double bind – 
newcomers were expected (and found it useful) to mold their experiments to the 
established framework of surface science; yet they were also expected to develop 
individually distinctive solutions to technical problems, and to create a certain 
nonconformist experimental persona for themselves. 
 Thus, the surface science community at Bell and IBM strongly shaped early 
STM design and use.  The labs prided themselves on being wealthy enough to 
concentrate a large and talented proportion of the surface science discipline in one 
place.  The local surface science communities at these places exemplified the ethic of 
stiff, internal criticism that we glimpsed in Chapter Two – after all, this allowed the 
local community to vet theory and experiments intramurally, so that only the best 
results saw the light of day.  At the same time, these communities provided new 
STMers with a tremendous resource – as we will see, it was only with the help of their 
local surface science traditions that corporate STMers could replicate the Zurich work.  
In the sense used by Michel Foucault, new STMers were disciplined by these 
communities.  Local surface science traditions were a locus of corporate oversight that 
molded STMers’ practices, reasoning, and identity – even their resistance to this 
pressure became part of their inclusion in the surface science discipline (Foucault 
1977a; 1994b). 
The First Replications 
 When IBM first considered bringing the STM to North America, Yorktown 
Heights management seems to have believed – as did Binnig and Rohrer – that 
electron microscopists were the logical first replicators of the instrument [RF1, 5/2/01; 
JD2, 2/22/01].  STM was simply another high-resolution microscope for looking at 
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conducting samples that might complement an orthodox electron microscope.  Even 
before publication of the 7x7, IBM sent an experienced Yorktown electron 
microscopist, Oliver Wells, to Zurich for six months to learn the basics of STM.  
When Wells returned he began construction of an STM using design elements from 
traditional electron microscope engineering.  Wells’ effort, however, wallowed and 
collapsed, though not before he was able to enroll a British postdoc, Mark Welland, 
who later jumped to a more successful STM program at Yorktown before returning to 
England and founding his own STM group at Cambridge. 
 Yet few electron microscopists entered the field and those who did often left 
soon after.  A few electron microscopists made the transition to probe microscopy at 
the end of the ’80s, usually with the aid of more experienced STM or AFM groups.  
Almost all of those who did were interested in biophysical applications and only 
understood probe microscopy as its biological relevance became apparent [JZ1, 
3/20/01; JH1, 6/10/02].  Before that, the touted benefits of STM were less than 
obvious to most electron microscopists – they already had a stable set of specimen 
preparation techniques and commercially available instruments and did not want to 
deal with an unproven technology like STM.  Through the ’60s and ’70s, electron 
microscopy had established itself as a mature field with core problematics and 
practices, and the artifacts to which the instrument was prone were so well understood 
as to seem irrelevant and invisible.  Unlike surface scientists, by the early 1980s 
electron microscopists no longer maintained a strong tradition of instrument building, 
concentrating instead on tweaking specimen preparation and commercial instruments 
for use in particular applications.  Thus, the electron microscopy form of life proved 
unreceptive to STM, where instrument-building was required, and where artifacts 
were still painfully unresolved.  Even later, when bio-STM and bio-AFM came on the 
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scene, a great deal of translation work was needed to convince EMers to take up the 
new technology. 
STM and Newcomers to Surface Science 
 Let us contrast the barriers to the entry of STM into the EM community with 
its more rapid, but not unproblematic, uptake in surface science.  Initially, Binnig and 
Rohrer faced lack of interest and even opposition from many surface scientists, not 
least from the juggernaut of the field, Bell Labs.  Murray Hill was one of the places 
where surface science was invented and where its fiercest proponents worked.  Intense 
criticism and skepticism were characteristic of Bell, and at first the STM did not pass 
muster [HR1, 11/13/01].  It was the 7x7 that captured the imagination of traditional 
surface scientists at Bell and made it possible for the replication effort to begin.  
Notably, it was a young(ish) staff scientist, Jene Golovchenko, who was just beginning 
to transition into surface science, who began experimental STM work at Murray Hill, 
despite the concerns of his managers: 
 
[STM] had all of the romance of being a challenging instrument to make 
work....  As someone who didn’t have a very big investment in surface physics 
myself, I hadn’t been brainwashed....  I don’t believe anybody else in the 
whole surface physics community at Bell Labs made the effort to do this kind 
of thing....  I think they had investments in [other] methods and of course it’s 
younger people [who start something new]....  There was probably some 
suspicion [from Bell Labs surface scientists] because I wasn’t really a surface 
guy in the first place and I wanted to do some crazy new thing....  I remember 
proposing to do this and estimating what I thought it would cost.  I didn’t have 
a very clear idea, I had never seen an instrument or anything, I had only just 
seen some papers that had come through.  I seem to remember being put on 
hold for a while.  Then as part of my strategy to make things happen I invited 
Rohrer to come and give a talk....  That was the most crowded auditorium.  I 
was just so thrilled because when I started I didn’t really detect much support 
or anything for it.  Now people were sitting on the floors in the aisles in this 
auditorium, it was the most crowded that I had ever seen....  right after that I 
got ... 100K or something like that to build a vacuum system and that kind of 
stuff. [JG2, 2/20/01] 
Interestingly, like Binnig and Rohrer, Golovchenko had come to surface science 
through instrumentation – he had developed an ultrasensitive device for detecting and 
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analyzing x-ray standing waves that he had then brought to bear on problems in 
surface science.  The x-ray apparatus used piezoelectric crystals for very fine angular 
control of the detector – which, in turn, led Golovchenko to the STM, with its 
piezoelectric positioning system, as an instrument he could easily build. 
Similarly, at Yorktown it was another new staff scientist looking for a project, 
Randy Feenstra, who had experience building instruments and a desire to learn surface 
science, who first successfully brought STM to IBM in North America: 
 
I graduated from Caltech in 1982 and got hired at IBM Yorktown Heights....  I 
could do whatever I wanted, but I had to pick something good....  I had been 
doing work in semiconductor materials....  At that time it was a bit of a mature 
field, and so I thought to myself I might like to move into surface science, 
which back in 1982 was a well-known field but was certainly still on the 
upswing, it was by no means a mature field.  I mean it was a very active field 
but most of the problems were unsolved at that time....  I ended up at the IBM 
lab in Zurich ... and so I saw the scanning tunneling microscope, that was the 
first time I had heard of it.  This was the summer of ’82, right so, it was not 
well-known at that time at all.  They had published their early work just on 
tunneling characteristics, which had gone relatively unnoticed....  Seymour 
Keller who hired me at IBM, he was a manager .... said “well I think somebody 
from Yorktown should come here and look at the STM and go back to 
Yorktown and build one.”  And I said “I’ll do it!...”  Because it was surface 
science, it was something new, it looked like a good project, and it looked 
better than the other things I had considered. [RF1, 5/2/01] 
Thus, for a young staff scientist with a desire to learn surface science, the STM looked 
like a doable (Fujimura 1987) and exciting project even before news of the 7x7 
crossed the Atlantic.  For established group leaders and experienced surface scientists, 
though, it took the 7x7 to inspire dedicated STM activity.  This was true for both 
theorists and experimentalists.  As Don Hamann, one of the most renowned surface 
science theorists at Bell, explains, 
 
My involvement in this started off back in either late ’82 or early ’83....  I got 
Binnig and Rohrer’s paper on the structure of the silicon 7x7 surface to referee.  
I looked at that and I said “hot damn, this is so exciting....”  I got very excited 
by that paper.  They had published previously some results on the gold (110) 
surface that was kind of ho-hum because it wasn’t much of a picture, it was 
like just a simple sinusoidal oscillation that they could see in one direction and 
this was a surface where structure was quite well established already anyway 
by diffraction techniques.  While I had been aware of that paper, I didn’t 
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exactly get excited by it the way I did by the silicon.  And since I got an early 
look at the silicon paper as a referee, and I was a theorist and they were 
experimentalists, I figured there was nothing unethical about my charging full 
speed ahead into that problem.  Jerry Tersoff had just recently come from 
Berkeley to work with me as a postdoc, and this seemed like a really good 
project for him to be involved with. [DH1, 2/28/01] 
With the appearance of the 7x7, managers and group leaders at many corporate and 
national labs began looking for postdocs and new staff scientists for whom the STM 
would be a “really good project” to work on.  At Yorktown, Joe Demuth, a surface 
science group manager, put together a team to build an STM, hiring Bob Hamers and 
Ruud Tromp and picking off Mark Welland from Wells’ group.  At IBM Almaden, 
management hired two Berkeley-trained surface scientists, Shirley Chiang and Bob 
Wilson (then a postdoc at Bell Labs), to build their own STM.  At Murray Hill, Young 
Kuk and Joe Griffith each started work on instruments, while at Ford Bob Jaklevic, 
one of the pioneers of sandwich tunnel junctions, put a postdoc, Bill Kaiser, to work 
on a tunneling microscope.  STM was growing fast. 
The Dilemmas of Replication: Did Zurich Matter? 
 All that remained was getting these new STMs to work.  What, though, did 
“working” mean?  Atomic resolution of the 7x7 was the most obvious achievement of 
the Zurich group, and, given the interest of American surface scientists in that 
reconstruction, the 7x7 quickly became the yardstick for new STMs.  To speed 
progress, IBM sent many nascent STMers to Zurich to spend time with Binnig and 
Rohrer and learn the basics.  Researchers undertook the “pilgrimage to Zurich” [JM2, 
7/6/00] because they understood what Harry Collins has explicated so well: namely, 
that sometimes the tacit knowledge needed to replicate a new technique can only be 
transferred by personal contact with those who have already gotten the technique to 
work (Collins 1974). 
 As Collins observes, though, personal contact does not guarantee replication.  
It became clear that going to Zurich helped a little in starting a new STM program, but 
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by no means assured success, and not going did not assure failure.  Also, whatever 
was gained by going to Switzerland, it did not seem to matter if you spent six months 
or six hours.  Bob Wilson and Randy Feenstra followed Wells and spent a few weeks, 
and learned some helpful things about STM design; yet it took them a long time once 
they returned to resolve the 7x7 [RF1, 5/2/01; BW1, 3/16/01].  After them, IBM sent 
researchers to Switzerland for less time – just enough to meet the Zurich group, see 
the instrument, and get design tips.  Those who went to Zurich still took a long time to 
build their STMs and replicate the 7x7, even if they were attempting close copies of 
the original design.  Moreover, the Bell teams and some IBMers did not have much 
contact with Zurich, yet they kept pace with those who had gone to Switzerland. 
 Two broad knowledge sets were most relevant to STMers at Bell and IBM.  
First, they needed generalized knowledge about building experimental apparatus – 
“fingertip feel” or “laboratory hands” (Galison 1987).  Second, you needed knowledge 
of surface science, particularly its core problems and specimen preparation techniques.  
As STM became more established, tunneling microscopy at Bell and IBM was 
entrusted to postdocs who had learned surface science as graduate students.  Early on, 
though, it was people from outside the field who used the formidable resources of the 
corporate lab environment to quickly come up to speed on the discipline’s methods 
and knowledge in aid of their STM efforts.  Interestingly, corporate researchers felt 
that lack of such immersion slowed non-surface science STMers, especially Calvin 
Quate’s group at Stanford, which started before them yet lagged in the race to atomic 
resolution [JD2, 2/22/01].  Instrument-building experience and availability of needed 
resources could, as in Quate’s case, take you far; but without familiarity with surface 
science resolving the 7x7 was murderously difficult. 
 That is, there are many kinds of tacit skills involved in replicating an 
instrument, and it is not always transference of the skills peculiar to its original 
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inventors that is most important to replication.  In the STM case, immersion in the 
corporate research lab surface science form of life facilitated replication as much as 
direct contact or rapport with the Zurich group (at least when resolving the 7x7 was 
the measure of replication; in the next chapters we will see a later, more widespread 
standard – atomic resolution of graphite in air).  Remember that Binnig and Rohrer 
themselves had needed to learn the tacit knowledge of corporate lab surface scientists 
in order to get the 7x7 in the first place.  Indeed, new instruments are probably very 
likely to be invented by mavericks outside or at the fringes of a discipline, yet only 
find acceptance when they strike a chord with more established members of the 
discipline; thus, gaining access to disciplined knowledge may be as important an 
ingredient of replication as access to the inventors (Becker 1982). 
 Personal contact did seem to matter, though, in the final push to replication.  
As years went by and none of the North American STMers could get the 7x7, worries 
began to mount.  By late 1984, several groups were building microscopes, but 
successful replication was elusive [BS1, 1/10/03; JG3, 2/28/01].  For postdocs and 
young staff scientists enmeshed in internal and external corporate lab competition, 
with managers conducting reviews and asking embarrassing questions, this was a 
painful time.  In November of 1984, though, Quate brought together several of the 
North American STM groups with the Zurich people to find some way around the 
hurdles to replication.  Quate had several former students at IBM Almaden and good 
rapport with Binnig and Rohrer, but was not himself tied into corporate rivalries; and 
as a well-known academic microscopist he had the gravitas to bring together groups 
that were competing but who, for almost two years, had not found their way to the 
starting line of the race [BJ2, 6/27/01; JG2, 2/20/01; BW1, 3/16/01]. 
 What resulted was a small weekend workshop in Cancun organized by Quate 
and a former student, Alex de Lozanne.  One representative attended from each of 
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several groups, usually the more senior group leaders: Bob Jaklevic from Ford; John 
Clarke a physicist from Berkeley, whose student, John Mamin, was attempting an 
STM; Bob Wilson from Almaden; Randy Feenstra; Jene Golovchenko; Lynn 
Swanson, a field emission expert from Oregon; Paul Hansma, a tunneling expert from 
UC Santa Barbara; and, from Zurich, Heini Rohrer and Niko Garcia, a Spanish 
physicist who had become intrigued by STM during a sabbatical in Switzerland.  The 
participants met in a hotel suite and gave short presentations about progress on their 
instruments.  For the most part, though, the meeting was a chance to complain about 
not getting atomic resolution, to pick Rohrer’s brain about how the Zurich group had 
done it, and to trade ideas about how to get around the small family of issues that 
STMers were beginning to recognize as their primary difficulties: in particular, 
vibration isolation, thermal drift, sharpening tips, preparing surfaces, and constructing 
feedback circuitry, and acquiring and preparing piezos. 
 The Cancun meeting came on the eve of widespread replication of the STM.  A 
few months later, by the March 1985 American Physical Society meeting, 
Golovchenko had atomic resolution of the 7x7, followed quickly by the other groups 
at Cancun.  Attendees have difficulty, though, saying what, if anything, was 
accomplished there.  Possibly it was simply scheduled when the researchers were at 
their lowest ebb and so on the verge of making the final breakthrough; or possibly 
there was some tacit knowledge circulating through the small gathering that gave the 
final hint.  Probably different groups gained different things from the meeting.  Either 
way, the situation improved decisively for some groups only after the face-to-face 
interaction with Rohrer and with other nascent STMers. 
 Attendance at Cancun, though, was not decisive, as shown by the interesting 
path of Joe Demuth’s group at Yorktown.  Demuth was an old-time surface scientist, 
with a long career of building various kinds of instruments and applying them to 
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current surface science problems.  By the early ’80s he had worked his way up in the 
management in the Physical Sciences Division at Yorktown, so when he ventured into 
STM he could throw significant resources at the problem [JD2, 2/22/01; RT1, 2/23/01; 
BH1, 5/9/01].  This meant he could parcel the problem into different skills and assign 
postdocs to each package – Bob Hamers, an experienced instrument builder moving 
into surface science, put together the complicated racks of electronics to control the 
instrument; Ruud Tromp, a surface scientist who had just completed his dissertation 
on the 7x7 and other reconstructions, contributed surface preparation and data analysis 
skills; and Everett van Loenen and Mark Welland did the mechanical design, adapting 
the blueprints of a microscope built by John Pethica and Mike Pashley at Cambridge, 
whom Demuth had visited early on (interestingly, when Pashley moved to Philips 
Research, down the road from Yorktown, he borrowed back the Demuth STM and 
added his own modifications [MP1, 7/13/01]).3
Demuth guided experiments to mesh with IBM’s interests and molded his 
postdocs (sometimes uncomfortably) into successful corporate surface scientists.  Bob 
Hamers, for instance, remembers how his attempts to bend his research back towards 
his graduate training in chemistry were frustrated both by Demuth’s advice and by the 
wishes of the higher Yorktown management. 
 
What I wanted to do was look for vibrationally inelastic tunneling....  I came in 
February of ’85 as a postdoc and then the next summer I turned permanent.  
That was right around the time I had just become permanent and I was 
basically talked out of it [vibrationally inelastic tunneling] by my manager, Joe 
Demuth, who thought that that was not a particularly productive way to go....  
IBM Yorktown was very much a solid state physics environment, and so 
people like Paul Ho, for example, who was a manager at that time, were really 
pushing people to look at the metal-semiconductor interface problem....  
Chemistry was not very highly regarded at IBM Yorktown, especially after the 
whole cold fusion thing emerged a couple years later, and there was not a lot of 
appreciation of looking at molecular systems....  So from that point on I 
worked pretty much on these metal semiconductor interfaces [BH1, 5/9/01] 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the Pashley/Pethica team were working on adhesion, friction, and interatomic forces, not 
atomic resolution, so they could not have passed on the tacit knowledge of how to do so to Demuth. 
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Neither Demuth nor his associates had much contact with Zurich, and their 
relationship with the other STM groups at Yorktown was competitive and strained; 
nor did they go to Cancun.  Yet they went from no program at all to atomic resolution 
in a much shorter time than the groups that did go to Cancun.  When the value of STM 
was still uncertain, experienced surface scientists like Demuth (who had little to prove 
to the corporate research world) let newcomers like Golovchenko and Feenstra risk 
everything; but with the 7x7, someone like Demuth, who knew the ins and outs of 
corporate surface science, could quickly gather together the resources and tacit skills 
needed to build an STM. 
The STM Family 
 By 1984, IBM began to push for the creation of an STM community, and 
encouraged Rohrer to organize a conference to bring together all the STMers in the 
world.  Initially, Rohrer resisted, since no one (even Zurich) had a reliable machine, 
and only Zurich had atomic resolution [HR1, 11/13/01].  Big Blue pressed ahead, 
though, and in July 1985, Rohrer organized a conference at the IBM Europe facility at 
Oberlech in the Alps.  Attendees included: European IBMers and academics; the 
American corporate lab groups; and academic researchers from California (Quate, 
Clarke, Hansma, and John Baldeschwieler from Caltech).  This was a tremendously 
successful meeting – small, forthright, and held amidst burgeoning enthusiasm about 
the possibilities of the technique.4  Most groups had not yet tested those possibilities – 
the proceedings show many, many diagrams of instruments-in-progress and images of 
low resolution “rolling hills” – but the gathering sowed the seeds for friendships and 
collaborations. 
                                                 
4 See the articles in IBM Journal of Research and Development, v. 30, issues 4 and 5 for the 
proceedings of this conference. 
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 Back at Yorktown, IBM management further stimulated the growth of an STM 
community.  First, they mounted a vigorous campaign to secure the Nobel Prize for 
Binnig and Rohrer.  The 1983 PRL on the 7x7 had aroused attention amongst surface 
scientists, but not general awareness of the instrument.  At the 1985 March APS 
meeting, Golovchenko displayed his atomic resolution images of the 7x7 so clear that 
he called them “pornographic”; the standing room only crowd cheered him on and 
dubbed the STM a phenomenon [JG1, 10/22/01].  IBM, ever jealous of Bell’s crop of 
Nobel laureates, put together a Nobel package for Binnig and Rohrer and pushed them 
into the limelight with a Scientific American cover story (Binnig and Rohrer 1985).  
At the same time, Binnig and Gerber were on sabbatical in California.  Their presence 
seems to have facilitated some transfer of tacit knowledge, and both the Almaden and 
Stanford groups quickly joined the ranks of atomic resolution [CG1, 11/12/01; SC1, 
3/8/01].  Binnig and Gerber also spent part of their year traveling to other STM groups 
on the West Coast to lend assistance.  John Mamin at Berkeley, for instance, 
remembers their skill at turning a “working” STM into an “atomic resolution” STM. 
 
Binnig and Gerber traveled around a lot, they were very nice and open, very 
generous with their time, they were visiting some of the other labs, so they 
came to our lab and they would also tell us “oh yeah, this lab has got, this lab 
is now working.”  [They taught us] some of the little tricks of the trade, putting 
voltage pulses on the tip to try to clean it....  We were just getting our 
microscope working but hadn’t really gotten any halfway decent images and 
Gerd came in and it was all sort of running but not running very well, and he 
flipped some switches and played with it, and it’s like, wow magically this 
beautiful image just popped out. [JM1, 3/15/01] 
At Yorktown, management saw they had several groups that would work with 
STM if they did not have to build one themselves.  So Demuth’s group, along with 
several technicians, designed a hardened, simplified version of their STM that could 
be “mass”-produced by the Yorktown Central Scientific Services shop.  Between 10 
and 20 of these were built and circulated around Yorktown (and the nearby Hawthorn 
and Eastview facilities) and later, to a limited extent, to outside academic groups [JV1, 
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6/28/00; DB1, 2/26/01].  IBM offered the instruments “free” to their research groups 
(i.e., the group would not need a line item in their budget to purchase the instrument), 
and eventually a few groups succeeded in using the instruments to produce 
experimental results. 
With the CSS microscopes, STMs could, in theory, more easily be entrusted to 
postdocs and used to produce quick, novel data.  The batch microscopes, though, 
usually needed extensive modification, or even rebuilding, for complex sociotechnical 
reasons.  Postdocs still needed to show that they had experimental “hands” and could 
create independent niches for themselves within the agonistic field of corporate 
surface science.  Thus, the CSS instruments, built as simplified versions of the 
Demuth group’s design (and hence geared to, and associated with, Demuth’s specific 
style of surface science) could be seen as suspect tools by other groups.  Rebuilding 
the microscope was a way to display the skills needed for successful corporate 
research and form a distinct scientific identity.  As Bob Wolkow, who worked at both 
Yorktown and Murray Hill, describes it, the politics of competition at the individual, 
group, and institutional levels all shaped the design and use of the batch-produced 
CSS instrument, as well as other custom-built corporate STMs: 
 
Demuth was an interesting character.  He generously made that machine 
available to a lot of people to copy.  Members of his group were distrustful of 
one another.  They bickered over credit for who did what when – all too 
common a problem actually.  One of the key scientists had a great falling out 
with Joe Demuth.  It became a nasty business.  Yorktown was at once 
wonderous and unfriendly.  The setting, the collection of sharp minds, the 
resources were superb.  But the internal rivalries made it quite unpleasant at 
times.  It seemed like for every sexy project going on, I don’t know if it was by 
plan or by accident, there was a competitive group in the same building.  So 
the Feenstra group distrusted the Demuth and Hamers team, and when I came 
on the scene I was able to get one of these kind of cloned plans of the so-called 
Demuth machine and, well, it didn’t work, I had to make it work and I was just 
the right fiddly guy....  There was a staff scientist in Phaedon Avouris’ group 
who was charged with getting an STM....  He was kind of collecting pieces and 
squirreling them away, literally in a closet in his office, and I was a postdoc 
who was to assist him but no one ever told me who was my supervisor and 
what I was responsible for and after ... two or three months had gone by and I 
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had done virtually nothing and I was thinking “what the hell.”  I talked to one 
friendly staff scientist there, and he said “well, if I was you I would just take 
charge of the situation and don’t worry about who you piss off, you’re going to 
die if you go on this way.”  So I just literally stole all the equipment from this 
guy’s office, moved it down to a lab that had been allotted to me, and I just 
started building....  I had no support, so this guy was really pissed off with me 
for doing this, and my boss, Phaedon Avouris, he didn’t take sides, he didn’t 
favor me or the other guy.  When I got it working, I had proved myself, then he 
fully supported me, he saw I had the hands to make it work.  I added a bunch 
of things to that machine right away.  Well, the funny thing is that, so I told 
you there were these camps, well Feenstra assumed that I was part of the 
Demuth camp, I guess because I was physically next to them in the building, 
and so for a good year or so ... he was very cool toward me, and only when he 
realized that I wasn’t particularly close to those guys either he warmed up to 
me.  The rivalry between those IBM teams and Bell Labs was even more 
severe, it was like some kind of football rivalry or something. [BW2, 5/22/01] 
Making STM into a Surface Science Tool 
 So how were STMs at Bell and IBM geared to the corporate lab environment?  
As outlined in Chapter Three, Binnig and Rohrer had not been particularly mindful of 
surface science in building their instruments, nor had the instruments they built been 
particularly reliable.  When the STM reached North America, many researchers started 
building close copies of the Zurich design, but found them unsatisfactory; at NIST, for 
example, they built an exact copy of the Zurich “birdcage” instrument, but found it so 
unreliable that they eventually had to wait for the arrival of a Yorktown veteran, Joe 
Stroscio, to build a new one more appropriate for surface science experiments [BC1, 
6/11/02]. 
 Unreliability had not been a major drawback for Binnig and Rohrer (indeed, in 
some ways it was a strategic asset).  They were building instruments as an existence 
proof.  Their style was to demonstrate one or two applications and move on.  
Moreover, in the early days, the STM had been a side bet, something to work on after 
hours or around other projects.  If the microscope was off-line, that merely meant they 
could work on other things.  Unreliability had been part of the exploratory and craft 
nature of their project, in keeping with Binnig’s cultivation of an erratic experimental 
persona.  The postdocs and young staff scientists trying to replicate the STM, though, 
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needed to implement the microscope as a robust, routine (if novel) tool to generate 
publications.  This entailed changes in design, starting with a better fit between the 
STM and UHV.  Binnig and Rohrer had not been wedded to UHV, and when air STM 
came along they moved in that direction; but for surface scientists UHV was 
indispensable.  UHV was an important nexus of incommensurability between surface 
science STM and other brands of probe microscopy.  Air versus UHV provided a 
critical axis on which to define one’s identity as a corporate surface scientist, and thus 
it generated critical, often harsh, boundary-drawing with respect to air STMers [BH1, 
5/9/01; DE1, 10/11/01]. 
UHV can be a very time-consuming environment, even for experienced surface 
scientists.  Taking an instrument out of the chamber, tinkering with it, putting it back 
in and bringing it back down to full vacuum can eat up a week or more of research 
time.  At Zurich this had been routine, since the group was continually making 
modifications to the design.  At Yorktown and Bell, though, researchers needed to put 
a large quantity of samples through the microscope without making major changes to 
the instrument itself.  So they built in airlocks and sample exchange systems, to allow 
samples to be moved in and out quickly; they added the traditional surface science 
complement of specimen preparation technologies, so that samples could be quickly 
cleaned in-chamber and modified before characterization; and eventually, as they 
came to believe that tip shape was vital to the quality of the images they produced, 
they added tip exchange systems, so that a bad tip could quickly be pulled out and a 
new one put in without breaking vacuum. 
 Also, they modified the STM to insinuate it into both surface science and the 
corporate and visual culture of the big research labs.5  For instance, Binnig and Rohrer 
                                                 
5 The literature on visual culture and science is now overwhelming.  A few key works are: Cambrosio, 
et al. (1993); Goodwin (1997); Rudwick (1976); Lynch and Woolgar (1988); Jones and Galison (1998). 
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– despite working for IBM – had flatly rejected using computers to control their 
microscopes or to display images.  Again, this helped them cultivate craft status for 
their instrument and the images it produced and virtuoso status for themselves.  At 
Yorktown, Murray Hill, and Almaden, though, computers were an essential part of 
corporate culture and, concomitantly, of the institutional way of doing research.  
Incorporating computer control was credited with making it easier to operate the 
instruments and to interpret images, but making them part of STM practice was not 
always easy, particularly when research needed to be balanced with corporate 
citizenship – for instance, researchers at IBM and Bell felt pressured to use the latest 
PCs or operating systems developed within their own institutions, rather than the 
equipment best-suited to their STMs [RT1, 2/23/01; JG3, 2/28/01]. 
Perhaps the corporate labs’ most major addition to the STM came in the area 
of spectroscopy.  After low energy electron diffraction, various kinds of spectroscopy 
made up the bulk of the surface scientist’s toolkit.  “Spectroscopy” is a rather elastic 
term that describes methods for inputting a range (or spectrum) of values into a system 
and recording the spectrum of values that come back out.  In most surface 
spectroscopies, the inputs and outputs come either as electromagnetic waves with a 
spectrum of frequencies (ultraviolet, infrared, x-ray, light) or any of a family of 
particles (electrons, ions, neutrons, alpha particles, etc.) with a range of momenta.  The 
alphabet soup of surface spectroscopies is a result of the mixing and matching of 
inputs and outputs.  Experimenters can put in any of several kinds of radiation and get 
radiation back out; they can put radiation in and knock several kinds of particles back 
out; or they can put particles in and get either radiation or more particles back out.  
Each kind of spectroscopy corresponds to a different pair of inputs and outputs, and 
each tells something slightly different about the energy bands in which electrons are 
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bound to the surface, or the strengths of the chemical bonds holding surface atoms 
together, or the springiness of the internal bonds of molecules adsorbed to the surface. 
Much of the work of the discipline went into creating and taming these 
techniques so their output could be interpreted as complementary.  Getting 
spectroscopic information out of an STM was an advantageous experimental route for 
nascent surface scientists at IBM, Bell, Ford, and elsewhere.  Binnig and Rohrer’s 
limited efforts in this direction had met with little success.  The postdocs and junior 
researchers at North American corporate labs, though, quickly constructed the 
electronics, software, and data analysis tools to turn their newly working microscopes 
into spectroscopic instruments.  Doing scanning tunneling spectroscopy involves 
changing the bias voltage between the tip and the sample (the input) and monitoring 
how this affects the tunnel current (the output).  Systematically varying the bias 
voltage while holding the tip at a constant lateral position yields a current-voltage (or 
I-V) curve.  Changing the bias voltage while scanning over the sample shows you 
where on the surface various peaks in the I-V curve are located, peaks that correspond 
to places where surface bonds allow electrons to preferentially tunnel in or out.  Thus, 
scanning tunneling spectroscopy (STS) can tell something about the two-dimensional 
position of these bonds – microscopy with a “chemical signature.”  There are a 
number of ways to do STS, but all of them involve breaking the usual STM feedback 
loop at some point in the scan; where, and how often, to break the loop was the major 
question in turning STM into a spectroscopic tool. 
 It is instructive to contrast the Feenstra group’s solution to this problem to the 
Demuth group’s.  Recall that Feenstra was new to the corporate research world, and 
for most of the ’80s he usually only had one postdoc working for him.  Using their 
limited resources, his group devised two ways of doing tunneling spectroscopy [RF1, 
5/2/01; JS1, 6/28/00].  The first allowed the tip to be positioned over a single spot and 
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kept stationary with extraordinary precision while the bias voltage was ramped up and 
down, yielding a continuous I-V curve comparable to curves seen with other 
spectroscopic instruments.  The second method allowed the bias voltage to be 
alternated between two values while the tip was scanning, yielding two electronic 
pictures of the same area.  The images might look completely different if, for instance, 
one bias voltage picked out electrons tunneling out of filled states and the other picked 
out electrons tunneling into empty states; this could be represented graphically by 
combining the images with different color schemes allotted to each bias voltage.  A 
celebrated early example was a Feenstra and Stroscio image of gallium arsenide 
showing the gallium atoms in red and the arsenic atoms in green (Feenstra, et al. 
1987). 
 The Demuth group, meanwhile, had more resources and people at its disposal 
and its spectroscopy design built on these advantages.  Their solution was to break the 
feedback at every pixel in a scan and take 24 I-V readings for each point.  This would 
yield 24 different pictures of the same area for each scan, or several thousand 
individual I-V curves.  This entailed an enormous commitment of resources in 
computer time, in data analysis, and in assembling software and electronics – Hamers, 
for example, had to string together rack after rack of boxcar integrators, so that the 
Demuth STM soon filled up much of its lab space [RT1, 2/23/01; BH1, 5/9/01; DB1, 
2/26/01].  At the time, there was little to choose between the Feenstra and Demuth 
techniques.  Feenstra’s is often called more “elegant” and Demuth’s more “brute 
force,” but both had areas in which they seemed most appropriate; where Feenstra 
made a splash with gallium arsenide, Hamers, Tromp, and Demuth gained acclaim 
with articles on the 7x7 (Hamers, et al. 1986).  The 7x7 had, of course, already been 
studied by every spectroscopy imaginable.  By using their method, the Demuth team 
could image the whole 7x7 unit cell and display separate I-V curves for each adatom 
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in the cell (see Figure 4-1).  This would provide atom-resolved information about 
electronic states, so that every peak and inflection seen in various bulk spectroscopies 
could be traced back to a particular atom in the cell.  Thus, in one fell swoop, the STM 
could be stitched into agreement with the whole complement of surface scientific 
knowledge, instruments, and practices.  For other surfaces, though, Demuth’s method 
was bureaucratically and technically burdensome, without producing any more 
striking results than other STM spectroscopies at Bell and IBM. 
 This cadre of STMers further synthesized tunneling microscopy with surface 
science by putting an STM in the same vacuum chamber with other traditional surface 
science instrumentation.  The first to go in was the mainstay of the discipline, low-
energy electron diffraction,.  Binnig and Rohrer had prepared specimens in one 
chamber, then transported them by hand in air to the STM; indeed, they counted it as a 
“discovery” that they saw anything at all after such a procedure.  For surface 
scientists, though, this was bad practice, and they assumed this was why it took the 
Zurich team so long to tame the 7x7.  Instead, they devised ways to bring a specimen 
into UHV, prepare it with in-chamber techniques, and use LEED to see if the surface 
was exhibiting the desired reconstruction.  Later, other instruments were combined 
with STM – Auger electron spectroscopy, electron microscopy, x-ray photoemission 
spectroscopy, etc.  Those who moved in this line of experiment built larger and larger 
vacuum chambers to house all the different tools.  At Almaden, for instance, the 
Wilson/Chiang team took advantage of the construction of a new research building to 
specify a laboratory that could house an extraordinarily large chamber with a full 
complement of sample preparation and characterization techniques, through which 
samples could be moved from one tool to another [BW1, 3/16/01; SC1, 3/8/01]. 
 The coordination of STM with other surface science techniques took place not 
just in the vacuum chamber, but in all areas of experiment.  When Golovchenko had 
 
 
 
152
 
Figure 4-1: Scanning tunneling spectroscopy.  One tactic for integrating the 
STM into surface science was to make it complementary to existing surface 
spectroscopy tools.  This image combines scanning tunneling spectroscopy of the 
silicon (111) 7x7 – the various atoms in the unit cell of which are pictured at the 
top – with ultraviolet photoemission spectroscopy (the dashed line in the bottom 
box) and inverse photoemission spectroscopy (the solid line in the bottom box).  
The different curves in the upper box represent I-V spectra measured over different
atoms in the unit cell.  From Hamers, et al. (1986).
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talked about atomically-resolved images of the 7x7 as “pornography”, for instance, he 
was referring to the indirectness of results provided by LEED and other techniques.6  
STMers had to work to make STM seem to gave a “direct” image of the same surface 
entities.  Some went as far as to “reclothe” STM images by Fourier-transforming them 
“back” into something very similar to a LEED image (see Figure 4-2). 
 
It was never such that you should imagine Fourier transforming a tunneling 
microscope picture and it would agree with a low energy electron diffraction 
picture....  But nevertheless it makes people comfortable, you still will see a 
7x7 pattern if you Fourier transform the tunneling microscope pictures.  It 
won’t have the intensities that LEED guys have or anything like that, but 
looking at this thing and knowing that it’s 7x7, that it’s not totally wrong....  I 
never thought it was worthwhile looking at a surface that I didn’t know what 
the LEED pattern was beforehand, because I wouldn’t even know if it was 
something.  You didn’t even always know what the calibration [of the piezo 
scanners] was....  You often saw pictures that looked distorted and not square 
because people were shifting them around, so that it would conform with 
fundamental things that you knew about the symmetry of the surface [from 
LEED].  So it was an interesting thing to see the interaction of these two 
surface physics ways of doing things, one a new baby and another that had 
gone on for a very long time. [JG2, 2/20/01] 
LEED, though, gives data about atom positions based on an average over a fairly large 
area (tens of microns by tens of microns), and so making STM images comparable to 
LEED data encouraged STMers to expand the lateral range of their instruments.  From 
the beginning, one objection put forward by skeptical surface scientists was that STM 
was so local that one could never be sure its results were not a fluke.  So long scan 
ranges became a priority, particularly as the CSS STM made tunneling microscopy 
accessible not just for surface physicists but for surface chemists as well [PA1, 
2/22/01]. 
 Other aspects of the visual culture of STM in this period contributed to its 
integration into surface science.  The use of computers for image processing and 
display, for instance, was not merely to tie the microscopes to IBM or Bell’s 
                                                 
6 The early modern metaphor of science as a disrobing of Nature has been well-documented in 
Schiebinger (1993), among other works,. 
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Figure 4-2: Fourier-transformed STM image.  One way for STMers to insinuate 
the instrument into surface science was to take STM images and Fourier-transform 
them.  These “reciprocal space” STM images were then similar, though not 
equivalent, to LEED images – since LEED is a reciprocal space technique, but one 
that averages over a much larger area, and to a somewhat lower depth, than STM.  
Crucially, surface scientists looking at these Fourier-transformed STM images 
could see that the STM was directly seeing the same unit cell symmetries that could
only be indirectly glimpsed through LEED.  From Demuth, et al. (1988). 
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computing infrastructure.  It was also to produce images that could speak to traditional 
ways of seeing in surface science, particularly those ways of seeing that enabled 
dialogue between theorists and experimentalists.7  Corporate surface science matured 
with LEED and the creation of better theoretical and computing machinery to process 
LEED images; experimentalists created LEED data, while theorists imagined 
structures for reconstructions and drew maps (with a viewed-from-above perspective) 
of them, projected the LEED pattern for those structures, and compared them to 
experimental results (see Figures 4-3 through 4-6).  The fertile nature of this work 
came from the flexibility of the fit between simulated and experimental LEED data, 
meaning dozens of possible reconstructions could generate similar LEED images. 
 Binnig and Rohrer’s pictures had not been crafted solely with surface science 
in mind.  Their first cardboard “image” of the 7x7 was striking and artistic, but did not 
resemble the bird’s-eye maps surface scientists were used to.  Surface science theorists 
wanted something like a topographic map, minus streaky scan artifacts.  For instance, 
the utility of Tersoff-Hamann theory (the most widely referenced STM theory of the 
time – see Figure 4-7) was that it showed that, often, the STM tip simply measures 
average charge density; STMers could draw lines of constant charge density and easily 
simulate STM images for a reconstruction that fit approximations made by the theory 
(Tersoff and Hamann 1983).  Thus, the corporate STMers quickly write line-filling 
software that would remove scan artifacts and produce an overhead, grayscale view of 
a surface that could easily be compared to a theoretical simulation in the same way 
earlier surface scientists compared experimental and simulated LEED results. 
 Finally, a last resort for harmonizing STM with other surface science 
instruments was a managerial one – different groups, specializing in different 
                                                 
7 The materialization of theory I describe here resonates with Eric Francoeur’s analysis of chemistry 
models.  See Francoeur (1997). 
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 Figure 4-3: LEED of the 7x7.  This shows the LEED diffraction spots for a
sample of the silicon (111) 7x7.  From Miller and Haneman (1979).  
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Figure 4-4: Model of the 7x7.  From the same article as the experimental LEED 
pattern in Figure 4-2, this figure shows a proposed model for the structure of the 
7x7 (not the one that was eventually accepted).  From Miller and Haneman (1979) 
 158
-
 
Figure 4-5: Simulated LEED pattern.  Again, from the same article as Figure 4
2, this image shows a simulated LEED pattern that corresponds to the structure 
model proposed in Figure 4-3.  This way of matching experimental LEED data, 
proposed structure models, and simulated LEED patterns was common in surface
science, and was a practice STMers had to contend with.  From Miller and 
Haneman (1979).  
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Figure 4-6: Matching STM images to theory.  The other way corporate STMers 
made tunneling microscopy a surface science tool was to develop simulated STM 
images corresponding to theoretical proposals for various reconstruction models 
and comparing those simulations to experimental STM images.  The Takayanagi 
proposal (top right) is the D-A-S model that has been most widely accepted.  From
Tromp, et al. (1986).  
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Figure 4-7: Tersoff-Hamann theory.  Don Hamann, a surface 
science theorist at Bell Labs, and Jerry Tersoff, his postdoc (later a 
staff scientist at IBM Yorktown), formulated the most widely used 
theory of STM operation.  The Tersoff-Hamann theory states that, for
some important surfaces, the STM image is a measure of the density 
of states.  Using the theory, STMers could compute the density of 
states for a given surface, then compare it to an actual STM image.  
Below are simulations based on Tersoff-Hamann computed for 
graphite at two different tunneling voltages.  From Batra and Ciraci 
(1988). 
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techniques, might report to the same manager, compelling eventual agreement about 
what their data meant: 
 
JK: There was a group doing infrared [spectroscopy of superconductors], and 
the infrared gives sort of comparable information, and the size of the gaps that 
I was seeing [with STM] were much smaller than the size of the gaps in the 
infrared.  It turns out that there’s a good reason for that....  The tunneling, it 
was so confusing, you can argue either way.  A lot of these techniques were so 
confusing.  People still argue about whether you can actually see a gap in 
infrared....  It really took a long time to just figure things out. 
CM: So how did it work talking with these infrared groups? 
JK: Well, I mean they were reporting to me too <laughs>.  So they had to be 
polite.  But I certainly respected them.  And it was clear that there was some 
difference and it’s probably real.  It just took a long time to sort of work things 
out. [JK3, 2/22/01] 
Surface Science and the Course of Experimentation 
 Once the first STMs were built and running at IBM and Bell, the tunneling 
microscopy community at these labs expanded quickly.  At the same time, as some of 
the postdocs and staff scientists who worked on the first STMs moved out of the 
corporate labs and into academia or national laboratories, STM went with them.  This 
was the start of what David Kaiser has called a “postdoc cascade” – the rapid growth 
of a field from the diffusion of trained people rather than primarily through the 
diffusion of ideas (Kaiser forthcoming-b).  From Bell, for instance, Golovchenko 
moved to Harvard; his Murray Hill technician, Brian Swartzentruber, moved to the 
University of Wisconsin to get his Ph.D. and helped turn Max Lagally’s distinguished 
LEED group into an equally distinguished STM group; and Young Kuk moved back 
to Seoul to found a highly successful probe microscopy group in Korea. 
Similarly, from Yorktown Bob Wolkow moved to Bell and then the National 
Research Council of Canada; Joe Stroscio and John Villarrubia moved to NIST; Bob 
Hamers eventually went to Wisconsin; Randy Feenstra to Carnegie-Mellon; Mark 
Welland to Oxford; and Everett van Loenen to Philips.  IBM Almaden eventually lost 
Shirley Chiang to UC Davis, but picked up Don Eigler from Bell, and Eigler in turn 
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trained a series of postdocs in low temperature STM who went to Berkeley, Stanford, 
Penn State, and the University of Illinois in the mid- to late-’90s.  Some of the 
movement out of these labs was organic; indeed, postdoctoral positions were designed 
to quickly train researchers in a particular area before packing them off to some other 
institution.  In the early 1990s, however, a mass exodus of early STMers, particularly 
to universities, began as recession gripped IBM and, to a lesser extent, Bell, 
effectively stifling much STM research at the big corporate labs [SC1, 3/8/01; RF1, 
5/2/01]. 
 Thus, the community expanded beyond the corporate labs, although it was still 
largely centered on IBM and Bell.  Indeed, the race to STM added fuel to the inward-
looking rivalry between the two surface science superpowers of the day: 
 
I did another review article for Annual Reviews of Materials Science in which I 
highlighted their [Avouris and Wolkow’s] work [at Yorktown].  In fact that 
ended up being kind of an odd little article because all of the examples that we 
gave in that article were either from this building [Murray Hill] or Yorktown 
Heights.  It was as if the rest of the world didn’t exist.  I kind of felt bad about 
that but looking at it, at the time .... I wrote that review article it was primarily 
people at Yorktown Heights and Bell Labs here who had most of the stuff 
going on. [JG3, 2/28/01] 
As the community grew, it did so along dimensions framed by surface scientific 
practices and knowledge.  As building STMs became more routine, for instance, it was 
expected that STM builders would gear their instruments to specific surface science 
questions or specific niches of surface scientific practice.  Wilson and Chiang, for 
instance, built an instrument which could prepare surfaces in special ways and add a 
variety of overlayers and adsorbates to a silicon or metal surface (Wilson and Chiang 
1987b); Bob Wolkow built a low-temperature instrument at Yorktown, then at Murray 
Hill he built a variable temperature one capable of playing with reaction rates in order 
to understand surface chemistry (Wolkow 1992); and Don Eigler built a low 
temperature STM at Bell, then rebuilt it completely at IBM Almaden, in order to chase 
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one of the holy grails of surface science, vibrational spectroscopy of an individual 
molecule (Eigler 1998). 
 The choice of surfaces to look at was also crafted to the surface science 
audience.  Indeed, as the technology matured, the most valuable group leaders 
postdocs could work under were those, such as Avouris or Demuth, who could 
enumerate the most important questions in the surface science community and point 
their younger colleagues to them [BH1, 5/9/01; BW2, 5/22/01] – an indicator of how 
the STM community at the big labs changed in the few years since Feenstra and 
Golovchenko had an enormous impact on surface science despite their own newness 
to the field.  The parameters that had the most meaning to surface scientists, and thus 
guided what to put in an STM, were the sample material, crystal index, unit cell, and 
adsorbate composition.  A group could move along any of these variables in ways 
marked out by years of surface science tradition; new instruments were common in 
this community, and the ways to exploit them in an orderly fashion most conducive to 
the time pressures of postdocs and young staff scientists were well known. 
 So, you could pick a particular material and index and go through all of the 
associated unit cells, as the Golovchenko group did with silicon (111) 7x7, then 9x9, 
5x5, and 11x11 (Becker, et al. 1986).  You could take a material like silicon and go 
through a variety of indices and unit cells, as the Demuth group did with the (111) 
7x7, the (111) 2x1, and the (001) 2x1 (Tromp, et al. 1985; Demuth, et al. 1985; 
Hamers, et al. 1986).  You could move through different though related materials, 
whether semiconductors (as the Feenstra group did with silicon, germanium, gallium 
arsenide, and eventually gallium nitride) (Feenstra, et al. 1986; Feenstra and Stroscio 
1987; Feenstra, et al. 1991; Smith, et al. 1998); or metals (as the Wilson/Chiang group 
did with gold, platinum, copper, and rhodium) (Hallmark, et al. 1987; Ohtani, et al. 
1988; Woll, et al. 1990; Samsavar, et al. 1990; Hallmark, et al. 1991).  You could put 
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down a series of adsorbates, as the Wilson/Chiang group did with naphthalene, 
azulene, and several methylazulenes on platinum (Wilson and Chiang 1989); or, like 
the Eigler group, you could put down a series of individual molecules on a similarly 
varying series of substrates (iron on copper, benzene on platinum, oxygen on niobium, 
xenon on nickel) (Eigler, et al. 1990; Weiss and Eigler 1993).  Such a course of 
experimentation could be done methodically and quickly – skills and knowledge 
useful for one sample easily transferred to the next.  The results of such experiments 
could be easily published and digested by the surface science community – STM 
helped fill in known gaps in the discourse of surface science (e.g. the atomic structures 
of reconstructions) and a postdoc or young staff scientist could quickly move from gap 
to gap, supplying much-needed information in a readily intelligible manner.  Thus 
were surface scientists (and STMers) made. 
Hybrids 
 IBM Research and Bell Labs were large organizations within very large 
corporations – prior to its break-up in 1984, AT&T briefly employed more than a 
million people.  So it would be difficult to imagine that these institutions were 
culturally monolithic.  Different disciplines within IBM Research and Bell Labs were 
at different stages in their development, had different histories and ecologies, and 
hence constructed different ways of conducting experiments and training new 
generations.  Within the local surface science communities, different groups had to 
forge different practices because of their varying relationships with the corporate 
center.  As we’ve seen, for example, the more well-resourced Demuth group 
approached STM design very differently from the less well-established Feenstra 
group.  The culture of internal and external competition tended to homogenize 
practices somewhat – researchers ofen converged with their rivals on very simlar 
questions, even as they were pressured to find distinctive, exemplary answers to those 
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questions.  There were a few groups, though – particularly at IBM Almaden – who 
took STM in a more radical direction, and their story is worth noting since it casts 
light on a style of probe microscopy that we will examine more in the next chapters. 
One of the first attempts to explore an alternative path for probe microscopy in 
the North American corporate world came from Bell.  There, management perceived a 
need to answer IBM’s invention of the STM with a new instrument of its own [DP1, 
11/7/01; KW1, 2/23/01; SB1, 3/22/01].  They probably knew that an IBM Zurich 
group (led by Dieter Pohl and Urs Dürig) was working on a relative to the STM 
known as the scanning near-field optical microscope (SNOM) (Pohl 1993).  Near-field 
microscopy had a pedigree even more ancient than STM.  The theorist E.H. Synge 
(brother of the Irish playwright John Millington Synge) had speculated on the 
properties of evanescent light waves propagating through a very small aperture in the 
1920s, and Hans Bethe had generated a more rigorously mathematical analysis in the 
1930s (Wickramasinghe 1989). 
Experimentally, a small aperture had been used for scanning near-field 
microwave microscopy in the early ’70s by the group of Ash and Nichols in England, 
though few had followed up their demonstration (Ash and Nicholls 1972).  When the 
STM showed that very fine control of solid probes at very small distances from 
surfaces was possible, near-field optical microscopy again aroused interest (indeed, it 
is possible to interpret the STM as a near-field electron microscope, and the first 
SNOMs – or NSOMs as they were known in North America – used electron tunneling 
as the feedback mechanism to keep the aperture close to the surface) [DP1, 11/7/01; 
UD1, 11/12/01].  Bell, with its long history in optics, saw this as an area of probe 
microscopy where they could quickly establish a lead, and in 1988 they hired a 
graduate student from Cornell, Eric Betzig, to bring NSOM to the world of the big 
labs.  Within a few years Betzig had helped put together an NSOM group at Bell, and, 
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with Pohl, awakened a community of near-field microscopists; new ways of making 
apertures and sudden increases in the resolution of the instrument made it seem like a 
promising alternative to other optical microscopies, especially in the area of single-
molecule spectroscopy [BD1, 1/2/01; SX1, 2/21/01].8
 At IBM, several groups pushed away from STM, particularly after Binnig, 
Quate, and Gerber developed the atomic force microscope.  Big Blue tried to patent 
the AFM as an IBM invention, and encouraged research groups to take up the new 
instrument.  A few IBM groups, such as Gary McClelland’s at Almaden and Nabil 
Amer’s at Yorktown, made major contributions to the development of AFM as a 
practical, versatile lab technology [GM1, 3/16/01; SC1, 3/8/01].  In general, though, 
the evolution of AFM owed more to academic groups (and their commercial spin-
offs), especially Cal Quate’s and Paul Hansma’s, which we will examine in the next 
chapters.  Interestingly, four research groups brought personnel from those academic 
labs into IBM, with telling results: at Almaden, John Foster (a former Quate student) 
and Jane Frommer worked on air STM; also at Almaden, John Mamin and Dan Rugar 
(another former Quate student) developed STM, AFM, and magnetic force 
microscopy; at Yorktown, Kumar Wickramasinghe (a former Ash student and Quate 
postdoc) put together an impressive program on a variety of probe microscopies; and 
also at Yorktown, John Kirtley, a former Hansma student, invented scanning SQUID 
microscopy. 
 All of these groups adopted some elements of an experimental style that we 
will explore in the next chapter.  None of them, for example, was tied to UHV (indeed 
the Foster/Frommer group popularized air STM as much as anyone).  Of the four, only 
                                                 
8 Near-field microscopy works by containing radiation so locally that it does not propagate away, but 
rather “evanesces” in place.  Using a very small aperture, one can actually use these evanescent waves 
to form an image with much greater resolution than an ordinary optical microscope.  The most intuitive 
analogy is that NSOM is the equivalent of a stethoscope for light (Pohl, et al. 1984). 
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Kirtley’s was housed with surface scientists in the Physical Sciences division of IBM 
Research.  Wickramasinghe worked in Yorktown’s Advanced Manufacturing 
Research Division, with responsibility for developing characterization technologies 
that would be useful to various IBM manufacturing lines – particularly semiconductor 
manufacturing [KW1, 2/23/01].  Thus, he concentrated on developing an AFM for on-
line wafer inspection, creating the SXM, the first of the giant factory-floor AFMs 
(Martin and Wickramasinghe 1995).  For Foster and Rugar, the environment at 
Almaden encouraged research and development on data storage (the nearby IBM plant 
in San Jose manufactures most of the company’s memory devices), especially since 
Almaden traditionally had a more applied orientation than Yorktown (Frommer and 
Foster 1988; Stern, et al. 1988).  Later, Rugar and Mamin started working with force 
microscopy, developing proofs of concept for data storage with AFM, as well as 
making advances in magnetic force microscopy (which, today, is a crucial 
characterization technique for the magnetic data storage industry) (Rugar, et al. 1990). 
Foster, meanwhile, acquired a semi-commercial air STM from a Quate student, 
Douglas Smith, and began toying with its electronics and software to develop 
lithography schemes.  When he began seeing contaminant molecules on the graphite 
substrates on which he was trying to write bits, he called on Frommer, a chemist, to 
help him identify the contaminants and understand them in ways that would support 
the lithography project [JF1, 10/19/01; JF2, 3/14/01].  Seeking aid in this way was 
natural for Foster, since in his dissertation work on Quate’s scanning acoustic 
microscope he had made similar transdisciplinary connections.  Frommer provided the 
know-how in specimen preparation and image interpretation to allow the team to 
examine first a series of organic adsorbates (simulacra of contamination molecules) 
and then a series of organic monolayers, including liquid crystals. 
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Finally, Kirtley started by building his own STM, but with an eye to samples 
not traditionally used in surface science [JK3, 2/22/01].  Eventually, he became 
intrigued by the new high-temperature superconductors pioneered by Mueller and 
Bednorz at IBM Zurich and began veering away from STM (as did John Clarke at 
Berkeley, a Cancun attendee and John Mamin’s adviser before Mamin went to 
Almaden) (Kirtley, et al. 1987).  Calvin Quate, too, became interested in high Tc 
materials at this time, though he tried to integrate his studies of them with his STM 
work.  Indeed, it was one of the hallmark of academic STMers like Quate, Hansma, 
Clarke, and their students that they congregated toward new “hot” materials that were 
receiving sudden, widespread, interdisciplinary attention, rather than concentrating 
solely on test objects like the 7x7 that had long histories in their own subdisciplines.  
In Kirtley’s case, this interest in high Tc materials pushed him to extrapolate from his 
STM experience to build a scanning SQUID microscope – an instrument with a 
superconducting quantum interference device at the end of a probe that could make 
spatial maps of very subtle magnetic variations in materials (Kirtley, et al. 1995).  In 
truth, the SSM departed widely from the STM that inspired it – as Kirtley puts it, “the 
only thing in common with the STM is the word ‘scanning.’”  Nevertheless, the STM 
should be seen as an older relative of the SSM; this tendency to use one microscope to 
inspire the design of highly divergent instruments is a characteristic of the Quate and 
Hansma groups that we will explore in the next chapter.  There were other similarities 
between the Quate and Hansma groups and those of their former students and postdocs 
within IBM – especially an orientation to outside communities (magnetics experts, the 
liquid crystals field, semiconductor metrologists, nanotech boosters) much more than 
the surface scientists.  The lesson of these groups is that you did not have to be a 
surface scientist to do probe microscopy at IBM; but, early on, if you were not a 
surface scientist, you probably came to IBM from a scanning microscopy group with 
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close ties to the company (in other words, the Quate group), and once there you were 
likely to do experiments that combined the Quate style with the commercial (as much 
as research) interests of IBM. 
Constructing Microscopes, Microscopists, and Knowledge 
 I want finally to summarize some salient characteristics of the early STMers’ 
experience of place.  The lab was where these people worked – for long durations and 
at strange hours with ever-present time constraints – as well as ate, passed the time 
with their fellow inmates, and occasionally slept.  More importantly, it was a place 
where they were processed and transformed, where the raw material of recent Ph.D.s 
was turned into mature surface scientists and corporate researchers.  This was done 
through an all-pervasive atmosphere of managerial oversight, competition between 
and within experimental groups, networks of relationships between theorists and 
experimentalists, and the constant, educative chatter of an often harshly critical surface 
science community.  These combined to discipline researchers – indeed, to make them 
competent members of the surface science discipline – in ways that affected their 
every move: how they chose experiments, how they built instruments, how they 
moved and spoke and held themselves in the lab, how to perceive and interpret 
images, how to write articles, how to attend to the work of others, how to cobble 
together and mobilize resources.  Their whole habitus was guided – though by no 
means determined – by the totalizing nature of the big research labs (Bourdieu 1990). 
 The complex of place, oversight, discipline, and the molding of knowing 
subjects should call to mind the work of Michel Foucault.  The theme of physical 
space and built environment highlight the intricate balance between the agency of the 
STMers and of the discipline/institution; certainly, STMers were constrained and 
molded in many ways, but at the same time they reworked their built environments 
and brought significant changes to the communities that were shaping them.  For 
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Foucault (particularly in Discipline and Punish), built environment materializes power 
relationships, in ways that facilitate the creation of particular types of subjects 
(Foucault 1977a).9  In the physical movement of people through the architecture of 
institutions – such as the Panopticon – power is inscribed on human bodies and 
subjects are disciplined into particular modes of behavior. 
In some ways this was how the architecture of the corporate labs worked.10  
Bill Leslie relates how Eero Saarinen designed the Yorktown Heights lab with a 
number of specific purposes in mind – a sweeping arc of natural granite on the 
outside, beautifully extolling the glory of IBM; inside, a curving hallway running the 
length of the building, with offices and labs off the backbone; in the hallway, spaces 
for people to gather and talk; in the offices and labs, no outside windows, but (at least 
at the beginning) complete transparency to all of the other rooms on the same row; in 
the cafeteria, a pad of paper at every table, for researchers to continue working 
through ideas even while eating; and everywhere, omnipresent, the corporate 
admonition to “Think!”, next to a clock, reminding employees of the proximity of the 
competition (or of their next review). 
 At Murray Hill, the complex was designed with laboratories along wings, so 
that anyone walking from their lab to the cafeteria or auditorium or back passed their 
supervisor’s office.  The hallway was a site for regulating even mundane behavior: 
 
One time I came upon Eric in the hallway, I was walking along this empty 
hallway and he was walking the other way, it seemed like an ordinary 
situation, we saw each other and said “hi Eric,” “hi Bob”.  We stood and talked 
for about 20 minutes.  I went to my office, he went to his, and within about 3 
minutes my phone rang and it was his manager, in fact his manager’s manager, 
a very high up guy, now a Nobel laureate....  He said “Bob, I understand you 
talked to Eric.”  I was flabbergasted and I said “Yeah,” he said “you told me 
you wouldn’t talk to Eric without my say-so.”  I had in fact agreed to that.  
                                                 
9 An excellent explication of Foucault on built environment is Lynch (1991). 
10 There is now an extensive and interesting literature on architecture and science.  See the contents of 
three edited volumes and one special journal issue: Galison and Thompson (1999); Smith and Agar 
(1998); James (1989); Gieryn (1999); and Ophir and Shapin (1991). 
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This manager/scientist was put in charge of shepherding us, these few guys 
who were going to try and start a company.  And since negotiations were so 
delicate, it had been agreed that none of us would talk about financial details 
and fussy details in little groups, we would do it through channels and Horst 
would always be involved if something substantive was coming up.  But I 
never interpreted that to mean we couldn’t talk at all, I interpreted it to mean 
we couldn’t talk about percentages or business or something.  Eric caused the 
whole business to fall apart eventually.  He soon after disappeared from the 
field and from science.  His meteoric rise was matched by an equally sudden 
disappearance. [BW2, 5/22/01] 
For STMers, the long walk down those hallways was especially perilous in the years 
when replication of the Zurich results was elusive. 
 
Kumar Patel [a manager at Bell Labs] of course was very very eager to see this 
thing succeed quickly.  He had gone out to see Cal Quate’s operation and a 
student there had ... built a tunneling microscope ... in about six months....  
Kumar came back and announced, if a Stanford graduate student could build 
an STM in six months an MTS at Bell Labs should be able to do it in a 
weekend.  So we all said “okay, we’ll do that.”  Two years later we got atoms.  
That was a long two years, especially that last six months, I really didn’t like 
walking down the halls, I didn’t want to run into my management because the 
pressures were just huge.  But fortunately everybody else was having trouble 
too.  Binnig and Roher were having difficulties getting it to work again. [JG3, 
2/28/01] 
Once replication had been achieved, Bell and IBM wanted to quickly grow the number 
of working STMs and generate articles as moves in their constant struggle for prestige.  
One way to do this was to put competing groups in different parts of the same 
building; they would be constantly aware of each other, always trying to race to the 
next well-defined surface science goal.  This was especially true for the Feenstra and 
Demuth teams, and to a lesser extent the Golovchenko and Kuk teams at Bell.  
Another way to grow STMs, though, was to cram researchers together in close 
proximity to let tacit knowledge flow freely and allow successful design solutions to 
dominate quickly.  At Murray Hill, for instance, STM camaradie was generated in the 
close quarters of a converted tool shed.  One veteran of the shed remembers how its 
occupants proximity led to a rapid turnover and implementation of designs: 
 
When I joined the group I started designing and building the low temperature 
instrument and Russell Becker and Brian Swartzentruber were working on the 
room temperature instrument....  Russell went this way, Brian went that way in 
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terms of design philosophy and everything else, and it turns out that Brian just 
happened to hit it right.  As soon as he did that Russell dropped what he was 
doing and started working with the machine that Brian had designed and 
built....  While I was doing the design of my low temperature microscope and 
trying to implement what the rest of Golovchenko’s group – Jene, Brian, and 
Russell – were developing, on a day by day basis, experience and knowledge, 
software, a whole body of ... knowledge, sometimes very hard-won, on how to 
get things done....  I got to see all that happening around me and that very 
much helped me refine what I was doing....  For instance Brian wrote the 
software that ran his tunneling microscope – we took Brian’s software and 
adapted it for my work.  They had problems with electronics and I learned 
from their mistakes as I did my electronics because I could see the mistakes 
and the problems that they ran into. [DE1, 10/11/01] 
As we will see in Chapter Five, this close-quarters method of instrument development 
was more common in the academic labs.  In the corporate labs, postdocs and new staff 
scientists were supposed to carve out scientific identities, sometimes at the expense of 
others; claiming and reshaping space were important tactics in that struggle. 
The basis for many of the STMers’ appropriations of their built environment, 
and the reason why so many of Bell’s tunneling microscopists had been housed in 
such close proximity, had to do with STM design.  Early STMs were easily disrupted 
by even the slightest environmental noise or vibration.  When Golovchenko began 
designing his first STM, he obtained a vibration meter used by architects and walked 
all around the Murray Hill building looking for quiet spots to put the instrument.  
When no laboratories were quiet enough, he tried the auditorium, then the acoustically 
shielded projection booth at the back of the auditorium.  Still unsuccessful, he looked 
for spot away from the main building and found a shed at the edge of the property. 
 Even for a powerful institution like Bell Labs, though, built environment is a 
contentious point of intersection with the wider world; and at Murray Hill, the 
immediate wider world was rural New Jersey townships jealous of their peace and 
quiet.  Within Bell, claiming space was an intensely political matter. 
 
Jene temporarily got the thing over in an auditorium across the way, which was 
about an order of magnitude better than the main building.  And then there was 
a huge battle to get it up the hill in the little tractor shed....  Space is 
fantastically difficult here.  Particularly in that time, the township that this 
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building sits in ... the front lawn’s in New Providence and the main building is 
in Berkeley Heights.  Berkeley Heights was really loathe to allow any new 
building on the site because of the infrastructure issues associated with it for 
the town.  Any time this site expanded it meant there was more traffic, more 
sewage treatment ... so the town was keeping a pretty tight lid on that and it 
meant that outside space was at a premium back in those days.  And the 
Buildings people were not at all happy about giving up a tractor shed for a lab.  
Well next door to that tractor shed was in fact a lab, owned by one of the 
directors in my organization.  And Jene went after that lab first and tried to get 
it.  The owner of it, Bob Laudise fought them off ferociously.  I wasn’t 
involved in that attempt – they went off and did that without telling me, but 
Laudise was just absolutely livid because I was associated with them.  So, he 
called me into his office one day and just let me have it....  But finally, Kumar 
was very powerful in those days.  He was an extremely powerful manager here 
and so Kumar was usually not to be denied, when when he wanted something 
to happen it happened.  So they got the tractor shed set up and we were out 
there for some years. [JG3, 2/28/01] 
Similarly, at Yorktown, vibration isolation was a basis for scrounging space and 
making the built environment one’s own. 
 
It was just too noisy, you could really only do experiments in the evenings and 
on the weekends.  So we would work for a couple days, trying to get analysis 
stuff ready and analyze data that we had, and then we’d go into a streak where 
we just worked nights and get data....  We moved to the ground floor at some 
point because it was just too noisy up here....  At some point CSS ... got new 
space, and so they moved out and we squatted there for a while.  It was this 
huge space, this enormous lab, and we just occupied a tiny little corner in there 
and we did a bunch of good experiments.  Then at some point we were kicked 
out of there.  So we found an empty office on Aisle 1.  This was all pretty 
informal.  One night, we had spotted this empty office so we took all our stuff, 
our STM, ... at night we wheeled it to the back lab and we started squatting in 
that office.  The office never got converted back to an office again, it became 
our lab....  Ground floor was important because you’re on bedrock there so it’s 
a lot more stable. [RT1, 2/23/01] 
Interestingly, claiming space in this way had a double edge.  Transforming offices, 
auditoria, and sheds into laboratories could help achieve experimental goals and 
demonstrate independence and initiative; but the STMers had to make sure they were 
still within the disciplining gaze of the corporate lab management. 
 
These guys had the craziest setup, they had like a clubhouse or a shack that 
was physically built away from the main laboratory building out on the edge of 
the parking lot, and it was fantastic because the noise level in the ground was a 
thousand times less than in the building, so you had to work that much less 
hard to keep your machine quiet.  But it created a weird little cliquey culture.  
Everyone at bell labs was already a little weird, but these guys were like 
hermits in their little shack. [BW2, 5/22/01] 
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That ended up being a bit of a problem for Russell because he stayed out there 
to the very end.  It’s a bit isolating out there....  To be really successful here 
you have to be a member of the community.  You have to be making daily 
contact with the people around here and the managers have to be seeing you 
doing things here and hearing about you from other people here.  So if you 
happen to be even just on the other side of the road and get isolated that’s very 
very dangerous.  Once I started doing my metrology work I came back into the 
main building because the vibration issues were not quite as severe, and the 
technology was getting better, we were learning how to handle it better....  But 
Russell stayed out there and I think that was one of the things that also hurt 
him a lot is that he sort of drifted away from the mainstream of the community 
here.  You really have to stay engaged with this community. [JG3, 2/28/01] 
Thus, displaying both self and instrument to those in charge was an integral part of 
being a corporate STMer.  As these former corporate scientists, one from IBM 
Almaden and the other from Standard Oil of Ohio, remember, “showing atoms” to 
upper-level managers was a quick way to win institutional support for a lab group. 
 
The guy who ran the division would come by, which is a big deal at IBM 
because everything at IBM is big and it all seems like such a big deal at the 
time....  This one fellow came by and I was going to give him a demo.  He’d 
typically see five or six labs and hear a pitch from the vice president....  And I 
was one of the guys.  So I was a little bit cocky because I just had the [STM] 
turned off in the lab, just sitting there idling, so to speak, and he came in, we 
walked up, I turned the TV on, I started the scanner in one dimension, started 
the scanner in the other dimension, thing started to take data, and there the 
molecules were, just sitting there, just like they were the night before, no 
difference.  It was great. [JF, 10/19/01] 
 
I thought that [STM] would be useful looking at real catalysts, but that was 
nonsense, as it turns out.  What was actually useful [was] ... I can remember 
being the show-and-tell exhibit for the analytical lab director, who would bring 
people into my lab and say “Don, show them some atoms.” [DC1, 9/5/01] 
Display was built into the essence of the corporate research project; the corporate labs 
were all about building monuments to the company, whether vast architectural ones 
like the laboratory itself, or nanoscale ones made possible for the first time by the 
capabilities of the STM.11  Especially at Almaden, STMers and AFMers exerted 
themselves to make corporate billboards out of ever-smaller clumps of atoms.  As Don 
Eigler, famed mover of atoms, remembers it: 
                                                 
11 The notion that display is an integral part of science is much discussed in the history of early modern 
science (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Schaffer 1995). 
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Within days of learning how to move xenon atoms around I was either doing 
experiments trying to figure out what was the ... physics that allowed me to 
move them around, and/or I was writing “IBM”....  I was extremely beholden 
to people here at Almaden, to the company, to the environment here for giving 
me an opportunity to be successful to be a scientist and to be part of this team 
and [writing “IBM”] was just loyalty....  That was one of my ways to give back 
to the company what the company had given to me. [DE1, 10/11/01] 
In one case, the failure to manufacture such a tiny monument to the company caused 
the disciplinary apparatus of the lab to engage.  As Randy Feenstra recalls the episode, 
 
[Russell Becker] eventually got fired from Bell Labs.  He was actually the first 
guy to move atoms, they made a little pile of germanium atoms....  Then the 
management at Bell came and asked him, “write out Bell Labs.”  This was 
really early on, this was practically 10 years before Eigler started moving 
atoms.  Russell thought about it and said “well, it’s going to take me hours to 
do this, it’s never going to be practical, this is a waste of time.”  He said “no, 
can’t do it.”  So management went off, and then they came back later and they 
said, “well, how about just doing it in Morse code.” ...  And he thought about it 
and he refused....  Anyways, unfortunately that was Russell, and so after a 
number of years when tough times came to the industrial research labs and 
there was a lot of rearrangements, he was really more or less blackballed from 
getting another position at the lab and eventually had to leave. [RF1, 5/2/01] 
We see here an extreme rendition of the Foucauldian capillarity of power (Foucault 
1977b, 39), the tendency of power to flow into ever more spaces.  Research at the big 
corporate labs entailed expectations of nascent surface scientists.  These expectations 
were made manifest in built space and physical movement at every scale – from the 
architecture and landscaping of the lab, to the positioning of single atoms. 
Yet, though these STMers largely accepted the disciplining process that 
transformed them into good corporate citizens, they also took every opportunity to 
play the system.  Indeed, in matters such as scrounging lab space and experimental 
materials, taking advantage of the corporation was an accepted way to display drive 
and initiative.  Interestingly, this kind of resistance had its own capillarity – that is, the 
search for what Erving Goffman calls “secondary adjustments” (i.e. scrounged 
compensations for being embedded in the institution’s transforming apparatus – see 
Goffman 1961) took place over every imaginable scale as well.  The tractor shed/lab at 
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Bell, for instance, was, on the one hand, the product of an intense technopolitical 
struggle and a means for management to accelerate STM-building (and the training of 
STMers) by placing its best people together in a cramped space; but the shed, as we’ve 
seen, was also a clubhouse, a site for camaraderie amongst people who were 
simultaneously resisting and cooperating with the same disciplining system. 
The STM’s ability to move atoms, too, served, on the one hand, as a means for 
Bell and IBM management to turn STMers’ and AFMers’ work to their employer’s 
advantage; but it also provided an outlet for creativity and a means to relieve boredom.  
The two sides to this activity should not, of course, be seen as separable.  Atom-
moving STMers use their microscopes to draw stick figures (which appear on the 
company website) and perform “magic tricks” and spell out friends’ initials 
(micrographs of which appear on the walls of the friends’ offices).  The art of 
positioning atoms into pictures or abstract shapes easily transmutes into the science of 
atomic corrals; and parlor tricks like using two atoms to “magically” move another 
one around can easily be seen as a secondary adjustment for research on quantum 
phenomena. 
Conclusion 
Surface scientists, STMs, publications, and prestige – these were the products 
of the corporate labs, at least until the recession of the early ’90s.  After that, the need 
for quick commercial gains displaced much of the basic research infrastructure of the 
labs.  Many STMers left, and those who stayed generally moved away from STM, 
often to electron microscopy or AFM.  In the ’80s, though, when STM was new and 
surface science was still an exciting field, the corporate labs had operated as an 
efficient machine for processing people, turning young researchers into accomplished 
surface scientists.  But we have also seen how these people were able to work the 
system, to carve out a space for their own identities and projects.  Today, the big 
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corporate labs are no longer the center of probe microscopy; indeed, the future of these 
institutions is uncertain.  Bell Labs, in particular, is a hollow shell of its former self, 
and all of its STMers have left or been let go.  IBM, after several lean years in the 
early ’90s, has reorganized and mostly recovered, although it will likely never have 
the preeminence it once enjoyed.  There is still some STM and much AFM at IBM, 
but Big Blue’s researchers are no longer the commanding presence in the probe 
microscopy community they once were.  The technology of probe microscopy, and 
with it the corporate probe microscopists themselves, have matured, and the 
excitement and dynamism (and also uncertainty) of the ’80s have diminished. 
Thus, this is a story of both success and failure.  The labs themselves, which 
once brought glory to their companies and supported whole subdisciplines, have 
faded.  Their system of training, and their strategy for expanding STM and AFM, 
however, have succeeded dramatically.  Many of the young postdocs and junior 
scientists who first got STM and AFM to work are now respected elders in the SPM 
community.  They enjoy the admiration of their peers (for instance, Avouris, Tromp, 
Tersoff, Feenstra, Hamers, Swartzentruber, and Kaiser have all received honors from 
the American Vacuum Society) and fill prominent positions at various universities and 
corporate and national labs.  The technique they pioneered is now central to the 
practice of numerous disciplines, and their contributions to its development are widely 
recognized and cited.  Thus, no matter how total an institution might be, it still 
engages with the world.  For the labs themselves, this engagement with the world 
(long buffered by the largesse of their companies) became increasingly problematic 
and even disastrous.  For the graduates of those labs, though, the disciplining process 
they underwent prepared them well for the wider scientific stage.
 
 
Chapter Five 
Academic Labs and the Transformation of Probe Microscopy 
 
 In the first four chapters of this dissertation, we examined early probe 
microscopy work in corporate and national laboratories.  It was there that tunneling 
microscopy was invented, and work done in those settings made the STM famous and 
provided the greatest volume of its early successes.  Yet there was some early STM 
research in academic labs in Germany, Switzerland, California, and a few other places.  
These academic groups lagged early on, yet ultimately it was through them that probe 
microscopy was transformed from a home-built, high-end technique particular to one 
or two disciplines to a widespread, off-the-shelf tool relevant to many communities.  
Thus, we shift our focus here to academic probe microscopy.  In particular, this and 
the remaining chapters spotlight the early California groups, since it was around them 
that the community of AFMers and non-surface science STMers cohered, and it was 
through them that the technique became widely commercialized.  In later chapters, we 
will see what happened to the community they seeded; here, though, I want to look at 
the very local culture they constructed for building and using instruments, and the 
complicated relationship between microscope-building and the university setting. 
The growth of the modern research university has, of course, radically shaped 
the practice of science, just as the evolution of the scientific disciplines has profoundly 
shaped academic life. 1  Scholars in science and technology studies have long tracked 
the mutual construction of these institutions, and the ways in which their joint 
emergence has underwritten particular kinds of knowledge.2  Yet this literature still 
                                                 
1 For the postwar case, one of the most exhaustive studies (and one of the most influential on my 
analysis) is Leslie (1993).  See also Dennis (forthcoming); Owens (1985); Owens (1990); Kohler 
(1990); Warwick (2003). 
2 Kohler (1994) is one of the best of these, and certainly one of the most influential on this chapter. 
178 
 179
understates how closely pedagogy and training can be tied to the content and the 
practice of science.3  On the one hand, studies that examine the academic institutions 
of science rarely make the strong case that physical laws are partly an upshot of the 
need to train new scientists to use them; and, on the other hand, studies committed to 
the social construction of knowledge rarely point out how knowledge constructed in 
campus laboratories bears the mark of the academic institution’s training mission. 
 Thus, there are areas of science studies where greater attention to the 
mechanics of university research would significantly deepen our understanding of how 
scientific knowledge is constructed.  Most notably, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge literature seems to cry out for a more pedagogically-oriented analysis.  
Most of the major practitioners of SSK, including Harry Collins, Trevor Pinch, 
Donald Mackenzie, and David Bloor, have written extensively about the social 
construction of knowledge generated primarily in campus labs or by academic 
scientists (MacKenzie 1990; Bloor 1978; Collins 1992; Pinch 1986). 
Yet the characters in these studies are usually professors rather than students, 
and the pedagogical aspects of their work are treated as unrelated to the scientific 
disputes in which they become embroiled.  This is moderately surprising, given the 
Wittgensteinian roots of SSK; as Ray Monk and others have shown, pedagogy (of 
many varieties) took up a large and vexed portion of Wittgenstein’s life and thought 
(Monk 1990).  The Philosophical Investigations are peppered with meditations on 
teaching and learning, and the relationship between those activities and other 
Wittgensteinian topics such as thinking, recognizing, understanding, meaning, saying, 
feeling, and showing (Wittgenstein 1997).  This chapter, therefore, explores how 
training was an integral part of the grammar of the language games surrounding early 
academic probe microscopy.  Even when they were not formally teaching or learning, 
                                                 
3 A nice exception is Olesko (1991). 
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the students and professors who built these early STMs and AFMs continually strove 
to construct a sustainable experimental culture that produced both new microscopes 
and new microscopists.  Notably, the recipes they developed in response to this need 
eventually amplified the influence of this handful of academic groups and became a 
central – if ever-evolving – part of the construction of a scanning probe community 
and the attempted integration of that community into both the established disciplines 
and new transdisciplinary constellations such as nanotechnology and genomics. 
The STM Moves West 
 Unlike the corporate STMers, early academic probe microscopy groups were 
much more isolated from each other, had to operate with fewer resources, and had no 
ready-made disciplinary community (e.g. surface science) to judge their work.  These 
groups were – quite self-consciously – embarking on a new venture, one in which they 
had to cobble together materials, and where they were largely on their own in 
determining the course of experimentation.  Thus, they cultivated a naïve approach to 
research that, among other things, facilitated stronger rapport between them and the 
Zurich group than either they or Zurich had with Yorktown and Murray Hill. 
 Of the academic groups that first pioneered STM and AFM, the most well-
established (and the most closely-connected to Zurich) was Calvin Quate’s at 
Stanford.  In many ways, Quate exemplified the postwar Stanford created by Frederick 
Terman, the Stanford Dean of Engineering from 1946-55, and Provost from 1955-65, 
who promoted early attempts to commercialize academic research by sponsoring 
former students’ start-up companies such as Varian and Hewlett-Packard (Leslie and 
Kargon 1996).  Quate received his Ph.D. at Stanford in 1950 and took up a 
professorship in the electrical engineering and applied physics departments there in 
1961, working for the next decade on microwave research, at a time when the 
development and commercialization of microwave technology was central to 
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Stanford’s attempts to project its influence throughout the Bay Area.  Eventually, he 
carved out a niche specialty in the interaction between microwaves and acoustics, and 
soon became a world leader in that area.  In the 1970s, he used his expertise in that 
field to jump into microscopy, helping to invent the scanning acoustic microscope, an 
instrument related to medical ultrasound technology that used high-frequency sound 
waves to magnify small objects and even peer inside optically opaque materials 
(Quate 1976).  The SAM seems to have had a brief flowering among academic 
researchers, followed by many years of productive use in industrial non-destructive 
testing.  Though never a high-resolution microscope (averaging around 5 microns – 
i.e., 4 orders of magnitude coarser than STM), it did supply many of the needs of the 
non-destructive materials testing community (in, for example, the electronics 
industry); and it also laid the groundwork for Quate’s later entry into STM [JD2, 
2/22/01; JF1, 10/19/01; DR1, 3/14/01]. 
 Our other focus in this chapter is Paul Hansma’s group at the University of 
California at Santa Barbara.  Hansma had been a professor in the physics department 
at UCSB since 1972, where he set up a program in electron tunneling research.  Like 
Quate, Hansma’s previous experimental work – in his case, making sandwich tunnel 
junctions – profoundly influenced the shape of his early STM-building; but also, like 
Quate, Hansma saw the STM as a significant break in his research, a break signaled by 
the generational shift of his graduate students as cohorts trained in tunnel junctions 
were replaced by those trained in STM [PH1, 3/19/01].  Unlike Quate, Hansma did not 
embark on STM aided by links to Silicon Valley industrial institutions; the UCSB 
group was, in the beginning, smaller and more peripheral, and as a result its technical 
solutions were sometimes more idiosyncratic than the Stanford team’s. 
 One well-circulated story about the origins of Quate’s interest in STM is that 
he read a Physics Today article on the STM while flying to London in 1982 to accept 
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the Ranke Prize for Opto-electronics from the Royal Society (Schwarzschild 1982; 
Quate 1986).  While in London, he met with Eric Ash, a well-known acoustic and 
near-field microwave microscopist to discuss the STM; Ash had a former student at 
IBM Zurich, through whom Quate arranged to meet Binnig and Rohrer.  In 1982, the 
STM was still quite callow; beyond demonstrating the vacuum tunneling signature, its 
most successful application to date had been an unspectacular and almost universally 
ignored imaging of atomic steps on gold.  It had certainly not yet shown itself to be of 
any value to surface scientists or microscopists.  Quate, though, was not a surface 
scientist, and more an inventor/engineer than a dedicated microscopist.  Indeed, by 
1982 he was beginning to lose interest in the SAM, and took the advent of the STM as 
the occasion for a major shift in his research program.  From then on, no new cohorts 
of graduate students worked on the SAM.4  Recall that the resolution of the SAM was 
quite modest, and that its advantages lay more in its non-destructive character and its 
ability to peer within materials or to offer contrast even in optically or electronically 
transparent media such as glass.  Thus, for Quate, the then-low resolution of the STM 
was small concern, whereas he found its ability to offer non-destructive information 
about the electronic characteristics of materials highly intriguing. 
 Hansma’s introduction to the STM, meanwhile, came through Rohrer, who had 
done a sabbatical at UCSB a few years earlier and knew about Hansma’s work with 
tunnel junctions [PH1, 3/19/01].  Thus, Rohrer directed Binnig to make a side trip to 
Santa Barbara from a conference in Los Angeles to discuss the Zurich team’s vacuum 
tunneling experiments with Hansma.  Specifically, Binnig and Rohrer had always 
assumed that it would be possible to do tunneling spectroscopy with the STM, and had 
suggested as much in their early papers (the technical details of tunneling 
                                                 
4 Indeed, several of Quate’s former students and postdocs who worked on SAM – Dan Rugar, John 
Foster, Clayton Williams, Kumar Wickramasinghe – followed their mentor into STM and AFM. 
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spectroscopy are outlined in Chapter Four, since corporate STMers pioneered the 
technique at the same time as Hansma).  They had little desire, though, to turn the 
STM into a spectroscopic instrument themselves. Binnig and Rohrer only ever 
dabbled in spectroscopy, and never managed to get publishable results.  They did, 
however, inspire a variety of other groups to make the attempt, including Hansma’s.  
So, where Quate approached STM as a new kind of microscope, Hansma saw it as a 
variation on the tunnel junction, leading to profoundly different approaches between 
the two groups early on. 
 From the beginning, Hansma and Quate were in a league of their own.  Around 
North America, throughout the mid to late ’80s, groups in physics departments 
decided to build STMs.  Some, like John Clarke, a physicist at Berkeley, or Emanuel 
Feuchtwanger at Penn State, made early contributions but quickly petered out; others, 
like Max Lagally at Wisconsin or Barbara Hope Cooper and Wilson Ho at Cornell, 
started later but became leading contributors.  With their headstart and cooperation 
with Zurich, though, Hansma and Quate were able to mold a West Coast STM 
community.  This community included notables like Clarke; John Baldeschwieler, a 
well-known chemist at Caltech whose group, like Quate and Hansma’s, became 
associated with a start-up microscope manufacturer; and Stuart Lindsay, a physicist at 
Arizona State, who, following a successful collaboration with Hansma, formed his 
own probe microscopy group and, in turn, started his own instrument-building 
company.  In addition, the West Coast probe microscopy community included 
researchers at the Universities of Arizona and Oregon, UC Davis, and the Battelle, 
Sandia, Livermore, and Lawrence Berkeley national labs. 
As with the corporate STMers, there was initially a long period (almost three 
years) when the academic groups had little to show for their efforts.  Indeed, Quate 
faced almost exactly the same replication hurdle as the groups at Yorktown, Almaden, 
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and Murray Hill, since he chose to go down the surface science path in building his 
first STM.  From his interactions with Binnig and Rohrer, Quate knew basically how a 
Zurich-type STM should work, and entrusted the construction of such an instrument to 
a graduate student, Sang-Il Park, with the mission of reproducing atomic resolution of 
the 7x7.  Because of his acoustic microscopy work, much of the infrastructure for 
building this STM already existed in the Quate group – piezoelectric scanners, 
feedback circuitry (and skill in constructing such circuits), output and imaging 
equipment, etc.  Thus, it was in these areas – particularly image production and 
rendering – that the Stanford team made its first significant contributions to the 
practice of STM construction.  That is, building the first West Coast STM presented 
few difficulties.  Indeed, Park (along with current and former students such as Scot 
Elrod, Alex de Lozanne, and John Foster) accomplished this task so quickly that he 
caused some corporate lab managers to reassess their own institution’s progress.  At 
the time, though, the test of a working STM (i.e. one capable of generating credible 
new knowledge) was atomic resolution, usually of the 7x7.  Here, Quate fared no 
better than the corporate labs; in fact, Golovchenko beat him to it, and Demuth and 
Feenstra more or less tied.  Both the corporate STMers and members of the Zurich 
team account for the Quate group’s slow pace by pointing to its lack of experience in 
surface science [JD1, 3/19/01; CG1, 11/12/01].  Turning a microscopy group into a 
surface science group – building a UHV system, hardening the microscopes to survive 
the ultrahigh vacuum environment, learning the recipes for preparing ultraclean 
samples of the 7x7 – proved difficult for Quate.  Thus, Park was able, in short order, to 
get his STM to produce low-resolution images – rendered exquisitely using the 
group’s advanced imaging software – but atomic resolution remained elusive. 
 More or less the same story held for the efforts at Berkeley and Caltech.  
Clarke entrusted the building of his group’s STM to a graduate student, John Mamin, 
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who was completing a dissertation on superconductivity.  Mamin continued on as 
Clarke’s postdoc, making slow progress toward a Zurich-type UHV instrument – slow, 
again, because learning the intricacies of UHV and sample preparation (without being 
located in an institution such as a corporate lab where surface science was routine and 
well-supplied) was difficult.  Similarly, at Caltech, one of Baldeschwieler’s postdocs, 
Paul West, heard about the STM at a conference, promoted the idea of shifting the 
group’s research, and began building a UHV instrument [PW2, 3/30/01; JB1, 3/28/01].  
Baldeschwieler was one of the early workers in both the nuclear magnetic resonance 
and ion cyclotron resonance fields, so the task of building new kinds of instruments 
was familiar; but, yet again, turning an instrument-oriented chemistry group into one 
capable of building a surface science STM was problematic.  West visited Switzerland 
in 1983 and brought back some of the Zurich team’s know-how about piezoceramics, 
tip preparation, and vibration isolation, and – like Park – rapidly built a “working” 
UHV STM.  Going from a “working” to an “atomic resolution” instrument, though, 
took more time, energy, and interest than he could invest: 
 
What I did there [at Caltech] was, built it and demonstrated the scan and did tip 
approach and you could measure voltage-currents, those sorts of things.  
Demonstrated the tunneling effect....  Before I left I don’t think we did any 
really high resolution images.  Getting high resolution images at that time was 
a real labor of love.  You might spend two or three months screwing around 
with it before you got a high resolution image.  At the time I was a postdoc so I 
had other – I liked the stuff but I also wanted to get a job. [PW2, 3/30/01] 
 Hansma, meanwhile, decided to sidestep many of these problems by heading in 
a completely different direction.  Seeing that IBM and Bell had the surface science and 
UHV applications locked down, he moved to adapt the STM to fit with his tunnel 
junction work.  This meant building “squeezable tunnel junctions,” devices where two 
conducting elements (usually gold wires) could be brought very close together and a 
voltage applied until electrons began to tunnel across the gap (Moreland, et al. 1983).  
With their use of crossed conducting strips rather than a two-tip or tip-sample 
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configuration, the squeezable tunnel junctions built by Hansma and a graduate student, 
John Moreland, looked much more like traditional metal-oxide-metal sandwich 
junctions than did any of the previous vacuum tunneling attempts by Young, Teague, 
Thompson, or Binnig and Rohrer (see Figure 5-1).  By the mid ’80s, though, the 
tunnel junction business was losing steam, and even the advent of vacuum gaps did 
little to stimulate it.  Initially, one motivation for Hansma to move to the new 
configuration was the potential for an easier insertion of molecules – especially 
biomolecules – into the gap.  While these squeezable junctions were relatively easy to 
construct, though, they presented great difficulties of interpretation.  Here, Hansma 
had to choose his audience.  If he went to the tunnel junction community, he would 
need to present some gold standard of calibration, much as Ivar Giaever had done for 
sandwich tunnel junctions in the ’60s (Giaever 1974).  If he moved to the STM 
community, in which image-making was the primary locus of activity, he would 
probably need to build a full-blown microscope.  In the end, what made the decision 
easier was the more or less accidental discovery that the squeezable junctions worked 
just as well in air as they did in a vacuum, a discovery with profound implications for 
Hansma’s local moral economy (Thompson 1971; Kohler 1994) of training students 
and building microscopes, and equally important ramifications for the STM 
community as a whole. 
 Recall that all the initial Zurich work (including Binnig and Rohrer’s patents 
on the STM) had been done with the assumption that a high vacuum was necessary for 
electrons to tunnel.  In part this was to appease surface scientists (who needed a high 
vacuum to keep samples “well-defined”); but cursory calculations also indicated that 
typical voltages between the tip and sample would cause electric breakdown of the air.  
Some people did benchtop testing of their STMs in air, of course; but for surface 
scientists (or anyone following their lead – e.g. Binnig or Quate), getting credible 
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Figure 5-1: Squeezable tunnel junctions.  The Hansma group developed this 
device that could measure vacuum tunneling to a strip electrode, rather than to a
tunneling tip.  From Sonnenfeld, et al. (1985).
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atomic-resolution images in air was unthinkable.  Hansma, though, was not trying to 
image; and what he found in testing his tunnel junctions was that, spectroscopically, 
air or vacuum seemed to make little difference (Moreland, et al. 1984). 
Starting Over 1: Diversification of Approaches 
 News of Hansma’s discovery began to spread just as, in late 1984, the groups 
that were following the surface scientific path were reaching crisis point.  No one in 
either the corporate or academic labs, could replicate atomic resolution of the 7x7.  
Even Binnig and Rohrer had not advanced much further in a year and a half.  So, as 
outlined in Chapter Four, Quate assigned a former student from Mexico, Alex de 
Lozanne (by then a professor at the University of Texas) to organize a small meeting 
of nascent STMers in Cancun.  The Cancun meeting catalyzed the rapid spread of 
atomic resolution in late 1984 and early 1985, such that there was significant hoopla 
over the instrument at the 1985 American Physical Society March meeting, and IBM 
went ahead with its plans for an STM summit meeting in the Austrian Alps at the end 
of the year.  Thus, 1985 is, in many ways, the pivotal year for the early development 
of probe microscopy.  Atomic resolution, while still not routine, was at least known to 
be replicable; air STM was now a possibility; Binnig was in California, developing 
significant new designs with the Quate group; IBM was mounting an aggressive 
promotion of the STM, leading to the Nobel Prize for Binnig and Rohrer the next year; 
both Binnig and Rohrer were beginning to tire of STM in ways that would profoundly 
shape probe microscopy; and a probe microscopy community was coming into 
existence, through conferences, collaborations, and the spread of microscope designs. 
 Even before Binnig’s arrival at Palo Alto, air STM had worked its way up from 
Santa Barbara to Stanford (as well as down to Pasadena [RC1, 6/27/02]).  An air 
instrument offered a great deal to academic groups that saw themselves as oriented 
more to instrumentation than to surface science (or, in fact, any other subdiscipline) – 
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indeed, especially at UCSB, that self-perception was co-constructed with the ability to 
work in air.  If air STM could be made routine and credible, it would be much easier 
to build and tinker with than its UHV cousins.  It did not need, for instance, to be built 
with the special materials and design features needed in UHV; and there would be no 
cumbersome, expensive, finicky vacuum chamber.  Use in air eliminated lengthy 
pumpdowns and bakeouts needed to evacuate a UHV chamber; thus, unlike surface 
scientists, air STMers could take apart and modify microscopes in minutes rather than 
weeks.  No vacuum chamber also meant greater bodily access to the microscope.  Of 
particular importance was the ability to eyeball the microscope and the sample and 
make real-time judgments about (and modifications to) both. 
 Air STM also meant significant changes in the practices surrounding samples.  
Samples could now be replaced much more quickly, potentially increasing the pace of 
experimentation; samples that would not survive the rigors of UHV (including many 
biophysical samples) could now be examined; and since exposure to air was no longer 
a problem, sample preparation could now be done away from the microscope, again 
eliminating much of the cumbersome bulk of a UHV STM.  Obviously, samples 
examined in air would no longer count as “clean” or “well-defined” by the standards 
of surface science, but the California academic groups quickly used this to their 
advantage.  Air STM opened the doors to a vast array of samples, all prepared less 
rigorously than silicon or other surface science materials (and, potentially, with less 
need for skill and expertise in preparation techniques).  Thus, air STM offered the 
grounds for a divorce from surface science, and the reformulation of the tunneling 
microscope as a general-purpose, easy-to-use tool available to many disciplines and 
many kinds of samples. 
 Seeing STM as a general-purpose microscope led Quate and Hansma to 
reorganize their practice in two significant, enduring, and related ways.  First, it meant 
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the lines of development could be moved further away from those narrowly dictated 
by surface science; thus, an intense diversification of designs, modes, and applications 
of the instruments ensued.  Second, a utility microscope had to be useful to someone, 
so the California groups began searching for users of their instruments.  The first of 
these consequences – diversification – was apparent early in the Hansma group’s 
attempts to operate squeezable tunnel junctions, and then STMs, in environments such 
as water, oil, air, and other gases and solutions.  The move to liquid environments 
stemmed partly from a desire to carve out a niche distinct from the corporate STMers’ 
dominance of UHV and surface science. 
 
We realized IBM was doing a wonderful job with Gerd Binnig and Heini 
Rohrer in high vacuum, and there was no hope of competing with that.  They 
had too much talent and money for us to meaningfully compete.  But I thought 
there would be a niche in making scanning probe microscopes that would work 
in air and liquid. [PH1, 3/19/01] 
It was also, though, an attempt to meet the corporate STMers’ rigorous standards of 
cleanliness, but without the time and expense associated with UHV – surfaces could 
be kept very clean if they were immersed under solutions with very tightly controlled 
purities, yet a liquid “cell” containing the sample and probe was much smaller and 
easier to deal with than a bulky UHV system.  This change in design, though, was 
accomplished with a view to how it might be relevant to new uses and users.  That is, 
because liquid environments are conducive to biological systems, liquid STM was 
immediately coopted to allow the Hansma group to make its work relevant to 
biologists and biophysicists. 
 
The first people who conceived these STMs, they were interested in atomic 
scale physics and so they had the idea that surfaces needed to be atomically 
clean and these things needed to be in ultrahigh vacuum chambers so that you 
could keep your surfaces atomically clean.  And Paul had two real insights.  
One is that the biologists need to operate in liquid, in physiological 
environments, the other insight that he had is there are two ways to keep a 
surface clean – one is to protect it by enclosing it in a vacuum, ultrahigh 
vacuum.  The other is to protect it by enclosing it in a very clean fluid. [CP1, 
3/19/01] 
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 Diversifying the shape and uses of the microscopes only became routine in the 
Quate lab after Binnig arrived in 1985.  The groundwork for this shift was laid partly 
by the invention of AFM and single-tube scanners.  AFM, with its wider array of 
samples and its more intuitive imaging mechanism, had the potential to be a more 
interesting instrument to a wider range of disciplines than STM had been thus far; 
while the single-tube scanner offered quicker, less finicky construction.  With AFM 
and air STM – and with Binnig’s presence in the lab – the practices of the Quate group 
shifted considerably.  There was now much more room to choose among different 
designs, and applications.  Here, the pedagogical mission of the laboratory became 
crucial.  Each graduate student carved out particular niches in the technology and use 
of both STM and AFM, niches that self-consciously built on what had been learned 
previously about the instruments, but would expand that knowledge base in some 
distinctive way [MK1, 10/12/01; SG1, 3/27/01; JC2, 3/20/01.  Contrast this with the 
situation of postdocs and junior researchers at the corporate labs.  The corporate 
STMers learned new things about their microscopes, but they were being evaluated on 
how they used the STM to fill in gaps in the body of surface scientific knowledge.  
The students in the California academic groups did not see themselves as making such 
a positive contribution to a formal body of knowledge.  Instead, they referenced their 
projects to their own local group’s needs and expertise; and that expertise, rather than 
accumulating positively, spread outward in a series of shifts – STM in air, in water, in 
oil, in an electrochemical cell, then AFM and other types of microscopes. 
In the flurry of activity between 1983 and 1990, even when these groups might 
have had reason to reference what they were doing to external needs and to contribute 
positively to a cumulative body of knowledge, they subordinated those needs to their 
penchant for a more free-wheeling practice.  For instance, in the early days the grant 
officers at the National Science Foundation and the Office of Naval Research who 
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funded Quate and Hansma gave them some leeway in jumping quickly from project to 
project in ways that departed somewhat from the original grant proposals.  Tunnel 
junction grants funded STM work, which secured STM grants that funded AFM work.  
On occasion, students had to scramble to bridge the work they’d been doing to the 
work they’d been funded to do: 
 
Dr. Quate is a master of raising money.  At one point he got money from DoD 
to do very small scale data storage, the idea being that a cruise missile would 
have an ultracompact topographic map of the entire world’s stored on it.  
That’s the way he pitched it anyway.  It seemed like we worked on everything 
but that for my first three years.  Then he said “oh, we’re up for renewal, we 
have to get some results in,” so Tom Albrecht and Morris Dovek and I 
performed this experiment based on a fluke accident that Doug Smith came up 
with.  Doug had attributed it to something else, thought that he was depositing 
molecules, but it turned out that the fields were blowing holes in the first 
atomic layer of the graphite.  So Tom and I figured that out and then came up 
with a way to do a bunch of these, and made a program that let you spell 
things.  In fact, that’s sort of how I proposed to my wife, was on a little piece 
of graphite.  So basically, we did that work to satisfy a contract, largely.  But 
then that really set Dr. Quate off thinking, “well, now I can maybe make teeny 
transistors and, maybe if you have a 10 nanometer line of conductor on an 
insulator you can figure out what would be the transistor’s beta coefficient, 
what will be its properties and voltage transitions and all that sort of stuff....”  
We did a lot of quick experiments.  But that whole thing, we did it in like three 
months – made the microscope, made the software, made the electronics, and 
wrote a paper and Tom and I graduated.  Literally, we’re writing our theses 
and it was the last chapter in my thesis because it wasn’t going to be there until 
by the time I got done. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
This quote exemplifies three characteristics of the Quate and Hansma labs: their strong 
orientation to funding (which corporate STMers did not have to think about in the 
same way); the ad hoc way in which they matched their practices to representations of 
those practices in funding proposals; and their tendency to bounce from topic to topic 
in search of funding or relevant communities, rather than to positively accumulate 
knowledge in any one area.  As students carried out experiments, they and their group 
leaders pushed their work toward whatever bits and pieces of “interesting” artifacts or 
expertise or knowledge could be created most quickly.  Group leaders could keep 
long-term goals (such as those expressed in grant proposals) in mind, and could 
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reference current work to those long-term goals; but the short-term work also 
generated surprises and data that could hive off.  Importantly, as we will see in the 
next chapter, the array of smaller “results” that was created could be packaged as 
contributing to “science” or “technology” – creating knowledge or advancing the 
technique – and individual results could sometimes be switched from one pigeonhole 
to the other.  No short-term result carried heavy epistemic weight, but all results were 
taken as opening possible avenues for quick, generative experimentation. 
Quate, who started STM work with more funding contacts than Hansma, had 
the resources to recruit a large crew of students and set them working on multiple 
microscopes at once.  With many projects ongoing simultaneously in a tight-knit 
group, people, designs, equipment, and samples could all circulate freely between 
experiments: 
 
[Quate] is remarkable in that, unlike most professors, he would bring in 
students from physical chemistry, from electrical engineering, from the 
medical group, from applied physics, and physics, and they would work on 
these projects.  He would sort of let us work in twos and threes and the group 
would get together all the time.  Because there was such a diverse group people 
could say “oh, okay, you’re going to do the electronics on this,” or “I’m having 
problems debugging this board, can you help with that?” or “I need to make 
something for ultrahigh vacuum, get this surface scientist that has tons of 
experience.”  There was a ton of different expertise and very open kinds of 
people.  It wasn’t like “I’ve got my project,” it was a more team-oriented 
thing....  Microscopes were made very quickly and debugged very very 
quickly. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
One hallmark of the academic groups was a readiness to use any handy flotsam 
and jetsam to jerry-rig microscopes together.  Found, borrowed, appropriated, and 
cobbled cultural materiel all made their way into their STMs and AFMs.  At Caltech, 
Baldeschwieler’s group obtained atomic resolution using a pencil lead as an STM tip; 
at UCSB [JB1, 3/28/01], the Hansma group found that surgical tubing offered the best 
vibration isolation, hand-crushed pawn shop diamonds made excellent cantilever tips, 
and plucked eyebrow hairs were good brushes for gluing the diamonds to the 
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cantilevers [SG1, 3/27/01].  Group members recall Hansma excitedly coming to work 
one day describing an ad he had see on television for Gillette Platinum Plus razor 
blades, and proposing to use the oxide-free blades as tunneling surfaces in his 
squeezable junctions [BD2, 10/18/01].  At Stanford, this kind of bricolage flowed in 
part from (or at least accorded well with) Binnig’s unique gifts and unusual 
experimental practice: 
 
Gerd Binnig is one of the most amazing people in that he comes up with, I 
don’t know, 10 ideas a day.  9 of them suck, but he can cycle through ideas so 
quickly, and he gets one good a day where the average person might get one 
per 10 days.  He’s willing to take a chance, tries crazy ideas, never believes 
that something is too wacky....  It was about 10 o’clock at night on a Friday 
night, and Gerd and I were working on this low temperature microscope, and 
we had an arcing problem or something, the electronics fried, so I said “well, 
shoot, my fiancée is coming in 10 minutes, maybe we should call it an 
evening.”  He goes “no, we have 10 minutes.”  I swear to god, we got more 
done in that 10 minutes, it was just unbelievable....  [Another time] literally in 
less than 24 hours we made this microscope, out of glue.  I would go “this glue 
takes 2 hours to cure.”  He pulls out a heat gun and says “no it’ll take 10 
minutes to cure” and sure enough it worked.  We just accelerated everything 
like that, it was really a lot of fun....  The guy can get anything to work, he 
could take a pile of bananas and band-aids and get it to work. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
As this quote emphasizes, experimental work at Stanford, UCSB, and Palo 
Alto tended to be fast but somewhat chaotic.  In the corporate labs, remember, 
postdocs tried to beat the clock by structuring their work according to the disciplined 
practices of surface science.  In the West Coast academic labs, this disciplinary 
structure was less apparent.  Indeed, participants align the more free-form 
experimental outlook of the Quate and Hansma groups with their immersion in a wider 
“California” context.  One former member of the Hansma lab remembers the 8 to 5 
workday of the UCSB team in the late ’80s this way: 
 
CM: So most of the actual operation of the AFMs was during the day when 
there would be a group around? 
SG: Right, lunch would hit and boom.  This is California, everybody would be 
out, it would be a good lunch, and in fact I remember coming in and doing 
stuff at night and it was actually frustrating because I’d start collecting data 
and I’m thinking “oh maybe this is real” and I’d go “I don’t know, can 
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somebody else help me?”  If someone was there, great, and if someone wasn’t 
then we were stuck. [SG1, 3/27/01] 
One of defining characteristics of the Quate and Hansma groups was the 
substitution of short-term, dynamic frameworks for the more encompassing structures 
of disciplines like surface science.  At Santa Barbara Hansma used rules of thumb to 
motivate his people and set boundaries for experimental work; for instance, group 
members recall that Hansma would sometimes reassess a design and declare that the 
group had until the end of the week to make the design work before moving on to 
something new.  As often as not, this meant that the group’s most significant 
discoveries came on Friday afternoons, as group members worked to squeeze the last 
results out of an instrument [BD2, 10/18/01].  Hansma also structured lab work with 
proverbs (Shapin 2001), some of which continue to circulate widely through his 
network of former students and collaborators; two are particularly worthy of note.  
One, borrowed from his mentor at UCSB, Herb Broida, said to “do everything as 
poorly as possible;” i.e., throw experiments together with little polish or gloss, 
concentrating on quickly getting the basics to work.  The second said to “make as 
many mistakes as you can as quickly as you can;” again, the idea being to head in 
intuitive directions, test them rapidly, and move on. 
Starting Over 2: Outward-looking Focus 
 This emphasis on intuition, and de-emphasis on disciplinary frames, oriented 
the West Coast groups (particularly Hansma’s) toward activities of self-cultivation.  
The source of skills was seen less in formal training than in the exploration of new 
niches of tacit and personal knowledge.  Self-cultivating activities, whether inside or 
outside the laboratory, could contribute to this exploration.  At times, this simply 
manifested itself in the much greater importance of outdoor activity and team sports at 
Stanford and UCSB than in the corporate labs.  Likewise, we can see these cultural 
values expressed in, for example, group members’ activities during the summer: 
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Paul [Hansma], he’s pretty interesting about this, he takes his summers off, 
essentially every summer.  He really is gone.  He’ll be incredibly reluctant to 
come in at all to the university.  Not while I was there, but in subsequent years, 
he would actually have lab meetings occasionally but he’ll have them at his 
house, okay.  So he would just stay away for the summer.  He would come out 
to a retreat-like thing on the East Coast, he had some Indian guru type that he 
was close with somehow. [JH1, 6/10/02 
Barney Drake (Hansma’s technician), too, often disappeared from Santa Barbara, 
usually to travel the world or to work as a river guide.  Other self-cultivating activities 
often mentioned by group members include photography, yoga, and meditation.  
Moreover, we can see ways in which this orientation to hobbies and activities played 
out in Hansma’s method for translating design ideas into working prototypes.5
 
[Hansma] has a woodshop at home, and he would go home for a few days or 
over a weekend, and using the tools he had available in his shop, his band saw 
and his drill press and a few other wood tools, he would carve up a prototype.  
Basically, it would always be a 2 to 1 size prototype, and he’d use hot melt 
glue and stuff like that to stick it all together, and then he would bring this in to 
Barney Drake, the technician, and then Barney would actually reduce that to 
machine drawings and metal and make up a real prototype....  The fact that he 
focused on designs that could be built in an afternoon or two in his woodshop 
with his woodworking skills, it forced an elegant and simple design.  What 
flowed from that is they were elegant and simple to operate, much more ... than 
the things that had preceded it. [CP1, 3/19/01] 
The pedagogical heterogeneity of the UCSB group reinforced their valuing of tacit 
knowledge.  If the ability to acquire ad hoc informal skills was valued more than a 
pedigree of formal, disciplined knowledge, then almost anyone might possess suitable 
skills (or the ability to develop them).  Thus, one could find valuable personnel by 
looking in unexpected places.  Hence, Santa Barbara became a magnet for people with 
backgrounds that would have seemed highly unusual at other centers of probe 
microscopy.  The Hansma group was not more heterogeneous than other groups by 
some of the classic sociological metrics (race, gender, ethnicity, etc.).  In educational 
                                                 
5 For some interesting studies of hobbyists, see van der Grijp (2002); Haring (2002).  Both these studies 
detail the complex circulation of artifacts and expertise in networks that, like the probe microscopy 
community, include old-timers and newcomers alike and, eventually, manufacturers catering to those 
participants. 
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background, and life experience, though, the Hansma group seems qualitatively much 
more diverse.  The range of actors who became enrolled in building SPMs at Santa 
Barbara included junior high students, river guides, undergraduates, yoga instructors, 
retirees, and historians [PH1, 3/19/01; HH1, 3/19/01; BD2, 10/18/01; MT1, 2/26/01; 
OM1, 11/16/01].  This diversity would, I believe, be unthinkable at the corporate labs, 
or even at Stanford. 
Three such people particularly contributed to the group’s success.  The first 
was Paul Hansma’s wife, Helen.6  Although she had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, by 
the time the group started into STM and AFM Helen had been underemployed in 
scientific work for a number of years – spending her time instead raising the couple’s 
children, and teaching yoga and elementary school science.  A persistent theme of the 
group’s research, though, had been the desire for projects that would draw on her 
expertise enough that she could work at least part-time in the lab.  Even from the 
squeezable tunnel junction days, biomolecules had been part of the group’s focus; and 
as the microscopes were adapted more for biophysics, Helen’s contribution became 
more central.  Through the ’80s, she re-entered lab work by preparing biological 
samples, and by teaching some of the rudiments of molecular biology to the group’s 
instrument builders.  By the early ’90s, she was a full-time professor, with her own 
projects, her own postdocs, and – importantly – a large crew of undergraduates, all 
learning how to prepare samples and characterize them with the AFM.  Interestingly, 
undergraduates seem to have played a significantly larger role in events at Santa 
Barbara than anywhere else in the probe microscopy community [HH1, 3/19/01]. 
 The second unorthodox character was Barney Drake, a UCSB alumnus who 
came to work as Paul Hansma’s technician in the tunnel junction days.  Drake is 
                                                 
6 For some material on scientific spousal collaborations, see Rossiter (1997); Rossiter (1980); Outram 
(1987); Pycior, et al. (1996). 
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Hansma’s self-described “hands,” the person who made the group leader’s designs a 
reality, who coaxed instruments into operation so graduate students could use them, 
and catalyzed the transformation of these idiosyncratic research microscopes into 
commercial products.  Drake gives a telling anecdote about how he became central to 
the group’s STM work [BD2, 10/18/01]: once, while he and Hansma were on 
sabbatical at the University of Virginia, working with Robert Coleman, they built a 
low-temperature air STM.  One Friday (again, a pivotal day for the group), Hansma, 
Drake, and one of Coleman’s students were trying to get the STM to work with little 
success.  At that point, very early in Drake’s time with Hansma, he had not yet proven 
himself and did not get a chance to try to make the STM work; but, after 5:00, when 
Hansma and the students went home, Drake stayed on, thought through the design of 
the instrument he had helped build, saw a possible problem, and fixed it simply by 
looking down the long dewar in which the STM was submerged and shifting it so that 
it would be less subject to incident vibration.  Then, in half an hour, Drake got some of 
the first images ever of charge density waves, and, excitedly, took them to Hansma’s 
house over the weekend.  From that point on, as Drake remembers it, Hansma let him 
run every instrument; indeed, graduate students remember Drake as the one who 
would come in each day, calibrate the microscopes, and tell them which ones were 
working and which ones were “fussy.”  As Drake’s anecdote hints, one important 
characteristic of Hansma group culture was that the labor of putting together a 
microscope was seen as conferring a more intimate knowledge of how it worked – a 
kind of tacit knowledge that overcame deficits in formal, disciplined knowledge.  
Thus, students were encouraged to build and rebuild instruments not only to learn 
about instrument-building, but to gain a better feel for the images being generated with 
the microscopes. 
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 The final member of this trio of characters was a retired physicist named Sam 
Alexander.  Late in his career, Alexander had developed a pet alternative to 
Einsteinian relativity, but had never been able to test his ideas [PH1, 3/19/01].  In 
retirement, though, he found he had little to occupy his time and asked his former 
colleague, Hansma, for some lab space and a little equipment so he could carry out his 
experiments.  These consisted of attempts to measure very slight changes in the 
lengths of metal bars as they were rotated from one orientation to another.  The 
detection scheme he cobbled together from spare lasers and optical tables drew on a 
concept known as the optical lever.7  In a laboratory that fed on undisciplined – even 
fringe – ideas like Alexander’s, and depended so much on the quick circulation of 
skills, it was almost inevitable that his work would be coopted for the group’s 
microscopy research. 
The linchpin for this cooptation came from a perceived flaw in then-current 
AFM designs.  The Binnig AFM – with the STM probe mounted on the back as a 
detector – had spread rapidly to IBM Almaden, Santa Barbara, and a few other places.  
These first AFMs, though, were notoriously difficult to operate.  The user had to 
manually approach the STM tip down to the AFM cantilever; then, once the STM tip 
was tunneling, approach the AFM cantilever down to the surface.  Then scanning 
could begin, but it would only last as long as both the STM tip and the AFM probe 
remained sharp – STM tips being notoriously erratic, especially in air, and AFM 
probes inevitably degrading over time (especially in the then-prevalent contact mode, 
where they scrape against the surface).  Even if an image were formed this way, the 
user could never be sure whether they were seeing features the AFM probe measured 
                                                 
7 An optical lever uses the fact that, when arranged properly, very small changes in the position of a 
light source can yield very large changes in the point where the light beam strikes a surface.  Think 
about shining a flashlight on a wall – you can turn your wrist only a few inches, yet this causes the point 
where the beam hits to the wall to shift by several feet. 
 
 200
on the sample surface, or features the STM tip measured on the back of the AFM 
cantilever’s surface.  As one former Hansma student remembers it, Hansma saw that 
STM detection was problematic and worked toward simpler designs, but he also 
expressed frustration with students’ slow progress generating data with these AFMs. 
 
Paul [Hansma] could never understand why we couldn’t get it, I mean we 
spent all our time doing maintenance.  It was like 85% maintenance....  
Everything broke.  If the electronics didn’t break then just putting the 
cantilever in one of the metal pieces that was holding the cantilever holder 
would break.  Getting one good image was it.  In fact, Paul used to have a 
saying, “one paper one machine.”  Basically, one image, one paper, and then 
we’d build the next microscope. [SG1, 3/27/01] 
Note the proverb of “one image, one paper” – again, this was a maxim rather than a 
hard and fast rule.  It could be brought in to structure work when needed, but the group 
could also draw on multiple images from multiple microscopes in the publications 
when that avenue seemed to offer greater opportunities. 
Because of the problems with STM detection, Hansma was on the lookout for 
a detector that would make the microscopes less finicky, and starting to turn his sights 
toward Alexander’s eccentric project in one corner of the lab: 
 
[Sam Alexander] was working one afternoon a week, for the fun of it, in a 
corner of our lab, mostly by himself.  He went through a series of instruments, 
each one getting a little better and each one getting him thinking that there 
might be an effect right at the edge of measurement. Then we built ones that 
were increasingly better, but the effect would still recede....  It was becoming 
clear to both of us that this effect didn’t exist.  Also, we were getting so 
frustrated with the electron tunneling for detecting the deflection of levers that 
we decided to combine two projects that weren’t working into one that would.  
We decided to use Sam’s optical lever to detect the deflection of our 
cantilevers. [PH1, 3/19/01] 
The combination of the two ailing techniques that Alexander and Hansma and Drake 
(and graduate students like Scot Gould and Craig Prater and a postdoc, Othmar Marti) 
worked out was to make the AFM cantilevers reflective (either by coating them or by 
gluing small mirrors or shards of glass), then shine a laser onto them; the laser would 
reflect off the cantilever into a photodiode, which would produce a voltage correlating 
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to the deflection of the cantilever (see Figure 5-2).  By feeding the voltage into almost 
exactly the same feedback and output circuitry as an STM, they suddenly had an AFM 
with significantly fewer moving parts and much less delicate calibration. 
 The process was not immediate, of course.  According to Hansma group 
mythology, there were seven prototypes between the first optical lever and a routinely 
working instrument.  The most fundamental changes between prototypes involved 
shrinking the optical lever.  The first prototype was mounted on an optical table and 
the laser spot reflected off the cantilever onto the laboratory wall, but eventually the 
group got the whole apparatus down to “coffee can size” (in fact, coffee cans were 
used as vibration shields).  The optical lever clearly ranks with the tube scanner as one 
of the developments that made AFM a technique that the many rather than the few 
could invest in.  Though others – notably Meyer and Amir at IBM – invented similar 
optical lever schemes almost simultaneously, the innovation quickly became 
associated with the outward-looking Hansma group rather than with the more 
involuted corporate AFMers. 
 Though more plugged into the corporate world of IBM and Silicon Valley, the 
Quate group resembled Hansma’s team in that they worked and played hard, and 
looked beyond their lab for inspiration and help.  For instance, where Hansma found 
inspiration in woodworking and spiritual retreats, Quate looked to physical activity 
and the camaraderie of team sports.  As a short bio on the IEEE website puts it, “Quate 
is an enthusiastic outdoorsman. He skis, hikes, jogs, and was an addicted kayak 
enthusiast until he discovered the sailboard.”8  Clearly, these aspects of the Stanford 
form of life contributed to Binnig’s rapport with Quate and his students: 
 
Gerd is an incredible “let’s just try it” kind of guy.  If you actually saw 
anything that he built, you would have to say that it's a bloody miracle that he 
                                                 
8 From http://www.ieee.org/organizations/history_center/legacies/quate.html.  I base some of my 
analysis here on Warwick (1998). 
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 Figure 5-2: Optical lever detection for AFM.  Light from a laser bounces off the
back of the cantilever and into a photodiode.  The output from the photodiode 
indicates how much the cantilever is flexed.  From Alexander, et al. (1989). 
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got it to work....  That also added to the fun of being in that group, just seeing 
[Binnig’s] working style and, you know, you have to understand, this is 
Stanford and, when I joined the group I had to improve my volleyball, I had to 
learn how to windsurf, we’d work like crazy and then we’d go off and blow 
steam.  It was a really fun time. [JN1, 6/28/01] 
With time, the Quate and Hansma groups started to coordinate both their similarities 
and differences in a collaborative way.  Some Quate students regularly visited Santa 
Barbara, bringing with them cantilever technology; and some Hansma students made 
it to Palo Alto, bringing with them optical lever techniques [CP1, 3/19/01; MK1, 
10/12/01].  The two lab leaders were in frequent contact, and together they came to a 
new understanding of probe microscopy.  Though IBM and Bell dominated STM, 
Quate and Hansma quickly became the centers of gravity for the non-surface science 
STM and AFM community. 
Drafting the Disciplines 
 The same bricolage that informed Quate and Hansma’s cobbling together of 
microscopes applied as well to their search for materials to characterize with the new 
instruments.  They trained their students primarily to build instruments, rather than to 
use those instruments to learn something new about a particular kind of sample; thus, 
they often had little idea what samples would be interesting and informative.  To some 
extent, all STMers faced this problem; no one fully understood what the capabilities of 
the microscopes were, so any sample could potentially be the next 7x7.  The corporate 
STMers solved the sample-selection problem by referencing the disciplinary 
framework of surface science; they narrowed their scope to samples about which they 
already knew a great deal, and where they could solve particular key questions. 
The academic groups, on the other hand, responded with a diffuse, even 
Feyerabendian, methodology.9  With instruments constantly being produced at a very 
                                                 
9.  That is, the Quate and Hansma group’s style of work resonates with Feyerabend’s observation that 
“science is an essentially anarchic enterprise....  Proliferation of theories [or experiments] is beneficial 
for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power” (1988, 5). 
 
 204
quick pace, students and professors had little time or inclination to learn the difficult 
sample preparation techniques and formal knowledge associated with a discipline like 
surface science.  Quate tried that path initially, but difficulty learning to prepare the 
7x7 led to long delays and microscopes lying fallow for months.  Once air operation 
arrived, both Quate and Hansma often had three, four, five, or more microscopes 
operating at once, with each instrument being retired after just a few months [MK1, 
10/12/01; JN1, 6/28/01; JH1, 6/10/02]; the corporate groups, on the other hand, would 
have one or at most two microscopes in use, and would use them for years, even 
decades; even individual samples could last for months or years [DE1, 10/11/01].  
With so many surplus microscopes, and so many students trying to figure out what to 
do with them, the California groups were tempted to characterize anything and 
everything at hand.  “Found” samples became the order of the day: 
 
So one day I’d come into the lab and there’s this bloody instrument cable 
going into the freezer.  “What are you doing?”  They’d say, “Oh, we’re trying 
to do AFM of ice.”  They were trying to AFM of scotch tape.  Tunneling in 
insulating fluids, so we tried to tunnel between Pepsi and Coke....  On the air 
side it was just crazy, random things that were being tried all the time, and 
some of them worked and some of them didn’t.  But, you just dream an 
experiment and then you’d go do it. [JN1, 6/28/01] 
Indeed, the development of AFM (which could image insulating and conducting 
materials) owed much to the desire to characterize anything and everything.  Given 
that, in 1985-6, STM was becoming routine, while the first AFMs were unutterably 
difficult, it is a testament to the strength of that desire that these groups stuck to AFM. 
 Problems with this methodology began to appear early, however.  If one 
characterized samples in the absence of some disciplinary familiarity with their 
properties, one did not really know what to expect from an image; and if the image 
disagreed with what one saw in a textbook or calculated on the back of an envelope, 
then it was difficult to say whether the disagreement was “real” or an artifact of the 
microscope.  This was a problem that confronted Hansma in the first days of air STM; 
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when he first imaged graphite in air, he found he could obtain atomic resolution, but 
that the heights of the atoms seemed to be ten times larger than predicted.  According 
to the group’s mythology, he held off on publishing anything about graphite while he 
tried to figure out the discrepancy – only to be scooped by Binnig (Binnig, et al. 
1986b), who had found the same thing a little later but, naïvely, had not hesitated to 
publish even the most counterintuitive results [BD2, 10/18/01].  From that point on, 
Hansma resolved to follow Binnig by pushing ahead with publications even when all 
the i’s had not been dotted and the t’s and had not been crossed. 
Thus, Hansma’s response to his misstep with graphite was two-pronged: on the 
one hand, insouciance in the face of possible error; and on the other hand, the mass 
production of articles to protect against the consequences of that insouciance.  From 
this, first Hansma, and then Quate, developed the outstanding hallmark of the West 
Coast academic style of probe microscopy: the production of an astonishingly high 
volume of papers, instruments, applications, and data that were both tremendously 
valuable to the development of the technique and also of widely uneven quality.  As 
these two former postdocs, one of Quate and one of Hansma, remember it, 
 
It was all over the map.  I’ve published some things that are wrong, like 
everyone did.  I mean basically we were saying “these are the atoms” and 
that’s a tremendously naïve point of view....  I think there was just an 
understanding that results in there to a certain extent were not very 
reproducible.  In the early days of course there was enormous pressure to be 
first to publish something, even if it was wrong.  The Quate group, more work 
was inspired by some of their wrong results.  Some of their wrong results were 
so inspirational that they became very important results anyway even if they 
were completely wrong....  Such as the inelastic tunneling spectroscopy that 
was done by Doug Smith on molecules in liquid helium ... that inspired an 
enormous number of follow-up experiments.  Most of what was published in 
that paper turned out to be wrong....  For me the point of that paper wasn’t the 
details of the spectra that they published and the interpretation, the point was 
“hey, you could dunk this thing into liquid helium and do neat stuff....”  The 
weakness was that when you actually tried to make it into science, that’s where 
often it went astray.  But I don’t think that it mattered very much in the end.  I 
mean that inspired so many people to try and do low temperature STM 
 
 206
experiments of various types that even if they were publishing to say that Doug 
Smith was wrong it didn’t matter. [JN1, 6/28/01]10
 
Paul [Hansma] has published a lot of papers that were just terrible....  His 
favorite papers were the ones where you couldn’t quite be sure if you were 
right or wrong.  If you were right it’s very important, if you’re wrong, pfft, 
you’re wrong, okay....  Paul was just motoring a hundred miles an hour and 
was leaving a bit of a mess in his wake....  Paul has said that “look, people will 
forgive you if you’re wrong.  If you’re right occasionally, and you’re right on 
important things, people will forgive you if you’re wrong.  If you’re always 
wrong, it’s not so good, you want to be right, particularly in the beginning, and 
after that you can be wrong occasionally and it’s okay, people just don’t hold it 
against you....”  You can actually be wrong but still make an important 
contribution....  Even this paper on hydrogen bonding, I don’t know if it’s 
wrong but it’s not clearly demonstrably right.  But there were papers like that 
that Paul published that are incredibly inspirational. [JH1, 6/10/02] 
Within the probe microscopy community, this willy-nilly experimental work found 
differing receptions.  Many surface scientists found it unnerving and careless.  In 
particular, the occasional unreproducibility of the builder groups’ results seemed to 
confirm to surface scientists that STM in air was a worse than useless technique. 
 After 1985, though, dismissiveness from the surface scientists gave Quate and 
Hansma little pause.  The initial phase (when replication was difficult and cooperation 
between the West Coast academics and the corporate STMers fruitful) was over, and 
both UCSB and Stanford were drawing adherents.  Moreover, through the ’80s, almost 
any STM or AFM image stood a fair chance of reaching publication; images that, 
today, everyone (including their authors) describe as “wrong” or “garbage.”  Even at 
the time, some probe microscopists knew some of their “discoveries” would be un-
discovered at a later date; it did not matter, so long as they were advancing the 
community and the technology. 
Both Quate and Hansma realized, though, that this could not be sustained in 
the long run; simply letting graduate students loose on samples was generative and 
productive, but it led to utterly uninterpretable images.  What they sought, then, were 
people from outside the groups who knew what samples were scientifically 
                                                 
10 The article referenced is Smith, et al. (1987). 
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interesting, who possessed the skill to prepare those samples in such a way that they 
would yield results under the gaze of an STM or AFM, and who were expert enough 
to interpret the resulting images in a way that would lend the academic groups 
credibility.  Like Hansma’s proverbs and rules of thumb, interdisciplinarity offered 
these groups a means to structure and make sense of the creative, generative chaos of 
their students’ instrument-building practice. 
 Note how the academic groups differed from the corporate STMers.  At IBM 
and Bell, such a large proportion of the surface science community was in one place 
that STMers did not need to look outside their institution (or, if they did, they looked 
only to the competing institution) to have their work judged and validated.  Quate and 
Hansma, and the few other academic probe microscopists, were essentially alone in 
their endeavor – they were surrounded not by surface scientists, but by biologists and 
geologists and physiologists and chemists and electrical engineers and so forth.  To 
have their STM and AFM work seem credible or even intelligible to anyone in their 
own institutions, these groups had to build some kind of interdisciplinary bridge. 
 This kind of pattern had a fairly long history in the Quate group, going back to 
the acoustic microscopy days.  Thus, when air STM, and then AFM, became available, 
Quate started sending graduate students out to collaborate with other groups; and he 
brought in postdocs to help graduate students figure out how to choose and prepare 
their samples and interpret their data (Kirk, et al. 1988; Richter, et al. 1990; Dovek, et 
al. 1988).  At Santa Barbara, interdisciplinary collaboration was partly associated with 
the desire to draw on Helen Hansma’s training; as Paul Hansma puts it, he “married 
into biology.”  The group’s first joint project, though, came when Hansma and Drake 
took a sabbatical at the University of Virginia to work with Bob Coleman, one of 
Paul’s friends from graduate school.  Coleman studied charge density waves at the 
surfaces of layered compounds (compounds which are relatively easy to keep clean in 
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air), so it was a natural project for Hansma and Drake to build a low-temperature air 
STM and try to integrate it into Coleman’s research (Coleman, et al. 1985). 
 The Virginia interlude showed that Hansma and Drake could design and build 
an instrument with a specific type of sample and application in mind, and collaborate 
with a practitioner in the field most associated with that sample in order to generate 
credible knowledge.  This success encouraged Hansma to bring collaborators to Santa 
Barbara to interact with his graduate students.  Fortunately for the UCSB group, in the 
late ’80s, many many people wanted to come to Santa Barbara and strike up such 
collaborations [PH1, 3/19/01; HH1, 3/19/01; BD2, 10/18/01; JH1, 6/10/02].  By 1986, 
Binnig, Quate, Hansma, and others like them had shown that the new instruments 
might be applicable to a wide range of samples and might be compatible with the work 
of a wide range of disciplines.  Moreover, they had shown that they were willing to 
share instrument designs, helpful hints, and the various tricks of the trade – the small 
bits of tacit or not-so-tacit knowledge that newcomers needed to get started.  As a 
result, UCSB (as well as Stanford) became the center of a dense network within the 
probe microscopy community.  Almost everyone who was already in the field was in 
frequent contact with Hansma and sent their preprints there; and almost everyone who 
wanted to break into the field visited Santa Barbara and/or sent their students and 
samples there: 
 
Paul [Hansma] also was a nexus for information in probe microscopy.  
Everyone who was in the business would send him preprints.  And he’d 
circulate those preprints.  So we really saw just a huge amount of information 
very very quickly, long before it was published and it was just an incredibly 
rich environment.  There were always a lot of visitors and things like that.  I 
don’t know how it is now but I’ve really seen few scientific environments that 
were quite that rich and rewarding. [JH1, 6/10/02] 
With all of these visitors, samples, and preprints flowing in, time became even more of 
an issue.  As usual, there was a Hansma maxim to guide the group’s behavior: visitors 
could come to Santa Barbara for “an afternoon or six months.”  By the early ’90s, the 
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tide of “afternoon” visitors was so great that one graduate student was designated a 
dedicated lab tour guide.  Most of these visitors saw the instruments, talked a little 
with Hansma, and perhaps brought with them a sample to be quickly characterized; 
later on, as the instruments were commercialized, many of these people were 
prospective customers of Digital Instruments (the Santa Barbara-based STM and AFM 
manufacturer) and the Hansma group acted as a kind of scientifically-accredited sales 
adjunct for the company. 
 It was the six-month visitors, though, who really powered the experimental 
engine of the UCSB team.  As in the corporate labs, many of the people who filled this 
role were postdocs or young professors – people with disciplined skills and 
knowledge, but looking to use the new and relatively untried microscopes to carve out 
a productive niche within that area [PH1, 3/19/01].  In some cases, professors at 
UCSB (such as Joe Zasadzinski or Galen Stucky) might share a student or a project 
with the Hansma group; in other cases, professors at other universities (such as Carlos 
Bustamante or Hermann Gaub – both biophysicists) sent their postdocs to Santa 
Barbara to forge a collaboration and then bring the technique home; in yet other cases 
(such as Stuart Lindsay, a biophysicist, or Bruce Schardt, an electrochemist) a 
relatively young professor came to Santa Barbara for a while to learn about the 
technique then return to their home institution to found a new center of STM or AFM.  
The mass of the “six month” (often really a year or even two) visitors, though, were 
self-guided postdocs – people who had heard of probe microscopy, found out who the 
best groups were, and contacted Hansma to join his lab. 
The first in this line was Othmar Marti [OM1, 11/16/01], whom we met in 
Chapter Two as the builder of the famous “Blue Box” at Zurich.  When he came to 
Santa Barbara in 1987-8, he filled the same niche in skills and experimental persona 
that Binnig did at Palo Alto (with Barney Drake playing the Gerber to Marti’s Binnig). 
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[Othmar Marti] is a character, oh he is a character....  He had expertise in 
everything.  He was great as a machinist, they hated him in the machine shop I 
believe because he would take no precautions, he would just get in there and 
burn and cut and drill and press and the whole thing, chips were flying 
everywhere and at least he wore glasses since he probably never wore safety 
goggles.  He’d come back and his hair’s coated with the stuff....  Othmar did 
one of the first machine jobs on the microscope that we buy commercially 
[from Digital Instruments].  But Othmar was out of control so Barney [Drake] 
went down and did a good job and the rest is history. [SG1, 3/27/01] 
 Unlike most of the later postdocs, though, Marti (in his work, knowledge, and 
approach) overlapped significantly with Drake, Hansma, and the lab’s graduate 
students.  He was, in Hansma’s parlance, a “builder” [JH1, 6/10/02]  When Marti first 
arrived, the group was still most preoccupied with figuring out how to build working 
instruments, and he was instrumental in encouraging the switch from STM to AFM, 
and in making the optical lever detection system for AFM reliable.  By the time he 
left, the focus had shifted to figuring out how to use AFM in new applications, and 
how to make connections to new disciplines.  Thus, he was followed by a steady 
stream of postdocs whom Hansma called “runners” (i.e., people whose main task was 
to run instruments on new samples, rather than design and build new microscopes): 
Jan Hoh, Manfred Radmacher, Hans Butt, Gernot Friedbacher, Peter Dietz, Irene 
Revenko, Roger Proksch, etc. – mostly drawn from biophysics and molecular biology.  
Most of these people (especially in the early days) came to Santa Barbara with little or 
no firsthand experience with AFM (or its cousins).  Usually, they had seen a few 
images, read a couple articles, talked with an adviser – i.e., informal, casual 
acquaintance with the technique, and vague but high expectations about what it could 
do.  When they got to UCSB, they usually familiarized themselves with the technique 
by working up to the now standard test of instrument and instrumentalist – atomic 
resolution of graphite in air.  Then, they would start to prepare and characterize their 
own samples – gap junctions, Langmuir-Blodgett films, amino acid crystals, proteins, 
DNA, biominerals. 
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 In the process of figuring out how to image the “epistemic things” 
(Rheinberger 1997) of their own disciplines, these postdocs would consult with other 
members of the lab.  If the postdoc ran into trouble imaging, they could always ask a 
builder (who possessed the subtle knowledge of the instrument thought to come with 
building one); at the same time, they would teach the builders some of the rudiments 
of specimen preparation and biophysics, and give them some idea how to interpret the 
images of their samples [CP1, 3/19/01; JC2, 3/20/01].  As in Galison’s description of 
“trading zones” (Galison 1997), there would usually only be a local pidgin, rather than 
a full-blown technical language, common to both postdocs and Hansma’s students and 
technicians; postdocs would bring with them sophisticated knowledge of how to 
prepare and understand certain samples, while the students and technicians would turn 
to college biology textbooks to figure out what they were looking at or what they 
should look at next (since the builders saw these samples largely in terms of how they 
could enlarge the capabilities of the instrument, rather than as objects of their own 
expertise).  The runners allowed the Hansma group to speak more authoritatively 
about a wider range of samples, and therefore more credibly to a wider range of 
audiences.  This was helpful in getting articles accepted, in bringing in more visitors, 
in inducing users to buy instruments based on Hansma’s designs, and in getting 
funding for more work – all the things Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar describe as 
part of the “cycle of credibility” (Latour and Woolgar 1986). 
 
By the end of the summer I had collected a bunch of data in which the 
adhesion between the tip and the sample could be modulated depending on the 
solution conditions.  I was doing that mostly because I was trying to 
understand what was going on, but when Paul came back [at the end of the 
summer] it turned out that he had been getting money from NRL, but that NRL 
program was getting phased out, so he was actually in a tight financial spot.  
But he came back and he looked at that data and we talked about using the 
AFM to do quantitative adhesion, things like that.  He actually took that data 
and went back to the NRL and said “well look, this is what we want to do, we 
want to use AFM to study adhesion.”  That was a thing the NRL’s incredibly 
interested in, so he got a big chunk of change actually from the NRL to move 
 
 212
all that research over to adhesion, so he was very happy with me, he was 
incredibly happy with me, because I’d inadvertently if you will, but still, I’d 
collected a bunch of data in my first three months there that got him I think a 
fair amount of money.  So I think about then he said “well, okay, here, now 
you can stay” <laughs>.  “I’ll find money, okay.” [JH1, 6/10/02] 
 Several tangibles emerged from the postdocs’ long visits.  First, a series of 
journal articles, usually coauthored by a postdoc and a graduate student, each showing 
how AFM could be applied to different systems and samples (Hoh, et al. 1992; 
Hansma, et al. 1994; Manne, et al. 1990; Friedbacher, et al. 1991; Dietz, et al. 1992 
Hansma, et al. 1996; Proksch, et al. 1995; Hansma, et al. 1993).  In writing these 
articles, graduate students showed they could build a successful instrument and work 
with a user of that instrument closely enough to understand their disciplinary needs 
and get the instrument to reveal something new about their samples.  Postdocs, 
meanwhile, showed they could attach themselves to a new technique and integrate it 
with the traditional knowledge and skills of their discipline.  Finally, the visitor left 
Santa Barbara, taking the technique with them and founding, joining, or rejoining new 
centers of probe microscopy.11
 Thus, the STM and the AFM were routinized into the life of these academic 
groups, in ways that were reflected in the design of the instruments.  Keep in mind, 
though, what “routine” meant in these “builder groups” – it meant they could routinely 
build more microscopes, funnel more graduate students into constructing new variants, 
attract more postdocs, and bring in funding to build new kinds of STMs and AFMs.  
Probe microscopy was still not “routine” in the sense that it could be used on a daily 
basis by a wide variety of researchers.  That was a goal of the builders – indeed, it 
partly motivated the drive to bring in postdocs.  Up to about 1989, though, while 
Binnig, Quate, and Hanmsa had managed to help a few other builder groups get 
                                                 
11 Again, as in Chapter Four, an example of a “postdoc cascade” (Kaiser forthcoming-b). 
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started, they had not managed to spread the technique amongst people who did not 
build their instruments. 
 We will see the successes and failures of exporting probe microscopy into new 
contexts in Chapters Six through Eight.  It was not inevitable that STM and AFM 
spread this way; indeed, the technique moved slowly out of the corporate labs, and 
only to similar institutions or to isolated academic groups (who then built their 
microscopes).  The tendency at Stanford and UCSB to circulate the technique among 
more diverse communities, and to apply it in more diverse ways, was closely tied to 
the Quate and Hansma groups’ pedagogical mission.  In the corporate labs, young 
surface scientists were surrounded by a substantial portion of their discipline, and 
supported by resource-rich corporations; this combination yielded a more formalized, 
involuted way of doing STM.  In the academic labs, graduate students and postdocs 
were surrounded by a variety of disciplines, and made do with meager resources.  
Where the corporate STMers followed trusted paths for establishing credibility in 
surface science, the academic SPMers had only ad hoc recipes to make their 
microscopes relevant to various communities. 
 From this comparison, we can pick out sources for the academic SPMers’ 
practices.  Beholden to no single discipline, they instead built links with every 
discipline they encountered; having few resources, they built instruments from 
cobbled-together materials and then used those instruments to look at “found” objects; 
not having a recipe for constructing new kinds of instruments, they tried a variety of 
methods and built a variety of microscopes; seeing the dangers of too much generative 
chaos, they imposed temporary order through maxims, proverbs, and borrowed 
disciplinary frameworks; not tied to any particular discipline, they looked inward to 
cultivate new skills, and they looked outward to find people with unusual insights, 
materials, and skills; in looking outward, they created an SPM community.  All these 
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characteristics were closely bound to pedagogy.  Most importantly, the academic 
groups were surrounded by a multiplicity of disciplines because they were located in 
modern research universities; and while Quate and Hansma could have isolated 
themselves from that environment, they saw they could use it to improve the technique 
and give their students useful experience.  Though negotiating meaning with new 
disciplines was not always easy, it was, in the end, extraordinarily valuable.  As we 
will see, the Quate and Hansma groups laid the foundation for the immense popularity 
of STM and AFM; and, at the same time, they trained cadres of graduate students and 
postdocs whose adaptability and resourcefulness have made them leaders in both 
academic and commercial probe microscopy.
 
 
Chapter Six 
DNA Debates and the Shift to AFM 
 
 By 1990, STM and AFM were becoming routine, reliable techniques; and, 
though not yet commonplace, they were diffusing rapidly into new communities.  This 
diffusion was a product of three mechanisms: the “postdoc cascade” spreading out 
from the corporate labs and the Quate and Hansma groups; an influx of new people 
building microscopes; and the availability of the first commercial STMs and AFMs.  
Routinization brought not just new participants, but a change in attitude.  Probe 
microscopists talk about the period from 1990 to 1992 as a tipping point, when, for 
instance, the papers at STM Conferences became overwhelmingly concerned with 
what authors saw with their microscopes, rather than what they had done to build or 
innovate their instruments.  In some ways, this influx of newcomers and change in 
attitude were exactly what early STMers had sought: IBM, for instance, wanted a large 
STM community that would reflect glory back on Big Blue, while Quate and Hansma 
sought to enroll new allies in order to generate credibility and hence attract funding, 
students, interesting samples, and further collaborations. 
Expansion came at a cost, though.  The probe microscopy community became 
a more diverse place, where participants had less and less in common.  Small frictions 
that could be overlooked when STMers had been focusing on building reliable 
instruments became more intractable as researchers started to debate the knowledge 
created with those instruments.  Newcomers’ values sometimes conflicted with those 
of the old-timers, and old-time STMers’ values began to shift as they saw their 
community changing.  What resulted were a series of disputes and controversies, 
culminating in an argument in 1990-2 about whether air STM could atomically 
resolve, and perhaps even sequence, DNA. 
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Scientific disputes have, of course, been central to the science and technology 
studies literature.  In the sociology of scientific knowledge tradition, especially, 
controversy has been a powerful tool of social analysis, a mallet for cracking open 
epistemic bottles and taking out the ships.1  In other areas of S&TS, controversy is 
methodologically less crucial, yet still useful in telling engaging stories about how the 
weave of seemingly universal, timeless knowledge often contains idiosyncratic, non-
conformist threads.2  So far in this dissertation, we’ve seen only the minor frictions of 
a nascent community, rather than outright controversy, even though many participants 
found some of the knowledge created with the new STMs and AFMs to be wrong or 
inadequate.  Controversy about questions of knowledge only broke out when the social 
order of the small early STM community began to break down.  The DNA dispute of 
1990-2 is important because it paved the way to a new social order within a larger 
probe microscopy community.  Analytically, this controversy is interesting because 
some participants used technological measures (what is the best way to design a 
microscope? which is more useful to the majority of researchers, STM or AFM?) to 
answer scientific questions (can an STM sequence DNA?), and because the 
commercialization of the instruments offered a means to reorder the probe microscopy 
community and quiet the dispute.3
Cultures of Controversy in the SPM Community 
Before we examine this dispute, we should look at the different kinds of 
STMers (and AFMers) involved, and how they preferred to handle controversial 
                                                 
1 The “ships in a bottle” metaphor is from Collins (1992, 5).  See also Pinch (1986) and Bloor (1978).  
MacKenzie (1990) is an outstanding controversy study that aims SSK in much the same direction as 
this chapter – i.e., an analysis of a simultaneously scientific and technological controversy. 
2 Latour, for instance, transformed his lab study at the Salk Institute (Latour and Woolgar 1986) into an 
analysis of controversy in Science in Action (Latour 1987).  Haraway’s Primate Visions (1989), too, is 
by no means SSK, yet several of the chapters clearly focus on SSK-type controversies. 
3 I draw on Lynch and Bogen’s (1996) concept of “sleaze” to analyze this kind of exploitation of 
interpretive flexibility. 
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science.4  To see why and how disputes arose in the probe microscopy community, it 
is necessary to understand that different kinds of STMers belonged to different 
cultures of controversy, and that different ways of handling and exaggerating or 
minimizing disagreement profoundly shaped the development of the technique.  The 
corporate STMers, for instance, rarely seemed interested in bringing scientific disputes 
to a boil.  Surface science, particularly at the corporate labs, could be ruthlessly 
critical, with a stringent policing of sample preparation and other practices.  This 
minimized full-blown public controversies that could reflect badly on the corporation.  
When discrepancies between different researchers’ results did become public, there 
seems to have been little hurry to resolve them; surface scientists assumed that, with 
time, “the truth will out” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984).  So long as a researcher’s work 
had been vetted by his or her institution, uncertainty need not spark controversy.  For 
instance, while there were disbelievers in the initial Zurich 7x7 results, their doubts 
were expressed mostly through backchannels within the walls of the Zurich lab – there 
is little published material to indicate anyone ever questioned Binnig and Rohrer, and 
once Binnig and Rohrer had the backing of IBM’s surface scientists, naysayers quieted 
down.  Both skeptics and believers took the Zurich work more as a new move in 
ongoing debates about the 7x7, rather than as an open wound needing closure.  This is, 
perhaps, all the more remarkable given how little Binnig and Rohrer knew of the 
language and techniques of surface science. 
One hallmark of “controversy” in surface science in the ’80s was the 
extraordinary length of time needed to come to closure.  Controversy studies in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge tradition usually depict debate as a no-man’s land of 
ambiguity and uncertainty, with closure swooping in quickly to set everything straight 
                                                 
4 See Simon (2002) for a recent controversy study that examines how different participants orient to 
controversy and closure. 
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again.  As far as I can tell, this simply does not apply to surface science; for most 
problems, surface scientists seem rather to have enjoyed drawn-out, low-level 
disagreements.  Solving reconstructions, for instance, resembles horse-racing more 
than anything, with various theorists and experimentalists placing bets on different 
atomic structures and letting time (usually on the scale of years or even decades) yield 
up a winner.  Indeed, one way in which STM significantly disrupted surface science 
was by helping to bring such horse races to a close much more quickly (leaving 
surface scientists without a favorite pastime). 
 Thus, the corporate STMers were usually content to let disputes simmer 
quietly or disappear altogether.  When, for instance, the Chiang/Wilson group at IBM 
Almaden and the Hamers/Tromp/Demuth team at Yorktown came to contradictory 
interpretations of images of the same reconstruction (Wilson and Chiang 1987a; van 
Loenen, et al. 1987), their disagreement is remembered more as grounds for humor 
and hurt corporate pride than heated dispute [SC1, 3/8/01; RT1, 2/23/01].  Notably, 
this indulgence in controversy shaped how the corporate STMers approached 
disagreement and dispute with other corners of the STM community.  In particular, 
though the corporate STMers had doubts about the practices and results of early 
colleagues at Santa Barbara, Stanford, Berkeley, Penn State, and other universities, 
they kept their reservations to themselves.  Corporate STMers believed that since 
Binnig, Quate, Hansma, and other early “builders” were not surface scientists, they did 
not know any better, and that time would eventually set them right. 
Like their corporate counterparts, members of the builder groups (Binnig, 
Quate, Hansma, and their associates and emulators) tried to minimize outright 
controversy wherever possible.  Here, though, they were in a more precarious position.  
Three aspects of “builder culture” seemed to invite controversy.  First, their rapid, 
high-volume, mass-production of instruments, papers, and samples meant that some 
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materials were characterized quickly and with little sample preparation or disciplined 
knowledge about how to interpret images.  Second, since the materials characterized 
were relevant to a variety of disciplines, builder groups found themselves generating 
knowledge for audiences whose language and practices they did not always 
understand.  Finally, the rhetoric of the builder groups emphasized that mistakes were 
natural – indeed, that they were necessary and important tools of learning. 
 The leaders of the builder groups recognized some of the possibilities for 
controversy in this style of work.  In pushing the envelope of the instrumentation and 
its application, they continually risked sparking disputes with practitioners from other 
disciplines.  As we’ve seen, visitors (mostly postdocs and young professors) to the 
builder groups lent them the knowledge, the technique, and the credibility to navigate 
these dangers.  Interestingly, the Hansma group enrolled visitors (and thus avoided 
controversy) more successfully than Quate’s team.  Quate’s students were somewhat 
less directly involved with their extradisciplinary collaborators, and so sometimes 
wandered into minefields.  For instance, Doug Smith did work on the vibrational 
spectroscopy of sorbic acid that was clearly an attempt to beat surface scientists to the 
punch on an important question in their discipline (Smith, et al. 1987).  Yet in using an 
air STM, and in departing from many of the sample preparation methods deemed 
necessary by surface scientists, he seemed to invite dispute.  As it happened, questions 
about his paper were raised at conferences and in the literature (Hamers 1989; 1996); 
and it was only in 1998 that Wilson Ho became the first researcher to do scanning 
tunneling vibrational spectroscopy of a single molecule in a way that was accepted by 
the surface science community (Stipe, et al. 1998). 
 In the area of superconductivity, too, Quate’s people ran into heavy weather.  
One student’s rather earnest plea in his dissertation nicely illustrates this point, and, 
indeed, sums up much of the argument of this chapter: 
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As the experiments on LaSrCuO were being completed, the world was 
jumping from the announcement of superconductivity at temperatures above 
the boiling point of liquid nitrogen.  YbaCuO was now the material of choice.  
So of course there was a rush to put samples of this new high Tc compound 
under the STM....  By the time Chu had discovered superconductivity at 90K 
just about every living scientist, it seemed was involved in superconductivity....  
Though this was an exciting time, the scientific integrity, or at least 
thoroughness, was not at its usual high level.  I will use my own work as an 
example of this hysteria.  We were anxious to publish this tunneling data, as 
we knew that several other groups were examining the same materials with 
STM’s [sic].  The LaSrCuO experiment was repeated just twice to verify the 
gap value....  The paper was written in two days and simultaneously we were 
performing the same experiments on YBaCuO.  Again, the results were very 
hard to reproduce, but once we reproduced the gap that we felt was the best, 
we started writing.  Now there were only two days until the March meeting so 
it had to be written quickly and, as a result, the interpretation was not entirely 
accurate. (Kirk 1989, 127-8) 
This quote highlights many of the phenomena I want to explore in this chapter: an 
exciting new field, a rush of newcomers, rallying around a new “material of choice,” a 
palpable sense of excitement, and at the same time frictions and disputes arising from 
the influx of newcomers. 
After these disputes, Quate seems to have tired of controversy and sought out 
less contentious areas of research.  Thus, he began to shift more and more toward 
technological and industrial applications of STM and AFM – particularly AFM 
lithography – and also used his group’s work with cantilever fabrication to enter the 
world of micro- and nano-electromechanical systems (MEMS and NEMS) (Emch, et 
al. 1988; Quate 1992; Park, et al. 1995).  Notably, this shift in practice entailed a shift 
in audience.  By producing fewer images for publication in scientific journals, Quate 
steadily thinned his ties to the scientific communities where he had run into trouble; 
instead, by working on potentially marketable AFM-based technologies (such as 
multiprobe data storage systems) he bound his group’s fortunes more closely to high-
tech corporations such as IBM.  At the beginning of the debates outlined in this 
chapter, the Quate group was still a commanding presence in the scientific STM 
community; by the end, the Stanford team was contributing relatively little to debates 
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about the proper interpretation of STM and AFM images, and contributing much more 
to questions about how to turn the AFM into a commercial data storage device. 
 The Hansma group, meanwhile, remained pivotal to the development of the 
probe microscopy community, while largely avoiding the disruptions of controversy.  
Like Quate’s team, the Santa Barbara people published results quickly, some of which 
they and others look back on as “wrong” or “garbage” [JH1, 6/10/02].  Hansma, 
though, deployed several strategies that minimized the harmful effects of any 
missteps.  For one, he built a more extensive and more heterogeneous network of 
allies in various scientific communities than Quate did.  This network functioned as an 
effective safety net for Hansma.  The biophysics and molecular biology postdocs who 
began visiting in the late ’80s and early ’90s showed graduate students how to prepare 
samples in a credible way and filtered out particularly rash claims from articles.  When 
they left Santa Barbara, they formed their own groups and continued pioneering 
biophysical applications for AFM; this, in turn, made it harder for life scientists to 
discount biological applications of probe microscopy on the basis of any single 
disputed result. 
 One of Hansma’s other controversy-avoidance strategies was to present a 
moving target.  With each graduate student developing some new wrinkle to the 
technique, and each visitor adding a new application to the group’s repertoire, the 
Santa Barbara team was continually moving from research topic to research topic.  By 
the time any potential critics could respond, the group would already be demonstrating 
the usefulness of the technique in some new area.  More importantly, the group 
integrated its development of the instrumentation and its development of new 
applications seamlessly enough that any piece of work could be alternately cast as 
“scientific research” or “technological innovation.”  Some results might appear in 
publications like Biophysical Journal (oriented to “runners”) and others in the Review 
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of Scientific Instruments (oriented to “builders”), but the same graduate students were 
involved in producing both.  Results that were criticized could be shifted from one 
category to the other; in most cases, this meant that dubious “scientific” results were 
recast as significant demonstrations of “technological” improvements. 
 Finally, it is clear that Paul Hansma was extraordinarily astute about which 
research directions to pursue and which results to publish.  Time and again, we see 
that he entered fields just before they became hot, and left them before they began to 
attract skepticism.  In some ways, this was a classic self-fulfilling prophecy – the 
Santa Barbara team had been at the center of STM and AFM long enough that when 
they started something, people watched and often emulated them [SL1, 1/6/03; HG1, 
11/14/01].  Conversely, when the Hansma group left a field, that topic’s immunity to 
controversy often weakened.  This was true both for specimen choices (e.g. graphite) 
and major design changes (e.g. optical lever AFM).  It’s important to note, though, 
that these prophecies were self-fulfilling partly because of the network Hansma had 
built – by enrolling a large number of collaborators and associates, he ensured an 
audience for his innovations and experimental choices.  Though these associates 
worked independently, their debt to, and respect for, Hansma made them likely to 
follow his lead, especially at times when seemingly intractable problems beset the 
SPM community. 
Graphite and Experimental Vertigo 
The strongest ties in the Hansma and Quate networks were between the 
Stanford and UCSB groups, their close collaborators, former students and postdocs 
(the “six month visitors”), and, increasingly, the start-up SPM manufacturers who 
employed many of their former personnel.  Beginning in the late ’80s, though, 
“afternoon” visitors – as well as those with little or no contact with Santa Barbara or 
Palo Alto – also contributed to the rapid expansion of STM and, later, AFM.  Among 
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academic chemists and physicists, the Quate and Hansma way of doing air STM and 
AFM became a template for experimental activity.  For many academic non-surface 
scientists, Quate and Hansma had demonstrated that air STM was cheap and easy to 
build (relative to its UHV cousin).  An experienced graduate student could build an air 
STM in less than a day with a couple thousand dollars worth of materials [MK1, 
10/12/01].  Even neophytes could construct an instrument from scratch and put it to 
work in an amount of time approximating the length of a graduate student career or a 
postdoctoral visit.  Also, Quate and Hansma had shown that STM was flexible 
enough, and had a wide enough array of applications, that research groups, and even 
individual students, could easily carve out niches – what this researcher calls “low-
lying fruit”: 
 
It was pretty clear that one actually didn’t know where the best place to use the 
technology was.  That is, you just didn’t know what application, where you 
were going to learn something new and interesting.  I mean some people talk 
about picking the low-lying fruit, it’s a little bit like that.  There’s all these 
problems out there, but some of them are just going to give more easily to the 
technology than others.  So in the beginning, when I was first here, I spent a lot 
of time trying a lot of little different things, and that was mostly because I said 
“look, I’m not problem-driven, what I’m interested in is I think there are a lot 
of interesting scientific problems that I could work on, I’d like to find 
something where I can make a contribution....”  So I spent a lot of time sort of 
dabbling in lots of different things. [JH1, 6/10/02] 
This notion of low-hanging fruit was central to the Quate and Hansma group’s 
methodology and the way these groups weathered controversy.  Although group 
leaders might have larger goals in mind, at any point experiments jumped toward 
whatever easily-obtainable, interesting short-term goal was opened up by the previous 
experiment, rather than building in a positive way toward a single objective. 
Two technological innovations – the tube scanner and improved vibration 
isolation (both explained in Chapter Two) – helped catalyze the proliferation of STM 
at the end of the ’80s.  As important as any specific design change, though, was the 
growth of an STM community.  As STM conferences became a regular occurrence, 
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and networks for exchanging students, samples, designs, and preprints sprang up, 
design solutions such as the pocket STM or the tube scanner began spreading more 
quickly.  In the late ’80s, most growth in probe microscopy came from academic labs 
willing to borrow established designs and quickly get into the business of imaging 
new samples.  Thus, probe microscopy became more standardized and routine; and the 
community reached a turning point where practitioners published more about the 
images they were generating than about the new microscopes they were building. 
With that turning point, applying the microscopes to new materials drove the 
rapid expansion of the probe microscopy community as much as new design 
innovations.  Of course, new applications were continually dovetailed with new 
designs, and with new understandings of what an STM could do and how it worked.  
In turn, each of these new understandings and new applications opened the door for 
experimentalists to bring the STM into new communities.  The demonstration that 
STM could be done in air, water, and other fluids, for instance, was perceived as 
opening the door to electrochemists, biophycists, and others with samples that needed 
to be kept clean but not exposed to UHV.  The rest of this chapter is concerned with 
one such application/innovation: the use of air (or water) STM to look at biomolecules 
(particularly DNA) adsorbed onto highly-oriented pyrolitic graphite (HOPG).  
Graphite and DNA fueled the rapid expansion of STM in the late ’80s; but, by the 
early ’90s, this complex of practices became the center of a major controversy. 
As we’ve seen, air and water STM were central to the Quate and Hansma 
groups’ strategy of moving probe microscopy away from surface science and into a 
variety of other disciplines; thus, non-vacuum tunneling microscopes were looked on 
with eagerness by many academic groups, and with suspicion by the corporate 
STMers.  Likewise, graphite was a problematic but useful material from the 
beginning.  Hansma had imaged it early on, but had seen atomic corrugations 
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hundreds of times larger than made sense – large enough that, even to someone with 
no specialization in the study of graphite or surfaces, the images seemed absurd and 
unpublishable.5  Binnig had imaged it a little later and seen much the same thing; but, 
insouciant as always, he quickly published these absurd images.  We saw in Chapter 
Three that the large atomic corrugation problem was alleviated by John Pethica’s 
analysis of forces between the tip and sample (which eventually inspired the AFM) 
(Coombs and Pethica 1986; Pethica 1986; Pethica and Oliver 1987).  Even before 
Pethica gave some rationale for these anomalies, though, newcomers to STM eagerly 
latched onto graphite as their sample of choice.  For Binnig, Hansma, and these 
newcomers, graphite promised to do for air STM what the 7x7 had done for its UHV 
cousin.  For example, it could play the 7x7’s important standardization role.  Any 
group building a new air STM would test their instrument on graphite first – atomic 
resolution of highly-oriented pyrolitic graphite (HOPG) meant (like atomic resolution 
of the 7x7) that the microscope had achieved the minimum standard of operation.  
Even the earliest AFMs took graphite as their first samples for this reason. 
By the same token, even a few surface science STMers (particularly in 
California) used graphite to test their instruments in air before putting them into UHV.  
As this surface scientist at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory puts it, 
 
Graphite I did [image] but more as a test.  Not for doing science with it, but for 
test.  As a test material it’s a good material.  Well at least we thought it was a 
good material.  It has the following advantages: graphite, in air, you can just 
cleave it, it’s made of sheets laid on top of each other, you can remove one and 
the new surface ... is exposed as a fresh new clean surface ... [and] chemically 
they are so inert that nothing reacts with graphite.  So even though it’s in air, 
the air molecules and junk molecules that float in the air, they may land but 
they don’t stay on the surface....  So as a test material that allows you to do 
quick tests in air....  Metals ... don’t stay clean, so it has to be done in 
vacuum....  Every time you do that you have to put it in vacuum, pump all the 
                                                 
5 In a close-packed surface like graphite, the atomic corrugation is the distance between the topmost 
layer of atoms and the next layer down.  Think of a graphite surface as resembling a piece of corrugated 
tin, with the “corrugation” being the distance between the bumps (top layer of atoms) and troughs 
(second layer).  A good example of atomic corrugation can be seen in Figure 3-3. 
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air out, and wait until the vacuum is good which usually takes a couple of 
days....  So if you could have the microscope operate in air ... it’s very 
convenient.  So for that reason, graphite became immensely popular.  Most 
people that did STM, the first thing they would try was graphite in air.  If they 
see the graphite they know the instrument is sort of working.  Then you can ... 
do it in vacuum with metals. [MS1, 3/9/01] 
So graphite could easily serve as the measure of a working instrument; but it was also 
used to standardize the skills of new microscopists. 
 
AG: Whenever anybody’s learning a new technique and it doesn’t matter what 
it is, you always have them work on something that’s known, say “can you 
produce what is known here? ”  Then we can go and move away from that....  I 
have a new crew that just came in and it’s about a month of, you know, we’re 
going to do the standard things here to get up to speed on this.... 
CM: Where do the “standard things” come from?  Is it a matter of sitting 
people down with particular specimens? 
AG: Yes, right, exactly.  You will run graphite in air because everyone should 
be able to do that.  Then we’ll do gold underwater, then we’ll put down this 
metal monolayer business and once you get to that level then you are viewed 
as being certified.  You have to be able to do that.  The other thing is that with 
any technique, the most important thing is to know when the machine is 
broken.  Machines break and that’s just the way it is.  So we have them do 
some of these simpler things on a regular basis just to show that the machine is 
working.  For example, graphite in air now is something you should be able to 
do every day, right – so I say, once a week go make sure you can do it, not 
because I think you’re losing your skills but just to prove that the machine is 
actually working. [AG1, 6/25/01] 
As these quotes show, graphite had a number of advantages that made it such a 
favorite material.  It was cheap and could be easily ordered from laboratory supply 
catalogs [AG1, 6/25/01].  It was extraordinarily easy to prepare – “cleaning” the 
sample simply required pulling the top layers off with a piece of scotch tape.  Anyone 
with the skills to build an STM (whatever their disciplinary background) could get 
their hands on it, put it into their microscope, and stand a good chance of seeing atoms 
– thus making it attractive to a much wider range of researchers than the finicky 7x7.  
Indeed, the ease of obtaining atomic resolution was due – at least in part – to the same 
anomalously large atomic corrugations that had vexed Hansma – a very large 
corrugation provided better signal-to-noise and hence clearer pictures, even if the 
corrugation seen in an STM was more a product of the tip pushing on the graphite than 
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of the “real” corrugation of HOPG.  That is, the “reality” of the corrugations, and the 
scientific feasibility of the material, were much less important than the advantage 
graphite offered in standardizing the instrument and its operator. 
Much of graphite’s popularity stemmed from its use as a substrate on which to 
deposit and examine interesting molecules.  Electrochemists and surface scientists 
liked the STM because it provided views of large, clean, flat, crystalline expanses of 
their favorite materials.  As the STM spread to other subdisciplines, though, those 
fields wanted to use it to look not at surfaces, but at objects deposited on surfaces.  
Binnig, Quate, Hansma, Baldeschwieler, and their new allies saw the STM as a 
general-utility instrument (like an optical or electron microscope), capable of looking 
at isolated entities on a surface and radically magnifying them.  In particular, they 
wanted to look at the “epistemic [and/or technological] things” particular to the 
subdisciplines of the builder groups’ collaborators – things like biomolecules or 
magnetic bits in a disc drive (Rheinberger 1997).  Doing so with an STM or AFM, 
however, required putting these entities down onto some kind of surface – a substrate.  
Ideally, this substrate would be inert, clean, easy to prepare, and highly conducive to 
atomic resolution.  Atomic resolution was useful because (A) it gave a quick indicator 
that the microscope was working properly; and (B) since distances between atoms of a 
substrate are known, they could be used as a ruler to measure an adsorbed molecule – 
much as, at lower resolution, electron microscopists use the pitch of the copper grids 
on which they mount samples to locate and measure features within those samples. 
Graphite seemed to exhibit all these properties.  Suddenly, it became easy to 
put all kinds of molecules down onto graphite and image them, and many kinds of 
experimentalists – physicists, chemists, biophysicists, biologists, etc. – took 
advantage.  The final reason graphite and air STM boomed in the late ’80s was that 
commercial instruments became available in this period.  Indeed, as we will see in 
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Chapter Seven, the first commercial instruments were designed with air STM of 
molecules on graphite as the major (if not the only) envisioned application.  So now, 
even those without the skill, time, or interest to build their own STM could enter the 
fray.  The result was a gold rush for air STM on graphite.  Examining the proceedings 
of the IBM Oberlech conference in ‘85, the 1986 STM conference in Santiago de 
Compostela, and the ’87 STM conference at Oxnard, we see a dramatic change in the 
demographics of STM that accompanied highly-oriented pyrolitic graphite.6  At 
Oberlech, speakers were predominantly from IBM, plus a smattering from Bell, Ford, 
Stanford, UCSB, Caltech, and a few European universities; virtually all of the atomic 
resolution-capable instruments reported on were being operated in vacuum, though 
graphite and air were beginning to creep in at the edges.  Santiago de Compostela was 
somewhat more inclusive – many more academic groups, and the first groups from 
Japan – but, again, graphite and air were still marginal.  By Oxnard, almost 15% of the 
papers had graphite in their title, and several more concerned research or instrument 
design done using graphite.  Of eleven sessions at Oxnard, two were on “layered 
compounds” (i.e. graphite plus some layered superconducting materials) and one was 
on “biological applications” (usually involving graphite); in addition, talks about 
graphite surfaced in sessions on “atomic force microscopy,” “theory of STM, STS & 
AFM,” and “STM & AFM of liquid/solid interfaces.”  No wonder, then, that many of 
the participants, especially those coming from surface science, felt overwhelmed by 
the tide of graphite.  For those who had been doing STM for a few years, such as this 
IBM Zurich surface physicist, the new substrate and the new microscopists looked 
suspect: 
 
Suddenly the world went graphite because everybody could image suddenly 
graphite but not other things.  They could image graphite in air.  Paul Hansma 
                                                 
6 The proceedings of these conferences are in: IBM Journal of Research and Development, 30.4-5; 
Surface Science, 181.1-2; and Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology A, 6.2. 
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in Santa Barbara imaged graphite with a chicken fat coating and someone 
imaged graphite with pencil lead.  So it really got a bit boring with the 
graphite.  So I moved on to single crystals, surface physics type things....  [At] 
Oxnard .... it was talk after talk after talk after talk after talk and it was 
graphite, graphite, graphite, graphite – everybody had a different graphite story 
and they all invented some new story....  Stuart Lindsay from Arizona, I had 
my eyes closed ... and Stuart was describing the results, and I was listening 
about the DNA “and here we can see this part and here we can see this part” 
and it was so marvelous, I couldn’t believe it, I opened my eyes and it [the 
image] was just awful, it was just unbelievable. [JG1, 10/22/01] 
For surface scientists, air STM images, particularly those done on graphite, were a 
lightning rod – air was so open to contamination and graphite so ill-defined that they 
had trouble understanding or believing the new STMers’ results.  Indeed, they had 
trouble seeing (quite literally) what the new STMers saw.  Bob Hamers, a former 
Yorktown postdoc, remembers having trouble interpreting the air work on graphite: 
 
There was one paper from Ciraci and Batra [two IBM theorists], where they 
were predicting on graphite that you should have a reversal of contrast....  So, I 
thought “well, okay, I’m going to see if I can see that.”  That’s the one time I 
started to work on graphite.  At that time Binnig and Rohrer had reported 
seeing corrugations about 2 angstroms high on graphite.  I thought “wow, that 
should be easy to see.”  So I tried it in ultrahigh vacuum – couldn’t see 
anything.  You could see corrugations maybe a tenth of an angstrom, okay, and 
I’m thinking “am I doing something wrong here or what?”  Actually my 
manager, Joe Demuth, was getting kind of like “why can’t you get this, 
everybody else is doing these in air and seeing height changes that are 2 
angstroms high....”  Later people were reporting corrugations of 20 angstroms 
high and 200 angstroms high between atoms that were only 1.97 angstroms 
separated, because [in air STM] ... the tip was actually in contact with the 
surface, and so I kind of got disgusted at that point and figured “you know, this 
graphite doesn’t look like a good place to spend my time.”  It was kind of 
misleading....  The first commercial vendors of STMs were doing 
measurements in air, and they would have this little STM sitting on the table 
and they would show that you could actually knock on the table and it 
wouldn’t see any vibrations.  Okay, but this thing was totally bogus....  That 
turned a lot of people off to STM at the beginning was the commercial vendors 
were showing these wonderful images of graphite with atomic periodicity, but 
not true atomic resolution in air, and making it sound like it was very easy and 
could be done anywhere, but in fact when you got to any other sample, or 
anything that you’d really want to study, it was no longer true. [BH1, 5/9/01] 
Such qualms about air and graphite were well known, and discussed widely in the 
literature and at the STM conferences.  Corporate surface scientists saw these 
ambiguities as reasons to disregard any work done in air; for most newcomers, though, 
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these were simply teething problems to be expected from any new technology.  For 
them, the potential benefits of air and graphite were too tempting not to employ them. 
 The questions about graphite continued to mount, however.  As a result, many 
look back on the late ’80s and early ’90s as a period I have called “experimental 
vertigo” (Mody forthcoming-a).  Air/water STM, with graphite as a substrate, was too 
exciting and promising to ignore; but the sudden influx of new researchers working 
with a highly problematic material sparked friction and skepticism.7  The strains of 
accommodating large numbers of newcomers into what had been a small community 
with a relatively common focus were rapidly becoming apparent.  Two Zurich STMers 
– one (Binnig) an old-timer, the other (Bruno Michel) one of the bio-newcomers – 
remember biology’s problematic integration into the community: 
 
Heini Rohrer was my boss....  He was a very good physicist, but in 
biochemistry he said, “do what you want.”  He was always very supportive of 
my work since he wanted his invention to contribute something useful in the 
biological field.  In the initial phase there was a very strong physics group here 
[at IBM Zurich], and they said “we’re doing the purest and finest research, and 
there is one guy doing the dirty stuff” <laughs>....  The hardest thing was 
presenting the results to a wider audience....  We went to a conference....  [My 
group leader] gave the talk, and that was the first time ever that direct 
biological imaging by STM was shown, and people laughed at him <laughs>.  
[They said] “that’s crap.” [BM1, 11/12/01] 
 
CM: So at the point where there were multiple groups doing STM, did there 
start to be some standard for judging the competence in using it?  I mean, for 
instance, achieving atomic resolution on different kinds of materials. 
GB: Yes, that was in the beginning easy because we met quite often and we 
could discuss things and then the field was kind of clean in this respect.  So 
there was not much nonsense published.  That happened later, quite a bit.  In 
particular when many people started with biology and many many people – the 
community grew so fast and then people started measuring with the STM and 
seeing something and interpreting it immediately in a direction which was 
completely wrong.  They were not very critical and they didn’t think about all 
the kinds of artifacts you can create.  Like this small group in the beginning – 
we always would point “ah, this might be an artifact, look into that.”  By this 
exchange of information everything was under control, I would say.  But later 
it was a little different.  That was a bad phase for STM.  STM got for a while a 
very bad reputation, particularly in biology. [GB1, 9/26/00] 
                                                 
7 A classic example of interdisciplinary “bandwagon science” (Bromberg 1982; Fujimura 1988). 
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The DNA Controversy 
 Eventually, the doubts about air STM and graphite blossomed into open 
controversy.  The locus of this dispute – and the point on which the fate of air STM 
hinged – was the ability of the STM to image DNA at very high (possibly atomic) 
resolution.  The rise and fall of air STM resembles many scientific and technological 
controversies; but it also has some wrinkles that extend our understanding of how 
disagreements erupt and closure is achieved in scientific communities.  This 
controversy is particularly interesting because, in the end, closure in a technological 
debate (which is better for most users, STM or AFM?) provided the means for exiting 
the regress of a scientific debate (can STM image DNA?). 
 The roots of the DNA controversy lie in the continual quest to find an 
equivalent of the 7x7 for air/water STM.  In some ways, graphite fulfilled this role.  It 
was a well-known material and a suitable standard for both instruments and 
instrumentalists; and in other ways – availability, ease of preparation, suitability as a 
substrate – it even outperformed the 7x7.  Graphite alone, though, lacked the sexiness 
of the 7x7 that had won the STM many converts, plugged it into ongoing debates, and 
eventually secured it the Nobel Prize.  Importantly, no discipline showed much 
interest in learning anything new about graphite surfaces, and no field was engaged in 
any debates about its nature.  For surface scientists, it was a more or less understood 
but disciplinarily marginal material with few technological applications and little new 
science to offer; for molecular biologists, it was a tool, a ready-to-hand substrate, but 
not a scientifically interesting object per se.  STMers had questions about graphite, but 
they were never able to insert these questions into any other community’s discourse; 
thus, they were left to answer their questions on their own.  Moreover, at a visual 
level, even STMers found their images of graphite to be much more banal than those 
of silicon.  For reasons that would become important later, the STM usually showed 
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monotonous row after row of close-packed carbon atoms with no point defects – an 
image that offered little visual appeal and almost no new knowledge – though it did 
make it easier to isolate and observe adsorbed molecules [JM2, 7/6/00]. 
 Thus, STMers were eager to find something to put on graphite that would 
attract interest and new users.  Finding such a material was difficult, though – it had to 
be more or less conducting, and flat enough to avoid various tip-induced artifacts.8  
One solution was to use the STM to look at monolayers of complex molecules – i.e., 
very thin, flat layers of tessellated molecules.  Two kinds of layered arrays of 
molecules became particularly popular – liquid crystals and Langmuir-Blodgett films 
(often called self-assembled monolayers) (Foster and Frommer 1988; Nejoh 1990; 
Lang, et al. 1988; Fuchs 1988; Hansma, et al. 1991).  In both cases, there was an 
active community to whom STMers could communicate their findings.  Also, these 
arrays enjoyed early successes because they “proved” that the STM could, in fact, 
image molecules.  STMers had long seen “dirt” and “gunk” in their images that they 
assumed were molecules, and some had also offered images of individual molecules 
that they put down deliberately.9  Securing the correspondence between those images 
and the molecules in question was problematic, however; critics could always claim 
that STMers merely scanned along until they found “gunk” that resembled the 
molecule they were looking for and assumed (perhaps mistakenly) a correspondence.  
Ordered, regular arrays of molecules, as found in liquid crystals, seemed to overcome 
this problem.  The regularity and complexity of the micrographs, and the sheer number 
                                                 
8 The most notorious of these artifacts is called a “tip-sample convolution.”  Though not a strict 
convolution in the mathematical sense, a tip-sample convolution yields an image in which features of 
the tip and the sample are mixed together (“convolved”).  This happens because the tip has a certain 
width; if it scans across surface feature that is sharper than that width, the tip will slide across the 
surface feature in such a way that the point closest to the surface is not the apex of the tip.  Since the 
STM always produces an image in which it is assumed that tunneling is occurring through the apex, the 
image will always be somewhat distorted for non-flat surfaces. 
9 Similar to the transformation of photographic “scruff” into an epistemically interesting “pulsar” in 
Woolgar (1976). 
 
 233
of molecules being imaged, made it more difficult to claim that the images were flukes 
or wishful thinking. 
 The real holy grail for air/water STMers, though, was imaging DNA.  Even 
before graphite’s advent as an STM substrate, researchers in Zurich and elsewhere 
were putting DNA down onto silicon, paraffin, and other surfaces (Amrein, et al. 
1987; Gross, et al. 1988; Amrein, et al. 1988).  With the advent of graphite, however, 
the combination of nucleic acids (both DNA and RNA, in a variety of guises – single-
stranded, double-stranded, four-stranded, single-base sequences, plasmids, etc.) – with 
the highly-oriented pyrolitic graphite substrate became immensely popular.  DNA was 
of interest to an extraordinarily wide range of researchers – chemists, biophysicists, 
and molecular (and evolutionary) biologists, even materials scientists, mathematicians, 
computer scientists, and the new breed of nanotechnologists.  The behavior and 
macrostructure of DNA at the molecular level was long discussed and debated; so if 
the STM could, indeed, visualize that behavior and structure reliably at atomic 
resolution, then it might find instant and widespread application. 
 Two final features of DNA were particularly attractive to instrument-building 
academic groups like Binnig’s, Quate’s, Hansma’s, John Baldeschwieler’s at Caltech, 
or Stuart Lindsay’s at Arizona State.  First, just as Binnig and Rohrer had known 
virtually nothing about the 7x7 when they started imaging it, so DNA seemed (to the 
builder groups, anyway) ready to yield knowledge even to neophytes: 
 
I didn’t really know much about DNA.  But it was a great biomaterial to start 
with, because in the AFM field it was too early for people with serious DNA 
research questions to play with this microscope that was still in the prototype 
stage, so I didn’t need to know about the latest DNA research.  Oh, it was also 
wonderful for me that I could have a decade out of the lab and come back in 
with no particular handicap because nobody knew anything about how to do 
AFM of biological materials, so there wasn’t any body of knowledge. [HH1, 
3/19/01] 
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Thus, builders thought they could concentrate on putting together new instruments and 
pushing the envelope of the technology, while still producing interesting data.  
Secondly, DNA – like the 7x7 – seemed to be a highly generative material; that is, 
there were enough small variations on the DNA molecule, that once you started down 
that path you could generate a very large number of slightly different yet still 
interesting experiments.  This meant a large number of experiments done quickly, 
without having to learn a new knowledge base each time – something that fit well with 
the style of the builder groups. 
 One possible application of STM of DNA – much maligned today, though 
widely entertained at the time – was to use a tunneling microscope to sequence strands 
of genetic material.  In the late ’80s, the Human Genome Project was beginning to 
gather funds and organize efforts to sequence the human genome.  At the time, several 
techniques were vying to be the project’s primary sequencing tool, and there were 
good reasons to think that STM could compete.  After all, STM was an atomic 
resolution microscope.  If it could atomically resolve a strand of DNA, then it might 
be able to discriminate one base pair from another; if it could do that regularly and 
reliably, then it promised to sequence the entire genome much more cheaply and 
quickly than any other technique.  Hansma, Baldeschwieler, and Lindsay, in 
particular, vied for funding from the Human Genome Project and the National 
Institutes of Health to build microscopes that could sequence DNA [SL1, 1/6/03].  
Indeed, Hansma’s long line of biophysics postdocs can be seen, in part, as a largely 
unsuccessful attempt to tap into NIH funding for this and other projects.  
Baldeschwieler, who had received NIH funding for his nuclear magnetic resonance 
work in the ’70s perhaps knew better how to talk about medical applications, and 
received an NIH grant titled “Electron tunneling microscopy for biological systems” in 
1986. 
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 The first thing builders tried to demonstrate to the molecular biology and 
biophysics communities in general, and the Human Genome Project and NIH in 
particular, was that the STM could atomically resolve a strand of DNA.  The notion of 
“atomic resolution,” though, was beginning to fray.  For one thing, a microscope that 
could see atoms on flat surfaces of silicon or graphite might see nothing on surfaces 
with more varied topography.  A flat graphite substrate might yield individual atoms, 
but the single strand of DNA lying on top of it would look blurry and indistinct.  
Moreover, as both scanning tunneling spectroscopy and STM theory matured, most 
STMers became less realist about atomic resolution [JN1, 6/28/01]; from one 
tunneling voltage to another, the positions of atoms could vary quite significantly, a 
problem that became more pronounced as people started looking at more complex 
biomolecules. 
Finally, the banal, “clean” quality of most images of graphite became a 
concern.  As I’ve written about elsewhere, defects, impurities, contaminants, and 
imperfections are an important part of achieving a credible reality effect for 
microscope images in materials science and surface science (Mody 2001).  This is 
especially true in probe microscopy, where, by the late ’80s, participants began to 
realize that problems in the hardware, software, or electronics can all cause the 
instrument to produce spurious images that look identical to a defect-free, close-
packed crystalline surface.  So the total absence of defects in images of graphite began 
to diminish the credibility of the STM.  By 1987, a Quate student, Howard Mizes, had 
begun to examine the theoretical underpinnings of the tip-sample interaction in air 
STM of graphite, and showed that “atomic” resolution was something of a misnomer 
(see Figure 6-1). 
 
It took several years before people began to realize that the image they were 
getting off graphite, with apparent atomic resolution, was in most cases flawed 
and probably reflected a transfer of one flake of graphite to the tip.  So what 
 
 
 
236Figure 6-1: Moiré patterns on graphite.  A moiré pattern results when two 
regular patterns (e.g. two grids) overlap, creating a third pattern where the two 
original patterns cancel or reinforce; imagine looking through two window screens.  
In STM of graphite, if the tip has accumulated a flake of graphite, then the result is 
an image that superimposes two graphite surfaces (a moiré pattern).  Consequently 
the white spots in the images below are not (unlike most STM images) thought to 
correspond to individual atoms; rather, they represent ensembles averages of 
several atoms.  From Albrecht, et al. (1988).
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you were scanning over the surface was graphite over graphite, and you were 
looking at Moiré patterns.  The reason that people ultimately began to realize 
that fact is that they looked at the images of the graphite and realized they were 
never flawed – you always had perfect order.  Now, wait a minute – graphite 
does have flaws in it on occasion.  Why don’t we see this?  Well if you have a 
Moiré pattern then in fact you have an ensemble average, that’s why the 
images were near perfect.  Prior to that realization everybody calibrated his or 
her ability for atomic imaging with graphite.  You joined the world [of STM] - 
by showing that you could image graphite.  Well the truth of it was that, if you 
couldn’t image graphite with atomic resolution, you certainly weren’t going to 
image anything else with atomic resolution, but imaging the graphite was no 
proof that you had actually imaged individual atoms. [JM2, 7/6/00] 
These Moiré patterns (seen with STM and AFM, and on other layered materials 
besides HOPG) did little to tarnish the material’s advantages as a standard for 
instruments and instrumentalists.  They did make it problematic, though, to talk about 
“atomic resolution.”10
 
All surfaces suffer from contamination from the air.  For this reason, atomic-
scale imaging in air with the AFM has been mostly limited to layered 
compounds (e.g. graphite, boron nitride, mica, etc.).  All of these have regular 
hexagonal or square lattices with only a few surface defects.  None have a rich 
structure such as that of the Si[111] 7x7 surface.  Lattice images of such simple 
surfaces do not irrefutably prove that the instrument is achieving atomic 
resolution....  Strangely, very few variations in the perfect lattice have ever 
been recorded with the AFM.  Could it be possible that the AFM is somehow 
averaging the lattice structure over a fairly broad area so that point defects do 
not strongly appear, yet somehow the average lattice structure is being 
maintained? ...  In most of the AFM literature, the term “atomic resolution” 
means that images are taken which have variations on the length scale of 
atomic spacings.  There is some difficulty, both experimentally and 
theoretically, in interpreting these variations as true atomic resolution features. 
(Barrett 1991, 26-7) 
Mizes’ findings called into question any new, publishable knowledge extracted from 
such images.  It was with this understanding of graphite and atomic resolution in 
people’s minds that the first “atomically resolved” STM images of DNA appeared. 
 By 1988, these images were coming from a number of places.  At IBM Zurich, 
Giorgio Travaglini, working with Rohrer, modified a standard Zurich STM for larger 
                                                 
10 As discussed in Chapter Four, there is a vast sociological and historical literature on the visual aspects 
of science and technology.  See Daston and Galison (1992); Lynch (1988); Lynch and Edgerton (1988); 
Latour (1988a) for a first cut at this topic.  The STM case is, perhaps, interesting because STMers were 
not trying to simplify or abstract images in order to lend them intelligibility; rather, they were hoping to 
make them more complex and disordered in order to lend them credibility. 
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scan ranges and lower tunneling currents, until his group was finally able to images 
helices of recA-DNA complexes [BM1, 11/12/01].11  At first, they tried a standard 
trick from electron microscopy, coating the DNA with metal to make it conductive; 
later, they put uncoated DNA onto paraffin, with similar results.  At Arizona State, 
Stuart Lindsay, a former Hansma collaborator, followed suit (Barris, et al. 1988; 
Lindsay, et al. 1989).  Next came Carlos Bustamante, another biophysicist and 
Hansma collaborator, at the University of New Mexico (later Oregon and then 
Berkeley) (Dunlap and Bustamante 1989; Garcia, et al. 1989).  Where Lindsay’s 
collaboration with the UCSB group centered more on instrument design, the later 
Bustamante collaboration focused on sample preparation techniques.  One of the 
problems of using STM or AFM to look at large molecules is that, unless they are 
anchored properly, the molecules will simply be swept aside by the probe.  The 
Bustamante/Hansma collaboration was among the first to develop a reliable means of 
anchoring DNA so that it would remain still under the gaze of the microscope [HH1, 
3/19/01; CB1, 10/17/01]. 
 Soon, the DNA field became quite crowded – Gil Lee at Purdue, Bruce 
Warmack and Dave Allison at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, John Baldeschwieler 
at Caltech, Binnig (now at Munich), Wigbert Siekhaus at Lawrence Livermore, and 
others all entered the fray, especially as the first commercial instruments became 
available (Arscott, et al. 1989; Allison, et al. 1990; Youngquist, et al. 1991; Heckl, et 
al. 1991; Allen, et al. 1991).  Almost all of these groups concluded that atomic 
resolution of DNA was tantalizingly close.  One signpost pointing to atomic resolution 
was the presence of helical strands on graphite that displayed the right pitch (number 
of turns per unit length) as DNA.  The strands themselves were blurry, but they looked 
                                                 
11 RecA is a protein which can be made to coat a single strand of DNA, forming a recA-DNA complex. 
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roughly like DNA, and it was hoped that, with modifications and practice, the STM 
might resolve the atoms making up the helix. 
 The high point of this line of investigation came in 1990, when 
Baldeschwieler’s group published an atomically resolved image of DNA (see Figure 
6-2) on the cover of Nature (Driscoll, et al. 1990).  Almost immediately, though, 
questions were raised about this and similar images [WH1, 11/14/01; DB3, 4/3/01].  
Notably, many of these questions arose from the interdisciplinarity of the field.  Probe 
microscopists were running into intractable problems grafting STM and AFM onto 
new epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999).  In making what seemed like an obvious 
bridge to electron microscopy, for instance, STMers found themselves under 
suspicion.  Joe Zasadzinski, an electron microscopist at UCSB who worked with 
Hansma, remembers this time: 
 
People were just starting to come out with some of the wilder pictures of DNA 
with STMs and things.  Both Paul [Hansma] and I didn’t really believe that 
what they were seeing was what they were claiming to be seeing....  The 
importance to having a microscopy background is that most microscopists are 
the last ones to believe any of their pictures.  You’re sort of raised in that 
culture.  You’re supposed to think of all the things that you could’ve done 
wrong.  See, when it looks like what you expected it to look like, there’s such a 
strong gut level “go out and publish” sort of feeling that you really have to 
check yourself if most of your work is in visualization....  You could probably 
get it past the reviewers because, lord knows, a lot of people did <laughs>.  
That was sort of the era of STM at that time, is people were just looking at 
everything.  It was a new microscope, it was a new way to do things, it 
promised such high resolution....  As a microscopist I knew some of the 
drawbacks of drying things out of solution and all of the artifacts you can get 
in electron microscopy.  I mean, I wouldn’t have prepared the samples for an 
electron microscope typically by a lot of the procedures that [STMers] were 
using. [JZ1, 3/20/01] 
Similarly, STMers found it hard to make inroads into biology.  In the days of home-
built instruments, and even into the commercial era, few biologists worked with 
STM/AFM (leading to a lack of biological sophistication in the DNA controversy).  
One biologist who was able to bring biology into an instrument-building group 
remembers how rare and difficult that process was at this time: 
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 Figure 6-2: Baldeschwieler's cover of Nature.  A well-known and controversial
image from the Baldeschwieler group purporting to give atomic resolution of a 
segment of DNA.  You can see the turns of the helix and, it is claimed, the base 
pairs connecting the two strands.  From Driscoll, et al. (1990). 
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Mainly, everybody in the field was a trained physicist that knew how to do a 
little biology.  That is, they bumped into a biologist in the hall and he gave 
them a little vial and the biologist said “there’s some DNA in there” <laughs> 
and the physicist went back to the lab and tried to image it.  I mean there were 
a few biologists in the field but not very many. [MA1, 10/12/01] 
By 1990, some of the established STM/AFM builder groups were beginning to realize 
the dangers of neglecting the epistemic needs of the disciplines for whom they were 
demonstrating the credibility of the new instruments.  It is notable, for instance, that 
the Hansma group, though heavily invested in DNA, kept its head down during the 
controversies of 1990-2.  It is even more notable that Binnig, once such a maverick, 
now began to sound a note of caution.  Lindsay, too, put the brakes on his enthusiasm 
and published a skeptical article entitled “Can the scanning tunneling microscope 
sequence DNA?” (Lindsay and Philipp 1991).  For them, and for other skeptics, the 
infamous Baldeschwieler image became the prime point of contention.  The Caltech 
group’s Nature cover had been prestige science, but it was also – almost instantly – 
controversial science. 
 Baldeschwieler’s detractors focused primarily on the Caltech group’s apparent 
lack of a methodology for dealing with contamination and artifacts.  Such fuzzy 
methodology had been standard (indeed, had been tremendously beneficial) early on 
in STM and AFM; but now, as probe microscopists tried to make the technique 
credible to disciplines with more method-heavy practices (where the microscope was 
expected to integrate into an ongoing complex of theories, concepts, materials, recipes, 
and other instruments), the SPM community’s leaders focused on establishing 
standards for dealing with contaminants and artifacts.  Recall that the first problem 
with graphite had been anomalously large corrugations due, in part, to a contaminant 
and water layer at the surface of the highly-oriented pyrolitic graphite, and thus visible 
only to air STMers and not their corporate, UHV counterparts.  A second problem had 
been the lack of point defects, ascribed to the tendency of the tip to pick up a graphite 
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flake (or other “gunk”) and scrape it across the surface, creating a Moiré effect.  
Finally, in 1990-1, a new problem emerged.  STMers began to “see” DNA even where 
they were not intentionally putting it onto graphite.  Perfect helices started to appear 
without any sample preparation whatsoever – i.e., without even a sample to be 
prepared.12  The disturbing possibility was that the “DNA” everyone had been so 
excited about was not genetic material, but some contaminant masquerading as such. 
 
That certainly looks like a twisted helix of DNA.  But according to these 
particular researchers, they put no DNA down unless they sneezed on their 
samples.  I mean that became a running joke of, you know, who sneezed on 
their samples. [JF2, 3/14/01] 
 In 1990-1, Lindsay, Binnig, and a former Siekhaus postdoc named Tom Beebe 
all brought to the community’s attention HOPG’s tendency to form long, meandering, 
strand-like defects that could mimic DNA, right down to the pitch of its helix.  In a 
series of key articles, Lindsay, Binnig, and Beebe showed images of “DNA” that were 
indistinguishable from images of “clean” graphite (Clemmer and Beebe 1991; Heckl 
and Binnig 1992; Lindsay, et al. 1990).  Likewise, the Travaglini group at IBM Zurich 
– which was embedding DNA in paraffin on top of graphite – found much the same 
thing.  With these exchanges of evidence and counterevidence, the experimental 
vertigo that had afflicted air STM of graphite became thoroughly disorienting.  Many 
STMers had known about various problems with graphite and DNA, had discussed 
them at STM conferences, and had begun devising workarounds.  To have a star result 
like Baldeschwieler’s called into question so publicly, though, meant that a more 
radical solution seemed necessary, one that spoke to the concerns of the disciplines 
whose expertise intersected that of the STM community.  Many STMers (especially 
those who are now AFMers) look back on this as a bleak time of experimental and 
disciplinary misrule and distrust: 
                                                 
12 This is somewhat reminiscent of the controversy surrounding Blondlot’s “N-rays” (Collins 1992, 45; 
Ashmore 1993). 
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There was a lot of pseudoscience that went on in biology in those days....  If 
you look around on graphite, eventually you can find anything you want.  
Reconstructions in graphite can resemble different crystalline materials, they 
can resemble long-chain molecules, literally if you look around long enough 
you’ll see what you want to see.  We had a term for that – “face of Jesus.”  If 
you looked around long enough you’d see the face of Jesus.  But it took a long 
time for people to figure that out because of course they put these things down, 
they’d look around for a few weeks and they’d see what they wanted to see and 
they’d publish a picture.  Everybody else’d say “wow, that’s really neat” and 
they’d put it down and they’d look around for a few weeks and they’d see what 
they wanted to see and they’d say “yeah, it works.” [MT1, 2/26/01] 
“Closure” versus “Moving on” 
STM of DNA was more controversial than any other research area in probe 
microscopy, then, because it was the focus of ever-greater difficulties handling 
interdisciplinarity in a rapidly-expanding instrumental community.  DNA represented 
an attempt by the air STMers to make their work relevant to far-flung and well-
established fields.  Some of these disciplines, especially molecular biology, 
approached the instrument and the instrumentalists with skepticism.  At the same time, 
more enthusiastic converts – especially physicists and biophysicists (some with the 
“bio” only recently attached) flooded the STM community.  Like the well-established 
“builder” groups these newcomers generated data quickly, using sample preparation 
and image interpretation methods to which they often were not accustomed.  Unlike 
the builder groups, though, they had virtually no pedigree in STM instrumentation to 
blunt the edge of any incautious results they published – i.e., they could not recast 
dubious scientific results as instances of technological innovation, and they did not 
have the builders’ network of postdocs and collaborators to support them.  Indeed, as 
the first commercial instruments became available, many of these people were buying, 
not building their microscopes.  This set up a dynamic where biologists were inclined 
to be skeptical, and the new STMers gave them results on which to exercise that 
skepticism.  Anxiety about newcomers and interdisciplinarity is evident even today, as 
bio-SPMers remember the DNA controversy: 
 
 244
 
There were reports later on of imaging DNA that were possibly more valid, but 
still, in my opinion, it was physicists doing biology.  Physicists are smart, I 
mean, that’s not slamming physicists by any stretch.  But their experimental 
design was quite different than a typical molecular biologist bench scientist 
design. [EH1, 6/22/01] 
 
Developing an instrument was done in physics groups.  But you need a 
biological group.  You get something from the biologists, put it on your 
substrate, and you will see it.  You have to prepare it and for the preparation 
you have to find out the right concentration.  If it’s too much, it’s overcrowded, 
you can’t see anything anymore.  If you have low coverage it takes too long to 
come to the next one.  So you need always to discuss with the biologists....  
Physics groups, this was always a problem for them.  At least to get to a result 
you need very good communication between both biochemists and the 
physicists. [RG1, 11/14/01] 
 
Magnificent pictures have already been obtained with the STM showing 
atomic features on the surfaces of crystalline semiconductors or evaporated 
metal films.  Nevertheless, not every STM picture is a revelation, and journal 
editors and referees will become more fastidious once the enthusiasm 
surrounding the new technique has settled.  Biologists, with their desperate 
need for non-destructive high resolution microscopes, became immediately 
interested in the STM, but most attempts to obtain STM images of biological 
matter were met with frustration.  Actually, most images of DNA, protein or 
supramolecular assemblies such as viruses look rather dull and uninformative 
and could stir up excitement only in those circles whose members are 
completely unaware of the state of the art in biomolecular electron microscopy. 
(Baumeister 1988) 
For the more established builder groups, and for the new manufacturers with 
whom they were associated, DNA represented a catch-22.  On the one hand, people 
like Binnig, Quate, and Hansma valued the openness of the community they’d 
constructed and strove to expand the SPM field; but, they were profoundly uneasy 
with controversy and possible threats to the credibility of the technique.  Such threats 
were quite real, and the effects of the DNA controversy can still be felt today: 
 
When people started to leave out the metal coatings [on biomolecules] and still 
could get pictures, that was really hard to figure out.  I don’t think anybody 
really successfully figured out why the pictures showed through.  People could 
also see the same things without any real materials on the substrates.  Then 
nobody believed anything.  I think what a lot of that stuff did actually was 
pretty much for a while remove probe microscopy from biology.  There was a 
real sort of rush to belief in the beginning....  We went through bad times 
where the images were pretty much showed to probably be artifactual.  That’s 
held for quite a while.  Because even in proposals now that I write to NIH – 
not this last one but the one about three years ago, they were still saying that 
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“nobody believes AFM and this is not a biological tool and everybody knows 
it’s artifacts.” [JZ1, 3/20/01] 
The effects of the DNA controversy were perceived as propagating far beyond the 
handful of researchers working on nucleic acids; therefore, pressure to come to closure 
quickly was much greater than for any previous SPM dispute. 
One path to closure might’ve been to establish rigorous experimental 
procedures, to continue refining air/water STM until artifacts would disappear and the 
technique would seem credible to all.  Indeed, the language of many probe 
microscopists in describing the controversy points in this direction: biologists, they 
say, were not being fair, every microscopy is prone to artifacts early on, people should 
look at the history of electron microscopy to see how long it took for artifacts to be 
dealt with there, etc. [JH1, 6/10/02; MA1, 10/12/01].  The means to vet bio-STM of its 
defects and transform it into an instrument in which biologists could believe were 
apparent to most probe microscopists in the early ’90s; yet few people actually 
traveled that path.  It’s important, though, to highlight these die-hards, since their story 
emphasizes the contingent, yet inexorable, logic of closure. 
As we’ve seen, one way to refine bio-STM would have been to look at 
biomolecular arrays, rather than individually adsorbed molecules that could be 
mimicked by defects.  Work on Langmuir-Blodgett films was one step in this 
direction.  Another, more closely connected to the DNA controversy, was to image 
monolayers of the DNA and RNA bases – guanine, cytosine, thymine, adenine, uracil.  
Mike Allen (working with Wigbert Siekhaus at Lawrence Livermore National Lab) 
and Wolfgang Heckl (working with Binnig at the IBM outpost in Munich) both made 
significant progress in this direction, particularly in figuring out proper imaging 
conditions and specimen preparation techniques (Allen, et al. 1992; Heckl, et al. 
1991).  Another tack would have been to borrow a trick from electron microscopy by 
coating biomolecules with metal to make it conducting.  Electron microscopists trying 
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to break into STM (such as Joe Zasadzinski, a Hansma collaborator at UCSB or 
Reinhard Guckenberger at the Max Planck Institute) tried this technique, with some 
success (Zasadzinski, et al. 1988; Guckenberger, et al. 1988).  Both metal-coating and 
molecular arrays, though, risked dangerous comparisons with other techniques.  
STMers were never able to borrow just enough from crystallography or surface 
science or electron microscopy to make bio-STM look credible without also making it 
look uninformative relative to what was already known in those disciplines. 
 
There were some groups that went to metal coating for STM....  Matthias 
Amrein.... did some very good work on metal-coated rec-A complexes with the 
STM and showed that it’s a lot of work and maybe it’s not much better than 
electron microscopy.  So people were saying that’s good but maybe that’s not 
unique enough, or not enough of an improvement.  Most people gave up. 
[MA1, 10/12/01] 
 
The majority of biologists, though, would tend to say, especially in the early 
going, that you didn’t learn anything new.  Okay, and that was in fact usually 
an accurate criticism, that you didn’t know anything that you didn’t know 
before.  I mean, so you can image DNA – what, you didn’t know what DNA 
looked like?  So you could see a DNA binding protein – you could do all of 
that by rotary shadow EM.  So early on people got a lot of flak for “yeah, and, 
so what?” you know.  And I think that people in the field really thought that 
well what’s happening here is, okay, if we can get to where electron 
microscopy is now in just a couple years, then where are we going to be in 5 or 
10 years?  But the biologists didn’t think about that.  They looked at what they 
saw in front of them.  They didn’t see where are things going to be, which I 
always thought was just historically naïve.  I mean why can’t you look into the 
future and say “wow, you can do that now!”  It’s like, no, the response was 
“yeah, I could that with electron microscopy.” [JH1, 6/10/02] 
One answer to doubts about bio-STM of nucleic acids was an elaborate control 
experiment to discriminate between “real” and “artifactual” images.  Stuart Lindsay 
followed this route using sequences of DNA known to have a particular shape. 
 
[STM] was just a mess for biology.  But nonetheless, we produced quite a few 
papers.  The “proving the point” paper about DNA on metal electrodes is one 
in which a guy at Columbia made DNA cis-platin complexes – cis-platin ... 
kinks the DNA, or is believed to.  So he sent us DNA, with and without cis-
platin, and he didn’t tell us what was in what test tube....  It worked, you could 
see little kink things when you had the cis-platin, and you didn’t when you 
didn’t have the cis-platin.  But ... my conclusion was that if you had to put a lot 
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of work into proving that you could do it under special circumstances, it wasn’t 
what you wanted as a routine assay in biology. [SL1, 1/6/03]13
 Finally, one could remedy bio-STM by tweaking specimen preparation and 
imaging parameters to produce pictures of even the most recalcitrant samples.  
Extremely low tunneling currents, for instance, allowed STM to operate even on thick 
insulating molecules like DNA; substrates other than graphite yielded fewer 
mimicking defects; and environmental conditions, such as humidity, could 
occasionally have a miraculous effect on bio-STM images (Heim, et al. 1996).  
Lindsay, for example, had always observed DNA on gold, not graphite.  In doing so, 
he avoided the direct criticism of graphite work leveled by Binnig, Beebe and others; 
yet in the rush to closure, all bio-STM suffered from guilt by association. 
 
Tom Beebe’s paper of course had a big impact.  I think the fact that you can 
image DNA on metal surfaces is probably not widely recognized.  So the 
papers of the Kawai group are probably not known about by the people that 
still today say “oh, you can’t image DNA with an STM.”  Now, I know you 
can, but I don’t think it’s a worthy enough cause to get up on my chariot and 
say “look, I was right and you were all wrong, here’s the definitive work,” 
because there’s more important stuff that I can do....  It was important at the 
time, when it was very controversial, it’s important because it’s damaged the 
credibility of techniques such as sequencing by probe microscopy....  But I 
think the community’s been put off because of their knee-jerk – understandable 
– knee-jerk reaction to the Beebe paper. [SL1, 1/6/03] 
Similarly, Guckenberger – and, to a lesser extent, Bustamante – continued looking for 
ways around bio-STM’s problems well into the ’90s.  Guckenberger found that by 
using various amplifiers, he could image even with an extremely low tunneling 
current.  This meant that his STM could measure even the very few electrons that 
tunneled through very thick molecules such as DNA; then, somewhat unexpectedly, he 
found that ambient humidity influenced the quality of his images.  Something about 
the layer of water vapor that collects on any surface exposed to the air – water vapor 
that most STMers viewed as a contaminant – actually improved the tunneling 
mechanism.  Although Guckenberger’s work was known to many people in the bio-
                                                 
13 The article mentioned is Jeffrey, et al. (1993). 
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SPM community, by the time he published almost everyone had “moved on.”  Only 
Bustamante tried to replicate his results, and that only out of stubborn curiosity [MA1, 
10/12/01; RG1, 11/14/01; CB1, 10/17/01]. 
 The alternative to making bio-STM credible was to abandon it, usually for 
AFM.  By leaving STM behind, and by putting rhetorical distance between STM and 
AFM, the new AFMers could cast criticisms of probe microscopy as outdated and 
relevant only to STM.  Indeed, though abashed, many AFMers continued to try to win 
biophysicists over, and some, such as Hansma, continued to harbor the goal of using 
probe technology to sequence DNA.14  Even a cursory look at the literature shows 
that, after 1992, air STM vanished, practically overnight.  STM in fluids, too, 
disappeared, except for a very small community in electrochemistry.  Again and again, 
journal articles refer to the move to AFM as a kind of unquestionable fact, against 
which hard-core bio-STMers like Guckenberger had little recourse: 
 
Efforts have been made, therefore, to image biological material without 
coating.  The results, to date, have often been disappointing, and many 
researchers in biology have turned their efforts toward atomic force 
microscopy (AFM). (Guckenberger, et al. 1994) 
 
In no area has the excitement about this new generation of microscopes been 
greater than in biology, for the operation of these instruments is not restricted 
to artificial or unnatural environments....  [I]t has been in biology that the 
applications of STM have been most controversial....  [I]t is becoming 
increasingly apparent that further developments in the applications of STM in 
biology may be difficult, owing primarily to the low conductivity of the 
samples.  In fact, STM may never leave the specialist’s laboratory to become a 
tool of general use in the broader biological community.  It is SFM [scanning 
force microscopy – i.e. AFM] that is currently yielding the greatest number of 
biological applications and is likely to continue to do so in the future. 
(Bustamante 1994) 
In the ’90s, continuing with air STM of DNA meant meeting biologists on 
their own turf, learning in-depth their methods and ways of arguing – i.e., a heavy 
                                                 
14 One idea, associated with the Hansma group, is to feed a strand of DNA through an enzyme, with an 
AFM cantilever resting on top of the enzyme.  As the DNA feeds through, the enzyme reconforms 
differently depending on the DNA base pair it is “reading.”  If the cantilever is sensitive enough, it can 
therefore use changes in the shape of the enzyme to tell the sequence of the DNA strand. 
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investment in time, energy, and disciplinary identity.  You could continue in the old 
way, showing images of DNA without meeting biologists’ epistemic needs – as, for 
instance, Baldeschwieler did.  Doing so, though, meant disbelief from biology and 
marginalization within the STM community.  Instead, the builder groups – and the 
physicists, biophysicists, and chemists who were largely following their lead – 
avoided becoming biologists by disowning STM.  With AFM becoming more reliable, 
and commercial AFMs coming on the market, STM could be redefined as a dead end.  
Many former air STMers now saw tunneling microscopy as a limited technique: 
 
The scanning tunneling microscope is a wonderful microscope for ultra-high 
vacuum work, or work where you can keep a surface absolutely clean.  
Layered compounds ... are perfect compounds for scanning probe microscopy 
because you can cleave them to reveal a flat surface, and they’re reasonably 
stable in air; they don’t oxidize.  But that’s true of almost nothing, which is 
why I wanted to go beyond scanning tunneling microscopy, to reach the goal 
of having something that would be generally useful for imaging.  I started to 
realize that the number of samples you could look at in air with a scanning 
tunneling microscope was vanishingly small.  If you look around the room in 
which you’re sitting, there’s nothing except perhaps gold jewelry that you 
could look at with a scanning tunneling microscope.  So when Gerd Binnig 
published his article with Quate and Gerber about the AFM I was very 
interested.  With Calvin Quate’s encouragement, I basically abandoned STMs 
on the spot and started working to make AFMs that would be practical 
instruments. [PH1, 3/19/01] 
Thus, AFM offered new materials to characterize, and hence new disciplines to link 
with; but it also offered a chance to start over, to cut the tie to surface science and 
leave behind the botched link-up to biology represented by STM of DNA. 
The last act of leaving STM behind was to redefine what an air STM had been 
doing all along.  Here, in making their divorce amicable, the academic AFM builders 
and the corporate STMers could at last collaborate in creating knowledge.  On the one 
side, the academic groups knew the experience of using an air STM backwards and 
forwards; on the other side, the corporate STMers had good surface scientific reasons 
for believing that air STM had never been reliable.  The former knew that you could 
get a “tunneling” current even when you were scraping your probe against a surface; 
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the latter knew that in air there was always a contamination layer that would obfuscate 
any real tunneling.  So a new picture of air STM emerged – not one that researchers 
ever fully investigated, but one that sufficed for justifying the redrawing of the field. 
 
It comes out that in graphite essentially you don’t have tunnel current....  The 
tip is actually in contact, the tip is touching....  Well people pretty soon realized 
that .... you are sort of modulating, squeezing up and down your surface....  At 
the beginning, there was lots of, as you say, controversy.  Today people don’t 
talk about that anymore. [MS1, 3/9/01] 
 
Is the tunneling current,... from the tip through the sample to a carbon atom at 
the surface affected by what the carbon atom is sitting on in the second layer?  
There’s a carbon sitting above the middle of the ring; is that passage of current 
going to be different than the passage of current through a carbon atom that is 
sitting above a bond or an atom below it?  Yeah, that was discussed, whether it 
was actually ever resolved I’m not sure.  Certainly a lot of empirical evidence 
but I don’t know about the theoretical.  It was a goldmine for theorists.  I’m 
sure if you talked to ten people who worked on that they’d give you ten 
definitive explanations of it.  I don’t recall if there was ever a universal 
agreement on that.  People kind of moved on. [JF1, 10/19/01] 
Reordering the Community and Reinterpreting the Technology 
Thus, as in Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump, we can see the 
end of the DNA controversy as a moment when questions of political order (what are 
the boundaries of the SPM community? who are its leaders? what types of researchers 
should be joining it?) were settled simultaneously with questions of scientific 
knowledge (can an STM image DNA?) and technological practice (which is better, 
STM or AFM?).15  The builder groups and the start-up manufacturers with whom they 
were associated had taken full advantage of the graphite gold rush while they could, 
but by 1990-1 had seen the dangers of letting the boom go unchecked.  It is notable 
that bio-STM had always had skeptics, but that it did not become a full-fledged 
controversy until after Quate, Hansma, and the microscope manufacturers had made 
AFM reliable enough that it could be sold commercially. 
                                                 
15 The idea of “coproduction” of knowledge and social order describes this kind of closure well.  See 
Latour and Callon (1992) and Latour (1990) for early uses of the term and Reardon (2001) for a more 
extended analysis of its implications. 
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Once off-the-shelf AFMs could be bought, the core commitment to improving 
bio-STM and making it credible to biologists evaporated.16  STM’s poor, unreliable 
cousin suddenly became the instrument of choice.  In its heyday, air STM helped build 
an extraordinary user base for probe microscopy – one ad from Digital Instruments 
(the Santa Barbara-based microscope maker) in early 1990 estimates 300 DI 
instruments in operation, “more than half of all the STMs in the world.”17  By 1992, 
the vast majority of DI’s users had switched to AFM, as had most other STMers 
outside electrochemistry and surface science.  Thus, the probe microscopy community 
effectively reorganized around: (A) the presence of instrument manufacturers; (B) the 
long-standing partnership between those manufacturers and a select few builder 
groups like Quate, Hansma, and Lindsay; and (C) a very sharp distinction between 
STM and AFM.  This reorganization alleviated many of the frictions that had plagued 
the community early on.  Reorganization allowed expertise to be seen to reside more 
squarely with the early builder groups, their close collaborators, and their associated 
start-ups; expertise, in turn, allowed the builders and their network to deal more 
methodically with newcomers and with “artifacts” (spurious images) in ways that 
made AFM’s entry into new disciplines much easier than STM’s had been.  In 
particular, the manufacturers, rather than various builder groups, were now responsible 
for attracting newcomers, getting them started, and, in effect, taming them to produce 
the “right” kind of AFM image – a process we will examine in the next two chapters. 
Interestingly, air STM still lingers on; yet the places in which it ekes out an 
existence tell us much about how complete closure has become, and how important 
commercial AFMs were in that closure.  To understand the last remaining air STMers, 
                                                 
16 That is, the move from STM to AFM resembles the kinds of technological paradigm shifts seen in 
much recent history and sociology of technology (Constant 1980; Schatzberg 1999; Bijker and Pinch 
1987). 
17 From Faseb Journal, v. 4, n. 13 (1990), p. 1. 
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it’s necessary to point out that STM, by the end, had become an extraordinarily simple 
and standardized technology.  Designs, schematics, and software were readily 
available to anyone trying to build one.  There are very few moving or even delicate 
parts, and most of the components are cheap and readily available.  AFM, on the other 
hand, is not seen as nearly as simple a device to construct.  Very few build their own 
AFMs from scratch; the designs, schematics, and software to build one are harder to 
get access to (since almost all AFMs are commercial instruments); and the parts are 
seen as much more expensive and difficult to make (especially microfabricated 
cantilevers).  Thus, in places where money is tight and therefore commercial 
instruments seem less appealing, homebuilt air STMs are still favored over AFMs in 
research.  This is most true of China [PH1, 3/19/01], where a number of lab groups 
regularly publish results on air STM of biomolecules (Li 1999; Zhang, et al. 
1994a;Zhang, et al. 1994b).  Also, in Europe and North America, air STM has made a 
very small comeback not as a research tool, but as a science fair or hobbyist’s project 
[NG1, 2/28/01].  Unlike the AFM, air STM is perceived as an intuitive enough 
concept and a simple enough technology that high schoolers can make them out of 
Legos and clay.18  That is, air STM survives exactly because it cannot be bought yet is 
cheap and easy to build. 
So what does this tell us about scientific controversy?  First, it should be clear 
from this controversy, and from the events of the previous chapters, just how 
successful, and yet also how difficult, cross-talk between disciplines can be.  Unlike 
many classic controversy studies, the actors in this chapter came from a wide variety 
of disciplines; perhaps the nearest equivalent studies would be Trevor Pinch’s 
sociology of solar neutrino physics or Peter Galison’s history of high energy physics, 
                                                 
18 If any of my readers would like to make one themselves, http://www.e-basteln.de/index_r.htm 
contains some good hints. 
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both of which highlight the travails and benefits of interdisciplinary dispute (Pinch 
1981; Galison 1997).  The biggest difference with probe microscopy, though, is its 
smallness; a collider facility stretching over acres, or a neutrino observatory buried in 
an abandoned mine, is a big, expensive, rare artifact/experiment/workplace.  By 
comparison, a probe microscope is small, cheap, and common; even in the earliest 
days, the opportunity cost for building an STM was relatively low, and through the 
’80s and ’90s that cost continued to plummet.19
Low barriers to entry resulted in (A) diversity of participants in the field; (B) 
diversity of instrumental designs; and (C) quick commercialization of the instrument 
(the topic of the next chapter), which dramatically lowered entry barriers even further.  
Early on, the diversity of designs was quite low (almost everyone did UHV STM), 
and, though practitioners came from different disciplines, they were all so focused on 
a common problem (resolving the 7x7) that their methodological differences were 
rarely an issue.  As the technique became more routine and more widespread, though, 
methodological heterogeneity became difficult to ignore.  For the most part, 
momentary frictions could be eased by what Michael Lynch and David Bogen call 
“sleaze.”20  Sleaze – the fuzziness of possible narratives surrounding any action – 
allowed surface scientists and academic STMers to claim a common community in 
some settings, while casting mutual doubt in others; it allowed builder groups to move 
their experiments back and forth across the line between “applications” and 
“technological innovation”; it allowed air STMers to make valuable use of graphite, 
                                                 
19 Again, the idea that the low opportunity cost of building an air STM enticed some people to continue 
experimenting in that area even after closure of the DNA controversy is similar to the ongoing cold 
fusion work described in Simon (2002). 
20 Despite the loaded terminology, “sleaze” need not be pejorative.  I interpret Lynch and Bogen to be 
describing a kind of social WD-40, a lubricant that allows any action to be cast and recast in a number 
of lights, giving actors the flexibility to navigate complex situations, identities, and audiences. 
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despite what could have been paralyzing doubts about its suitability; and, in the end, it 
allowed many air STMers to reinvent themselves as AFMers. 
Sometimes, though, sleaze can be called out as an inappropriate social practice.  
As we’ve seen, this transformation depends strongly on the cultures of controversy 
involved.  The corporate STMers abided the extraordinary flexibility of method and 
identity of the academic builder groups without instigating outright controversy 
(though private carping was common).  The builder groups tried (usually successfully) 
to tightly manage sleaze, deploying flexibly interpretable practices when necessary 
and reining them in when things became untidy.  The extraordinary expansion of 
probe microscopy in the late ’80s, though, momentarily spread the social lubricant too 
thin.  The new STMers who started building and buying microscopes and publishing 
mountains of images could less plausibly portray their experiments in a flexible 
fashion.  That is, when the newcomers showed a picture “DNA,” their audience 
(particularly in biology) heard them making a claim about DNA; the alternative story, 
that their images of DNA were simply meant to advance the technique, went unheard.  
Without this flexibility, STMers had to argue on biologists’ terms, with which they 
were largely unfamiliar. 
AFM reintroduced the needed social lubrication by recasting a scientific 
question about the validity of DNA images into a technological debate about which 
technique (AFM or STM) was more “routine,” more “user-friendly,” more “general-
purpose,” and more relevant to a variety of disciplines.  Maybe those STM images of 
DNA were all artifacts, but you could be sure AFM was “really” seeing DNA (and 
since you “knew” that air AFM could not obtain true atomic resolution, you could do 
away with “wild” claims about atomically resolved nucleic acids); or, maybe, you 
really could see DNA with an STM, but under such difficult and narrow conditions 
that it was not worth bothering.  Either way, it did not really matter.  
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Commercialization reconfigured the ways in which probe microscopists could deploy 
the discursive flexibility of sleaze; for the vast majority who bought AFMs, probe 
microscopy became a site for the flexibility of the mundane.  That is, for most users, 
probe microscopy today is not the locus of astounding revelation; rather, it is a 
mundane, unremarked-on laboratory technology, one among many – a lab group might 
buy one because they have money left over or because it is easy to have one student 
learn how to operate the instrument.  With commercialization, it is easy to add AFM to 
the tool-kit, and to rely on the safety net of the manufacturer’s applications 
department, and the AFM community, to avoid unintentionally using the instrument in 
rash or controversial ways.  Most users have the discursive flexibility of saying that 
they are biologists or materials scientists or chemists who happen to do AFM 
occasionally, rather than dedicated AFMers who live or die by the technique. 
For the builder groups, and the manufacturers, sleaze is still useful to navigate 
between “applications” and “instrument development.”  Today, though, this kind of 
discursive flexibility is the prerogative of elites in the probe microscopy community – 
the very few who still build their own instruments and need to justify building over 
buying.  Discoveries are more commonly treated as astounding or spectacular within 
this group; yet these are exactly the kinds of innovations that can attract controversy.  
As we will see, these elites generally rely on each other for a safety net in case of 
controversy – either through close relationships between builder groups and various 
manufacturers, or through extended networks of collaboration like that surrounding 
the Hansma team.  In the next two chapters, we will see how the manufacturers handle 
interpretive and practical flexibility, and how they tame their customers to forestall 
damaging forms of controversy.
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Commercialization, Lab Culture, and Tacit Knowledge 
 
 As we’ve seen thus far, the STM and AFM were, from the beginning, 
embedded in commercial enterprises.  In the corporate labs, probe microscopy was 
meant to draw recognition to the corporation, provide knowledge that might someday 
be relevant to the company’s products, and serve as a research site for personnel who 
might eventually move to other projects within the company.  Even in the academic 
builder groups, probe microscopy was a proving ground for students who often moved 
on to corporations like IBM and KLA-Tencor (a semiconductor equipment 
manufacturer); moreover, early academic STMers depended on the patronage of IBM 
and Bell Labs in building a sustainable probe microscopy community.  Yet it was only 
in 1986 that anyone began thinking of STM as a product to sell; and, perhaps 
surprisingly, it was in the academic builder groups (particularly the ones in California) 
that this idea took shape.  As we will see in Chapter Eight, the corporate labs only 
began halfheartedly marketing a few of their microscopes well after 
commercialization had transformed the landscape of probe microscopy. 
 Recently, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and even philosophers of 
science have joined economists in studying the commercialization of scientific 
research.  Historians of pre-twentieth century instrumentation, for instance, have 
gained new insights by looking at the commercial networks connecting scientists and 
artisans; and among historians of twentieth century instrumentation, 
commercialization is often a convenient narrative endpoint, a marker that a once-
idiosyncratic tool has become robust and reliable enough to be black-boxed (Secord 
1994; Jackson 1999; Hentschel 2002; Holmes and Levere 2000; Buchwald 1994).  In a 
somewhat separate literature, scholars such as Derek Bok, Paul Rabinow, John Ziman, 
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and Henry Etzkowitz have debated whether commercialization of research, and the 
perceived corporatization of the university, inhibit Mertonian norms such as openness 
and equality and therefore curtail knowledge generation (Bok 2003; Etzkowitz 2002; 
Ziman 2002; Rabinow 1996; Rabinow 1999). 
 Though the story of the commercialization of STM and AFM can be read in 
light of these literatures, I want to approach the process from a different direction.  
Instead of asking the normative question of whether commercialization disrupts 
science, I want to examine what characteristics of local experimental culture can foster 
commercialization, and how different parties to the process represent it as beneficial or 
disruptive; and instead of taking commercialization as an endpoint, I will look at what 
happens across this transition, and how an instrumental community responds to its 
transformation into a marketplace. 
 To do so, I draw on two literatures.  One is the sociology of technology 
literature (especially the social construction of technology program) (Bijker and Pinch 
1987; Bijker 1995a; Pinch and Trocco 2002; Rosen 1993; Mody 2000).1  Much of 
SCOT examines how scientific research is steadily transformed, materialized, and 
repackaged into marketable products, though the products in question are things like 
fluorescent light bulbs and bakelite, rather than microscopes and spectrometers.  
Recent work in SCOT makes clear why stopping at the point of commercialization is 
inadequate; users and consumers are too influential in the continual reworking of 
technologies to ignore.2  This seems particularly the case for scientific 
instrumentation, where, as we will see, consumers often threaten to become producers 
of technology, and producers must act like consumers in order to maintain credibility. 
                                                 
1. I particularly follow the methodological recommendations of Bijker (1995b). 
2 This point is made best in Kline and Pinch (1996).  Although definitely not part of SCOT, Kathleen 
Jordan and Mike Lynch’s (1992; 1993) studies of local reinterpretations of the plasmid prep clearly 
have something important to say about how users of commercialized instruments continually reopen 
black boxes. 
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 The other is Peter Galison’s work on so-called “trading zones” (Galison 1997; 
1996).  His Image and Logic contains rich descriptions of various kinds of 
intersections between science and commerce (for example, particle physicists and 
emulsion manufacturers) that resonate with the concerns of this chapter.  More 
generally, though, Galison’s “trading zone” concept describes well much of the 
growth of STM and AFM.  I take the trading zone as a “place” where different kinds 
of practitioners meet, form more or less lasting relationships, construct local 
interlanguages for mediating those relationships, exchange artifacts, techniques, ideas, 
shortcuts, personnel, and other cultural materiel, and, in the middle of it all, generate 
knowledge.  Actors’ interpretations of the tokens of their exchanges, and even the 
exchange event itself, need not match up.  Nevertheless, they can make themselves 
mutually understood (for the moment) in ways that may eventually transform the 
participants’ disciplinary homelands.  In the case of probe microscopy, we saw how 
the academic STMers, confronted with an epistemic and institutional dilemma, formed 
partnerships with representatives of a variety of disciplines – a paradigmatic trading 
zone.  In this chapter and the next, we will see how commercialization meant the 
elaboration and expansion of this academic group form of life and the increasing 
literalization of the economic metaphor implicit in the trading zone concept. 
Bricoleur to Boxwallah 
 I want to springboard from the trading zone by highlighting some of the 
colonialist undertones of Galison’s talk about pidgins and creoles.  I find it odd that 
Galison builds on an elaborate analogy between scientific vernaculars and trading 
languages without ever mentioning that the best-known pidgins and creoles emerged 
from mercantilist and imperialist encounters.  I don’t want to make too much of this – 
scientific disciplines, after all, are not nations or peoples – but there are interesting 
ways to play with this aspect of the trading zone concept, particularly in thinking 
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about commercialization.  Commercialization stories can sound much like colonialist 
tales, as told from the vantage point of commercializer/colonizer: the spreading of 
influence; the entangling of the fates of various communities with that of the center; 
the enrollment of key members of those communities in the mission of the center; the 
sending of missionaries out to inform/preach; the disciplining of embodied knowledge 
and practice to the standards of the center; the exoticization of people at the periphery 
as profoundly unlike those at the center; and so on. 
 I want to explore these commercialization narratives by focusing on two 
characters found in many stories about classical trading zones: the bricoleur, well-
known from (colonialist) anthropology; and the boxwallah, a significant figure in the 
mytho-history of imperialism in India.3  The bricoleur should be familiar to science 
studies, notably from Karin Knorr-Cetina’s The Manufacture of Knowledge.  As 
Knorr-Cetina quotes François Jacob, the bricoleur “does not know what he is going to 
produce but uses whatever he finds around him” and “gives his material unexpected 
functions to produce a new object” (Knorr-Cetina 1981, 34)4  It should be easy to see 
this kind of bricolage in the resourcefulness and creative mistake-making that marked 
the builder groups at Stanford and Santa Barbara. 
 As Peter Redfield points out in Space in the Tropics, colonial projects of 
“modernization” and “development” often explicitly cite the need to replace bricoleurs 
with engineers, bricolage with technique (Redfield 2000).  The center sees the 
“making do” of tinkering as antithetical to rational, planned, thoroughly modern 
technocracy.  This is, indeed, very much how the scientists and engineers who 
commercialized SPMs see it.  They will say that a commercialized microscope is 
cleaner, more sightly, more efficient, more flexible, more reliable, faster, more 
                                                 
3 Bricoleurs are, of course, especially associated with Lévi-Strauss (1966). 
4 Bricolage can also be seen in Knorr-Cetina (1999, 88ff.). 
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friendly, and can do more “real science” for more people than an instrument made by 
a graduate student.  Redfield illustrates, though, that in any real place where colonial 
plans encounter “underdeveloped” land, people, or ideas, there is continual slippage 
between bricolage and technique.  In this chapter, I want to frame this slippage in the 
character of the boxwallah.  Outside of India, boxwallahs are relatively unknown, 
though their influence on the development of imperialism in the Indian subcontinent is 
wholly incommensurate with their obscurity.  The term refers to the commercial 
agents (first European and later Indian as well) who permeated the goods, 
technologies, and practices of Western capitalism throughout the subcontinent.5  In 
this chapter, I want to cite the boxwallah as a character typically found in colonialist 
trading zones.  He is the consummate commercializer who manufactures the center’s 
rationalizing mission on the ground, though only by adopting and adapting the local 
practices, language, and beliefs of those who are being “rationalized.” 
As such, the boxwallah is a mediator, an agent caught between, yet also 
profiting from, different players in the trading zone.6  In the Raj, as in India today, the 
commercial boxwallah often lags in status behind the ostensibly more learned 
bureaucrat.  Yet, as George Orwell pointed out, the boxwallah’s wares can spread 
influence more effectively than the bureaucrat’s edicts: 
 
[Kipling] never had any grasp of the economic forces underlying imperial 
expansion.  It is notable that Kipling does not seem to realize, any more than 
the average soldier or colonial administrator, that an empire is primarily a 
money-making concern....  His outlook, allowing for the fact that after all he 
was an artist, was that of the salaried bureaucrat who despises the “box-
wallah” and often lives a lifetime without realizing that the “box-wallah” calls 
the tune. (Orwell 1946) 
                                                 
5 Naipaul (1991) contains some interesting, if polemical, descriptions of modern boxwallahs.  Also, 
Kaushik Basu uses the character of the boxwallah (much as I do) in examining government/industry 
relations in India today (Basu, et al. 1997). 
6 Mediators and “boundary shifters” are becoming an important site for SCOT.  See Boczkowski 
(2004); Kline (2000b); the final chapter of Pinch and Trocco (2002), and the essays in Oudshoorn and 
Pinch (2003). 
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Similarly, in science, commercializers of instruments often lag in status behind 
research elites.  Certainly, in the case of probe microscopy, STMers at the most 
prestigious national and corporate labs were often skeptical of the motives and the 
practices of microscope manufacturers. 
 
IBM had lots of early shots at [commercializing the STM and AFM] and 
dropped it.  The hilarious thing is when you actually go to academic meetings 
you can just feel it.  We walked into a hotel bar in Hamburg for one meeting, 
the IBM guys were sitting there like Christoph Gerber ... [and] Heini Rohrer ... 
and they always give Virgil [Elings, founder of Digital Instruments] shit, he 
comes in the bar and they’re like “where are the moneybags?”  <laughs> The 
truth is, it hurts those guys.  They did all the basic research and then they 
dropped it, they could’ve had the optical lever patent but they were so 
disconnected that Meyer and Amir actually published that paper in ’88 and 
then they filed the patent over a year later. [JC2, 3/20/01] 
Moreover, manufacturers’ perceptions of, and resistance to, these elite attitudes often 
structured the way they designed and marketed microscopes, especially at Santa 
Barbara.  Thus, being this kind of mediator in an instrumental community can drive 
creativity, but it can also lead to difficult choices and ambiguous identities.  In the case 
of commercializing STM and AFM, this quandary – what I will call the “boxwallah’s 
dilemma” – was twofold.  First, probe microscope manufacturers sought to rationalize, 
standardize, and re-engineer home-built microscopes as commercial products; yet they 
continually found they needed to return to the academic builder groups’ bricolage and 
anarchy in order to improve their products.  Second, most manufacturers found they 
needed to strongly differentiate themselves from their customers to enable users to 
justify buying rather than building their microscopes.  Customers needed to be 
convinced that manufacturers had special expertise and a distinct culture of innovation 
that allowed them to market much more sophisticated microscopes than users could 
ever build themselves.  Yet the manufacturers also found they needed to strongly 
resemble their customers in order gain credibility with (and appropriate innovations 
from) their users.  Users needed to be convinced that the manufacturers understood 
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users’ practices and communities, and could properly make the instruments speak to 
their concerns; often, to persuade users of this, manufacturers had to actually engage 
in the kinds of research being done by their customers.  Different manufacturers faced 
this dilemma to different degrees, and engaged it in different ways.  Yet none could 
completely avoid the problems inherent in the boxwallah’s dilemma. 
Facilitating Factors 
 The first STMs seemed unlikely candidates for commercialization.  They were 
cumbersome, expensive, slow, unreliable, and took intense training to operate.  IBM, 
though, was always interested in growing a large STM community, and one aspect of 
that desire was the attempt to make the microscopes more friendly – more standard, 
more reliable, faster.  Big Blue instituted the first in-house proto-commercializations 
of the STM with Othmar Marti’s Blue Box and the Demuth group’s CSS instrument.  
With the advent of the tube scanner, air operation, and mastery of vibration isolation, 
researchers outside the corporate labs began to see that it would take fewer resources 
and less time to mass-produce an STM.  Also, these changes in microscope design 
coincided with the emergence of an STM community, thereby providing a potential 
manufacturer with a ready supply of people to buy and use the instruments, and a pool 
of people to design and build them.  Finally, the awarding of Binnig and Rohrer’s 
Nobel Prize in 1986 brought enormous publicity for the tunneling microscope, and 
validation that the community had accrued enough expertise and finesse with the 
instrument that becoming an STMer no longer presented much of a risk. 
Thus, this was the era when the first STM manufacturers emerged, associated 
not with the corporate labs, but with the West Coast academic groups.  Several aspects 
of Quate and Hansma (and Baldeschwieler and Lindsay) group culture naturalized this 
leap to commercialization.  Above all, since these groups styled themselves as 
instrument-building groups, they trained their students to design and make more 
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microscopes than they could use – there were always several operating at once, none 
of which lasted very long since an instrument had little value once a student had 
shown he or she had mastered a new design innovation and could make the instrument 
work reliably.  Microscopes were, in a sense, disposable; as a Hansma maxim put it, 
“one microscope, one journal article, and move on” [SG1, 3/27/01]. 
 When left to their own devices, the instrument builders used this surplus of 
microscopes to conduct random, playful, undisciplined experiments.  Soon, though, by 
choice and necessity, they made these microscopes available to postdocs and other 
visitors.  With these visitors, the academic groups took on a more interdisciplinary 
character.  As the visitors left, they took the microscopes with them, spreading them to 
new locales and disciplines.  Thus, the academic groups were already bartering 
microscopes for knowledge and credibility and cultivating demand for their wares.  
Interdisciplinarity also led to a strongly felt division of labor, with “builders” making 
microscopes and “runners” forging new applications [JH1, 6/10/02].  This created a 
fairly efficient (even factory-like) turnaround in moving new microscopes from 
design, to construction, to use in characterizing new samples [MK1, 10/12/01].  
Through collaborations, the academic groups built a large network of contacts, with 
whom they circulated people, materials, designs, methods, and preprints.  That is, they 
constructed a vibrant, fast-moving “gift economy,” of the sort Davis Baird has cited as 
a precursor of scientific commercialization (Baird 1997).  For instance, Stuart Lindsay 
and others who built microscopes with digital controllers repackaged their control 
software and either gave it or sold it cheaply to fellow builders [SL1, 1/6/03]; 
likewise, the Quate group was well known for circulating its microfabricated 
cantilevers as a way to help new AFM builders [CP1, 3/19/01].  These donation 
networks both grew the community of builders and enhanced the donors’ prestige 
within that community.  Circulation and gifting spread knowledge, skills, and 
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instrumental reliability, and made more likely the future transmission of (and desire 
for) more skills, knowledge, and reliability. 
 One last factor facilitated commercialization of STM and AFM from the West 
Coast academic groups – place.  It mattered that Quate, Hansma, Baldeschwieler were 
all in California, although it mattered differently at either end of the state.  In Palo 
Alto, the Quate group had always been well-integrated into the research life of Silicon 
Valley.  Quate’s career was closely tied to the pioneers of the Valley (Frederick 
Terman, Edward Ginzton, and the Varian brothers); his research interests moved 
smoothly from the first wave of Silicon Valley industrialization (microwave 
technology) to the second (non-destructive testing for the microelectronics industry); 
and many former students were embedded in the Valley’s big firms (such as IBM).7  
In the ’80s, as the Silicon Valley “phenomenon” emerged, the Quate group 
increasingly harmonized with a nascent (and somewhat stylized) Silicon Valley 
“culture” (Hall and Markusen 1985; Saxenian 1993).  That is, Quate team members 
easily characterize their lives as woven into “traditional” Silicon Valley values: the 
“centrality of work,” “positive feeling towards work as the opportunity for 
innovation,” “entrepreneurialism,” competition, individualism, and a tendency to work 
hard and play hard (Castells and Hall 1994, 21-4).  Commercialization of almost 
anything, but especially high-tech instrumentation, had a long history at Stanford, and 
the Quate group saw itself as part of that history.8
 Commercialization at UC Santa Barbara and Caltech, on the other hand, was 
stimulated by the vast Los Angeles military-industrial zone.  For some students, the 
                                                 
7 Bill Leslie (1993) nicely narrates these transitions and the role of the commercialization of academic 
science in the development of the Valley. 
8 Lenoir and Lecuyer (1997) is an especially well-documented study of one such case that bears many 
similarities to the commercialization of probe microscopy. 
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nearby defense industries offered a place to work after graduation, and a chance to 
hone technical skills before starting companies of their own: 
 
[After my postdoc at Caltech] I took a job at this aerospace company called 
Aerojet Electrosystems.  Surface science lab doing surface science.  I was 
looking at materials for infrared detectors.  XPS, Auger, that kind of alphabet 
soup.  That was starting the buildup of Star Wars and there was a lot of money 
flowing into the aerospace companies and, I wasn’t really happy there, it 
wasn’t really appealing to me.  So I didn’t stay there very long….  I started a 
company in my apartment, and the idea was to make little piezoelectric 
translators to go in vacuum chambers.  That’s something where we thought 
there was a real customer need.  I did that, I spent all of my money.  After I ran 
out of money I went back, started talking to Baldeschwieler because I knew he 
was well connected with the money, and so we decided to start a company, and 
that was called Quanscan. [PW2, 3/30/01] 
Often, the aerospace sector acted as a negative stimulus.  Its presence made Santa 
Barbara-Los Angeles a high-tech haven, yet few of the Baldeschwieler or Hansma 
people imagined themselves working permanently in the defense industry.  One 
veteraon of this era describes the employee pool of Digital Instruments, the Santa 
Barbara-based STM and AFM manufacturer: 
 
[Virgil Elings] was a professor at UCSB when he started Digital Instruments. 
There was a severe economic downturn in Santa Barbara county due to the 
Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and a general recession in the 
military/industrial complex.  Since Santa Barbara, postcards and red-tile roofs 
aside, was a military/industrial complex town there were all these very bright 
people coming out of defense layoffs and graduating from UCSB that were 
hungry for work, and he gave us jobs.  He gave us something intellectually 
engaging to do that we could be excited about that wasn’t the military.  For 
many, it’s tedious to go to work on weapons and build thing you hope no one 
will ever use. After a point, you’re just not particularly proud of it.  So he was 
able to pick and choose among these defense refugees, if you will, primarily 
from Hughes Aircraft and Delco and the UCSB graduates that would’ve fed 
into those places, and assemble a great talent pool. [JW1, 10/18/01] 
Though many SPMers rejected the aerospace jobs they could have found in LA or 
Santa Barbara, they also valued the lifestyle of these communities.  Indeed, in 
becoming refugees at the microscope manufacturing startups, many scientists and 
engineers crafted their lives to fit with what they thought those locales, and their new 
enterprise, symbolized: 
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I had a lot of energy, I was young.  It’s ... the high-tech startup myth....  Ten, 
twelve people in the company,... there’s this new potential, new energy....  One 
of the reasons I came down here was so I could run on the beach and wouldn’t 
always have to wear shoes.  I used to run on the beach every other day six 
miles right out from the university west to Coal Oil Point and back.  Just that 
spirit, being in the sun and you know being able to go to the beach for two 
hours in the middle of the day and feel good and take a shower and come back.  
Just that energy, it not being a traditional engineering, conservative 
environment.  That’s what I needed in order to thrive.  It was spun off from the 
university in kind of a rebel spirit, kind of a classic ‘Rebel Without a Cause’ 
type spirit on all of our part. [JM3, 10/18/01] 
The Early Days 
 The first STM “start-up” came out of the Quate group in 1986.  Doug Smith 
was in the waning days of his graduate work, with the eventual prospect of joining 
Binnig as a postdoc in the IBM enclave in Munich.  He had had a checkered graduate 
career (recall the tempest over his vibrational spectroscopy results from Chapter Five), 
but had built a wide variety of STMs (and even AFMs), and had cultivated contacts 
across the STM community.  This first STM commercialization was of a piece with 
the bricolage and hobbyism of the builder groups.  Smith’s STMs were not mass-
produced, standardized microscopes, but rather hastily handmade kits, built in a 
garage and sold to a few of Smith’s contacts who seemed to have the skill but not the 
time to build one themselves. 
 
CM: Tell me a bit about Doug Smith’s STM company? 
MK: The Tunneling Microscope Company.  Doug had come up with this really 
cheap way to make microscopes in air and this one guy in the navy wanted that 
microscope, so Doug said “well, for $5000 I’ll make you the head.”  He 
needed some tips so I made them, plus some of the wiring for the electronics 
for the microscope.  That was just my second year.  He sort of did this thing at 
night and sold maybeva dozen of these things.  Basically Dr. Quate said, I 
remember this line, “graduate students work, eat, and sleep, and most of the 
time they go hungry.”  You can’t have a company and be a graduate student at 
the same time.  So Doug had to finish up and move out. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
Interestingly, like users of the Demuth STM, users of Smith’s STM expected to have 
to tinker with it and adapt its design for their needs.  The Smith STM was more of a 
kit than a black box.  One of Smith’s customers, John Foster at IBM Almaden, 
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remembers having to build much of the instrument himself to get it to do what he 
wanted it to do. 
 
JF: It was the most elegant and simple little device that Doug, and I suspect a 
few of his cohorts at Stanford, had engineered.... 
CM: By the way, were you doing all this with electronics that Doug Smith had 
provided with the STM or did you build new stuff? 
JF: No.  I got the pre-amplifier from him but, no, the electronics – actually, this 
is an interesting point, that’s a good question.  No is the answer, I just got the 
object, the STM itself from him, which is literally just a bunch of plates, I 
think it’s $5,000 for the stuff....  But then to drive such a thing, the electronics 
to do that, I mean I had also been a scanning probe microscopist myself so I 
understood how it worked extremely well.  I mean you just go get a rack of 
electronics and just buy little bits and pieces, an HP thing here, an electronic 
thing there and you’re done.  The electronics for these things is ridiculously 
simple. [JF1, 10/19/01] 
 In Santa Barbara, meanwhile, a more serious venture was taking shape.  One of 
Hansma’s colleagues in the UCSB physics department, Virgil Elings, learned about 
STM from a visiting professor, Niko Garcia, a Spanish physicist who collaborated 
with the Zurich team, [VE, 3/20/01].  Elings had developed other instruments for the 
market, and he saw potential for a commercial STM.  Accordingly, he asked Paul 
Hansma to help him found a tunneling microscope company.  Hansma, though, was no 
more inclined than Quate to become directly involved in a startup company.  Instead, 
he agreed to help Elings design a prototype and consult on further collaborations.  
Thus, Elings’ STMs, from the start, had a UCSB look.  Elings, though, had begun to 
face the boxwallah’s dilemma.  On the one hand, he approached the native practices of 
the Hansma group and the STM community with intense skepticism, seeking to 
rationalize and discipline the bricolage of tricks, recipes, and “superstitions” they had 
accrued. 
 
CM: Had you seen a lot of other people’s machines at that point? 
VE: No, we never were people to go off and learn from other people.  If 
you’ve done a lot of that in life you’ll learn that it’s a waste of time.  Sorry, but 
that’s it.  Although we did borrow a microscope from Paul [Hansma], because 
we wanted to get something going.  We didn’t like it, so we redid his 
microscope.  We knew we wanted to make something commercially.  You 
can’t deal with this stuff that the people do in the lab that takes a graduate 
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student to operate and doesn’t work reliably.  So we changed a lot of that, put 
in some interesting things.  We debunked lots of rumors about the things and 
that was sort of fun. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
At the same time, Elings reproduced much of Hansma’s hobbyism and undisciplined 
activity in order to replicate the instrument: 
 
Scanning tunneling microscopes in particular are not terribly difficult to 
build....  Virgil decided he was going build one, and his excuse for building 
one was his son’s high school science fair.  So Virgil and his son built an STM.  
That was actually sort of the prototype for the Nanoscope I.  The display for it 
was a storage oscilloscope, it was very crude.  They entered it into the Santa 
Barbara high school science fair, and they won third prize out of three.  It was 
fully functional, they were actually able to demonstrate that they could see the 
atomic lattice of carbon atoms on graphite.  The reason they won third prize 
out of three is because the judges, who were all high school science teachers, 
unanimously said “everybody knows you can’t see atoms.” [MT1, 2/26/01] 
 Having constructed a prototype, and having seen that, by the mid ’80s, an STM 
was “not terribly difficult to build,” in 1987 Elings formed a company, Digital 
Instruments, to design, build, and sell more of them.  In doing so, he had two major 
advantages: experience with commercialization, and a nearby pool of people to join 
his company.  Both stemmed from his experience as a physics professor at UCSB.  In 
the ’70s, as UCSB sought to transform itself into a major center of high energy 
physics (the area in which Elings had been hired), Elings’ obstinacy and swagger 
brought him into conflict with his departmental peers.  UCSB dealt with this by 
sidelining him into what most of the faculty saw as an uninteresting, if lucrative, 
backwater – instrumentation. 
 
When Virgil was a young professor at UCSB, he had a bad boy reputation.  
According to him, he was never “with the academic program” and was a 
problem for his department.  I don’t know all details but he had a bit of a 
tenure struggle because people knew he was brilliant yet he wasn’t toeing the 
line in terms of producing papers and so on.  He had this odd notion that 
students ought to be trained for jobs, and thought that would be a good goal for 
the University.  So there was this Master’s in Scientific Instrumentation 
program that gave him something to do (and I’m guessing a place for the 
department to put him). It was an excuse to get master’s students into a physics 
program that had a complete lack of students during the anti-war and anti 
science years of the late ’60s and ’70s.  Also, UCSB Physics was not yet 
established as a major organization yet.  As we know, it is one of the best in 
the world now. So they had this program where they tried to rehabilitate (my 
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term) people who got degrees that were fairly useless for getting jobs, like 
biology.  I entered with a Masters in biochem, myself, and doubled my earning 
potential.  And that was a damn good thing because the Department could get 
their master’s degree fees, and we could get training that made us employable 
at high wages – win win. [JW1, 10/18/01] 
The Master’s of Scientific Instrumentation Program started out with a fairly orthodox 
pedagogy – teachers, lectures, labs, textbooks, final projects, etc.  Occasionally, 
though, UCSB professors would bring instrumentation needs to Elings, which he 
would turn over to a student as a final project.  Eventually, he saw that students who 
picked up these “real world” problems were learning the basics of instrument design 
much more quickly than those who sat through lectures or attended labs: 
 
This instrumentation program, we weren’t sure what it was going to be, but we 
thought that you gotta know about the physics of instrumentation, so we’ll 
have guys come in and talk about particle detectors and low temperatures, high 
vacuum, all those really important things in life that everybody should know 
about.  Of course, in the real world, these things weren’t important at all....  
We’ll have some nice labs and we’ll have lab write-ups that people can read 
and follow and not use their brain, this’ll really be good.  Well, we had an NSF 
grant, the equipment was slow in coming and we didn’t get the lab started on 
time, so some of the guys started doing real problems for chemists and 
biologists [on campus] who had some instrumentation problems....  When we 
got some of these “labs” of ours working it became really clear that the guys 
who were doing their own problems were learning so much faster than people 
reading instructions that it was pretty pathetic.  We decided also at some point 
that if you’re going to work on real problems you only have so much time in 
the day and we got rid of lectures. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
In this way, Elings, like Hansma, saw that making many educative mistakes can lead 
to efficient solutions more quickly than trying not to make mistakes: 
 
I did this instrumentation program 15 years, we probably did 150 projects for 
people around campus.  When we got to the end of every project, we realized 
that if you were going to do it over you wouldn’t do it the way you did it.  But 
the student isn’t going to do it over, so it’s a failure....  It’s not like solving this 
problem in which there’s one answer and okay you found the answer so that’s 
success....  I realized, “you dumb shit, you think that’s failure, and that’s life.  
You’ve done this enough times now to realize that you’re not going to get ‘the 
right answer....’  You keep thinking you can sit down and figure out a problem 
you haven’t done before and then start doing it and thinking that the answer 
ought to be what you thought at the beginning.”  It isn’t at all – it’s completely 
different!  You learn too much while you’re doing it.  So I said, “oh my god, 
we got to change.”  We have to change and do things in a way in which 
everybody realizes that the way they start out won’t be the way they end up. 
[VE1, 3/20/01] 
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This is the essence of what I mean by the boxwallah’s dilemma – the sometimes 
discombobulating understanding (audible in Elings’ exasperated speech) that 
instrument manufacturers’ rationalizing, standardizing, high-tech mission can best be 
achieved by resorting to the same chaotic, idiosyncratic, low-tech means they are 
trying to supplant. 
 For Elings, as for Hansma, this understanding was based in a particular view of 
the relationship between tacit and formal knowledge.  His experience running the 
instrumentation program showed Elings that formal knowledge – i.e. classroom or 
textbook knowledge – counts very little in building an instrument.  Instead, know-how 
and Polanyi-esque “personal knowledge” are key (Polanyi 1967).  To Elings, 
conventional wisdom and orthodox educational training both seem irrelevant.  His 
students and employees might use formal knowledge – equations, constants, textbook 
formulations – but the key was picking up these useful scraps quickly, individually, 
and informally, using raw intelligence rather than disciplined pedagogy: 
 
We had our smart guys.  Smart guys are where it’s at.  We had this philosophy 
that you can’t know what you’re doing.  I tried to permeate that through the 
business.  People say “well, don’t try that because I know that won’t work.”  
We don’t put up with that crap....  In fact the university engineering department 
asked me one time in some condescending way, “now what courses could we 
have that would be useful for industry?”  As a joke I always wanted to say 
“could you teach them how to put a nut on a bolt?”  Because that’s what they 
think we do in industry.  No, I said “why don’t you have a course called 
Inventing?”  They said “oh yeah, what would that be?”  I said, “well you guys 
do these goofy courses where every problem has one answer and I’ll memorize 
the answer and everything’s fine.  Why don’t you do a thing where each 
student has to bring in a problem, I don’t care if it’s a problem we can solve or 
not, but somehow he’s got to come up with an invention to solve this thing.”  
And of course they asked the really important question “how do we grade the 
students?” [VE1, 3/20/01] 
For Elings, educational pedigree mattered little.  If ability in making instruments came 
from doing, rather than from formal training, then one degree was as good as another:9
                                                 
9 There is now a large literature on “learning by doing” in economics; see Mowery and Rosenberg 
(1999) for the latest word.  I have found the “communities of practice” literature in sociology useful in 
thinking about how learning and doing mutually evolve: Wenger (1998); Lave and Wenger (1991). 
 
 271
 
At some point we started to let in people from outside of physics and brought 
in engineers, biologists, chemists, a guy out of psychology who was our best 
designer at DI.  So you let these guys in to do instrumentation....  It became 
clear that the last four years of your life [in college] didn’t make any 
difference.  All the subject matter [you learned] didn’t make any difference.  A 
smart biologist on a particular problem can learn what you know in a couple 
weeks in order to do this problem....  Academia spends all this time doing 
course content crap.  It turns out course content isn’t important.  I can’t 
remember anywhere inside DI where we were solving problems in which we 
relied on course content that somebody had in order to figure anything out.  
We were relying on the brain to figure something out, not course content. 
[VE1, 3/20/01] 
This devaluing of formal education meant the professional backgrounds of Digital 
Instruments early employees were quite heterogeneous.  As we’ve seen, Elings’ son 
was his “lab assistant” in building his first STM, and many of the people who became 
DI’s leading designers joined as undergraduates at UCSB: 
 
I was just an undergrad studying electrical engineering at UCSB, and needed to 
pay my way through college, so I went to the job board and there was a little 
thing that says they were looking for somebody to solder circuit boards.  
Whatever, electrical engineering, I can do that....  So I go in there with my tie 
and suit on, and there’s Virgil flinging boogers left and right because he likes 
to pick his nose, throw boogers at you.  “Job, sure, all right, don’t wear that 
stupid suit the next time you come....”  I started working on some of the 
designs and figuring how to make tips early on, and then gradually once I got 
my degree I got a job and I’ve just been there forever. [DB2, 3/23/01] 
Still other key employees were people who simply wanted to live in Santa Barbara: 
 
Actually I have a degree in history and I was a graduate at UCSB and was 
running a bookstore when I graduated, and figured I’d go into publishing....  
One of my coworkers knew this ex-professor from UCSB who had this little 
shop that was making these things called scanning tunneling microscopes, so I 
went to the library and looked it up and it looked kind of interesting, so I went 
down and applied for a job and they told me to get lost, so I went back a week 
later and applied for a job, Virgil told me to get lost, went back a week later 
and he said “anhh, all right.” ...  Obviously at the time nobody knew that it was 
going to be as successful as it ended up being.  It was just a collection of pretty 
strange people, building this thing that was used by pretty strange people.  
Present company included.  It was kind of a garage shop operation.  It had 
actually started out in a dentist’s office.  When I joined they had recently 
moved to what was an old bank building.  So it was what I assume to be a 
fairly typical high-tech startup. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
The most important early source of employees was the instrumentation program; 
there, too, students came from all kinds of educational backgrounds: 
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My background was in humanistic psychology and Eastern mysticism, that 
was undergraduate, but as a kid I was kind of a little laboratory rat.  So ... I 
kind of came back into science and got a master’s degree in scientific 
instrumentation at UCSB....  It was a very independent program.  I liked it.  
The university eventually phased it out because it was less theoretical physics 
and they wanted more of that.  But it was a very practical program....  Most 
people had one big project which was their thesis, and I did also.  I did some 
biomedical stuff and also a wind energy data logging system for use in Inner 
Mongolia, it was solar-powered....  So when I got out after three years in the 
master’s program, I went up to northern California for a year, where I used to 
live, and then decided that I had a good thing going in Santa Barbara after all, 
and so gave Virgil Elings a call.  He had already started Digital Instruments. 
[JM3, 10/18/01] 
 DI was not Elings’ first commercialization effort.  The instrumentation 
program not only supplied him with engineering talent, but also designs and 
prototypes for potentially marketable products, several of which he tried to capitalize 
on.  Elings viewed management skill as similar to instrument-building skill – 
dependent on tacit rather than formal knowledge, something to be learned by doing, 
something not marked by possession of an academic degree such as an MBA.  
Notably, his earlier commercialization attempts came to be seen as educative mistakes. 
 
He had had previous experience with other business ventures.  I don’t know if 
you’ve ever seen the optical illusion that’s two parabolic mirrors....  That was 
actually discovered by a graduate student at UCSB....  Well Virgil patented 
that and decided to produce them.  But he couldn’t make any money because 
he wanted to make them out of such good mirrors that of course they were 
ridiculously expensive....  The next venture was ... a company called Particle 
Sizing Systems, which basically took some existing technology and improved 
it through sensors and better software....  Virgil didn’t find it particularly 
technically interesting, I mean once you build the thing there’s not really huge 
improvements that you can do....  Third venture was a fluoroscope....  It would 
measure blood oxygen levels.  That was a frustrating experience for Virgil 
because that was the first time that he was really dealing with non-scientists, he 
was dealing in fact with MDs.  He just couldn’t handle their mindset, because 
he’d bring his fluoroscope in, which was much more repeatable and much 
more accurate than the existing models, and ... the doctor’d say, “oh, but the 
output doesn’t match what I’m getting from the existing device.”  He’d say 
“well, that’s because your existing device is not accurate or it’s not repeatable.  
Look at the lack of repeatability in the measurements that you’re currently 
making,” and the doctor would say “yeah, but it doesn’t match what I’m 
currently getting.”  So Virgil would basically just lose it. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
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 The centerpiece of the DI team was Elings’ star pupil from the instrumentation 
program, John “Gus” Gurley.  Technically, Gurley was a co-founder of DI, meaning 
he and Elings were the only employees to split the profits.  Early on, DI had no 
venture capital money and all expenses came out of Elings’ pocket; and Elings banked 
much of the early success of the company on Gurley’s talent and drive. 
 
Gus was his best student probably and a very talented digital designer and 
software engineer.  When the business started Gus was actually up in the Bay 
area working on flight simulation systems for the military....  The deal was that 
Virgil would bankroll the project and Gus would basically contribute a year of 
his life to getting this thing working, ...  Anyway, Gus had been working in 
some dark hole someplace for a year of his life, literally you’d walk in in the 
morning and Gus would already be there and you’d leave at night and Gus 
would still be there and you wouldn’t see him at all in between, he would just 
be holed up in this place working on the Nanoscope II. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
Together, Elings and Gurley formulated a design philosophy that, again, drew on 
lessons from the instrumentation program.  If, as Elings believed, all technical projects 
achieve their final form circuitously, through mistakes, serendipities, and culs-de-sac 
(where the most successful projects acknowledge and capitalize on mistake-making), 
then DI should be prepared to be surprised by new applications, innovations, and 
reinterpretations of what an STM was and how it worked.  Just as a good instrument-
builder picked up new skills quickly, with little formal training, so a good commercial 
STM would adapt to new applications quickly via a flexible architecture. 
 The key to this flexibility was powerful software and state of the art 
microprocessors.  That is, Digital Instruments’ STM would be a digital instrument – a 
radical advance in an era when the IBM PC was only five years old. 
 
When you make a new instrument you actually don’t know what the “best” 
solution looks like.  So therefore we learned that if you’re going to do a 
solution you have to be flexible, so when one day you wake up and figure out 
what the hell it is you’re doing, you can actually do something without saying 
“oh, it’s too late, I already got the circuit boards done.”  So we decided it all 
had to be digital so that when we figured out what these things did we’d in fact 
be able to change the programming and make it do it right....  As a great 
instrumentation program operator I would always say “I don’t really care what 
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your problem is, I know what the solution looks like – input, microprocessor, 
output.” [VE1, 3/20/01] 
Elings knew that having the first mass-marketed commercial STM would be a 
powerful advantage over DI’s competitors.  An early opportunity to do so presented 
itself at the 1987 STM meeting in Oxnard (just 40 miles south of Santa Barbara).  
Gurley’s digital controller, though, was still in development.  Instead, Elings pressed 
his analog prototype (the modified Hansma design from the science fair) into service.  
This instrument, the Nanoscope I, was, by most accounts, a solid and reliable but 
fairly unsophisticated air STM.  Though more complex than Doug Smith’s STM, the 
Nanoscope I was still considered (by both designers and users) not quite adequate for 
“real” science unless tinkered with by the user. 
 
In the beginning I called it the toy business.  There was no use for a scanning 
tunneling microscope, other than to show your friends that you could scan 
graphite atoms....  So what we were doing was supplying instruments to people 
who were going to make them themselves, our claim being that we could do it 
cheaper and better....  For us it was sort of lucky because later STM arrived at a 
decent place, and that was you got something out of it.  As opposed to the toy 
business, where you were making things that had no use.  I’m telling you they 
had no use....  As long as there’s nothing new that people see with these things, 
I don’t know exactly what we’re doing.  I remember some gal at Los Alamos 
saw spiral grains in these low temperature superconductors, that was the first 
time to me anyway that somebody using one of these things saw something 
they didn’t know was already there.  To me that was the end of the toy 
business. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
The “toy business,” for what it was, was quite successful.  This was the era of 
the air STM gold rush, when the STM community was expanding rapidly and the 
community had yet to conclude what could or could not be done with an air STM.  
Recall from Chapter Six that in 1990, DI estimated around 600 STMs in the world, 
more than half of them its own.  At the time, DI had a near-monopoly on commercial 
instruments, but Elings knew his “toys” would soon be eclipsed by the nascent 
startups in Berkeley, Phoenix, Pasadena, and Palo Alto.  The first step out of the toy 
business, therefore, was Gus Gurley’s completion of an all-digital controller, marketed 
as the Nanoscope II in 1988.  Digital control meant a less cluttered, somewhat more 
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flexible, more user-friendly interface.  Notably, the controller’s software offered DI 
greater flexibility; adapting the controller for new applications now meant changing a 
few lines of code rather than rewiring the instrument’s electronics. 
It’s possible to see what digital control meant by looking at the transition from 
analog, home-built instruments to the Nanoscope II.  By the late ’80s, home-built 
analog STMs and AFMs had become both sophisticated and massively complicated.  
Racks and racks of electronics, with knobs and dials and switches, allowed trained 
users virtuosic control over tip movement and other parameters – at one point, the 
Hansma group’s AFMs had 120 different knobs, switches and other controls, giving 
their users an extraordinary range of control [BD2, 10/18/01].  Yet having that many 
controls could also impede research if the user became hopelessly entangled in the 
analog jungle. 
 
I wasn’t easily weaned off of the homemade instruments because I had become 
stubbornly attached to them and it took quite a bit of prying to get me to switch 
over.  Once I did switch to the commercial instruments we found them to have 
a higher throughput in it was easier to use and just as good.  So the commercial 
companies had sort of streamlined, made it easier for the users to spend less 
time fussing with the instrument and more time analyzing data and taking 
data….  I had learned the technology at a lower level and whatever the higher 
level changes that occurred in going from a low level homemade instrument to 
a higher level commercial instrument weren’t much of a transition….  Life 
became easier with the commercial instruments which I suppose is what you 
would expect.  Digital Instruments, you can tell just by their name – I was 
using analog equipment, purely analog equipment and so lots of knobs and 
oscilloscopes and stuff like that and that all got packaged into something that 
looked like a computer and so it did make life easier.  Sure, there were still 
groups in the world that, that would only work with homemade instruments 
and that’s true to this day.  But there’s probably several thousand commercial 
systems in the field now. [MA1, 10/12/01] 
 Thus, by eliminating many of the knobs and switches, and automating their 
functionalities, digital control made it easier and less time-consuming to learn to use 
an STM or AFM.  For a small elite of avant-garde probe microscopists, though, digital 
control is seen as ceding subtle, sophisticated operation.  DI assumed most users 
preferred spending less time learning to use their microscopes and would not object to 
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automation.  By making this assumption, though, Digital gave itself the leeway to 
build extremely opaque black-boxes where most of the details of operation were 
hidden from the user, and where users were highly constrained in their ability to tinker 
with the microscope.  In other words, digital control was a disciplining tool that 
allowed DI to enforce particular kinds of behavior on its customers.  This was central 
to one-half of DI’s solution to the boxwallah’s dilemma.  By making instruments to 
which users had little interior access, DI heightened the epistemic and cultural 
differences between its engineers and its customers – a tactic aimed at making it easier 
to sell to subdisciplines with little instrument-building tradition. 
STM to AFM 
 The end of the “toy business” also brought a tightening of the bonds between 
DI and the Hansma group.  Early on, relations with UCSB had often been distant and 
occasionally even strained.  Several factors contributed to awkwardness: Elings had a 
precarious reputation in the UCSB physics department; the Hansma group had no 
tradition of commercialization, so relations with the startup were initially without 
precedent; and, Hansma had moved on from STM to AFM.  For years, Hansma tried 
to convince DI to commercialize the UCSB AFM design, but Elings resisted so long 
as the group’s AFMs bore too many marks of unreliable, student-built bricolage. 
 
At first, when Digital Instruments was just Virgil and a few people, we would 
invite him over whenever we had something new.  We went through seven 
tunneling AFMs that worked in the hands of students, but he wasn’t tempted to 
commercialize them yet.  He said, in effect, “If I come into a lab and 
somebody shows me great results they got recently, that’s one thing.  But if I 
can come in a lab and see an AFM running and getting good research results 
while I’m in the lab, then I’ll see something that can realistically be 
commercialized.”  When he came in the lab and saw it working well while he 
was there, he realized that this might be a commercial product. [PH1, 3/19/01 
 Elings remained, as usual, intensely skeptical about the AFM.  After all, it had 
lower resolution than the STM, used a more complicated detection scheme, and had a 
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reputation as a difficult instrument.10  Demand for AFM seemed to be growing, 
though, so he assigned an engineer, James Massie, to work with Barney Drake to 
commercialize the Hansma instrument.  As Drake describes it, commercializing the 
Hansma AFM was a difficult process; instruments made by graduate students for a 
leading AFM lab could afford to have idiosyncracies, small unreliabilities, and a 
tendency to break apart [BD2, 10/18/01; JM3, 10/18/01].  After all, one of the 
pedagogical methods of the Hansma group was to have students rebuild broken 
microscopes so they could understand the instrument’s working better.  DI believed, 
though, that a commercial AFM should be more rugged – they didn’t want users to be 
continually breaking it and sending it to California for repairs – and more user-friendly 
– users should be able to understand what the controls do without having to go 
through the process of building the instrument themselves. 
With the decision to develop a commercial AFM, DI and the Hansma lab 
forged a licensing agreement giving DI rights to the AFM patents, in return for fees 
and a stream of DI products to UCSB [PH1, 3/19/01; VE1, 3/20/01].  Eventually, this 
agreement made the Hansma patents some of the most profitable in the history of the 
University of California; it also made the Hansma group prosperous in equipment, 
helping secure its elite position in the probe microscopy community.  Also, the 
agreement blurred the boundaries between DI and the Hansma lab.  Hansma’s students 
migrated to DI in greater numbers, Hansma and DI personnel consulted more 
frequently, visitors to Santa Barbara could see cutting edge science done with DI 
instruments in the Hansma lab, and the circulation of knowledge, people, specimens, 
and equipment that typified the Quate and Hansma groups expanded to include DI as 
                                                 
10 Recall from Chapter Five that modern AFMs use a complicated optical lever scheme that require 
significantly more manual operator adjustment than a typical air STM (although less than the older 
STM-detection AFMs). 
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well.  This story from a Hansma postdoc gives the flavor of these quick and informal 
interactions in the early ’90s. 
 
We’d go down there and just do stuff at DI.  Once Jason and I were working 
on a calibration method for the cantilevers, and we needed to get a collection 
of cantilevers.  So we went down and there was a place where they put 
cantilevers that had been returned or had minor defects or whatever, it’s like a 
table just full of these things.  What we really needed were cantilevers that had 
slightly different thicknesses for this calibration.  So we went down there and 
we just sat there and we broke out cantilevers from 20 different wafers, which 
you would never be able to do anywhere else....  You’d go down and you could 
talk to the people doing all the development.  I remember having many 
discussions with Gus Gurley about “well, software should do this, software 
should do that” and things like that.  Some things they did and some things 
they didn’t.  There are things in there now that I remember I specifically 
suggested to them.  But it still had very much of a startup flavor to it, even if it 
might have had 50, 60 people. [JH1, 6/10/02] 
 Hansma and Elings and are astonishingly different people – Hansma projects 
openness and generosity, Elings irascibility, contrariness, and skepticism.  Yet they 
built organizations that, after the AFM agreement, meshed in a dynamic and 
productive (if also difficult) way.  For Hansma students who moved to DI after 
graduation, the transition could be jarring; but there was much in the DI “way” that 
resonated with the Hansma group’s methods [CP1, 3/19/01; JC1, 3/20/01].  Elings and 
Hansma might have treated their underlings quite differently, but they both peppered 
their conversations with guiding maxims and proverbs (“do everything as poorly as 
you can” or “you can’t know what you’re doing”), both structured their organizations 
around the primacy of tacit knowledge, and both drew on personnel of diverse 
educational backgrounds; thus, with practice, Hansma veterans could easily apply the 
lessons and the work ethic of graduate school to their jobs at DI. 
 Importantly, both men encouraged off-task, extra-experimental activity to 
stimulate tacit skills.  In the Hansma group this meant self-cultivation: hobbies, sports, 
travel, meditation.  At DI, employees congregated for weekly “inventing sessions,” 
brainstorming technical problems unrelated to probe microscopy: 
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One of the important things is to have no structure, so that there’s nobody who 
can say “let’s do it my way because by the way, I’m the boss, if you don’t do it 
my way I’ll fire your ass....”  It’s interesting in the company, once you start 
churning away and everyone’s busy there’s no time for inventing.  So we used 
to hold these inventing sessions once a week.  We’d do it for an hour and we’d 
just bring up random stuff and do inventing because everybody’s too busy 
during the week to even think about stuff.  What was sort of interesting after a 
while is that if Elings was sitting back there and I didn’t say “that’s the worst 
shit I ever saw” they would feel bad because it meant I wasn’t even interested.  
So it’s interesting.  Now I thought, strangely enough, it didn’t matter what the 
subject matter was, that I was teaching these guys inventing. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
Through hobbies or inventing sessions, people at both DI and UCSB accrued tacit 
skills, and applied those skills in offbeat ways.  At both UCSB and DI, this led to 
playful uses of the microscopes, and undisciplined methods of sample preparation: 
 
We didn’t do a lot of applications and we never have.  Our idea was to supply 
instruments.  Sort of like the instrumentation program.  We educated students 
in making things that do something, all right.  But then to use the thing to do 
something, that’s somebody else’s job....  We had this weakness that every 
morning I would go in and run the damn microscope and get hooked on it, and 
so it wasn’t til about 2 o’clock in the afternoon I would start to try and do 
something real.  But we always cranked the scan down, try and see atoms on 
anything and we would be surprised.  Just a weakness I guess.  My son showed 
atoms on a gold surface in a junior high science fair before it was published by 
IBM. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
 
[Virgil Elings] can be a bit of a crusty guy, or rather put on the act that he’s a 
crusty guy.  It was quite a shock for me coming from Paul Hansma’s lab, 
because Paul’s very genial and friendly and when you had an accomplishment 
in Paul’s lab he would make it a point of shaking your hand and saying 
congratulations.  You could create gold out of the air or you could levitate 
something in front of Virgil’s hands ... and he would look at it and go “ah, 
that’s a piece of crap.”  So we brought him over to show him this AFM that we 
had been operating and of course he said “ah, looks like a piece of crap, what 
are you imaging there, looks like shit to me....”  Then he reached over and 
grabbed a Polaroid picture and got a pair of scissors and cut off a little piece of 
the Polaroid picture, said “IMAGE THIS.” <laughs>  I had the same mindset 
that the people at IBM had in the early days, that the things that you image 
should be atomically flat, precision surfaces, and the idea of taking a piece of 
paper and sticking it in was just crazy.  I was like “well, I don’t know if this’ll 
work” and he goes “TRY IT.  This is what our customers’ll do, they’ll put any 
kind of shit under there.”  As I got used to Virgil's style I realized that he 
needled and teased us to challenge us to do more than we though was possible. 
[CP1, 3/19/01] 
This last quote points to a picture of the customer at DI as someone who might do 
irrational, inexplicable things that good microscope designers should plan for (and 
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attempt to tame).  This stylized distinction between builders and users embodied DI’s 
way out of the “boxwallah’s dilemma,” in which customers and builders were 
assumed to live in very different cultural systems – though a few amenable customers 
might be “progressive” enough that they could be used to explain to their 
subdisciplines the proper way to use the instrument.11  Let us examine some 
consequences of this distinction between engineers and customers, as well as some 
alternatives offered by DI’s competitors. 
Youth and Exuberance at Park 
 So far, I have made my story about STM and AFM commercialization revolve 
around Digital Instruments.  There are good reasons for lavishing attention on DI 
before moving to the other startups.  First, DI is today, by a wide margin, the largest, 
most successful probe microscope manufacturer.  Understanding DI is vital to 
understanding the social contours of the probe microscopy field.  Second, the local 
methods and philosophies of Hansma and Elings present special nuances for science 
studies that are only echoed implicitly by other startups.  Finally, DI was the first 
major manufacturer of STMs and AFMs; later startups clearly had DI in mind as they 
crafted their design philosophy, self-presentation, organization, and user base.  Our 
examination of DI echoes similar analyses carried out by Digital’s competitors.  
Obviously, I risk whiggishness in placing so much emphasis on the company that is 
counted the most successful of its kind.  It is true that I have occasionally mentioned 
factors that I believe were ingredients in DI’s success.  In this and following sections, 
though, I will outline ways in which DI’s advantages could have turned into 
handicaps.  DI’s ultimate success was in no way guaranteed, though the field is littered 
with companies that tried to prove that point. 
                                                 
11 My thanks to Chris Henke for discussions about agricultural extension agents’ similar picture of a 
“progressive farmer” who will spread news about innovations to other farmers (Henke 2000). 
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The company that, early on, stood the best chance of overtaking DI was, 
unsurprisingly, associated with the Quate group.  In 1989, two former Stanford 
postdocs, Sung-Il Park and Sang-Il Park (no relation) formed their own probe 
microscope company, Park Scientific Instruments.  In many ways, Park and DI 
resembled each other, and this resemblance fueled competition between them.12  
Though Park and DI often did not compete directly for particular niches or individual 
customers, symbolically they saw themselves as vying for preeminence in the SPM 
community.  Differences between them, however, highlight much about the technical 
culture at each.  Park, for instance, started out closer to the Quate group than DI did to 
the Hansma group [MK1, 10/12/01; JN1, 6/28/01; BP1, 2/3/04].  Quate veterans 
founded Park, and other Stanford graduates funneled into the startup from the 
beginning, while Hansma graduates migrated to DI much later.  This meant that, 
Quate group designs moved to Park more or less intact, while Hansma’s designs were 
subjected to Elings’ critical gaze followed by much reengineering before Digital 
commercialized them. 
Also, the Parks, unlike Elings, had no experience running a company or 
commercializing instruments.  Park veterans often describe this inexperience by 
saying the Parks styled themselves as “gentlemen scientists,” i.e., they saw 
commercialization as a gentlemanly activity, to be performed with a sense of fair play, 
and with an orientation to “best science” rather than the fiscal bottom line [MK1, 
10/12/01; DB3, 4/3/01; JA1, 10/15/01].  As a result, Park was supposedly less shrewd 
in its negotiating and marketing than the more canny Elings.  There were, certainly, 
occasions when Park miscalculated the treachery of ordinary business. 
 
Virgil was a very aggressive salesman, he focused on the air products and had 
a good margin and did a really good job with very, very kind of vicious sales 
                                                 
12 I will follow general usage in the probe microscopy community and use “Park” to refer to the 
company rather than to either of the founders. 
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tactics.  It seemed vicious at the time....  [Tactics like] “well have them run this 
or have them run that,” or “their specs stink here” and “make sure, keep them 
honest” kind of things.  It was a negative sell, “this is what the competition 
does wrong.”  And then he exploited things like his patents.  “Well, look, if 
they do that they’ll be violating my patent” and telling customers that.  Which 
is a no-no actually.  Not supposed to do that. [Park Scientific executive] 
One important mis-step centered on the availability of AFM cantilevers.  The Quate 
group led the development of mass-produced, standardized, cheap, reliable cantilevers 
by taking advantage of the Palo Alto technoscientific network and adapting 
lithographic techniques used in the semiconductor industry.  The Stanford cantilevers 
soon became part of the pre-commercialization gift economy and circulated to UCSB, 
IBM Almaden, and elsewhere [TA1, 3/14/01; MT2, 10/15/01].  In this way, silicon 
(later, silicon nitride) cantilevers and tips became standard equipment for most AFM 
groups.  Yet the techniques for making these tips spread much more slowly than the 
tips themselves.  Park, as the Quate group’s commercial heir, had sole access to the 
cantilever-production technology and thus effectively controlled the distribution of the 
cantilevers. 
 Veterans of DI and Park believe, and I think it plausible, that Park could have 
edged out DI had they maintained a tighter grip on the cantilevers and the means of 
producing them.  By controlling a crucial AFM technology, they could have kept in 
front of Digital in AFM development; and, by selling cantilevers to their competitor, 
they could have made a tidy profit on every sale of a DI instrument.  Out of 
inexperience, though, Park let the cantilevers slip out of its fingers. 
 
We were the only company at the time to really make cantilevers.  It turns out 
to be very capital-intensive.  Big mistake on my part, we ended up selling them 
to Digital Instruments.  It was such an enabling technology that we probably 
could have beat them at AFMs had we not sold to them....  I was scared that 
you couldn’t restrict trade.  But it turns out you can.  You don’t have to sell, 
you can offer cantilevers exclusively to the customers that buy your 
microscope.  It’s perfectly legal.  But I didn’t seek adequate legal advice at the 
time, and also I was intimidated.  It was just stupid.  I thought we could make 
money selling these things, and it turns out that yeah, you can make 10%, we 
would do really well in that market, but the market on the AFM was 20 times 
more expensive.  If you could block them from selling that you turned off their 
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revenue stream.  So we did not have a well-defined strategy in that regard and 
really screwed up. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
 There was a subtler sense, though, in which business inexperience mattered for 
Park.  Unlike Elings, the Parks and their team had not dealt with instrument users as 
customers before.  Some had collaborated with potential users (surface scientists, 
materials scientists, etc.) in graduate school; but these had been more or less equal 
partnerships in knowledge production.  Elings’ experiences with customers (and with 
academic scientists) led him to think of most DI clients as irrational, unpredictable, 
and profoundly unlike DI’s microscope designers and builders.  Thus, DI’s 
instruments were designed with this image of the customer in mind.  The Park team, 
though, built up an idea of its customer base from scratch, and, like many in that 
situation, they used themselves as a template.13  Thus, Park’s instruments resembled 
microscopes people in academic builder groups (or their collaborators) would use.  
Compared to the DI instrument, Park’s was a little less user-friendly (in terms of 
amount of time to train and intelligibility of the interface), but, early on, had a more 
open architecture, could be tinkered with a little more easily, and looked more home-
made – the interface, for instance, could be made to resemble an analog oscilloscope 
much more readily than DI’s [DB3, 4/3/01].  Also, Park showed a willingness to make 
very small batches of specially modified microscopes (“one-offs”) if they thought the 
science or the engineering of the modifications was interesting; DI, from the start, had 
scorned one-offs as a fool’s game: 
 
We weren’t in the business of kissing people’s ass [by making custom 
modifications].  I’d waste the rest of my life.  No, come on, we had good stuff.  
There was nothing better.  We sold only standard instruments.  “Oh, you want 
a special instrument, I would suggest that you make sure you have a couple 
hundred thousand dollars in your wallet and then go build your own.”  One guy 
                                                 
13 That is, Park saw itself both as a producer of quality instruments for research communities, and as a 
consumer of “interesting” research and technical innovation.  This analysis resonates both with 
Dornfeld (1998) and Pinch and Trocco (2002), which also describe producers’ use of themselves as a 
template in imagining consumers.  My thanks to Christina Dunbar-Hester and Trevor Pinch for 
discussion on this point.   
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said “look, I could make an AFM for $25,000.”  I said “Wow!  You ought to 
go do that.  The last one we made cost us a million dollars to make.  I wish you 
luck.”  The development costs the same whether you’re going to make 50 or 
you’re going to make one.  So we’re not going to make one.  Never did.  Never 
did make any custom stuff. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
 
In terms of custom modifications, for particular customers, that was something 
that actually Virgil just philosophically didn’t want to get into.  He didn’t want 
to be a prototype house, he didn’t want to just do one-offs for people because if 
you do that, obviously your engineering efforts are very scattered.  You’re 
always working on this one little widget for this one little customer.  
Regardless of how much you can charge that one customer, you’re really never 
going to get rich that way.  Pretty much I think Virgil had a quite clear 
business model in his mind when he started the company.  He wanted to build 
general purpose instruments, not one-offs. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
As we will see here and in Chapter Seven, questions about who customers really were, 
and how to deal with customers who wanted to buy or build unusual modifications 
(and thus how open to make the instruments’ architecture) lay at the heart of the 
boxwallah’s dilemma, and so cropped up persistently in the commercialization of 
STM and AFM.  DI eventually dealt with these questions by orientalizing most 
customers, while securing close relationships with a few, elite SPM groups; Park, on 
the other hand, made the distinction less sharp both between itself and its users and 
among various users.14
Youth and Exuberance at DI 
When DI and Park started out, though, the differences between them were 
relatively slight.  At first DI, like Doug Smith’s Tunneling Microscope Company or 
Joe Demuth’s CSS STM project, built instruments for people who had the skill but not 
the time to build one themselves, so the sharp distinction between builders and 
customers was more blurry.  Even after the introduction of the Nanoscope II (which 
was not meant for people who would normally have built their own instruments, since 
                                                 
14 We will examine further DI’s relationship to elite groups in Chapter Seven.  One way to picture them, 
though, is as a kind of colonial elite.  On the one hand, they collaborate with DI’s projects and lend DI 
authority, thereby enabling the sale of microscopes within their communities; yet they are troublesome 
for DI in that they continually threaten to lead their communities off in new, uncommercialized 
directions, or even to start up their own, competing regimes of authority and commercialization.  See 
Prakash (1992) for a study of colonial elites and science. 
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Elings saw digital control as too sophisticated to be home-built), DI was still cognizant 
that its user base was early adopters who showed unusual initiative in buying an 
unproven commercial instrument.15  Thus, customer support was minimal; users were 
expected to take their microscopes and do what they could with them. 
 
MT: DI at that point had almost no marketing effort.  We really didn’t have to 
sell them to people very heavily.  People came to us because they wanted to do 
research. 
CM: How were people hearing about it? 
MT: Well, we put ads in magazines.  We had no salespeople.  Jerome 
[Wiedmann] was the closest we had to a sales guy and he never traveled.  He 
would go to a show occasionally, usually things that were fairly close by.  Or 
were in places that Jerome wanted to go, one or the other.  But we had no field 
sales people.  It was mail order STMs is what it was.  That sort of stemmed 
from Virgil’s earlier experience with his other companies, that a sales force ate 
up too much of the pie.  If you developed a large field sales force then you had 
people who didn’t know what they were talking about out there selling things 
that you couldn’t produce, and it was just going to ruin your reputation and 
cost you a lot of money at the same time.  At that point our marketing efforts 
were pretty much restricted to producing brochures and placing the occasional 
ad in Physics Today. 
CM: What were people at DI learning about how to transport and install and 
train people on these things? 
MT: We weren’t learning anything about it because we didn’t do it.  Literally, 
we put the things in the boxes, we put them on the Fedex truck, and we sent 
them to the customer.  Now, due to the simplicity of the design, the technical 
acumen of the early adopters, there’s a number of things that you can attribute 
it to, we didn’t need to install them.  The fact is that you could literally get this 
thing up and running – the record was a user at NIST who went from having 
the thing in boxes on the floor to having atoms on graphite in an hour and 
fifteen minutes.  So we didn’t install them. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
Even so, DI did a brisk business: 
 
CM: How many of the toy microscopes did you sell before it made that turn to 
something useful? 
VE: We started selling in the summer of our first year, sold a million dollars of 
them in the first year, and kept half a million profit.  We had put $50,000 into 
the business, so not bad to get that back in the first year....  I’m telling you, we 
ran an ad “An STM for  25 grand and atomic resolution.”  I could watch 
Physics Today get mailed across the country from the phone calls we got.  We 
got phone calls as this thing went across....  I think in our first month we 
recouped the 50 grand.  So after the first month of selling we were never in the 
                                                 
15 People throughout the SPM community use the language of “early” and “late” adopters routinely.  
Ironically enough, the diffusion of this sociological term into other fields is unclear, but it may come 
from Rogers (1983). 
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red again.  It was a fun business.  But after that the job was really to make it 
useful. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
It’s instructive for a moment to look at some of Digital’s early ads, since they 
give a taste of the startup’s home-grown culture.  DI advertised primarily in 
publications with a multi-field readership – Science, Nature, Physics Today, American 
Laboratory, and occasionally the Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology.  Many of 
the early ads are breathless (“nothing compares to the performance of a NanoScope II, 
nothing!  The proof is in images like these which have been obtained only with the 
NanoScope II”) and self-confident.  One well-remembered campaign, for instance, 
showed a Nanoscope sitting on a pile of copies of Science, on the covers of which are 
STM and AFM images made (presumably) with a DI instrument, with the tag line 
“When You Need To Do Science” or “We Have Science Covered” (see Figure 7-1).16
We can see these ads as an unpolished yet highly effective expression of the 
laboratory culture of DI and the Hansma group.  The advertisements emphasize many 
of these group’s guiding ideals: for example, a sense of playfulness, as well as the 
ability to image “found” objects, with little or no sample preparation (see Figure 7-2): 
 
“Atoms on the Surface of Table Salt (NaCl) 
fresh from the shaker at Digital Instruments 
A New Era in Microscopy 
Now both insulating and conducting samples can be imaged quickly and 
reliably with atomic resolution.  This scan of table salt is an example: one of 
our employees did it out of curiousity [sic]”17
Also, many ads were meant to enroll new disciplines (and to display credibility to ones 
already enrolled) – “The NanoScope II is constantly being made more powerful and 
easier to use, and it is opening new doors in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, Biology, 
Semiconductors, Optics and Material Science.” 
                                                 
16 For instance, Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology – A, 11.3, p. A7 or Physics Today, April 
1991, p. 21.  Most of these early ads were written by Jerome Wiedmann, one of Elings’ former master’s 
students – who, in keeping with the culture of tacit knowledge at DI, had little or no formal training in 
marketing though he was responsible for all of DI’s publicity. 
17 From Physics Today, September 1990, p. 100. 
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Technology A, 11.3, p. A7. 
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 Figure 7-2: Straight from the shaker.  An early advertisement for the Digital
Instruments Nanoscope AFM, showing some similarities between DI and the 
Hansma group.  From Physics Today, September 1990, p. 100.  
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 Many ads featured images referencing articles in other issues of the journals in 
which they appear.  The images in the ads, though, were often made by DI employees 
using samples provided by the authors of those articles, rather than the authors 
themselves.  In one ad this process is actually described (see Figure 7-3): 
 
This month’s image is an atomic resolution scan of a single crystal of Bi-Ca-
Sr-Cu-O superconductor.  The atoms form a rectangular lattice which is 45 
degrees with respect to a larger structure, reported by Kirk, et al, which has a 
period of 27 angstroms.  The image was taken at room temperature in air.  The 
sample was provided by D. Mitzi and A. Kapitulnik of Stanford University.  
The image was made, as are all of the Images of the Month, at Digital 
Instruments on the Nanoscope II.  This image was made by Kevin Kjoller.”18
Sometimes, samples were sent to DI by researchers wanting to know whether it was 
worth buying a Nanoscope; many ads suggest potential customers “call today to 
discuss this new technology and to arrange a scan of your sample at no charge.”  Other 
samples were sent in by researchers who had bought a Nanoscope, but could not get it 
to work on the materials in which they were interested.  These samples wound up in 
the hands of Kevin Kjoller or Matt Thompson or DI’s other proficient runners, who 
generated images that would then be sent back to the researchers, along with some 
explanation of what the image meant and how to operate the instrument to produce 
high resolution with that sample [MT1, 2/26/01; KK1, 3/23/01]. 
At the same time these images would go into DI’s next advertisement.  Since 
advertisements are not peer-reviewed and have a shorter turnaround than articles, 
many of these images appeared in journals like Science and Nature long before DI’s 
customers could publish any results on the very same samples.  Researchers to whom 
this happened tell the story with a tone of irritated amusement; DI clearly wounded 
                                                 
18 From Physics Today, November 1988, p. 149.  “Images of the Month” was a DI ad campaign in 
1988-9.  Kevin Kjoller is an especially proficient AFMer at DI.  This particular ad is more descriptive 
than most, partly, I think, to get in a dig at the competition – Mitzi and Kapitulnik were Quate 
collaborators (“Kirk et al” is a Quate group paper).  Any instrument DI sold at Stanford (often achieved 
through large subsidies and incentives) was taken as a major victory over Park; selling to Quate’s 
coauthors would have been even sweeter. 
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 Figure 7-3: DI Image of the Month. From Physics Today, November 1988, p.
149. 
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their pride by publishing images of “their” samples first.  Being scooped by an ad, 
though, does not seem to have mattered as much in the moral economy of academic 
science as being scooped by a peer-reviewed article.  Such ads do seem to matter, 
though, in the cycles of credit and credibility operating at the intersection of the moral, 
political, and commercial economies of science (Latour and Woolgar 1986, ch. 5).  As 
Latour and Woolgar show, cycles of credit are crucial to instrument users – new 
instruments help generate articles, which foster credibility, which secures grants, 
which allow the purchase of new instruments.  The same cycle, though, operates from 
the instrument maker’s vantage as well; instruments sold mean articles generated, 
which means increased credibility among the colleagues of the authors of those 
articles, who may then buy more instruments.  Applying pressure at any point in the 
cycle can be beneficial; thus, DI and the other SPM manufacturers put their efforts not 
just into selling instruments, but into generating articles and securing credibility by 
any means possible.  DI did so by scooping customers with ads, forming special 
relationships with pioneer groups (especially Hansma’s), coauthoring papers, and 
bringing in “six month” visitors and postdocs just like the UCSB team. 
Changes and Proliferation 
This is, again, the boxwallah’s dilemma.  As much as Elings or other 
instrument makers saw their customers as profoundly unlike themselves, the cycle of 
credit often calls on instrument manufacturers to adopt the trappings of their 
customers – to publish articles, to do new research, to establish credibility.  In Act One 
of STM and AFM commercialization, this was done in an ad hoc, laissez-faire way, 
since instrument-savvy “early adopters” themselves resembled the instrument makers 
(by building and modifying microscopes, using them in avant-garde ways, and 
spreading word about the technique to their communities [MT1, 2/26/01; VE1, 
3/20/01; DC1, 9/5/01; AG1, 6/25/01]). 
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 As the ’90s began, though, instrument-makers’ methods for generating 
credibility became more formalized.  With an expanding customer base, new users 
could no longer be assumed to be “early adopters” or have “technical acumen.”  
Manufacturers (especially DI) began developing new applications themselves, selling 
these applications to potential users through marketing, and training new users once 
they bought the microscope.19  Also, recall that the explosion of new users was fed in 
part by the gold rush surrounding air STM of DNA on graphite.  The debates ensuing 
from this gold rush also expedited the end of DI’s honeymoon; the collapse of air 
STM as a viable technique in 1990-2 called DI’s main product into question.  Thus, as 
air STM ran into problems, DI distanced itself from the technique.  In doing so, 
though, the company needed new products to offer as substitutes.  To meet this need, 
DI formed partnerships with researchers to develop STM variants to open new 
markets; Bruce Schardt, for instance, an electrochemist at Purdue, came to Santa 
Barbara and developed an electrochemical version of the Nanoscope (a collaboration 
mentioned in ads).  DI also accelerated its appropriation of the Hansma group’s 
personnel and patents (especially AFM). 
 The transition away from air STM, however, was neither rapid nor inexorable.  
As we’ve seen, Elings was highly suspicious of many STM innovations, particularly 
those pioneered outside DI by academic researchers.  When Drake and Massie first 
began turning the Hansma AFM into a commercial instrument, Elings scoffed at the 
idea that AFMs might supplant STMs as DI’s core business [JM3, 10/18/01].20  So, DI 
did not switch to AFM and electrochemical STM overnight, but instead designed its 
instrument so that its capabilities could be widened or shifted to encompass the new 
techniques.  That is, AFM and EC-STM were envisioned not as new instruments, but 
                                                 
19 Lecuyer (1999) contains interesting material on application notes in the semiconductor industry. 
20 Elings’ dismissal of AFM is, today, an oft-repeated joke among Hansma group and DI veterans. 
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as new modes – add-ons to the basic Nanoscope II to increase its power and flexibility.  
A 1992 ad for an electrochemical microscope, for instance, says “The NanoScope 
ECSPM comes in both AFM and STM versions and is an option that can be added to 
the NanoScope at any time.”21  The first ad for a DI AFM headlined “The NanoScope 
II Scanning Tunneling Microscope, Now with an Atomic Force Microscope Option.”22  
Importantly, in moving smoothly into AFM and electrochemistry, DI reinterpreted the 
new crop of probe microscopes not as distinct instruments, but as “bells and whistles” 
to package into the Nanoscope architecture. 
 The final straw in pushing DI to give up its ad hoc approach to marketing and 
applications was the appearance of a new wave of STM and AFM manufacturers.  
These companies were all smaller than DI, but their appearance brought many changes 
in the SPM marketplace.  Most of these newcomers differed from DI in their design 
philosophy and market focus, and they found different ways to balance the horns of 
the boxwallah’s dilemma – some by integrating themselves fully with their customers, 
some by offering high-end research and instrumentation to small market niches, and 
others by trying to turn AFM into a tool the “masses.”  Their presence gradually 
pressured DI to change its organization, its marketing, its innovation process, and even 
its ownership.  A quick tour of the newcomers should illustrate how these companies 
tried to carve up (but also expand) the field of probe microscopy. 
Angstrom Technology/Molecular Imaging 
 The same West Coast academic research milieu that spawned DI and Park also 
incubated two of those companies’ most prominent competitors.  In Phoenix, a former 
Hansma collaborator, Stuart Lindsay (a physicist turned biophysicist), was 
methodically turning his lab at Arizona State into a prominent builder group.  As such, 
                                                 
21 From Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology A, 10.1, xxiv. 
22 From Physics Today, November 1989, 126.  Italics in original. 
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his team generated many of the same ingredients that fueled commercialization in 
Santa Barbara and Palo Alto – innovative solutions to problems of microscope design, 
widespread contacts in the STM/AFM community, graduating students with expertise 
in building microscopes, etc.  As at other places, commercialization in Phoenix was 
preceded by a kind of pre-commercial, gift economy phase; Lindsay’s group, for 
instance, had its own home-built control software that they offered for a nominal fee to 
other researchers. 
 Eventually, two local entrepreneurs, the McCormick brothers, offered to sell 
the Lindsay microscope commercially, and to set up the same kind of know-how-for-
microscopes trade that DI forged with Hansma [SL1, 1/6/03; JA1, 10/15/01].  Today 
their company, Angstrom Technologies, is largely forgotten, but their products did 
contain some important innovations which eventually found their way into other 
companies’ microscopes.  Indeed, their products may have been too innovative.  The 
underlying electronics were based closely on an ever-evolving and extremely 
sophisticated design used at ASU; by not limiting this sophistication and continual 
evolution, the McCormicks wound up with an unreliable and user-unfriendly product. 
 
Angstrom just never could build things well.  Uwe Knipping over here was the 
totally untrained, totally unqualified but technical genius technician in my 
colleague’s lab who’d built these digital systems, just built up and up and up, 
so by the time Angstrom got to production he had a box that contained 12 
transputer chips....  Unbelievably sophisticated.  A transputer, for example, 
took care of the electrochemistry, another transputer did video graphics, 
another one to the servo and what have you.  Unbelievably sophisticated.  Of 
course it didn’t work.  I mean it would work for so long and then in the middle 
of a critical experiment – crash....  It was hopeless, because the machines were 
so unreliable.  Uwe would never stop developing, and so they never defined 
something for production.  So the machines in a sense were amazing, and there 
isn’t a machine like it now in many ways, but they were just hopelessly 
unreliable.  So the day came when I said to Larry McCormick “sorry Larry, 
sorry Darryl, you guys are fun, but I need reliable machines” and I bought a 
Digital Instruments machine. [SL1, 1/6/03] 
 After Angstrom folded, Lindsay waited a couple years and then re-entered the 
market on his own.  Seeding the new company, Molecular Imaging, with his postdocs 
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and students, and forming a close but evolving relationship between startup and 
academic lab (with the startup designed to become more independent in time), he 
embarked on something resembling the Quate/Park model.  Starting in 1993, Lindsay 
saw little chance to beat DI in the general-purpose STM/AFM market, but he saw 
particular areas (especially electrochemistry and biophysics) where DI was weak. 
 
We’d been using DI machines, the controllers, which were just fine, very solid, 
very simple, but they worked.  We didn’t like the microscopes because they 
didn’t have any environmental control, you couldn’t do chemistry in them 
easily and so on.  The microscopes were built, really, as a toy – “look, we can 
do this thing in air, and, oh, well we’ll put one of Paul’s rather finicky liquid 
cells on if we can.”  But they’d missed the point of scanning probe microscopy, 
which is looking at in situ processes.  I used to talk to Virgil about this at great 
length, because I wanted to convert DI.  Virgil was a smart businessman, saw 
the market in semiconductors, and he just wasn’t about to get swept along 
about all this airy-fairy stuff about biology and chemistry.  So DI never did 
produce a good chemical microscope.  So we made ever more sophisticated 
chemical microscopes, and we made a couple of machines that we gave to 
colleagues or gave them plans or whatever.  At the time I had a wonderful 
postdoc, Tianwei Jing, who just was magic with his hands....  So, I said to 
Tianwei, “well, look, people want our microscope, instead of giving it away, 
why don’t you build them and I’ll start a company.” [SL1, 1/6/03] 
For Lindsay and other biophysicists, DI’s highly rational design philosophy forced its 
customers into a kind of Weberian iron cage of bureaucracy (Weber 1992).23  That is, 
for DI and for many users, the Nanoscope seemed like an optimal instrument; but its 
design was less well-suited for subdisciplines such as electrochemistry – those 
communities being, in DI’s view, too small to justify radical design changes.  Lindsay 
and others worked around these “irrationalities of rationality” by home-building 
elaborate add-ons to the DI Nanoscope.  Molecular Imaging commercialized this 
                                                 
23 In particular, Weber’s observations on the transition from traditional putting-out of textiles to a highly 
rationalized, capitalistic production of goods is reminiscent of the transition from academic builder 
groups to microscope manufacturing.  We will examine this topic more in Chapter Eight, but it is not 
too much of a stretch to think of DI as “McDonaldizing” (Ritzer 1996) instrumentation for its 
customers; in large part this has been successful, though has created noticeable frictions both between 
the company and certain kinds of users, and even within DI, where some designers have feared 
routinization of their own work. 
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practice by forming a partnership with Digital to sell specially modified 
electrochemical microscopes run by the DI controller. 
Thus, Lindsay was trying to convince other biophysicists and electrochemists 
to buy his workarounds rather than to build their own.  To make this a plausible 
option, he ran a two-track program: a leading academic research group securing 
credibility and pioneering new applications, linked to a manufacturer providing off-
the-shelf versions of the instruments used to build the academic group’s reputation.  
At the same time, this two-track solution placed MI in a precarious position with 
respect to DI.  MI’s existence highlighted the limits of DI’s rationalizing program, and 
demonstrated that building rather than buying could sometimes be a better option.  Yet 
the partnership with MI yielded sales in markets DI had written off as esoteric; if DI 
were to compete directly for those markets, it would have to gain credibility in those 
disciplines through the time-tested means of hiring researchers, writing articles, and 
developing applications. 
Quanscan/Topometrix 
 The other major West Coast academic spin-off emerged from the 
Baldeschwieler group, and, like Angstrom/MI, it took two tries to get going.  Paul 
West, a former Baldeschwieler postdoc, long nurtured the idea of commercializing the 
Caltech STM.  Indeed, this sense of long planning and determination to found a 
startup gave his efforts a distinctive cast.  Where Park cultivated “gentleman science” 
and DI encouraged quasi-anarchic skill-building, West’s company, Quanscan, adopted 
the trappings of modern business: venture capital, MBAs, slick advertising.  
Eventually these became common for SPM companies, but when Quanscan started, 
applying the disciplined knowledge of management to selling STMs and AFMs was 
unusual.  Initially, it was something of an ill fit.  To keep Quanscan afloat, West spent 
most of his time seeking venture capital money and SBIR (Small Business Innovation 
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Research) grants, selling the company as “innovators in nanotechnology” and cooking 
long-term plans for various applications of SPM technology, rather than in marketing 
usable microscopes [PW2, 3/30/01]. 
 In 1988, though, “nanotechnology” was a disreputably futuristic word.  West’s 
funders, eager for a real product line with present-day profits, pushed him to market 
his prototype microscopes.  It is possible Quanscan could have run with these 
microscopes; after all, it had many of the same things going for it as Park and DI.  The 
differences with DI and Park, though, are interesting and crucial.  Under other 
circumstances, Quanscan’s use of modern business methods might have proven an 
advantage over the ad hoc management of its competitors.  Certainly, Quanscan’s 
advent motivated the adoption of a more businesslike approach at DI.  As it happened, 
though, the extra layers of hierarchy and bureaucracy needed for such a management 
style were Quanscan’s undoing.  Eventually, infighting among the venture capitalists 
and MBAs with a stake in Quanscan halted the flow of money and put the company 
under the gavel.  Ironically, Elings could have bought what was left of Quanscan; both 
DI and Park sent representatives to the auction.  West, however, rounded up investors 
to buy the company back, changed the name to Topometrix, hired a new CEO, and 
started over.  This time, West seemed to hit his stride.  Like Park and DI, Topometrix 
aimed for the general research market by producing instruments with built-in 
flexibility for a wide range of intended users.  The company’s large, aggressive 
marketing department flooded journals like Physics Today and American Laboratory 
with glossy ads and, before long, generated enough sales to rank alongside Park.  
Topometrix answered the boxwallah’s dilemma by selling more flexible software, 
which users could have access to and even modify.  Thus, customers acted as out-
sourced loci of innovation for the company – any modifications they made could be 
appropriated and turned into products.  In Chapter Eight, we will explore further how 
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the competition between DI’s closed and Topo’s architectures played out in the mid-
’90s. 
McAllister 
 One last West Coast manufacturer exemplifies the ambiguities of commercial 
microscope making.  As we’ve seen, Berkeley was an early runner in academic STM, 
but quickly dropped out of the race.  In some ways, this abortive effort was replicated 
in the race to commercialization.  Stanford, UCSB, Caltech, and ASU all had leading 
SPM groups, and all were associated with significant startup manufacturers.  By 1990 
Berkeley itself had little in the way of STM, but at Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, Miquel Salmeron was building STMs and AFMs as part of traditional 
surface science work.  Two (interrelated) commercial STMs spun off from Salmeron’s 
group, both hovering in the strange liminal zone between gift economy and full 
commercialization.  Bob McAllister, a former technician for the Berkeley surface 
chemist Gabor Somorjai, had set up a small instrument-building service for local 
research groups, making unique tools for labs that lacked the time, personnel, interest, 
and/or skill to build equipment themselves.  Eventually, McAllister started 
collaborating with an instrument maker in Detroit, Adam Kollin, on commercial EELS 
spectrometers – McAllister supplying the hardware, and Kollin’s company (RHK 
Tech) the electronics.24
 
STM came along and everybody could see it was hot stuff so both Bob 
McAllister and Adam Kollin were interested in getting into the STM business, 
because they rightly figured that a lot of people were going to want one.  So 
again they worked out a deal where Bob would build the mechanical part, the 
actual vacuum part, because the idea was the vacuum STM was going to be 
what people wanted.  Adam Kollin and RHK would make the electronics.  This 
was generally based on what we [Salmeron’s group] had built here at 
Berkeley....  So we sort of provided them with all the details and ... we sent out 
lots of copies of the plans and circuit diagrams of what we built to whoever 
                                                 
24 “EELS” is electron energy loss spectroscopy.  A beam of electrons is directed at a sample, and the 
energy spectrum of the scattered electrons is used to determine the composition and bonding of the 
material. 
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asked, or also to people who came and stayed for six months or a year to see 
what we were doing and took away the plans with them when they left. [FO1, 
10/24/01] 
Eventually, McAllister moved to Idaho, effectively ending his collaboration with 
Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and RHK.  From Idaho, though, McAllister 
continued building custom STMs for researchers.  The rhetoric of his corner of the 
industry is illuminating.  His ads (see Figure 7-4) claim extreme value (“As your 
budget gets tight, every dollar needs to stretch further and further.  Sometimes 
painfully far.  Call us.  We’ll help you stretch your dollar”) combined with extreme 
specificity (“Discover the Freedom of Custom Instrumentation ... when “off-the-shelf” 
just won’t do the job.  At McAllister Technical Services we guarantee you’ll get 
precisely what you want.  We are known for our collaborative approach.”).25
That is, McAllister emphasizes that he offers instruments that allow users a 
high degree of uniquely subtle, sophisticated control, backed by his long-term 
commitment to customers – “McAllister’s STM electronics, software, and hardware 
work in concert so you can control all functions from your computer keyboard.”26  
Indeed, these issues have become indistinguishable in SPM manufacturing.  
Customers who want their instruments to have very specific functions are seen as 
wanting greater control over the operation of the instrument; yet in providing control 
and specificity, manufacturers feel obliged to expand their commitment to service and 
training.  In this, McAllister lies at one end of an artisanal spectrum among SPM 
manufacturers (with DI at the other end). 
McAllister and DI approach this aspect of the boxwallah’s dilemma from 
opposite directions.  DI separates the innovation culture of its engineers from the user 
culture of its customers, then re-engages customers by allying with elite users.  
                                                 
25 From Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology A, 9.4, xvi and Physics Today, August 1990, 165.  
Ellipses and underlining in original. 
26 From Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology A, 8.1, 729.  Underlining in original. 
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 Figure 7-4: Ad for McAllister Technical Services.  From Physics Today, May
1990, p. 114. 
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McAllister finds would-be elite experimentalists who want a microscope with very 
specific and sophisticated capabilities, then becomes (temporarily) a part of his 
customers’ lab groups – making his expertise part of their internal division of labor, 
rather than (as with DI) an external resource.  For both DI and McAllister, though, 
there is a continual slippage between instrument maker and instrument user.  
McAllister’s customers generally come from disciplines with strong instrument-
building traditions.  His customers know very specific things they want to do with the 
microscopes, and why they cannot do them with other commercial instruments.  Thus, 
he must closely collaborate with them to design their instruments, and after building 
the microscope he continues serving his customers as a kind of out-sourced technician.  
DI, on the other hand, sees many customers (particularly in biology and in industry) as 
coming from disciplines with very little instrument-building tradition.  Thus, DI 
believes it must coauthor papers with scientists from those disciplines, and even 
employ its own researchers in those areas, in order to create the credibility for other 
practitioners to hear about, and want to buy, a Nanoscope.  For both DI and McAllister 
(and all other SPM companies), the lines between user, builder, and manufacturer are 
continually renegotiated; yet such lines are necessary for customers to see that they 
could not (or would not want to) themselves build what is offered them.27
RHK Tech 
 Once McAllister left for Idaho, the partnership between Salmeron’s group and 
RHK grew both closer and more formal.  RHK began marketing more complete STM 
systems, and drafted Salmeron’s group into the manufacturing process.  In particular, 
the software for Salmeron’s STMs (written by his technician, Frank Ogletree), became 
the kernel of RHK’s control software; in return, LBNL became RHK’s beta testers, 
                                                 
27 This is similarly to the argument in Bowker (1994, 106ff.) about Schlumberger’s need to align itself 
with its customers while also differentiating itself from them. 
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receiving free instruments to try out and debug.  As Ogletree continued writing 
software to accommodate ever more subtle and sophisticated control algorithms, his 
code continued to flow into RHK’s systems [JG4, 6/29/01; FO1, 10/24/01].  This, in 
turn, bent RHK’s marketing toward research groups like Salmeron’s, i.e. groups 
planning to use their (bought or built) STMs in subtle, unorthodox ways (often for 
surface science).  Like McAllister, RHK emphasizes control, service, specificity, and 
collaboration between manufacturer and user.  The company’s ads target customers 
who ordinarily build their own instruments, and whose instrument-building can be 
appropriated: 
 
Achieving results with STM once meant building your own equipment.  Now, 
the AtomScan SysTeM 1000 lets you spend your time on research, not system 
development....  Individual components are also available to suit your specific 
requirements....  Providing you with the finest equipment available is only the 
beginning of the commitment.28
Again, this is a more or less profitable, but often difficult position to maintain.  As we 
will see in Chapter Eight, RHK relies on the building prowess of its customers to feed 
it innovations.  This means, though, that RHK has trouble expanding its product line 
to full STM systems, since its whole marketing philosophy is based on customers who 
want to build a significant part of their STMs; and it has to work very hard to 
demonstrate technical prowess and a full understanding of the research its users want 
to do, else many customers will return to building rather than buying. 
Burleigh 
 The West Coast startups were spun off specifically to sell probe microscopes.  
RHK, McAllister, and a few smaller firms, though, have tried to add SPMs to their 
existing product lines.  One is Burleigh, a piezoelectric components maker in 
Rochester, New York.  Burleigh’s piezo products received a boost in the mid ’80s, as 
researchers began buying them for home-built STMs.  With time, Burleigh started 
                                                 
28 From Review of Scientific Instruments, 59.6, 1. 
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packaging more of the piezoelectric guts of an STM together, until they decided to sell 
complete systems.  Like most companies in DI’s shadow, Burleigh wanted to find a 
niche in which to differentiate itself [DF1, 5/29/01].  Eventually, through local 
academic connections, they turned their focus to the college teaching lab market.  
Doing so could have meant comfortable profits – there are, after all, many many 
teaching labs; but designing for this market pulled Burleigh away from its core design 
philosophy of building extremely high-end tools for very small research markets.  
Plus, at $15,000, an educational STM was beyond the reach of most demonstration 
labs.  So Burleigh added claims that their educational STM also had research 
capabilities. 
 
Imagine what a powerful learning experience it would be if your students 
could actually “see” atoms.  Well, now they can.  The new Burleigh 
Instructional STM was developed specifically for use in college labs and 
classrooms, and it can dramatically enhance the way your students learn about 
atomic and molecular level phenomena....  The Burleigh Instructional STM is 
designed for education, but it could, in fact, function nicely as a basic research 
instrument.  After all, Burleigh manufactures sophisticated probe microscopes 
for research.  We offer complete systems as well as components that enable 
you to build your own STM.29
 As this quote shows, Burleigh tried to market simultaneously to demonstration 
labs, to experimentalists wanting to use an air STM in their research, and to builders of 
high-end microscopes.  This represented, I think, an ill-timed or ill-conceived attempt 
to short-circuit the boxwallah’s dilemma.  Interestingly, Burleigh’s strategy was 
guided less by the history of instrumentation than by the history of personal 
computing; they saw their cheap, simple microscopes as the counterparts of the PCs 
that flooded the market and edged out big, powerful mainframes in the ’80s.  This 
stripped down, mass-marketed SPM, though, had trouble competing with the more 
capable and flexible Nanoscope.  The Burleigh instrument did not have all the “bells 
and whistles” of the DI Nanoscope – it had fewer modes, fewer add-ons, could operate 
                                                 
29 From Physics Today, April 1992, p. 20. 
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in fewer environments, etc.  For Burleigh’s people, the bells and whistles were largely 
extraneous – the vast majority of probe microscope research could be done, they 
thought, with the modes included in their instrument.  As it turned out, though, for 
academic customers trying to secure tenure or stay ahead of their fields, the bells and 
whistles of the Nanoscope looked like a welcome safety net in case the direction of 
probe microscopy changed and some modes became hotter than others. 
Today, the Personal SPM seems quixotic, but, after all, optical microscopes 
have (after several centuries) reached the stage where both high-tech, specialized and 
low-tech, casual versions of the same product exist side-by-side.  Someday, SPMs 
may reach that point, but in the early ’90s, credit and credibility still mattered in ways 
that they do not for mass-marketed, low-tech instruments.  For an optical microscope 
in a high school lab, cycles of credit still operate, but in a more constricted manner; if 
students do not see what they’re “supposed” to see, they might fail a test, or the 
teacher might lose face, or the manufacturer might lose an account, but it is unlikely 
that the textbook will be rewritten based on what the students did see.  For SPM in the 
early ’90s, matters were not quite as certain; there was not yet general agreement 
about what a probe microscope could do, or which of its capabilities were most 
relevant to users.  More importantly, there was general agreement about the lack of 
closure.  That is, most SPMers believed startling new applications were around the 
corner, though they did not know which modes and functions would enable those 
applications.  Having the “bells and whistles” was a way to be ready for those 
applications.  Burleigh’s Personal SPM, in stripping down functionality, left itself 
open to attacks (mostly from DI) that it stranded users without the proper tools. 
Omicron 
 Finally, Omicron is a German firm that made UHV spectrometers for surface 
science before commercializing the STM design of Hans Neddermeyer’s group at 
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Bochum [TB1, 11/19/01].  For Omicron, the Neddermeyer STM represented a way to 
expand its range of products for the UHV/surface science market.  Thus, Omicron has 
concentrated largely on surface scientists and has adopted a strategy of offering 
integrated systems (rather than stand-alone microscopes) of STMs in concert with 
LEED, Auger, XPS, UHV chambers, and sample prep.  Omicron products are large, 
surrounded by other instruments, and engineered to an extraordinarily high standard.  
Surface scientists are the very people who, in the ’80s, built their own STMs, so the 
Omicron instrument is a “builder’s microscope,” and Omicron engineers are seen as 
having the same investment of technical identity in their microscopes that surfaces 
scientists do in home-built instruments. 
 
To my surprise actually, a company, Omicron in Germany, started coming out 
with commercial machines – I couldn’t believe it at first – that could seemingly 
do what my machine could do.  Then it became clear they could do it and they 
could do it better.  So there was a weaning from my machine, which was 
painful to use, just a pain in the ass, it broke every time you looked at it, and I 
could never train anyone to use it....  They continue to make some really 
excellent instruments.  They are the worst company in my experience to deal 
with, difficult guys.  They treat their machines as perfect and if anything goes 
wrong it must be because you, the idiot customer, has mistreated their machine 
or something.  Anyone I’ve met who uses their machines will tell you the same 
thing, they’re very difficult – but they make a very good machine.  So we’ve 
moved away from using the homemade machine, which is now totally retired, 
to commercial machines, and just now, for the first time in years, I’m building 
a new machine that’ll do things that you can’t buy. [BW2, 5/22/01] 
Omicron represents a solution to the boxwallah’s dilemma particularly suited to 
surface science.  As the quote shows, Omicron customers are continually close to 
departing and building their own instruments; yet by a mixture of quality engineering, 
possessiveness, confidence, and arrogance, Omicron levels the playing field of 
credibility and convinces them to remain customers.  In this context, it is notable that 
Omicron has had less success in selling AFMs and NSOMs, users of which come from 
different instrument-building traditions than STMers and surface scientists. 
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Conclusion 
 With Omicron, we conclude our tour of the major SPM manufacturers of the 
’90s.  There were others, most short-lived, some based in large companies like JEOL 
(a Japanese electron microscopy firm), others spun off from academic labs.  Their 
stories fill out the spectrum of approaches to the boxwallah’s dilemma that I’ve 
sketched here.  Most previous commercialization stories in S&TS have ended at this 
point, with the advent of manufacturers and the successful transformation of a 
homebuilt tool into a commercially available device.  That is, indeed, an important 
turning point in the existence of an instrument-oriented community; SPMers recognize 
the advent of DI and its rivals as crucial, and their memories are especially vivid of the 
first time they used a commercial instrument, or saw SPM vendors at the STM 
conferences, or had to make a choice between building or buying a microscope. 
Neither end of the commercialization narrative is sharply delineated, however.  
Even before there were dedicated SPM manufacturers, commercialization was, in 
some sense, always already a fact of life for STMers.  No one makes from scratch all 
of the components of even a home-built instrument.  Indeed, early on, one major topic 
of STMers’ gossip was where to buy components like piezos, tips, op amps, and 
substrates.  These materials, though, were manufactured for purposes other than probe 
microscopy; the work of the instrument builder was to locate and combine these parts 
to make a microscope – a paradigmatic process of bricolage, especially when the parts 
were safety razors or pawn shop diamonds.  Today, the rationalizing mission of SPM 
companies has swept aside much of this bricolage.  Manufacturers substitute their own 
products and experience for ever larger portions of the practice of instrument-building 
research groups.  The various manufacturers and their customers vie over just how 
much substitution is permissible, but the lower bar is constantly creeping up.  
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Instrument builders increasingly find it hard to justify not buying dedicated SPM 
software, electronics modules, environmental chambers, cantilevers, etc. 
Even with well-established SPM firms in place, though, the boxwallah’s 
dilemma refuses to disappear completely.  That is, not everyone yet accepts the 
manufacturers’ rationalizing mission.  On the one hand, there are still researchers in 
relevant disciplines who have not yet taken up STM and AFM.  Indeed, since the 
manufacturers talk about a day when AFMs will be as common as centrifuges and 
optical microscopes, they are likely to be dissatisfied with the diffusion of their 
instruments for some time to come.  For these recalcitrant users, companies like DI try 
to lead by precept and example; they send vendors to the relevant conferences, they set 
up applications labs so their employees can author papers in the relevant disciplines, 
and they circulate applications notes that trumpet the work of early adopters in those 
fields.  With respect to these potential users, the challenge is to make SPM seem 
mundane, yet still potentially exciting. 
On the other hand, there are still those who then try to bypass the instrument 
manufacturers by building their own microscope.  In general, manufacturers try to pull 
these people back in by building microscopes that they will want to buy.  Usually, this 
necessitates taking on much of the technical identity of experimentalists in these 
disciplines and displaying the skill and tacit knowledge of the home-builder (Haring 
2002).  Still, since many in the SPM community, including manufacturers, believe 
(and hope) that closure has not quite been reached on these microscopes, some 
experimenters continue to build their instruments for idiosyncratic or esoteric 
applications; yet it is exactly these instruments which could be the next hot thing.  The 
boxwallah’s dilemma demands that manufacturers insinuate themselves very closely 
to this elite and be ready to appropriate and rationalize their innovations.  As we’ve 
seen here, and will explore further in Chapter Eight, doing so means returning to the 
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very practices of chaotic bricolage that manufacturers claim to overcome, a strategy 
that presents opportunities and anxieties for manufacturers, users, and elite builder 
groups. 
The tug and pull that commercializers of instruments feel between elite 
builders and customers is only partially described in previous work on trading zones.  
The contexts described by Galison in Image and Logic, for instance, might be called 
first-order trading zones, where the boundaries of the trading zone, though evolving, 
show no tendency to expand and morph without end.  Participants come from a 
handful of backgrounds, and they are able to maintain long-term interactions through 
the social glue of an interlanguage or pidgin (which slowly turns into a full-fledged 
creole).  Situations where the interlanguage is wrapped around an artifact or technique 
which has activist sponsors that would like to diffuse it into a number of communities, 
though, might be called second-order trading zones; these exhibit the phenomena seen 
in Kaiser (forthcoming-a), as well as in this chapter.  In these situations, trading zones 
are much more fluid; and the glue that holds them together is often not an 
interlanguage but a particular social group – the boxwallah, commercializer, or 
mediator.  Indeed, commercializers often have to learn pidgin forms of a variety of 
different technical languages, as did colonialist boxwallahs.  Commercializers and 
boxwallahs inhabit the second-order trading zone, without turning it into a stable 
proto-discipline as in first-order trading zones.  Indeed, commercializers need the 
fluidity of their situation, and they construct complex ecologies, filled with different 
types of boxwallahs and auxiliaries (engineers, application scientists, elite customers, 
etc.) in order to make the trading zone a habitable and profitable place.  The 
boxwallah’s dilemma is to make sure that the trading zone is a place other groups will 
continue to need to come to – by making sure the goods and services sold within it are 
desirable, and that the trading zone is the only place they can be found.  As we have 
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seen, there are many different ways to construct a local culture within a trading zone; 
in the next chapter, we will see that the durability of boxwallah cultures can bring both 
triumphs and disruptions for their members and trading partners. 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight 
Probe Microscopy in the Era of Commericalization 
 
 The advent of commercial microscopes irrevocably changed what it meant to 
be a probe microscopist and what counted as good probe microscopy.  Probe 
microscopy today is in a transition that has rarely been documented in science studies.  
Numerous historians of science have examined the role of home-built instruments in 
the formation of technical subcultures; anthropologists and historians have illustrated 
the process of bringing an instrument to the market; and sociologists of science have 
often noted the importance of already-commercialized technologies in laboratory 
culture (Buchwald 1994; Galison and Assmus 1989; Rabinow 1996; Rasmussen 1998; 
Woolgar 1988).  Few, though, have pointed to the curious problems and opportunities 
presented to a community in which commercialization is becoming widespread, and 
instrument-building is becoming less common. 
 One way to think about commercialization is as a species of Weberian 
routinization (Weber 1992, 66ff.).  We saw in Chapters Two, Four, and Six that the 
early cultures of invention, development, and commercialization were very much in 
the charismatic mode (Weber 1947).  “Builders” like Binnig, Quate, Hansma, Elings, 
and their associates saw themselves forging something novel and surprising; and the 
cultivation of charisma, eccentricity, and personal knowledge was central to their 
success.  The dilemma of commercialization, though, is that it survives on charisma 
even as it aims at routinization; though the manufacturers need builder culture, their 
products make that culture less tenable.  In this chapter I follow routinization right into 
the design of the instruments, where we find an interesting pairing between Weber’s 
iron cage and Bruno Latour’s black box (Latour 1987, 2).  For Latour, a black box is a 
scientific fact materialized, a piece of knowledge so secure that it is no longer 
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questioned or even examined.  A black-boxed instrument incorporates such 
universally accepted, unquestioned facts – which means that the instrument can be 
standardized, and its inner workings can be hidden away.  In Latour’s view, users can 
insert the passage through such an instrument unproblematically into the career of 
their samples without continually having to renegotiate the tricky mutual calibration of 
sample, knowledge, and instrument needed with a more “transparent” or “translucent” 
box.  Note that commercialization of an instrument fits nicely into this schema – two 
of an instrument manufacturers’ central aims are usually to standardize the tool, and to 
streamline or hide away the local, idiosyncratic bricolage of an instrument built by 
postdocs or graduate students.  As we will see, the black box is an actors’ category, 
and one over which SPMers endlessly argue.  A box’s opacity is seen as defining how 
routinized its use is, and how idiosyncratically customers can shape its design.  That 
is, a thoroughly black-boxed instrument may enclose users in an iron cage of 
rationality, where they are molded to operate the microscope in ways that conform to 
the manufacturer’s vision of an “average user;” while a more translucent box is seen 
as offering a more porous but problematic kind of cage. 
 Finally, another way to think about the era of commercialization is in terms of 
the experience of different kinds of SPMers and the role anxiety this era induces.  As 
we’ve repeatedly seen, builders, runners, and other kinds of probe microscopists 
staked a considerable part of their identity on the success of the instruments with 
which they were associated.1  For some, the cultivation of technical identity through 
instrument-building was particularly intense.  Commercialization has brought forth 
new kinds of identities associated with probe microscopy; but it has also brought 
troubling questions about why some kinds of builder identities should persist.2  The 
                                                 
1 My analysis of technical identity owes much to Haring (2002). 
2 My analysis of the strategies of SPMers in crafting post-commercialization identities resonates with 
Mulkay, et al. (1975). 
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story of probe microscopy in the late ’90s is primarily one of tracking how various 
SPMers continually construct and reconstruct technical identities that accord with the 
realities of commercialization. 
DI’s Response: Modes and Microscopes 
 By the mid-’90s, researchers could buy STMs and AFMs from any of a 
daunting array of manufacturers.  Moreover, these companies had carved up the SPM 
field into market niches: Molecular Imaging concentrating on electrochemists and 
biophysicists, Omicron and RHK on physicists and surface scientists, Burleigh going 
after casual and educational users, and Digital Instruments, Park, and Topometrix 
focusing on more general users.  This burgeoning market segmentation was in part a 
move by smaller firms to co-exist with DI; in turn, success, and the presence of the 
new firms and their specialized modes, led DI to become more formally organized, 
and to develop more diverse product lines.  We can track this process through the ’90s 
by looking at what capabilities DI packaged into its research instruments.  For a 
decade and more, the Nanoscope has accrued a toolkit of modes and capabilities.  
Today, probe microscopes are commonly referred to as the “Swiss Army knife” of 
scientific instruments; commercialization, and the academic-commercial nexus that 
turns dissertations into products, has greatly accelerated the proliferation of tools that 
make up this knife.  To understand the social contours within the jungle of microscope 
users and manufacturers, it is necessary to understand the meanings attached to the 
proliferation of modes; and few sites have been more crucial in forging those 
meanings than the culture of innovation at Digital Instruments.3
                                                 
3 I use “culture of innovation” here in much the way that Diane Vaughan (1996) uses “culture of 
production.”  That is, Vaughan traces how macro-ethics of production played out at the microlevel of 
teleconferences and launch assessments.  Here, I trace how various ethics of innovation at DI – 
skepticism, tinkering, generative anarchy, etc. – played out in the creation of new modes and 
instruments. 
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Tapping for Gold 
As we saw in Chapter Six, openness to new modes and instrumental variations 
was integral to Virgil Elings’ initial decision to make a digital instrument 
incorporating flexible electronics and software.  Thus, DI employees were continually 
encouraged to tinker with the instrument and produce new modes; yet the company 
also cultivated an ethic of skepticism, in which new modes – whether invented 
internally or externally – had to fight hard to survive.  A major part of DI’s innovation 
culture (and the most shocking difference between DI and UCSB for former Hansma 
group members) was a tradition of disagreement (and even disparagement), harsh 
debate, strong (if mixed) emotions, and occasional lapses into infighting followed by 
lapses back into camaraderie [JM3, 10/18/01; JW1, 10/18/01].  Designers often had to 
work behind the backs of their managers to create new products, and many of DI’s 
most successful technologies started out amidst intense managerial opposition. 
 One source of inspiration for DI’s new modes and applications to package into 
the Nanoscope were a series of temporary collaborations with outside researchers.  
Sometimes, as with the importation of the AFM from the Hansma group, these 
collaborations resulted in more or less straightforward technology transfer.  In these 
cases, there might be some negotiation and redesign at either end of the pipeline, but 
all parties basically interpreted the transferred technology in the same way.  Other 
collaborations resulted in something more like a “technological dialogue” (Pacey 
1990), where interpretations varied widely, and where interactions between DI and 
other groups acted more to inspire than to import new technologies.  One such 
innovation – the so-called “tapping mode” – has been crucial in forming DI’s success 
and shaping the SPM field; more generally, the story of tapping mode is illustrative of 
how SPMers view mode proliferation and how they structure their research around 
innovation. 
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The roots of tapping mode can be found in the first AFM paper in 1985, where 
Binnig, Quate, and Gerber described two ways of operating a force microscope – 
contact mode, where the tip scraped the surface, and non-contact, where the tip 
hovered above the sample (Binnig, et al. 1986a).  For several years, only contact mode 
was viable, but some IBM AFMers – those associated with the Quate group – 
vigorously pursued non-contact through the late ’80s and early ’90s.  Recall that, 
unlike corporate surface scientists, Quate’s IBMers focused their research much closer 
to IBM’s product lines than to basic science – investigating things like wafer 
preparation or new data storage techniques.  For these applications, neither STM nor 
contact AFM was particularly desirable – most technology-oriented surfaces (e.g. 
silicon wafers) have a non-conducting layer at the surface, meaning no STM; and most 
have valuable and fragile surfaces, making the scraping action of contact AFM 
unwanted.  Quate came to STM from a non-destructive testing tradition, and probe 
microscopy’s potential in this area impelled his research, so it was natural for his 
students and collaborators at IBM to turn to non-contact AFM as a way to look at 
technologically relevant, non-conducting surfaces without damaging them. 
 This had several ramifications for the development of AFM.  For instance, 
these researchers –Dan Rugar, Kumar Wickramasinghe, Gary McClelland, Tom 
Albrecht, Bruce Terris, Gerhard Meyer, Nabil Amer, and others – were among the first 
to use optical detection methods for the AFM.  In non-contact AFM, the interaction 
between tip and substrate is so small and subtle that it is usually necessary to integrate 
that interaction over time until it becomes large enough to detect; one way to do this is 
to wiggle the cantilever over the same spot on the sample and see how the sample 
modifies the cantilever’s resonant frequency or driving amplitude.  This kind of 
algorithm is particularly difficult with an STM-based AFM detection scheme (as 
described in Chapters Three and Five); but an optical detection system can draw on a 
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long tradition in optics and electrical engineering (with which Quate’s students were 
familiar) dealing with resonant frequencies, beats, bandwidths, and quality factors. 
 So devising new optical detection schemes for non-contact AFM, and the 
mathematical machinery to go with them, became a cottage industry at IBM in the 
early ’90s.  Making these schemes work reliably on real-world samples, though, was a 
painful and elusive process.  DI and others viewed non-contact AFM as a pipe dream 
– mathematically elegant, but time-consuming and ugly in practice.  In the early ’90s, 
though, DI become more interested in industrial applications and “real-world” samples 
(and in developing ties with IBM), so non-contact became a more pressing issue.  
Interestingly, Elings directed some of DI’s most junior, least experienced people to 
look into it – expecting, probably, not to find anything, but ready to capitalize on 
discoveries made through his employees naïve style of experimentation: 
 
There was getting to be more and more noise in the community about non-
contact, so Virgil figured we’d give it a try.  He figured it wasn’t really going 
to come to anything, but he also figured the same thing about AFM.  When we 
first came up with the first AFM he was like “ah, nobody’s going to buy these 
things....”  So here we are a couple of years later and we’re hearing noise about 
non-contact.  Virgil decides, all right, we’ll build a non-contact AFM just so 
we can convince ourselves it doesn’t work.  So, we have a guy named Colby 
Bowles who was a junior at UCSB at the time, he’s working there for the 
summer.  Colby’s kind of your fairly typical Santa Barbara skateboard rat, he’d 
come in with bandages on his head and his elbows and all this kind of stuff.  
Really smart guy but perhaps not a paragon of patience.  So in some ways kind 
of an odd choice to get non-contact working, because non-contact is really a 
tough thing to make work because it’s a very unstable feedback technique, so 
to get it to work at all does require a lot of patience.  Anyway, the hardware’s 
been developed, Colby’s really just primarily working on getting the technique 
to work.  Well, I figure Colby lasted about two days, and he said “screw this,” 
and turned the amplitude way up, and that was one of the things that was 
absolutely defined about the IBM patent on non-contact was you had to keep 
the amplitude of oscillation of the tip very very low....  Well, Colby does this 
and lo and behold we start getting some beautiful images.  It took us a couple 
weeks to figure out we weren’t doing non-contact, we were doing something 
completely new....  That became tapping mode.  So that was patented and 
Colby became a hero.  Again, somewhat serendipitous that we discovered this.  
It was not everybody sitting around saying “what can we do to improve non-
contact?” [MT1, 2/26/01] 
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Thus was “tapping mode” (sometimes jokingly called “hammer mode”) born.  DI’s 
recipe of developing black-boxed user-friendly software and electronics, and 
popularizing new applications of its modes in various fields, has made tapping mode 
virtually ubiquitous in all kinds of industrial and academic labs.  One key to making 
tapping mode indispensable to DI’s customers has been the addition of “phase 
imaging” – the discovery that the detection scheme can feed back on changes in the 
phase of oscillation of the cantilever as well as changes in the resonant frequency and 
amplitude.  The invention of phase imaging shows, again, how DI culture makes 
designers fight for their innovations, but capitalizes on them once the fight is over. 
 
My big contribution for the AC techniques was the Extender, which was 
basically the electronics for measuring phase and frequency.  There’s another 
milestone in the company, it opened up a whole new area of things that you 
could see and experiments and measurements you could make....  Even James 
[Massie] had tried to make a circuit to look at phase and it wasn’t very 
conclusive.  That made Virgil a little skeptical but I didn’t think he’d done it 
right so I decided to give it a shot.  So basically it was me and Todd [Day], 
working at night, because it didn’t really have a lot of popularity at the time....  
There were other things I was working on at the time that were deemed as 
more important and this was just basically some improvement thing that I 
wanted to try because it interested me.  So, working mostly after hours and on 
weekends and stuff we’d just come in and work on this thing and it wasn’t long 
before we got this thing to work and it was actually pretty cool....  We decided 
that we needed to make it available on the Multimode and so Dennis Colby 
sort of kludged, well kludge is too polite a word, but basically they got this 
thing to work on a Multimode and we started selling it as the Extender. [DB2, 
3/23/01] 
Phase imaging has proven important in a number of areas, but particularly magnetic 
force microscopy (MFM), now a large niche for DI and a major addition to the 
Multimode.  Again, MFM started with Quate veterans at IBM, where understanding 
the microscale magnetic properties of materials is important to data storage.  As with 
other modes, Elings was initially skeptical, but when talk about MFM in the SPM 
community became loud enough he brought in a new staff scientist, Ken Babcock, to 
get DI into the game: 
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I remember the first day I started at DI – this’ll give you some sense of the 
place – I walked in, I met the person at the front desk and said “is there a place 
I can sit, where’s Virgil?”  He was gone so they stuck me off in a cube, I had to 
walk around and find people, “can I have a computer?...”  The next day, Virgil 
walked by the cube and stuck his head over and looked down at me and said 
“so, magnetic force microscopy.”  Before I could look up he was gone.  That 
was my beginning of communication with Virgil and I realized that most of the 
things he said you should sit and ponder.  It was like a zen master, okay, my 
mission is make magnetic force microscopy into something, but it’s up to you 
to figure out how to do that.  That was wonderful.  I felt my way along and it 
was just the funnest time I’ve ever had in a professional sense.  That was really 
great – it went from there and within a few weeks, getting some interesting 
data, connecting with customers and developing this into a real area.  I had a 
lot of ownership for that and I had a lot of motivation and DI at the time was a 
very easy place to get people to help you out and get things done, so that was 
really a magical time for me. [KB1, 3/23/01] 
From these microscopists’ stories about innovation culture at Digital, we can 
piece together the typical career of a new microscope, mode, or application at DI.  
First, the company usually found new modes such as the MFM in one of four places: 
(A) academic research groups, usually a “builder” group like Hansma’s; (B) national 
or industrial labs like IBM or NIST; (C) one of DI’s competitors; or (D) DI itself.  
Then, in most cases, personnel were exchanged: either a postdoc or scientist from the 
group that developed the new technique (or another group in the same subdiscipline) 
came to DI, or someone from DI visited the developing group to learn more [DA1, 
3/23/01; SM2, 3/21/01].  Finally, various internal negotiations (between applications 
scientists, technicians, engineers, marketing people, and programmers) massaged the 
technique in preparation for commercialization.  In this way, the Nanoscope has 
accrued MFM, “lift mode” and phase imaging, lateral force microscopy, imaging in 
fluid, scanning capacitance microscopy, scanning spreading resistance microscopy, 
electrostatic force microscopy, tunneling AFM, force pulling, nanoindentation, and 
other capabilities.  Other, more esoteric techniques have also developed along these 
lines, even if they are not ordinarily part of the Nanoscope package: scanning near-
field optical microscopy [BD1, 1/2/01], scanning thermal microscopy [AM1, 3/9/01; 
KW1, 2/23/01], ballistic electron emission microscopy [BK1, 10/23/01], scanning 
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electrochemical microscopy, etc.4  Indeed, there are now so many different kinds of 
probe microscopes that the SPM community faces the problem of forging naming 
conventions for them all (Friedbacher and Fuchs 1999). 
Open and Closed Architectures 
 Beyond naming, mode proliferation raises an array of questions for both 
manufacturers and users.  In particular, companies must negotiate which variations to 
follow up, which innovative research groups to ally with, and when to stake the firm’s 
credibility on one mode or another.  One recurring commercial SPM design issue – the 
question of “open” versus “closed” instrument architecture – nicely illustrates this 
process of negotiation.  An open architecture is one in which the manufacturer designs 
the black box to be more “translucent” – electronics schematics and operating 
software are available to the user and both hardware and software can be tinkered with 
by the customer rather than just the manufacturers’ engineers (Jordan and Lynch 1992; 
1993).  A closed architecture is more like the traditional Latourian black-box – its 
workings are enclosed and secret, and customers are discouraged from modifying 
them or even thinking too carefully about how they work.  This does not prevent 
idiosyncratic local practices from springing up around the instrument, but it channels 
the nature and meaning of those practices in particular ways. 
 Recall from Chapter Six the paradox common to many instrument makers (the 
“boxwallah’s dilemma”).  The manufacturer must cast itself as being culturally 
distinct from its customers in order to allow them to justify buying rather than 
                                                 
4 As explained in Chapter One, these microscopes differ primarily in the method of exchanging 
information between the tip and the sample; secondarily, they differ in the shape and material of the 
probe itself, as well as in their best resolution and the types of samples for which they are most useful.  
In NSOM, the probe is usually a small fiberoptic waveguide, or sometimes a cantilever with a very 
small aperture, that allows the instrument to measure evanescent light waves near the sample; SThM is 
similar to an AFM, with a special cantilever for measuring thermal effects; BEEM is a modified STM 
that feedsback on electrons that are tunneling out of buried metal or semiconductors layers, rather than 
the surface layer; and SECM is similar to electrochemical STM, but with the tip much further from the 
surface. 
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building; yet the manufacturers must cast itself as culturally similar to its customers to 
allow them to believe the company’s promises.  Starting with the introduction of the 
Nanoscope II in 1988, and even more so after the DNA controversies of 1990-2 
(reviewed in Chapter Six), Digital Instruments made a very closed architecture central 
to its solution to the boxwallah’s dilemma.  Indeed, Digital is famous for hiding the 
workings of its microscopes from its customers – by, for instance, filing off the serial 
numbers of electronics components so that users cannot figure out what exact circuit is 
being use.  Some users and rivals attribute this behavior to DI’s paranoia that someone 
else might copy their products.  DI people, though, dissolve the architecture issue by 
pointing out that (A) replication through reverse engineering is too difficult to be 
worth a competitor’s time; and (B) “open” and “closed” are relative values, and 
Digital’s instruments are open enough to meet customers’ needs. 
 
CM: Were you catching flak over having a closed architecture? 
VE: Why?! 
CM: I talk to some people and they say “yeah, DI’s closed and we wish we 
could tinker with it more.” 
VE: There was nothing you could do with [an open architecture].  I’m sorry, 
okay, we give you the source code then we’re not going to answer your 
questions, okay....  You can’t understand that shit.  We’re not going to answer 
your questions so it’s a joke.  Topo[metrix] would say “well, we’re open.”  All 
right, open one of their instruments, call them up and see what you get.  The 
answer was you don’t get shit.  You’re dealing with people who want to take 
your money because that’s business.  They’ll say whatever....  Our point was 
we don’t lie ever and we’re going to do things in a way that’s beneficial to the 
customer.  It’s not beneficial if I say “oh by the way here’s a program and you 
could do something with it,” because we know you can’t.  We can’t even do 
anything with it.  Are you kidding?  If we changed one line of this code it all 
blows up. [VE1, 3/20/01] 
Saltiness aside, this is an interesting quote.  It describes open architecture as an 
illusion and a marketing gimmick – only disreputable companies would try to 
convince customers that they would have any luck tinkering with an instrument as 
complex as a commercial SPM.  Moreover, this complexity is daunting even to the 
manufacturer – all the modes and capabilities crammed into a Nanoscope, and the 
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layers of its evolving hardware and software, make the architecture too interrelated for 
any customer to deal with [KB1, 3/23/01]. 
Indeed, the chaos of DI’s culture of invention was one of the major arguments 
within the company for not having an open architecture; openness would present an 
enormous management problem in that the code is so littered with little innovations 
done here and there, with very little documentation, that making the black box 
transparent is nearly impossible.  Also, the tricks and shortcuts embedded in this code 
could present a credibility problem if they were presented to users.5  The Nanoscope 
code takes a very noisy signal and smoothes it heavily to present to the user [JG3, 
6/21/02; PM1, 10/18/01].  DI people take great pride in this code, but other builders 
often complain that the level of smoothing is “illegitimate,” that the tricks used are 
“cheating.”  In some ways, a Nanoscope’s signals resemble sausages and laws – users 
might not want to see them being made.  For DI, there’s no reason why ordinary users 
would want to see what happens to the signal; but for some probe microscopists, an 
open architecture (like food labeling and transparent government) protects the 
consumer by allowing them to see how knowledge is made. 
 Thus, the open versus closed question reflects differing visions of the user 
(Woolgar 1991).  For DI, customers have plenty to do figuring out new ways to use 
the instrument, while Digital assumes responsibility for modifying and innovating the 
instrumentation.  Customers are not exactly passive – they can influence design 
indirectly in a number of ways – but they should be well-behaved.  The decision to 
make a closed architecture also stemmed from DI’s own vision of itself (early on) as a 
company of smart, inventive people designing microscopes, rather than a 
                                                 
5 I’m indebted to Ann Johnson for thinking of the programmers who write the Nanoscope’s code as the 
modern equivalent of the early modern “invisible technician” (Shapin 1989).  Programmers make the 
instrument reliable and user-friendly, yet their invisibility to customers is necessary to inspire 
confidence in its data. 
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bureaucratized organization with departments dedicated to handling customers rather 
than building instruments. 
 
It was part of the business decision that Virgil made.  We can make an open 
architecture system, but an open architecture requires support.  If we do that 
then we need a software engineer basically just for support.  That was at a time 
when we had a total of three software engineers.  So they said “this is not cost 
effective, this is not what we really want to do.”  It was really part of the same 
decision that we’re not going to build one-offs for people.  We want a general 
purpose, multi-application microscope that people can use easily.  Giving 
people access to all aspects of the software, source code, schematics, just 
wasn’t part of that model. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
Obviously, though, with an instrument that has so recently been commercialized, and 
which is being used in disciplines with a tradition of instrument-building, there has 
been disagreement with DI’s vision of the user. 
 
The relationship with the STM community was certainly good.  Well it sort of 
broke down into two groups, actually.  The relationship with the part of the 
community that always thought you had to build your own equipment was 
always somewhat strained, partially because of the decision early on with the 
digital control system not to provide source code.  It was kind of a black box.  
So that strained the relationships with that side of the community.  On the other 
side of the community was the people who just wanted a microscope that 
worked, weren’t really interested in the details of building a scanning tunneling 
microscope, that wasn’t what they were after.  What they were after was to be 
able to use a scanning tunneling microscope to learn something about what 
they were really interested in.  With those people we had very good 
relationships because we provided an STM that you could get running in an 
hour and a half. [MT1, 2/26/01] 
 Several DI competitors have developed open architectures specifically to 
market to certain kinds of researchers.  At Park, for instance, building customized 
and/or customizable instruments accorded well with the self-image of the “gentleman 
scientist” absorbed more with interesting technical problems than with market share. 
 
Park had some fantastic technologies that we developed, our reliability wasn’t 
the greatest but we were always known as a technical innovator as a company.  
DI didn’t do many specials, Park did.  But with their reliability, and their 
software was very clean, so they sold a lot.  Because, just doing what it did, 
their instrument was very easy to demonstrate.  But in terms of who had the 
largest field of view, who could scan the fastest, who had the most linear scans, 
all that sort of thing, Park was consistently ahead in being able to demonstrate 
those things.  But it always turned out to be harder to use and it was more for 
the Ph.D. kind of person....  So we would give customers the source code, we 
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would give them the electronics schematics.  Digital Instruments was very 
closed, it was called a black box.  They actually had a very arrogant way about 
them, you could have any color you wanted so as long as it’s black.  We would 
be much more open about it and got some sales from doing that.  We did better 
in the universities than DI did, but they did much better with the corporations 
who have the money, and so therefore grew faster. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
At Topometrix, open architecture was a core marketing position meant to draw in 
customers dissatisfied with DI’s black box. 
 
Topometrix certainly got started with the open architecture, I would say before 
everybody else.  And why?  One of the reasons to do it there was that we were 
the underdog.  We had some nice products, but we certainly weren’t known in 
the industry.  So how do you get people to want to try your product?  You look 
at where a competitor is weak or at least is not doing something you could do.  
At the time Digital Instruments tried to keep everything very proprietary and 
not allow people to have open access.  So we said, “well, what do we have to 
lose?  We have nothing to lose.  Let’s just make our electronics so that it’s 
open for people and make the software so it’s open for people....  So yes we 
got sales, we certainly got some people who were angry at competitors because 
they wouldn’t allow them to do those things, but once again it’s pretty much 
the researchers who want to play with everything, and that’s like 1% or 2% of 
the market, or maybe 0.1% or something.  But if you have no sales that’s a 
pretty nice way to start. [PW2, 3/30/01] 
 The architecture debate is simultaneously about the nature of the user, the 
proper relationship between user and manufacturer, and the locus of innovation.6  
Proponents of open architectures see them as letting users advance the technology 
more quickly; and a quick manufacturer can enroll innovative users in the 
development of products. 
 
But if you look today we actually have customers doing things that are really 
exciting and getting other customers excited that we would have no way to 
spend enough money to do....  That’s pretty much how a lot of this stuff gets 
born.  So the open architecture certainly helps advance new areas.  I would say 
DI has had very closed software, but their microscope itself is open enough 
that people could try a lot of new experiments.  So that advanced the hardware 
side.  But at Topometrix and at Park the software was much more open, so 
people could advance the hardware and software together, and a lot of the new 
advancements will be done that way. [GA1, 3/12/01] 
                                                 
6 The open architecture debate in probe microscopy bears some resemblance to the open source debate 
in computing; indeed, many of the people I interviewed were quick to bring up those resemblances as a 
way to structure their narratives.  For some analysis of open source cultures in computing, see 
Nissenbaum (2004) and Lee and Cole (2003). 
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 The crux of the open/closed architecture debate is this – for every microscope 
manufacturer, microscope users are potential customers, collaborators, and 
competitors.  Customers might use the product in an innovative way that the company 
could repackage and market; but many such avant-garde researchers always seem on 
the edge of building their own microscopes or even starting their own SPM 
companies.  The trick for established manufacturers, then, is to corral users as 
collaborators, not competitors.  A more open architecture shapes the manufacture/user 
relationship as one in which practically every customer is a collaborator of some sort.  
The open architecture is seen as allowing customers to modify and innovate more of 
the instrument than a closed architecture; thus, early on, a Park customer could tinker 
with their AFM in ways that only the engineers at DI could with a Nanoscope [BP1, 
2/3/04].  Thus, an open architecture lets companies out-source R&D for new 
products.7  Open architectures are less standardized, since customers modify them to 
their needs, causing headaches for both manufacturer and user, but surveillance of 
users’ changes also creates efficient channels for reimporting innovations. 
 
To be honest all we do if you buy a system and you want open architecture, 
you’ll get the software, you get a way to compile it, you get a manual about it, 
and you can talk to our programmers about it, but we won’t help you do your 
specific code.  Just impossible.  The minute you take whatever we have and 
start modifying it, there’s no way for us to ever reconcile how to fix ours 
relative to yours.  Now, there are times though when customers do exciting 
things and they’ll say “would you carry this back to your production 
software?”  If it’s definable then we will do that.  We will literally take that 
capability.  We’ll say “well that’s pretty interesting.”  Usually you can’t use 
their code because they’ve done it in some way that you can’t carry into 
production code.  But as long as they can explain what they did, and they’ve 
already demonstrated it so you know the proof of concept’s good, then you can 
just recode it in your own software.  That part has really been very good for us. 
[GA1, 3/12/01] 
Today, the only major manufacturer to specialize in open architecture systems is 
RHK; not surprisingly, RHK sees its customer base as coming from surface science 
                                                 
7 This is similar to the story told in Lindsay (2003). 
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and other fields with strong instrument-building traditions.  Indeed, RHK started out 
by, and still gets by on, marketing pieces of a complete UHV STM system, allowing 
customers to build the rest of the instrument themselves, to their own specifications 
and for their own targeted applications.  This puts RHK in a delicate position.  On the 
one hand, they want to sell larger, more expensive systems that package together all 
the pieces of a UHV STM.  On the other hand, they want to continue targeting a 
subdiscipline with an instrument-building tradition, and to capitalize on customers’ 
participation in that tradition to appropriate their innovations.  Over the years, RHK’s 
system has accrued sedimented layers of functions and capabilities through its 
extended dialogue with its customers; often, as with most SPM companies, one or two 
exceptional users contribute the bulk of these new modes. 
 
Someone would come to us and say “geez, I’d like to modulate the bias 
because I want to do a dI/dV instead of just an I-V curves.”  So we’d figure out 
how to put an input into that line, filter or isolate it appropriately so it wouldn’t 
induce more noise.  Eventually we just kept evolving more and more inputs on 
the back panel, and ways of bringing signals in and out.  So we’re constantly 
adding little nuances into the software to do these very specific kinds of 
research....  The other half of this is Miquel [Salmeron]’s initial relationship in 
working with us on the control.  He had a staff scientist there, Frank Ogletree, 
who was an extremely knowledgeable scientist with electrical design and 
software skills.  He’s written our software and continues to write our software.  
That relationship has been really key to the whole company....  Part of the 
agreement with Frank is he writes all of their specific codes for their 
applications and that all gets incorporated into the commercial product we sell.  
So we end up with a beta test site, and a scientist running our software who 
really understands all the nuances of the technique, which gets a product to 
market much faster than our competition. [JG4, 6/29/01] 
Such exceptional users both offer innovations that can be repackaged and marketed, as 
well as signal other potential customers that the company’s systems are not so 
standardized and inflexible that they will be useless for avant-garde users who might 
otherwise build their own. 
 For DI (and other closed architecture manufacturers), managing users is a more 
layered and mediated process.  For instance, DI has a large applications department 
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that handles most ongoing relationships with customers.  “Applications” covers both 
the people who do setup and training, look at problem samples, and run in-house 
microscopes to help in the development process, as well as the scientists brought in as 
post-docs or permanent employees to research the use of the company’s microscopes 
in new areas.  Note how this replicates the division of labor of the Hansma lab; indeed, 
Paul Hansma’s graduate students often become DI engineers, and both Paul and Helen 
Hansma have had postdocs move to DI as applications scientists. 
 Applications people fill many functions for DI.  They role-play users, by 
putting the instruments through all the idiosyncratic paces that users might.  They help 
with marketing, by translating DI’s rhetoric for specific disciplinary audiences and 
being missionaries for the technique: 
 
I ended up traveling a lot and being a diplomat.  I think there was some 
marketing involved.  I was involved with the marketing department in terms of 
making the brochures coherent to biologists.  Putting together talks and going 
out to different biology departments all over the world.  Giving seminars, 
sometimes at conferences, just showing what we were talking about, the 
convincing stuff, where the field had been, where it is now, where it’s headed, 
and who was doing the work and what the new improvements in hardware 
were, etc., etc.  They [DI] saw a future in biology, they wanted to bring in 
someone that was a biologist that also knew AFM and was young and foolish 
enough to travel a hundred days a year.  But I also got some research done. 
[MA1, 10/12/01] 
Applications scientists do in-house research, simultaneously forging new techniques 
(and hence new markets) and increasing the company’s credibility as a source for the 
generation of new knowledge.  This makes them colleagues in a strong sense of the 
people to whom DI is selling its microscopes – they go to the same conferences, look 
at the same samples, publish in the same journals (Manalis, et al. 1995; Babcock and 
Hopkins 1999; Magonov and Heaton 2000; Moller, et al. 1999).  This makes it easy 
for them to interact with customers (and non-customers) in the same field, to survey 
how customers are using products, to locate new innovations or to bring back to DI’s 
designers a user’s-eye view of changes that need to be made.  Of course, this does not 
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guarantee those changes, but it does give users a voice within DI (and DI a voice 
within various disciplines). 
 
MA: I would tour labs and be able to see how they were applying the 
instruments and they might have some questions.  They would always have a 
list of things they wanted changed for me to take back....  “There’s a bug in the 
software version when I try to do this filtering,” or “wouldn’t it be great if you 
could scan blah blah easily,” “why can’t I move the tip over to this spot if I 
want to, how do I do that?...” 
CM: How were those requests for customizing regarded back at DI?  What 
would it take for a request like that to actually end up in a product? 
MA: Well you go down to the corner store, buy a six-pack, and take it to the 
software engineer.  I found that out late when I was there that’s how you get 
things done.  But usually, if you wanted something done you do it yourself.  I 
mean you physically go and find somebody and you do it.  The software group 
would have a list and there were certain priorities assigned.  It is a tough 
problem because you want to make an instrument that’s of maximum use to the 
maximum number of people.  And so you’re always going to have a few 
people that want to do it differently and if you go changing it to make everyone 
happy it ends up being a mess. [MA1, 10/12/01] 
One can see Digital Instruments’ approach to the boxwallah’s rationalizing mission in 
this applications scientist’s use of DI’s oft-repeated slogan of the instrument “of 
maximum use to the maximum number of people.”  DI builds just enough capabilities 
into its microscopes for the “average user” (whom applications scientists are expected 
both to speak for and mold).  Building in more capabilities – to accommodate users 
who deviate from the average – would, in the view of many at DI, actually make the 
instrument less usable for the masses [MT1, 2/26/01; MA1, 10/12/01].  The perennial 
problem for all manufacturers in the age of mode proliferation is to know which 
modes, variations, capabilities, and functions. will be worthwhile to commercialize 
and market.  At DI, applications scientists act as filters between the community and 
the company to constrain the number of variations and ameliorate resource allocation; 
but applications people are also interested participants in this process, and their 
specific interests have helped shape what a Nanoscope looks like and what it can do. 
 As we saw with RHK, microscope manufacturers also shepherd customers by 
giving special attention to particularly valuable “exceptional users.”  At DI, 
 
 327
applications people locate users with special applications or modifications, with whom 
the company then forms partnerships.  Interestingly, enrolling these customers can 
mean a slight opening of DI’s black box.  For instance, this researcher who was 
building a near-field scanning optical microscope with DI’s help: 
 
RD: We were working back then with Digital Instruments and so we were 
trying to use as much of their equipment as we could.  So we used their 
software, their electronics, and just kind of tricked some of their signal into 
thinking it’s their own....  Just because they’re good at making things easy-to-
use and reliable. 
CM: But DI is sometimes kind of secretive about how their stuff works, right? 
RD: Yeah, we had an agreement with them.  The deal was that they would help 
with stuff and in return they would get first rights and refusal on anything we 
developed.  They were interested in making a near-field microscope, so it was 
a collaboration.  But you’re right, they don’t like to give it up.  But they 
reluctantly would send us schematics of their electronics and stuff so that we 
would know where to get the signals, which helped tremendously.  The 
software, we would call them and they would make changes but they don’t 
have an open architecture, they won’t give you any of their code.  The 
electronics, they would send us schematics on things that we asked for, 
usually.  Sometimes we would have to go back and forth a couple times.  But 
this is back in the days when Virgil Elings was still running the show, and it 
was kind of nice because once you got a rapport with Virgil, since he owned 
the whole thing, he could say what he wanted, it would go.  So you’d just call 
up Virgil and chat with him for a bit and the next day there’d be packages 
arriving or their head coder would call you and ask you what you needed. 
[BD1, 1/2/01] 
For exceptional users who develop exciting new applications (rather than design 
innovations), DI often forms a more research-oriented collaboration – groups are 
invited to write applications notes, which look very much like journal articles and 
which are distributed to DI’s customers.8  There are rebounding gains in credibility for 
both manufacturer and user here – the user gets a widely distributed publication 
(without the hassle of peer-review), while the manufacturer gets the endorsement of a 
group that is seen as doing cutting edge research.  Publication can flow the other way 
as well; it was common, for instance, for very early buyers of DI microscopes (many 
                                                 
8 For instance, the authors of Quist, et al. (1996), a DI app note, are from Uppsala University; the 
authors of Heinz, et al. (1998), from a Johns Hopkins group headed by a former Hansma postdoc; the 
author of Goken (1998) is at the University of Saarland; and the authors of Lutz, et al. (1997) are 
affiliated with Dow Chemical and EK Consulting. 
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of whom continued to have exceptional user relationships) to list DI personnel as 
authors on their first few publications (such as Manne, et al. 1991) generated with the 
DI device. 
Users and Identity: The SPM community in the ’90s 
 Commercialization has proven to be a dynamic, changing, evolving process – 
new modes, new functions, and new applications are added constantly, new markets 
come in view, new companies come and go.  Importantly, the manufacturers’ view of 
differentiation within the probe microscopy community has been one of the most 
dynamic parts of this story.  How the manufacturers think about differences between 
themselves and their various customers, and how they think about differences among 
customers and non-customers, continually and profoundly shapes and reshapes the 
contours of the community.  For the first builders and runners, this fluidity has been 
central to staying at the forefront of the technology; yet the ambiguities of identity 
induced by commercialization have also presented major challenges.  Each builder or 
runner group has developed different strategies for dealing with post-
commercialization realities. 
 Today, the early days of commercialization are seen as a golden age for the 
academic builder groups – their students had jobs to go to, they were able to barter 
expertise for equipment, their vision of STM and AFM was being branded, and 
hundreds of groups were buying instruments based (more or less) on their designs.  It 
was a heyday for runners as well – some found work in the manufacturers, while the 
rest founded their own STM or AFM groups, brokered sweet deals with the startups, 
and headlined the introduction of probe microscopy into various disciplines.  As 
commercialization facilitated the explosion in the number of SPMers, builders and 
runners both reaped the rewards.  They were no longer outsiders trying to flog a new 
and unproven technique.  Instead, they became the honored pioneers of a hot field, 
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allowing them to take up leadership positions within the ever-growing probe 
microscopy community by, e.g., running STM conferences or becoming the SPM-
savvy associate editors for various journals. 
 As commercial microscopes (especially AFMs) have become routine tools in a 
variety of industries and academic disciplines, though, builders and runners have faced 
certain existential problems.  In the days when almost everyone built their own 
instrument, the technology changed quickly relative to the number of people in the 
field; as information came in about what other groups were doing, builders changed 
directions on the fly.  The speed with which the AFM proliferated after the initial 
crude attempts at Stanford in 1985 is a good example – even though the early AFMs 
were incredibly difficult instruments to use, many groups saw what Binnig and Quate 
had done and quickly started building their own.  Even after commercialization, the 
technology still changed rapidly because builder groups could funnel a backlog of 
innovations into their associated startups. 
 With time, though, the startups grew and became much larger than any single 
academic group; also, the designs of, and practices for using, commercial STMs and 
AFMs stabilized.  Probe microscopy technology continued to change, but via 
variations on the commercial architectures – the design of the commercial instruments 
anchored what could be done with an SPM, and what users could expect to do with 
their SPMs.9  There were debates about just how much leeway users should be given, 
but even the most open architecture is more standardized and structured than the 
home-built instruments of the previous era.  Moreover, builder groups began to face a 
serious question – who, exactly, was the audience for their innovations?  If no one 
could replicate what they were doing on a commercial instrument, then their only 
audience would be other builders – and, with the number of builders dwindling both as 
                                                 
9 A kind of post-closure variation, as described in Rosen (1993). 
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a percentage of the SPM community and even in real numbers, playing to that 
audience began to entail a loss of credibility. 
 Builders can, of course, simply accept that times have changed and forego 
being builders – either by buying commercial instruments, or by leaving probe 
microscopy entirely.  Other options are to work on less radical changes that fit within 
the framework of the commercial instruments, or to push outside the envelope of 
probe microscopy by developing related (but non-microscopy) technologies.  Quate’s 
group, for one, has done the latter, working more and more on AFM-inspired data 
storage technologies rather than microscopy [MT2, 10/15/01; SM1, 3/13/01].  Hansma 
has split the difference by developing ultrasmall cantilevers for ultrafast AFM, and by 
pioneering force puller technology that uses stationary cantilevers to pry apart 
complex molecules [PH1, 3/19/01; HG1, 11/14/01].  Many builders who continue to 
build see themselves now, I believe, as mediators between the SPM manufacturers and 
the rest of the SPM community.  That is, they continue tinkering with the technology 
and developing new modifications and functions, while realizing that the exigencies of 
commercialization mean that very few groups will replicate what they have done.  
Rather, they work to display their innovations to both the manufacturers and their 
customers, hoping to create enough demand that their innovations will be 
commercialized. 
 Former runners face similar choices.  Once, they could coast on their close 
relationships with both builder groups and manufacturers, and ride the prestige of 
having introduced the technique into their discipline, thereby winning acclaim from 
two different communities [JN1, 6/28/01; JH1, 6/10/02].  As commercialization 
matured, though, use of STM or AFM in their disciplines became routine; and other 
researchers caught up enough to advance the technology and forge “exceptional user” 
relationships with the manufacturers.  To remain “exceptional,” some runners have 
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drifted into building microscopes (or SPM-related technologies) – with the difficulties 
this implies.10  Other runners realize that their “exceptional” status is, in all likelihood, 
ephemeral, and that someday they will merge back into their home communities as 
ordinary probe microscopists.  Adjusting to these changes in role, though, can be 
difficult.  Many of the early builders and runners look back on the ’80s and early ’90s 
as a thrilling time, and ending that phase of their careers is unappetizing.  So some try 
to ride the wave of innovation for as long as they can before becoming less 
“technology-driven.” 
The Fall and Rise of the STM Conferences 
Probably the most acute symptom of these anxieties about role can be seen in 
the changing attitudes of builders and runners to the STM Conferences.  Remember 
that the early conferences were about trading ideas for building STMs and AFMs, and 
getting newcomers up to speed on how to construct and operate the instruments.  
Today, very few people build their instruments, and welcoming newcomers is a job for 
manufacturers.  Moreover, as STM and (especially) AFM have spread to more and 
more disciplines, it has become difficult to keep all the techniques’ practitioners under 
a single umbrella.  For many, the STM conferences have lost their reason for being: 
 
We’d go to this thing called the STM meeting.  They were really fun for a 
while because they were really small....  It’s a conference that has largely 
outlived its usefulness.  It used to be there was some common theme.  It used 
to be small enough that you could pay attention to everything that was going 
on – biologists, chemists, physicists, everything.  There’d be three hundred 
people in the room and that’d be it.  Once it got up to a thousand, with parallel 
sessions, it started being like any other conference.  I suppose that you could 
argue that there would still be room for a small conference focused on new 
developments in instrumentation, but as far as I know there isn’t really that sort 
                                                 
10 Two probe-based techniques that were hot in 2000 were multi-probe data storage and force pullers.  
The former uses an array of AFM cantilevers to scan across a surface, occasionally striking the surface 
to leave behind a mark that represents a “bit” of data.  The same array can then be used to read out data 
produced in this way.  Force pullers work by attaching one end of a biomolecule to a cantilever and the 
other end to a substrate.  As the cantilever is moved up, it pries open bonds within the molecule, which 
can be sensed as changes in the deflection of the cantilever. 
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of conference.  It becomes part of this STM Conference where people are just 
presenting results in a diverse range of fields. [JN1, 6/28/01] 
 Yet, for diverse reasons, a number of groups keep these conferences rolling.  
For manufacturers, these conferences offer an extraordinary concentration of their 
customers, who are often feted and schmoozed, offered announcements of new 
products and developments, and given glimpses (or even trials) of new technologies; 
thus, for users, conferences offer a chance to have their voices heard by the 
manufacturers and give feedback on their systems, as well as to see where the 
companies are going.  Conferences give manufacturers a chance to attract new users, 
or to poach customers away from their competitors by setting up booths in the vendor 
exhibit; like many such meetings, though, the STM conference often has trouble 
getting attendees to take a look at the vendors’ booths.  At an STM conference I 
attended, not only were manufacturers giving away the usual complement of free 
tweezers, pens, slinkies, key chains, and candy, but the conference organizers, having 
noted a paucity of attendees in the vendor exhibits halfway through the meeting, 
resorted to giving the vendors coupons for free beer that they could distribute to 
anyone inspecting their wares. 
 Perhaps more important for the manufacturers, the STM conferences present 
opportunities to see and be seen.  All of their would-be competitors are on display, so 
that their rivals’ new products and innovations can be inspected.  Also, in the late ’90s, 
with the demise of some manufacturers, and spinning off of others, many former 
colleagues now work for rival companies.  The STM Conferences and other meetings 
are a place where they can meet on more or less neutral ground and engage in friendly 
competition – indeed, the vendor exhibit is the site of much horseplay and collegiality 
between people in the middle ranks of the manufacturers.11  In conference talks, 
                                                 
11 There is some literature on vendor behavior at trade shows and similar situations: Hinrichs, et al. 
(2004); Palmer and Forsyth (2002); Clark and Pinch (1992). 
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manufacturers engage in similar networking, display, and observation.  Their 
applications scientists, for instance, give papers showing how to adapt STMs and 
AFMs for particular uses or samples.  The company’s scientists demonstrate the utility 
of the instrument, and the validity of knowledge produced with that instrument, in a 
public setting where they can interact with, and be questioned by, their colleagues.  
Each company’s stable of “exceptional users” fulfills a similar function by presenting 
their work while highlighting the role played by their commercial STM or AFM (and 
directing potential replicators back to the manufacturer). 
 At the same time, those who wish to become exceptional users also present 
papers, and manufacturers’ scientists and engineers circulate around to talks that seem 
promising as sources of new products.  In this venue builders play out their role as 
mediators between ordinary users and the manufacturers, since both audiences are 
present and watching both the talks and each other.  New techniques from established 
or up-and-coming builder groups attract large crowds; and promising techniques may 
become the “buzz” of the conference.  At an STM conference I attended in 2001, 
Hansma-type ultrasmall, ultrafast cantilevers seemed to be the buzz; in other years, 
near-field scanning optical microscopy (NSOM) or carbon nanotube probes or force 
pulling were similarly hot topics.  Once an application accrues this kind of 
momentum, it becomes difficult for even the most jaded manufacturer to ignore. 
 Funding agencies and professional societies, too, see benefits from prolonging 
the STM Conferences.  In many ways, the interests of these organizations resonate 
with those of the manufacturers.  Granting agencies find a dense concentration of their 
grantees at these meetings, and their representatives attend to survey progress and get 
feedback; they can make themselves available to people who want grants; and can 
observe new directions in the field.  Professional societies gain memberships and dues 
from these meetings, while reifying the discipline itself.  After all, the “STM 
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Conference” is the most visible symptom that there is such a thing as an “SPM 
community.”  Indeed, the American Vacuum Society (which hosts the STM 
conference in North America) is a society in search of a community; and for some, the 
STM conferences provide the kernel of a community to bring into the AVS’ fold. 
Finally, the STM Conferences are also propelled by elite SPMers.12  These 
people plan and organize the STM conferences, play the most vocal and regulatory 
roles at the meetings and in the literature, their work is most widely acknowledged as 
exemplary by other SPMers, and their discourse focuses most exclusively on SPM.  
Most of them still build their own instruments, though a few are various companies’ 
exceptional users.  This group faces its own kind of identity problems in the 
commercialization era, and their response has been, in part, to reconstitute themselves 
as a “craft elite” of the SPM community.  Unlike some of their colleagues, they have 
decided that their investment in STM or AFM is so great that they wish to tie their 
professional identities more to the technique and the instrument than to their home 
disciplines.  This means they constantly tinker with their microscopes and develop 
new advances in the technology, rather than work on a range of samples or 
applications on which they can report to other physicists, chemists, biophysicists, or 
surface scientists.  Indeed, commercialization has pushed some of these people into 
building extremely specialized, sophisticated, esoteric microscopes for specialized, 
sophisticated, esoteric applications such as single molecule vibrational spectroscopy, 
magnetic resonance force microscopy, or atom manipulation (Ho 1998; Eigler 1998; 
Ferris, et al. 1998; Viani, et al. 1999; Mamin and Rugar 2001). 
The positions of these people could be extraordinarily unstable – it is never 
quite clear who their audience is or who might replicate what they are doing.  The 
existence of an STM Conference, though, nicely stabilizes their identity issues.  It 
                                                 
12 For a classic analysis of the role of such elites, see Mulkay (1976). 
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presents them with an audience that can appreciate the high quality of the instruments 
they build and the results they achieve; it reifies a group with a history that they can be 
seen to have been pioneering; and it makes their research seem advanced rather than 
esoteric.  Still, it takes a great deal of sociotechnical work both to remain in the elite, 
and to justify elite work.  On the one hand, the craft elite meticulously builds highly 
idiosyncratic, often quite expensive, microscopes that little resemble what most users 
work with; hence, many in the elite are found at the more prosperous national and 
corporate labs, though academics who build up enough resources are also major 
players.  These groups also work hardest at presenting highly rendered, artistic images, 
in contrast to ordinary users of commercial instruments, many of whom do not stray 
from their microscope’s default color palette. 
In organizing the STM meetings, this elite is more or less self-selecting: 
 
CM: How did you get to be conference chair? 
RW: I don’t know.  I volunteered to help out and the next thing I knew I was 
the chairman....  Like in any field, there’s a kind of clique or something of 
leading people, and things get shared around.  So people like Feenstra and 
Hamers and Wiesendanger, and other people have had their turn in various 
capacities....  Frankly I don’t know how I hand this off to the next person, I 
don’t know how to call a meeting.  There are sort of invisible structures in 
place.  So it’s just a cliquey thing and, you know, everyone’s welcome.  
Everyone who wants to step up and be in that clique is kind of welcome.  I 
think you get looked over as you come to the door and it’s a gradual thing.  
“Who’s he and are we going to let him in?”  But then inevitably anyone who’s 
willing to do some work is partly already in the door, and then you might not 
get fully allowed in if you don’t have the sort of oomph to back you up, it’s a 
very vague thing. [BW2, 5/22/01] 
We will see in the epilogue how this elite, and others tied to the STM Conferences, 
have drawn on nanotechnology discourse as a way to stabilize the problems of 
audience and identity surrounding these meetings in the commercialization era. 
The Big Machines 
The STM Conferences are a synecdoche for the simultaneous success and 
disruption of the probe microscopy community in the commercialization era.  In some 
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ways, no part of the community has been left more uncertain by widespread 
commercialization than the manufacturers responsible for it.  Probe microscopy in the 
’90s expanded rapidly in numbers of users, in places employed, and in types of 
disciplines and communities to whom it was made relevant.  As we’ve seen, this 
wrought many changes in how academic groups viewed the instrument, and how they 
viewed themselves as builders or users.  Somewhat less dramatically, though more 
lucratively, probe microscopes (primarily AFMs and MFMs) crept into the industrial 
workplace – especially quality control and reliability labs in a variety of 
manufacturing sectors.  Today, anyone who manufactures products, the quality of 
which may depend on nanoscale properties (e.g. adhesives, photographic film, ball 
bearings, liquid crystal displays, microelectronic components, and so on), likely owns 
several commercial AFMs. 
 At the beginning of the ’90s, many probe microscope companies turned to this 
industrial market; the time seemed right both to build interest among potential 
industrial users, and to harden the commercial instruments to make them more suitable 
for industrial use.  Symptomatic of this new focus were the first commercializations of 
probe microscopy activity at IBM and Bell.  IBM, of course, had long led research in 
STM, AFM, and MFM, but the early ’90s marked the company’s first efforts to make 
real money off the technology.  In general, the early ’90s recession forced IBM to find 
overlooked sources of profit.  At IBM Research this meant, initially, an increased 
willingness to defend Big Blue’s patents.  As we’ve seen in Chapter Three, Binnig’s 
research style made patent protection difficult, but IBM started to press its case 
anyway, particularly with DI and Park.  This led to a surprising collaboration between 
the two rival start-ups; though Park and DI recognized that IBM might have a right to 
some royalties, they did not recognize the demand for a blanket 1% of all sales that 
Big Blue was demanding.  Thus, they cooperated to research which exact pieces of an 
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STM or AFM had originally been patented by IBM; in doing so, the weakness of some 
of Big Blue’s patents put the start-ups in a good negotiating position, even with 
respect to the biggest of corporate giants: 
 
It turned out we [Park and DI] worked together a lot on intellectual property 
stuff because of IBM.  It was funny, Park Scientific and DI were the #1 and #2 
companies, we were pretty serious competitors, but because we had this, not a 
common enemy, but a common problem in IBM wanting to assert their 
royalties, we worked together on understanding the patents and how IBM came 
to have all these patents.  There was a lot of monkey business going on in these 
patents....  You have to go back to 1952, oddly enough.  IBM was found guilty 
of antitrust.  As a result they had to open their patent portfolio.  They suggested 
that as an appeasement for this going forward.  So IBM told any company that 
operated in their field, or any company that was likely to infringe their patent, 
“look, we’ll license all our patents to your for 1% royalty, if you license all of 
yours to us.”  Just we’re-open-you’re-open.  If you use our stuff you pay us 
1%.  And they never enforced it.  But the appeasement had a 40 year life, I 
think.  Starting in 1992, because it was 1952 to 1992, they started sending out 
letters saying “we’re looking to collect our 1%, and you guys make STMs and 
AFMs.  We hold the fundamental STM patent, we hold the AFM patent.”  Our 
companies had been in business now 4, 5 years, and it was going to cause a big 
big problem because we were going to owe back royalties, we were going to 
have to pay IBM this big lump sum.  1% is all bottom-line stuff, right....  But 
IBM was really playing hardball because they had a new internal decree that 
IBM’s intellectual property would earn the company a billion dollars a year, 
and they were really pushing that, and this meant a million or two in royalties, 
so it wasn’t chump change.  In the end we had to pay them but we really 
battled it down to quite a bit less than it was going to be. [MK1, 10/12/01] 
 IBM also involved itself in the “big machines” – AFMs for industry.  With its 
stake in both magnetic data storage and semiconductor manufacturing, IBM had an 
abiding interest in non-destructive, high resolution AFM for processing and reliability 
studies, as well as process-line quality control.  Thus, a former Quate lieutenant, 
Kumar Wickramasinghe, was easily able to convince his managers to let him develop 
a large, factory-line (non-contact) instrument for IBM use.  Crucially, IBM decided to 
develop the so-called SXM internally and also sub-contract it to DI [KW1, 2/23/01]. 
This came when DI was about to expand into the industrial market anyway, so 
the IBM offer was hard to refuse.  Elings, though, was skeptical of non-contact mode 
and of what they perceived to be IBM’s high-science approach.  DI’s whole design 
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philosophy was based on developing easy-to-build, easy-to-use modes that could be 
made workable in the hands of the largest number of users; the company saw its 
customers as people with little time to understand finicky techniques like non-contact 
[MT1, 2/26/01; DB2, 3/23/01].  So the partnership with Big Blue sputtered, though DI 
used it to springboard into designing industrial instruments.  Wickramasinghe, 
meanwhile, finished his SXM and soon IBM was batch-producing them for its own 
semiconductor lines.  Later, with the recession in full swing and IBM management 
pushing researchers to contribute to the bottom line, the SXM was farmed out to 
Veeco (a Manhattan Project-era vacuum engineering company, one of the corporate 
founders of the AVS, and now a manufacturer of tools for semiconductor processing) 
to sell externally. 
At Bell Labs, the company’s slow decline following AT&T’s breakup in 1984 
led to a similar restructuring of SPM research around more applied topics.  Joe 
Griffith, a former surface science STMer, used the company’s new, more commercial 
orientation, as a starting point for designing a factory-line metrology instrument 
relevant to many of the same applications as the SXM. 
 
I had my own [STM] instrument and we worked on that for a few years.  It 
worked out well.  But times began to change, and I guess it was about 1987 
Kumar Patel who is the executive director of my area got very interested in 
proximity x-ray lithography....  So I could see this coming.  One day I showed 
some data to my director and he did not like it, “this is not a good thing to be 
working on, you should be working on x-ray lithography.”  And it became 
clear that either I did that or I better go find some other place to do my work.  
So I went back to my office and thought very hard about it for several months 
in fact and considered for a while doing x-rays, as a way to do metrology on 
the patterns.  One thing that was becoming obvious was that they were having 
greater and greater difficulty measuring the dimensions of the features that 
they were making, and we needed to have a way to measure those.  So I 
decided that metrology would be an interesting area for me to get into.  
Originally I thought about it in terms of x-rays, but .... I went back to thinking 
about my probe microscopy and got to playing around with the idea, maybe I 
could do the metrology with a probe microscope.  One day I presented that 
idea to Kumar, and he liked it.  Well he said “yeah, this is a good thing to do, 
go do that.”  So I was still in probe microscopy but now applying it a little bit 
more directly to the metrology. [JG3, 2/28/01] 
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 As with Wickramasinghe’s SXM, Griffith’s big machine, though developed for 
Bell Labs’ own requirements, was soon farmed out to a manufacturer to build, sell, 
and generate licensing revenues for the corporate lab. 
 
In order to make this work in my lab I had purchased a little electronic box 
from a company called Atomis....  As the larger manufacturers were getting 
more and more sophisticated tools, especially as they went over to Windows, 
they were locking up the source code so that people couldn’t get access to it.  
The experimenter was forced to go and beg the company to make 
modifications to the code if you wanted to do something new.  And I really 
wanted to do the code, I knew how to write code and these guys at Atomis 
were willing to give me access to the code.  Well just after I had bought the 
thing from them they told me that they were being bought out by a fellow 
named Chuck Bryson who .... wanted to get into the probe microscope game.  
So as I was buying the tool from Atomis he was buying the company.  We 
quickly struck up a relationship and hit it off pretty well, and it turned out his 
ambitions were a little bit bigger than just making a probe microscope tool, he 
really wanted to make a metrology tool for the semiconductor industry, he 
wanted to go all the way, and very quickly got interested in our technology and 
the possibility of licensing it from us.  So that’s how all of that got started, it 
was a little bit of an accident.  On my end I had management who was eager to 
pursue this and his end he had the desire to go do it. [JG3, 2/28/01] 
 Several sociotechnical considerations are crucial in turning a research AFM 
into this kind of industrial tool.  First, these “big machines” are much larger than 
research AFMs, partly because they need to accommodate a larger sample.  In order 
for an industrial AFM to have a decisive commercial advantage over tools like the 
scanning electron microscope, it must be non-destructive.  For example, in the 
semiconductor industry, so much money goes into putting integrated circuits onto an 
individual wafer that manufacturers would prefer to be able to sell, rather than destroy, 
all of the wafers that they test [CP1, 3/19/01].  This means that relatively little 
(preferably no) sample preparation must be done – i.e., the sample must remain its 
normal size and shape; again, in semiconductor manufacturing, a wafer is tested at 
several points in its fabrication, so the entire wafer must be able to be moved into and 
out of an industrial AFM.  In research, samples can be cut down to small sizes to be 
placed into small microscopes, but in industry (where samples may be very costly or 
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where every product may undergo some quality checks), samples can be quite large 
(in semiconductor manufacturing, for instance, wafer sizes have crept up from 6” to 8” 
to 12” to 16” to keep pace with Moore’s Law).13  Large samples mean important 
changes in design.  In a research AFM, the scanning of the tip relative to the sample is 
done by moving the sample back and forth and keeping the tip stationary (thereby 
making the optics of deflection sensing less cumbersome).  In a large-sample AFM, 
though, scanning the sample would be slow and mechanically difficult, so AFM 
builders had to figure out a way to keep the optics simple while scanning the tip back 
and forth.14
 Also, industrial users are seen as having their own peculiar problems and 
expectations.  Time, money, and skill mean quite different things in industry than in an 
academic research environment.  Academic users are seen as not particularly caring if 
the instruments take a few weeks to learn how to use, or if they occasionally break 
down; graduate student labor is cheap and long-term.  Industrial users are seen as 
wanting tools that are more reliable and can be operated by anyone, not just Ph.D.s or 
Ph.D.s-in-training.  This last was one of the crucial weaknesses of the SXM: 
 
[The SXM] is just a stunning achievement.  But I think part of the problem was 
that it was too complicated for the fab environment....  An issue they [Texas 
Instruments] ran into was it took a very high level operator to make the thing 
work, especially in the early days, because it was just a very very touchy tool.  
There was a period in which Herschel wouldn’t let anybody else do certain 
measurements with it because he was the only one who could make it work.  
They were looking very very hard for somebody who wasn’t a Ph.D. who 
could run the thing.  And they finally found one.  They finally found a guy 
who was able to run the thing and his record said he wasn’t a Ph.D.  Well it 
turned out that the record was wrong, because the guy had lied on his 
employment application.  He had a Ph.D. and didn’t tell them.  Under normal 
                                                 
13 One of the many variants of Moore’s Law predicts a regular doubling of the number of transistors per 
wafer.  This is achieved both by decreasing the size of transistors and by increasing the size of the wafer 
(Moore 1965; Mackenzie 1996). 
14 Recall that with an optical detection scheme, a laser bounces off the cantilever into a detector (usually 
a photodiode).  This system was chosen over the STM-based detector partly because it has fewer 
moving parts.  If the tip, rather than the sample, has to be scanned, though, the laser must somehow 
move so that it stays focused on the cantilever moving beneath it. 
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circumstances that would’ve been grounds for firing but he was so good that 
instead they just moved him to another area.  So that tool ran into difficulties 
because the fab environment is such a demanding environment.  What they 
want in a fab is a machine where the operator pushes a button and either 
something happens or a number comes out.  That’s all they want.  They don’t 
want to know what’s going on inside.  With all of these tools it has been a real 
struggle to get up to the point where you could get it to that level of simplicity. 
[JG3, 2/28/01] 
At DI, this need for “push-button” tools sparked a decade-long program to develop 
robots and software for scanning algorithms to do all of the things a human operator 
does with a research microscope – replace samples, replace tips, know when tips need 
replacing, scan the sample, find interesting features, and assess/interpret the image. 
In making their AFMs fit for industrial use, manufacturers have had to adjust 
to customers who are seen as demanding more support and quicker service; but SPM 
makers with an interest in the industrial market have also had to adjust to being the 
kind of company that has the organization and ethic for taking care of such customers. 
 
The last three or four years I’ve been really focused on these automated 
systems.  We found the customers to be extremely demanding and they also 
have big dollars to throw around so we put a lot of attention into figuring out 
how to make the systems they can use....  You have to know what the users’ 
expectations are, how they expect to interact with the machine, the reliability 
they expect, the ease of service they expect, how the measurement is going to 
be output.  Every time you don’t know one of those things then you’ll get a call 
later saying, “what do you mean this feature is missing, every tool in our fab 
has this feature, how could yours not have it?”  We learned some of that the 
hard way in the early days because we evolved from a scientific instrument-
only company to a scientific instrument and automation company.  There was a 
lot of background information that we needed to learn, there was a steep 
learning curve. [CP1, 3/19/01] 
Live and Let DI 
 Thus, the big machines made significant demands on DI – suddenly, the 
company needed a bulked up service and support section to deal with industrial 
customers, a more sophisticated marketing department to entice those customers, and 
armies of programmers and engineers to construct the robots and code needed to build 
the tools those customers wanted.  DI’s resources drained into these projects, drawing 
attention away from development of its research instrument.  In the end, this was an 
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enormously successful strategy, in that DI was able to attract vast numbers of 
industrial users and dramatically expand its sales; by the end of the ’90s, there was no 
question that DI was the premier AFM manufacturer.  Yet neglecting the research 
market also opened niches for its competitors and caused friction within the company. 
 Though not everyone says so publicly, there is a good consensus inside and 
outside DI that the company “abandoned” the research market for much of the ’90s, 
and that that strategy significantly affected the contours of SPM commercialization. 
 
I get more and more inquiries from people now who are talking about 
controlling an older DI head with our controller....  They have no desire to 
upgrade their DI, because it doesn’t do what they want to do.  The common 
phrase I hear is DI has abandoned research.  I mean that’s a pretty general 
feeling in the industry is that they have gone commercial and they don’t care 
about researchers. [Executive at a DI competitor] 
Here’s how an engineer/manager at DI described it: 
 
We had lost our reputation, people thought we didn’t serve the research market 
anymore.  To some extent that was true.  For three and a half years, I counted, 
we didn’t come out with one significant new research product.  To me that was 
really putting us at risk. [KB1, 3/23/01] 
Still, retaining the research market was a high priority, even if development of DI’s 
research instruments was not.  The probe microscopy community, though, developed 
such that the commercial research SPM market thrived on new modes, new 
functionalities, and new applications.  DI’s applications department pressed the 
company’s advantage in some fields (primarily by pioneering tapping mode for a 
variety of applications [MA1, 10/12/01]), but this was only temporary salvation, 
especially since DI’s competitors were finding ways around its tapping mode patents.  
Digital felt it needed to block its competitors in the research market while continuing 
to focus its resources on the industrial sector. 
 Aside from obvious sales and marketing techniques, DI used a number of 
interesting tactics to discourage competitors and remain at the helm of the SPM 
community.  First, it quietly exited from its few cooperative activities with other 
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manufacturers such as IBM and Molecular Imaging.  Second, it began policing its 
intellectual property more fiercely.  With tapping mode gaining popularity, several of 
its competitors sought to market similar techniques.  For DI, this was obvious patent 
infringement – they had discovered the advantages of intermittent contact (albeit 
perhaps by accident) and had aggressively patented and marketed the technique.  It is 
safe to say that intermittent contact would not have become nearly as widespread 
without DI’s marketing campaigns; and it is probably also safe to say that the specific 
benefits of intermittent contact in a wide variety of applications would have lain 
dormant much longer without Digital’s discovery of tapping mode. 
The patentability of tapping mode, though, is widely contested, not only by 
DI’s rivals but also by many builders and runners.  Binnig and Quate, in their original 
AFM paper, had described both contact and non-contact modes, and many researchers 
point out that intermittent contact is therefore an obvious (and thus unpatentable) 
intermediate state (Binnig, et al. 1986a).  Others mention that academic articles 
describe something very similar to tapping mode well before DI’s patent (although 
they also admit that no one articulated the dramatic advantages of tapping until after 
Digital packaged it into the Nanoscope).  The power of tapping, combined with 
ambiguity over its meaning, made it an obvious site for patent litigation; competitors 
saw tapping mode as an easy steal, while DI saw patent protection as an easy way to 
preserve its share of the research market without diverting resources from 
development of industrial AFMs. 
Of the companies that developed their own intermittent contact modes, only 
Topometrix inspires real moral outrage from Digital veterans. 
 
Topometrix knew who they were.  They knew they weren’t Digital Instruments 
with its hugely superior technology and 30+ patents.  But Topo believed they 
had these other ideas about how to be in business – things like a business plan.  
DI never had one. Some of their technical ideas were just stupid and some 
were reasonable.  But their products were not well-executed.  The closer I 
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looked at the Topo instrument, the more repelled I was by the way the thing 
was put together and the attitude of “throw instruments over the transom and 
see if anybody bites.”  Another important thing about Topo was that they 
allowed investors to play with them.  We would get calls every week at DI 
from people with money wanting to buy in, but we turned down all of them.  
Topo gave investors a chance to participate – and most investors don’t know a 
good high tech product form a bad one.  So we had a competitor. [JW1, 
10/18/01] 
It’s easy to dismiss this comment as the rhetoric of one manufacturer about another; 
but something about Topometrix – both its instrument designs and its business 
practices –offends the sensibilities of DI people.  Topo’s use of modern business 
methods, I think, threatened DI’s ethic of iconoclastic skepticism; indeed, it was partly 
because of Topo’s success that DI became more formal and businesslike.  As we will 
see, this transition has sparked some friction at Digital.  Thus, pursuing Topometrix 
for patent infringement became an emotionally charged issue with DI, and one that, 
ironically, ended up draining resources and dissipating much of the company’s focus. 
 
Then we got involved in this patent dispute.  And instead of going into a cross-
licensing thing, or giving them any credit for their intellectual property or 
whatever the hell else one normally does we fought like a pit bull.  Looking 
back, we could have cut a deal and and let them die on the vine by dint of their 
own incompetence.  But, we were going to take the fuckers down.  We were 
bloody-minded, and this gets back to Virgil’s heart-head fusion.  In his view, 
they had offended our sensibilities by polluting our market with such an 
inferior product that they didn’t deserve to breathe the same air as us.  The 
result was that a huge amount of management’s time and energy and focus was 
consumed by this holy crusade against the evildoers of Brand X. [JW1, 
10/18/01] 
For Topometrix, DI’s patent was themselves a source of indignation – how 
could you patent an obvious extension of earlier work?  Indeed, for Topo, the lawsuit 
was an opportunity to unite different strands of indignation about Digital across the 
probe microscopy community; in the end, though, few microscopists were willing to 
voice their complaints in court, even when they might be germane to the case. 
 
Topometrix, historically, was doing quite well through 1993-1994.  When it 
got involved in this lawsuit it just pulled the wind out of the sails....  During 
that time Topometrix had gone from being a $12 million to being a $9 million 
company.  Barely surviving.  And Digital Instruments had grown from being 
say, at the start of the lawsuit they were an $18 million company, they had 
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gone to $40 or $50 million....  The patents they were alleging that we infringed 
were not valid patents.  Flat out they weren’t valid patents.  They were patents 
for things that had been done for years....  Customers don’t want to get 
involved....  There were people who could’ve made a difference....  They 
could’ve stood up and said, “I did that 3 years before the patent was filed.  I’ll 
sign a declaration.  It was too stupid to publish in a paper.”  But they wouldn’t 
do that because they didn’t want to get involved. [PW2, 3/30/01] 
The suit dragged on for three and a half years, ending in a draw – DI and Topo settled 
out of court by agreeing to drop the suits and counter-suits and cross-license their 
patent portfolios.  In truth, though, Topometrix was decimated – its customers had 
been scared off, its R&D had been derailed, and its finances had been drained.  DI, 
meanwhile, was expanding at a dramatic rate – its industrial microscope, the 
Dimension, was selling rapidly, and its hold on the research market was still firm. 
This disparity in fortunes allowed DI to begin eliminating its biggest rivals 
through purchase.  Between 1997 and 2001, the probe microscopy marketplace saw a 
remarkable streamlining (or constriction) as various competitors merged and 
submerged.  First Park sold itself to Thermo Electron, an instrument manufacturing 
holding company.  Then, Park (now christened Thermomicroscopes) hired 
Topometrix’ former CEO, Gary Aden, to reorganize the failing enterprise; Aden 
convinced his employers to purchase Topo and merge the two former rivals [GA1, 
3/12/01].  Next was DI’s turn – through the mid ’90s, Elings had been looking for 
someone to buy his company.  An initial approach from Wyko (a semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment company) turned sour, but eventually he started negotiations 
with Veeco, the company that commercialized Big Blue’s SXM. 
Elings’ deal with Veeco (which he and DI/Veeco’s managers call a merger, but 
many see as a buyout) has had many ramifications, but the reasoning at the time was 
simple.  First, Elings personally received a couple hundred million dollars.  Second, 
DI benefited from Veeco’s entrenched position in the semiconductor market; Digital 
had the microscope, but Veeco had the contacts and experience in the closed 
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community of chip manufacturers.  AFMs for semiconductor process-lines can sell for 
more than $1 million each, so each sale is crucial; and Veeco and its subsidiaries have 
been selling process-line equipment since the founding of the semiconductor industry 
in the ’50s.  Third, Veeco offered DI more orthodox management methods, and a 
structure for surviving the inevitable retirement of its charismatic leader.  Elings had 
built DI on personal rule; on both the technical and business sides, almost everyone 
reported directly to him [PW2, 3/30/01; JW1, 10/18/01].  Since he had never groomed 
a successor with the same kind of charismatic authority, Elings felt DI needed more 
by-the-book management to survive his departure. 
 Being part of Veeco made possible the final phase of DI’s triumph.  In late 
2000, Thermomicroscopes, slow in recovering from the Park/Topo merger, sold itself 
to DI/Veeco and became a subsidiary, TM Microscopes.  It is amusing and a little sad 
to watch DI employees adjust to this addition.  On the one hand, (as of mid 2002) they 
sometimes sound awkward and faltering in praising instruments that for a decade they 
had excoriated; on the other hand, they also express a shocked wonderment that, after 
all, there were some really smart people with some really good ideas at Thermo. 
Post-consolidation Proliferation 
 The “rationalization” of the Big Three manufacturers – their consolidation into 
one company, the streamlining of product lines, and the institution of highly rational 
business practices – has had some benefits for both the companies and their customers.  
The iron cage of consolidation, though, has also produced irrationalities and anxieties.  
So far, customers have complained little – some are uneasy, but content to wait and 
see how their lives are affected by the decrease in competition and the gradual 
elimination of open-architecture AFMs.  The anxieties of employees at DI and its 
former rivals, though, have broken into the open.  The best evidence for this is the 
exodus of employees from these companies in the late ’90s.  At Park, many 
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experienced engineers and scientists began drifting away even before the merger with 
Topometrix; after, even more moved on, since Thermomicroscopes eliminated Park 
product lines in which many in the company had a deep personal investment.  
Interestingly, former Park employees have formed an enclave at KLA-Tencor, a 
Silicon Valley semiconductor manufacturing equipment company and one of 
DI/Veeco’s major competitors in the wafer characterization business.  Thus, while the 
Park people no longer have their own company, they do still work together in an 
organization that competes with DI’s parent company. 
 At DI, the Veeco merger sparked unease and secession.  With the arrival of the 
Veeco management team and their rationalization of DI’s operation, many of Elings’ 
people felt alienated or sidelined.  The transition from charismatic leadership to 
routine management was jarring; and some saw Veeco’s philosophy as robbing DI of 
the spontaneity and chaos that made it successful.  Thus, employees drifted away: 
 
A couple years after the merger with Veeco, I would say the small AFM 
business was teetering on disaster because we lost, I did an analysis, about half 
of our AFM experience in years on the side of the company that dealt with the 
small systems....  The management really changed and there was a lot of 
uncertainty. [KB1, 3/23/01] 
In part, we can see these tensions as mirroring the role instabilities faced by builder 
and runner groups in the academic world.  With SPM commercialization now firmly 
entrenched, and the pace of innovation for the research market slowing, it was no 
longer clear what it meant to design and build commercial research STMs and AFMs.  
With consolidation, the moral economy of selling SPMs changed, and some DI 
engineers saw influence and respect shifting away from them. 
 
Ed Braun [a Veeco executive] comes in, he’s a little short guy, stands on a 
stool and says “you guys are doing everything right, why would we ever want 
to change anything, you guys are making money doing a perfectly good job, 
we’re not going to do a thing, we’re just going to leave you alone.”  Of course, 
they take over and one of the first things that happened that got the core group 
of people talking was they started giving the sales force commissions.  That 
may not sound like a big deal because pretty much every company does that.  
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DI actually never did for what I think is a very good reason, in that a sale, at 
least in a company that sells high-tech instrumentation, actually involves a lot 
more people than the salesman.  I mean the salesman will make the contact and 
maybe open and close the deal, but he’ll also bring the person back and 
somebody from applications will run the samples and get the data and do all 
this stuff, and maybe the guy’s going to have some technical questions, he’ll 
talk to some engineers, and he’ll need a new feature added so he’ll talk to some 
software people.  Basically a sale involves a bunch of people not just a 
salesman, so why should that guy get a huge cut of a sale for basically not 
having any, I don’t want to say non-productive, but I mean from an engineer’s 
point of view what a salesperson does is non-productive, it doesn’t contribute 
to any new products or anything like that. [DB2, 3/23/01] 
Like their academic counterparts, many commercial SPM builders look fondly on the 
late ’80s and early ’90s, when life was more exciting, work was more chaotic and less 
managed, and their individual contributions made a greater difference.  Accordingly, a 
group within DI began planning ways to revive the lost world of the SPM startups.  
The name of their venture – Asylum Research – is, of course, a double entendre.  On 
the one hand, Asylum is a refuge for those marginalized by Veeco; on the other hand, 
an asylum is a place for misfits and eccentrics, and the secessionists clearly want to 
cultivate the chaos and “craziness” that they see as underpinning DI’s success. 
 
While [Elings] hung around he ran a shield between DI and Veeco in New 
York, but the cultural chasm that existed between those two companies was 
just absolutely incredible....  DI was an incredibly flat management style.  For 
the most part it was Virgil and Gus, the president and the VP.  In production 
there was a little more structure but on the R&D side it was mostly that and the 
creativity and more a free spirit attitude.  What you’d typify as a small 
company spirit at DI.  The neat thing was since the guy who ran the place was 
a Ph.D. in physics, being a scientist there was as important as say being a sales 
guy or a production guy or something like that.  If you actually look at the 
Veeco management structure it’s almost all sales and those are the people that 
get promoted and that’s what’s important there....  [Elings] told some of us that 
he was planning to retire in May of ’99 and so a group of us got together and 
decided once he retired that it wouldn’t be a place we really wanted to work so 
we started this place in April of ’99. [JC2, 3/20/01] 
Today, Asylum (still based in Santa Barbara) makes force pullers and is starting to 
market an AFM and clearly intends to offer a counterweight to their much bigger 
parent and neighbor.  In doing so, they’ve received moral support from Hansma and 
other old-time academic builders.  The advantages to academic builder groups of 
 
 349
cultivating a DI spin-off should be clear – it increases competition (and thus more 
variety) in the market, it offers more opportunities for academic builders to establish 
collaborative projects with manufacturers, and it turns back the clock to an earlier era 
when manufacturers were small and depended heavily on the academic builders. 
Conclusion 
 Whether Asylum succeeds or not, its appearance marks one kind of turning 
point for SPMers.  For the first time, some in this community have pointed out the loss 
that attends routinization and rationalization.  DI has been tremendously successful at 
spreading the routine use of SPMs into countless new areas; yet use has so far never 
been completely separable from innovation in probe microscopy, and the routinization 
of the one has led almost inevitably to the routinization of the other.  Many builders, 
inside and outside DI, are unsure how to justify their work in this new era, and the 
existence of Asylum is a pointed testimony to this confusion.  Yet it is also taken as a 
sign of hope and health.  Commercialization is, in some sense, anathema to builder 
culture, in that it seeks ever larger markets for off-the-shelf instruments; yet, as we’ve 
seen, it is also strongly dependent on builder culture for sustaining the growth and 
evolution of the instrumentation.  If the manufacturers (particularly DI) are too 
vigorous in rooting out or routinizing builder culture, they will only suffer in the end.  
With Asylum, this realization has hit home at DI, and Digital is now taking steps to 
reinvigorate its own builder culture, and to re-establish its presence in the research 
market that inspired its most innovative period in the early ’90s.  Asylum’s 
appearance, then, may be a sign that the SPM community has found a way to signal 
stagnation and provide an occasional much-needed escape from the iron cage.  This is 
not a new story – much the same process happened in the semiconductor industry in 
the ’60s and ’70s, when the rapid proliferation of start-ups and spin-offs from giants 
like Fairchild and Texas Instruments drove innovation and discouraged ossification 
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among manufacturers (Lecuyer 1999).  Probe microscopy may not be as frenetic as 
semiconductors, but many now see a need for that kind of safety valve. 
 In general, the appearance of Asylum, and the reinvigorated response to it by 
DI, is synecdochic for larger shifts in the SPM community at the start of the 
millennium.  Many SPMers’ lives reached various existential crises at the turn of the 
decade: the corporate labs were suffering a long decay, the STM Conferences were 
searching for a raison d’etre, and many pioneers of the technique were retiring.  Just as 
in the DNA controversies of 1990-2, the SPM community of 2000-1 seemed to be 
looking for a new kind of social order, a new kind of knowledge to go with it, and new 
technical identities to secure within the new order.  As of 2000, with the 
announcement of the National Nanoinitiative, this new order seemed to be on the 
horizon.  Nanotech, whatever it is, is for now flexible enough to offer the kinds of 
safety valves and social glue that SPMers seem to need – it is fuzzy enough both to let 
builders be charismatic and innovative, and to let ordinary users of commercial 
microscopes forge a common instrumental and visual language.  In the conclusion of 
this dissertation we will briefly look at some of the relationships between nano and 
SPM; those relationships, though, are rooted in the exigencies of commercialization 
that we have explored here.
 
 
Chapter Nine 
Probe Microscopy and Nanotechnology 
 
 In 2000, when Bill Clinton prepared to announce the creation of a National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, his aides looked for an appropriate place for him to make a 
speech on the topic.  They chose Caltech, one of the mythical birthplaces of 
nanotechnology, the school where Richard Feynman taught for most of his career and, 
in 1959, gave the now-famous “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom” after-dinner 
speech that today plays such a prominent role in the imaginations of nanotechnologists 
(Feynman 1999).  Clinton’s aides also looked for an appropriate backdrop to hang 
behind Clinton during the speech, one that would display American achievements in 
the field.  Here, they chose the other great bonfire of the nanoimagination – atomic 
manipulation with an STM.  It is difficult to find reviews of nano that do not 
prominently mention or display Don Eigler’s spelling of “IBM” with single xenon 
atoms in 1990.  Eigler’s images are beautifully rendered and rhetorically powerful – 
they were the first to speak to the current reality of nano’s long-term vision of putting 
atoms exactly where we want them. 
 So Clinton’s aides called Eigler’s lab at IBM Almaden, and asked his postdoc, 
Hari Manoharan, if he would spell out “NANO USA” and send them an image for the 
presidential backdrop.  At the time, Eigler’s group was conducting experiments on CO 
on nickel – one of the classic systems of surface science.  Since Eigler’s machine can 
maintain an ultraclean, ultracold environment for years at a time, he rarely changes 
samples unless a series of experiments on that material has finally run its course.  So 
Manoharan decided to use the CO that was already in the chamber to spell out the 
presidential headline.  When he was done, he sent the image to Washington, and one 
of the aides quickly called back to congratulate him and to ask, for the record, what 
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atoms were used in the message.  “Well, it’s actually not an atom, it’s a molecule.”  
“What molecule, then?” “Carbon monoxide.”  “Isn’t that a poison?  I don’t think we 
can use that” – and the NANO USA image quietly disappeared from the scene. 
 Probe microscopists are fond of telling this story, both publicly and privately, 
and they usually give it a very knowing spin [PR1, 3/7/04].  That is, it demonstrates 
for long-time STMers and AFMers that, whatever nano is, they are central to it, from 
which they take great pride; but it also shows to them that the whole nano rubric is a 
joke, a concoction of bureaucrats and financiers with little regard for the daily practice 
of science.  There’s a lesser-known sequel that adds a codicil to this moral.  After they 
dropped Eigler from their plans, Clinton’s aides went back to Almaden to find another 
group that would give them a suitable image.  This time they contacted Dan Rugar and 
John Mamin, who had developed a technique to deposit small mounds of gold, 
containing about a thousand atoms each, in a controlled way.  Clinton’s people asked 
them to make not “NANO USA,” but an image of the Western Hemisphere as seen 
from space – a reminder, perhaps, of one of the last great American “big science” 
intitiatives, the race to the moon [DR1, 3/14/01; JM1, 3/15/01]. 
 The relationship between nanotechnology and probe microscopy goes back a 
very long way, but it is also so complex that is obscure even to the participants.  Part 
of this relationship is the work of people who are seen to be appropriating STM and 
AFM work without being credible members of the community; part of the relationship 
has been forged by important mediators at the margins of the community, in response 
to significant changes in probe microscopy, in the disciplines which use STM and 
AFM, and in the wider scientific establishment of Europe, North America, and Japan; 
and part of the relationship was created by SPMers themselves in response to role 
dilemmas brought on by commercialization and other changes in the landscape of 
probe microscopy.  Thus, there is a great deal of ambivalence among SPMers about 
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nanotech; some see it as the savior of the probe microscopy field, others see it as a 
healthy opportunity to gain funding, forge collaborations, and create markets; and 
others see it as an unwelcome imposition by bureaucrats and dreamers. 
Drexler and Futurism 
 In this epilogue, I want to trace two different tracks of rhetoric about probe 
microscopy and nanotechnology, one older but with thinner ties to the field, the other 
more recent but somewhat more organically related to SPM work.  The first is the 
tradition most closely associated with Eric Drexler and the Foresight Institute in Palo 
Alto.  According to legend, Drexler began thinking about “molecular engineering” 
while still an undergraduate, reading up on the latest in supramolecular chemistry – 
especially computerized molecular modeling – and genetic engineering.1  This led him 
to posit the possibility of designer molecules, of a world carefully put together atom-
by-atom.  This was a “bottom-up” world of goods built one atom after another, with 
complete precision in their placement, rather than the familiar and ancient “top-down” 
world in which goods are made by chiseling away at large, undifferentiated masses.  
From this simple starting point, Drexler imagined endless possibilities made real – 
cheap spaceflight, unlimited energy, green manufacturing, a universe of information at 
everyone’s fingertips, even immortality.  Crucially, Drexler’s world was also one of 
terrifying hazards – of ubiquitous surveillance, of home-brewed weapons of mass 
destruction, and even the extinction of humanity, or even all life on earth, at the hands 
of our intelligent, autonomous, nanobot creations. 
 Though Drexler based much of the technical content of his discussions on 
advancements in the ’70s in biochemistry, the traditions that gave birth to those 
discussions were the visionary communities surrounding interplanetary spaceflight, 
artificial intelligence, and new information technologies.  These were communities 
                                                 
1 I draw on Regis (1995) for biographical information on Drexler. 
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that took as their heroes people like Babbage, Tsiolkovsky, and Goddard – visionaries 
who failed to accomplish their grands schemes, and sometimes were even laughed at 
in their own time, but who were later celebrated as heralding an inevitable 
technological revolution.  Thus, there is at times a strange mixture of utopianism, 
paranoia, and resignation in Drexler’s writings and presentations – a belief that he and 
his group are forecasting something which is inevitable and which will likely be 
beneficial, but that such prescience can be both boon and bane. 
 There is also, as Stefan Helmreich has pointed out, a recurring trope of 
liberation in these futurist traditions – whether liberation from the earth (spaceflight), 
from the body (artificial intelligence), from dead media such as books (Drexler was 
also involved in early hypertext projects, and it is a little-noticed fact that almost all 
his writings end with proclamations about hypertext and other new media), or 
liberation from death (nanotechnology) (Helmreich 1998).  The institutions of such 
visionary projects tend to be unique, disparate, and only loosely affiliated with 
traditional academic disciplines – organizations like the Space Studies Institute 
(founded by Drexler’s undergraduate mentor, Gerard K. O’Neill), the MIT Media Lab 
(where Drexler nominally received his Ph.D. under AI guru Marvin Minsky), and 
Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog and Global Business Network, of which 
Drexler became a part when he moved to Palo Alto and founded his own 
nanotechnology organization, the Foresight Institute.2
 My point is that Drexler belonged to a well-established techno-visionary 
tradition, with its own culture, rhetoric, and institutions.  Through the 1980s, though, 
the links between these institutions and the settings where most STMers and AFMers 
could be found were quite spare.  Since Drexler’s vision depended on getting 
                                                 
2 Brand is on the board of the Foresight Institute and Fred Turner informs me that he and Drexler are 
personal as well as professional friends.  See Turner (forthcoming) and Brooks (2003) for fascinating 
descriptions of Bay Area futurism and techno-counterculture. 
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practicing scientists to think about the consequences of their work and to begin 
coordinating their research around the concept of molecular nanotechnology, he set 
out to increase his contacts with working research communities, particularly the probe 
microscopy field.  One way to do so was to reference prominent scientists who stood 
at the intersection between the techno-visionary and research worlds.  No figure 
played this role more perfectly than Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize-winning 
physicist and maverick.3  In an after-dinner speech to the American Physical Society 
meeting at Caltech in 1959, Feynman laid out a compelling vision of tiny mechanical 
motors and manipulators and nanometer-scale information storage, a vision Drexler 
and other nanotechnologists have repeatedly appropriated as the founding statement of 
their field, even as they use Feynman’s vision to justify quite contradictory 
interpretations of that field. 
 As Davis Baird and Ashley Shew have nicely shown, Feynman’s “Room at the 
Bottom” speech has become the rhetorical entrée for probe microscopy into the 
nanotech arena (Baird and Shew forthcoming).  In the speech, Feynman makes a loud 
call for microscope development: 
 
If I have written in a code, with 5 times 5 times 5 atoms to a bit, the question 
is: How could I read it today?  The electron microscope is not quite good 
enough....  I would like to try and impress upon you ... the importance of 
improving the electron microscope by a hundred times....  [I]t should be 
possible to see the individual atoms.  What good would it be to see individual 
atoms distinctly?  We have friends in other fields – in biology, for instance.  
We physicists often look at them and say, “You know the reason you fellows 
are making so little progress?...”  You should use more mathematics, like we 
do.”  They could answer us ... “what you should do in order for us to make 
more rapid progress is to make the electron microscope 100 times better....”  It 
is very easy to answer many of these fundamental biological questions; you 
just look at the thing!  You will see the order of the bases in the chain; you will 
see the structure of the microsome.  Unfortunately, the present microscope sees 
at a scale which is just a bit too crude.  Make the microscope one hundred 
                                                 
3 Various hagiographies of Feynman, such as Gleick (1993) demonstrate his enduring iconic status for 
physicists and non-physicists alike.  Kaiser (forthcoming-a) contains a somewhat more sober yet 
fascinating account of the growth of Feynman’s network. 
 
 356
times more powerful, and many problems of biology would be made very 
much easier. (Feynman 1999) 
As Baird and Shew demonstrate, in today’s standard histories of nanotechnology, this 
statement from Feynman is almost always given point of pride; and it is almost always 
used as a stepping stone to discuss the STM, atomic resolution of the 7x7, and the 
implications of probe microscopy for nanotechnology. 
 When Drexler first began formulating his version of nanotechnology, the STM 
had not yet been invented, and he seems never to have referenced the atomic 
resolution capability of the field-ion microscope or the transmission electron 
microscope.  His first published writings on the subject, though, came in 1983, the 
same year Binnig and Rohrer’s images of the 7x7 were published; and his first, 
widely-read book on the subject, Engines of Creation, appeared in 1986, the same year 
Binnig and Rohrer won the Nobel Prize (Drexler 1990).  Engines is Drexler’s popular 
opus, so it is sparing in technical details about anything, yet even here he points to the 
STM’s importance to the grand project.  His far more technically-oriented book, 
Nanosystems (published in 1992), goes a step further and includes an entire section 
discussing use of the AFM in “mechanosynthesis” (i.e., the formation of molecules 
and supramolecular systems by pushing atoms into place mechanically, rather than by 
the more haphazard methods of traditional chemistry) (Drexler 1992).  Paul Hansma 
and a number of his and Cal Quate’s collaborators are thanked in the preface, making 
probe microscopy (along with the protein engineering community) one of only two 
fields to be acknowledged so specifically. 
 Thus, Drexler made a serious effort in the early ’90s to enroll prominent probe 
microscopists in his project – and with good reason, since much of his argument 
depended on both the inevitability and the outlandishness of his claims.  That is, he 
paints the post-nanotechnology world as inevitable, yet as un-believably different from 
our own world.  One way to do this is to point to current research that has already 
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achieved things that are outlandish, and which point the way to an even more 
unbelievable future.  Atomic and molecular manipulation with an STM or AFM – 
especially when colorfully done, as with Don Eigler’s 1990 spelling out of “IBM” 
using xenon atoms – is canonically an activity of this sort: unbelievable, yet real, with 
the possibility of more unbelievable parlor tricks and even products down the road.  
As Drexler put it in testimony before the US Senate in 1992, 
 
Five years ago when I spoke on the subject, audiences would reply, “You say 
that the basis of molecular nanotechnology is putting molecular building 
blocks in precise places, but is that really possible?”  Today that question does 
not arise because part of my talk is a slide showing 35 precisely placed xenon 
atoms on the surface of a nickel crystal, spelling the letters IBM, from work 
done by Don Eigler’s group at IBM’s Almaden Research Center. (Drexler 
1993) 
Yet not all probe microscopists agreed that their work pointed to the future Drexler 
envisioned, and some resented his attempts to draw them into his network.  Eigler, for 
one, said that Drexler “has had no influence on what goes on in nanoscience.  Based 
on what little I’ve seen, Drexler’s ideas are nanofanciful notions that are not very 
meaningful” (Rotman 1999).  Quate, too, observed of Drexler (in the New York Times) 
that “I don’t think he should be taken seriously.  He’s too far out” (Regis 1995, 232). 
 One of the few probe microscopists who did engage with Drexler, though, was 
Quate’s former student, John Foster.  Recall that Foster, along with Jane Frommer, 
had developed a project at IBM Almaden to use air STM to examine complex 
molecules (organic compounds and liquid crystals) on graphite, yielding some of the 
first unequivocal images of solitary molecules.  Later, Foster discovered that he could 
actually move the molecules around, “dissect” them with voltage pulses, and even 
“herd” them into groups.  This was exactly the kind of “mechanosynthesis” Drexler 
saw as heralding the coming age, and, given Foster’s geographical and cultural 
proximity to Foresight, it was natural that he was invited along with a few other 
practicing scientists to join the Institute’s first conference on nanotechnology in 1989 
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(Foster 1992).  There, Foster found an enthusiastic audience and a welcome 
understanding of the importance of work on the nanoscale, but also a sometimes 
unnerving willingness to believe the impossible: 
 
Drexler .... entered this picture at that time.  He would invite me to those early 
conferences that he had.  Because frankly there were only so many of us that 
were actually doing anything and we were among the few who were actually 
doing any kind of nanomanipulation at all, making it work.  So he wrote that 
up in his books and so forth....  Drexler – there is this funny thing in science .... 
if you have a new idea it’s hard to get it in....  Not that I’m comparing Drexler 
to any of these folks, but if Galileo comes up with an idea everybody says “no, 
that’s not right, you’re crazy....”  It’s easy to pick on people that come up with 
a vision.  That being said, Drexler is kind of way out there on the end because 
he had quite a strong vision, it was just huge....  And he had some people sort 
of in his court that were very powerful, the Feynmans of the world....  There 
have to be people that are hard-core scientists and are show-me.  On the other 
hand you have to have the visionaries, because if you don’t they aren’t going to 
go very far in a hurry, and you won’t make some leaps of faith....  I can see 
there’s value in both camps, though Drexler was so hard over in this other 
camp that it was difficult for some people to take him seriously at all....  It’s 
not like people [mainstream researchers] were really discussing “well, gee, 
what’s physically wrong with that [Drexler’s] picture, why can’t that happen?  
Isn’t this okay, won’t this work out?  I mean biology works this way.”  That’s 
really [Drexler’s] argument.  Certainly it’s that we ought to be able to do what 
biology does....  I believe his arguments, I believe it can be done.  But anyway 
he wasn’t very well received by the scientific community. [JF1, 10/19/01] 
Foster makes an important observation here.  It is common to hear practicing probe 
microscopists express unease about Drexler’s vision of the future.  It is also common, 
particularly since the founding of the Nanoinitiative, to hear prominent 
nanotechnologists decry Drexler’s work in terms that are simultaneously technical and 
ad hominem.  Nanotechnology today is entering a phase in which the ritual expulsion 
of Drexler is central to constructing the boundaries and the legitimacy of the discipline 
(Gieryn and Figert 1986). 
 This is one reason why nano is such a fascinating laboratory for exploring the 
themes of science and technology studies.  In the divide between Drexler and his 
detractors we can see “interpretive flexibility” and the “social construction of 
knowledge” played out before our eyes.  There are, for instance, a handful of technical 
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issues on which Drexler and his detractors (some of whom, such as Rick Smalley, 
were at one point admirers) have repeatedly argued – most dramatically the “sticky 
fingers, fat fingers” discussion about how, exactly, Drexler proposes that atoms will be 
positioned precisely by molecular assemblers (Baum, et al. 2003).  Each time they 
debate, they produce the same claims and counter-claims and counter-counter-claims.  
As in any technical debate, they disagree not just on the scientific matter, but on 
whether each has adequately understood the other, whether counter-claims are 
germane, and whether more iterations of claim and counter-claim are necessary.  In 
such a situation – as the sociology of scientific knowledge has amply demonstrated – 
there is no way for “reality” to speak for itself and inform audiences to the debate as to 
which side has access to nature and which does not.  Any such truth-claim can always 
be met with yet another counter-claim that in turn begs for refutation. 
 Thus, audiences must make social judgments to supplement the technical 
claims at play.  Indeed, much of the time audiences radically truncate their attention to 
the potentially long-winded repartee of claims and counter-claims; knowing what they 
know about the participants in the debate, many audience members will hear and 
believe one side’s claims without hearing out the other side’s initial argument, much 
less their succeeding iterations of counter-claims.  Most probe microscopists watching 
Drexler have, for good but eminently social reasons, decided that Drexler’s visions are 
fantastic and unhelpful; by dint of his style and position outside the institutions to 
which they belong, most probe microscopists (even the ones Drexler routinely cites) 
do not view themselves as contributing directly to the nano world Drexler imagines. 
Nano Succeeds Micro 
 Nonetheless, it is difficult for even the most die-hard skeptic to deny that 
Drexler put his finger on a quickening pulse within various research communities, and 
that in doing so he brought attention to research that could easily have labored in 
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obscurity.  Moreover, the Drexlerian vision of “nanotechnology” proved ambiguous 
enough that many different actors could seize on it and broaden its scope.  Indeed, as it 
turned out, Drexler was not the first to refer to nanotechnology; the label was probably 
coined by Norio Taniguchi in 1974 in a paper entitled “On the Basic Concept of 
‘Nano-Technology’” (Taniguchi 1974).  Taniguchi was writing for an audience of 
precision engineers, the same community for whom Russ Young had tried to make the 
Topografiner relevant just a couple years before.  Young and Taniguchi were (perhaps 
ahead of their time) both pointing to the fact that precision engineering was beginning 
to deal with tolerances well below the 100 nanometer mark.  This was the case for 
macroscale artifacts like stepper motors and ball bearings, but it was even more true 
for microscale artifacts like integrated circuits and air bag accelerometers. 
 That is, as the microelectronics industry exerted itself to fulfill Moore’s Law 
(the rough doubling of the number of components per chip every 18 months), the 
absolute size of some features began to dip below 100 nm (at least in one or more 
critical dimensions), and tolerances crept to even smaller sizes.4  Taniguchi was the 
first to give a label to what many in the microelectronics industry realized: that if 
Moore’s Law were to be sustained, the industry would be working in the region of the 
nanometer (10-9 meters) rather than in the region of the micron (10-6 meters).  By the 
time Drexler popularized “nanotechnology” in the late 1980s, those working in the 
avant-garde of this miniaturization effort had begun to substitute the prefix “nano” for 
“micro” in much of their rhetoric. 
 Drexler’s own vision of nano differed from that of miniaturization specialists, 
in that he imagined a bottom-up world of building things from atoms, rather than a 
top-down world of making miniaturization technologies ever finer.  Yet the term itself 
was ambiguous enough that almost anyone working on systems where at least one 
                                                 
4 See Mackenzie (1996) for a nice analysis of the performative aspects of Moore’s Law. 
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dimension had features with critical lengths less than 100 nm could lay claim to it.  
Moreover, as some researchers began pointing out, the purview of “bottom-up” fields 
like supramolecular chemistry had begun to overlap with the that of “top-down” fields 
like electron lithography.  “Nanotechnology” now began to refer to the overlap of the 
two approaches; and probe microscopists were especially well-situated to capitalize on 
and promote this interpretation of the term.  Heini Rohrer, for instance, began writing 
on the topic in the early ’90s, stating in 1993 that: 
 
Miniaturization naturally carries us far beyond microtechnology, it carries us to 
science and technology on the nanometer scale – into the nanometer world.  In 
the following I would like to discuss some aspects of the next big step of 
miniaturization, the one from the micrometer to the nanometer, in which local 
probe methods will play a most important role....  Ten years ago nanoscience 
and technology were not yet commonly used terms.  But it was foreseeable 
already at that time that in advancing into the world of the ever smaller, 
miniaturization would not stop at the micrometer. (Rohrer 1993) 
In 1995 he wrote that: 
 
While solid-state science and technology have moved down from the 
millimeter to the nanometer scale, chemistry has simultaneously and 
independently progressed from the level of small, few-atom molecules to 
macromolecules of biological size....  The nanometer age can thus be 
considered as a continuation of an ongoing development: for example, 
miniaturization in solid-state technology [and] increasing complexity in 
chemistry. (Rohrer 1995) 
Probe microscopists could be found at all points along this spectrum between bottom-
up and top-down.  On the one hand, there were a few (mostly builder) groups working 
on manipulation of objects from single atoms to fullerenes (C60 molecules) and 
buckytubes (sheets of carbon rolled into cylinders) and everything in between.  On the 
other hand, AFMs, MFMs, and more exotic tools like scanning capacitance 
microscopes and scanning thermal microscopes were becoming useful to people 
working in both corporate research and industrial quality control labs trying to deal 
with integrated circuit features that were now smaller than 100 nm, and magnetic thin 
films with thicknesses diving below 10 nm [DR1, 3/14/01; DB3, 4/30/01]. 
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 It is in this context of a perceived convergence of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches in the late ’80s and early ’90s that we begin to see the first gestures toward 
nanotechnology among probe microscopists.  In general, these gestures exploited the 
ambiguity of the term by latching onto a buzzword without signing onto any particular 
(especially Drexler’s) interpretation, and maintaining the plausibility that “nano” 
simply referred to probe microscopy’s higher-than-“micro” resolution.  For instance, 
the “nano” in Digital Instruments’ NanoScope (introduced in 1987) was probably 
meant to signify that DI’s STM was superior to traditional light and electron 
microscopes in that its resolution could push well below one nanometer.  At the same 
time, whether intentional or not, selling a product with “nano” in its name rhetorically 
positioned DI well, if and when nanotechnology became the next “big thing.”5
 Possibly the earliest attempt by probe microscopists to align squarely with 
“nanotechnology,” rather than to hedge on commitment to a label with doubtful 
technovisionary baggage, was Quanscan’s motto “innovators in nanotechnology.”  
This, however, was the exception that proves the rule.  Recall that in 1988 Quanscan 
was a marginal company living off government grants and venture capital money 
rather than the sale of products.  As such, Quanscan was always oriented to a much 
more distant and visionary future than competitors like DI and Park.  Indeed, I think 
we can see the instinctive aversion of many DI employees to Quanscan/Topometrix’ 
perceived preference for glossy marketing and long-range, visionary planning over 
solidly-engineered products as strongly akin to the instinctive aversion of most probe 
microscopists to the rhetorical style of Drexler and the Foresight Institute. 
 One other mechanism for probe microscopists to hedge their way closer to 
nanotechnology came through a series of scientific “bandwagons” that occurred in the 
                                                 
5 Again, this is nice example of the skilful use of interpretive flexibility that Lynch and Bogen (1996) 
have labeled “sleaze.” 
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early ’90s.  As we saw in Chapter Six, SPMers (particularly builder groups) were 
always on the lookout for “hot” materials to characterize, a predilection that left the 
early days of the technique marked by fads and gold rushes.  Some of these fads (such 
as the sudden popularity of graphite) were more or less internal to the probe 
microscopy community.  Others, though, began outside the field and drew probe 
microscopists in.  The discovery of high Tc superconductors at IBM Zurich in 1986, 
and the attendant frenzy of research on superconductivity, for instance, spurred many 
STMers and AFMers to turn their attention to these materials.  Similarly, when the 
Human Genome Project came into being in 1990 and started casting around for 
suitable instrumentation, probe microscopists suddenly turned in droves to DNA. 
 Some of these bandwagons involved materials that stood right at the point of 
convergence between the top-down and bottom-up approaches, materials that today 
are seen as prototypical nanomaterials.  Probe microscopists, for example, were 
among the first to think about the mechanical (rather than just biochemical) properties 
of DNA [SL1, 1/6/03; EH1, 6/22/01], and a number of groups collaborated with 
experimenters who could make (but not see) intricate erector-set-like three-
dimensional nucleic acid structures.  Similarly, probe microscopists became interested 
in nanometer-thick Langmuir-Blodgett films just when those materials experienced a 
revival under the new moniker “self-assembled monolayers.”  Indeed, “self-assembly” 
soon became a much-discussed topic among nanotechnologists, and people like 
George Whitesides who are today leading nanotechnologists began growing 
monolayers (a bottom-up process) in combination with top-down techniques like 
lithography.  Likewise, when fullerenes and nanotubes hit the scene in the late ’80s 
and early ’90s, probe microscopists caught the “fullerene fever.”6  Builder groups, 
especially, quickly procured the new materials, provided the first images of them, and 
                                                 
6 The spread of fullerene research has in fact been studied using epidemiological models (Braun 1992). 
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then started manipulating them to form nanostructures – a fullerene abacus, a 
transistor made from nanotubes, even gluing nanotubes to AFM cantilevers and using 
them to probe deep trenches (where a long, thin tip is more desirable). 
Institutional Support 
 Thus, by 1991-2, probe microscopists stood ready to take advantage of their 
nanotechnological credentials, but they also hedged those bets and continued working 
within more traditional programs in surface science, biophysics, electrochemistry, etc.  
Through the ’90s, this was the general orientation of most probe microscopists who 
knew anything about nanotechnology, and it is probably where the community would 
still be if nano had not started to accrue institutional support.  Though it is clear that 
many of the constituent components of nanotechnology would have been supported 
whether there had been a “nano boom” or not, it is also clear that research-sponsoring 
institutions like the NSF and IBM, as well as disciplinary organizations like the 
American Physical Society and the Materials Research Society played a key role in 
herding the disparate sectors of nanotechnology under one umbrella and thereby 
lending credence to proclamations that nano was the “Next Industrial Revolution.” 
Interestingly, it was in putting nano on the agenda of institutions like these that 
Drexler may have had his most lasting, if indirect, influence.  Engines of Creation 
reached a wide audience, including influential politicians and civil servants, and by 
1992 Drexler’s ideas were beginning to get a hearing.  Al Gore, for instance, seems to 
have been inspired by the ecological implications of nanotechnology, and brought 
Drexler to testify before a Senate committee hearing on “New Technologies for a 
Sustainable World” just a few weeks before becoming Bill Clinton’s running mate 
(Drexler 1993).  Later, Gore seems to have given instrumental support for the 
founding of the National Nano Initiative (Atkinson 2003, 86).  On the same trip to 
Washington for the committee hearing, Drexler also gave a presentation to Adm. 
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David Jeremiah (the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council.7  Jeremiah has become one of the primary links 
between Drexler and mainstream nanotechnology; and, though he was certainly not 
the only instigator, it was through naval research that the institutional grip of 
nanotechnology began to take hold of probe microscopy. 
The roots for this go back to the very earliest days of tunneling microscopy.  
When the STM first came on the scene, it caught the attention of surface scientists at 
the Naval Research Laboratory outside Washington, DC.  One, Rich Colton, took a 
sabbatical in the Baldeschwieler group, helping to build their first air STM.  When he 
came back, his group bought one of Doug Smith’s “commercial” air STMs, and 
brought in a former NIST STM postdoc, Lloyd Whitman, who became a staff scientist 
and set up a UHV system at NRL [RC1, 6/27/02; LW1, 6/27/02; NB1, 2/20/01; GL1, 
7/19/01].  Thus, the NRL embarked on probe microscopy at about the same time, to 
the same extent, and by the same means as other national labs with prominent surface 
science groups – NIST, Lawrence Berkeley National Labs, and Lawrence Livermore 
National Labs. 
Importantly, though, Colton’s manager was Jim Murday, a leading member of 
the AVS and a leading surface science grant officer.  Through Murday, the ONR 
began sponsoring probe microscopy research, both within surface science groups as 
well as non-surface science builder groups like Quate’s and Hansma’s, groups 
working on sensor and data storage technologies derived from what Murday termed 
“proximal probe” techniques [JM2, 7/6/00].  At the same time, with support from 
Murday and others, the AVS also began supporting probe microscopy work – again, 
across the whole range of research, not just within surface science.  For instance, along 
with its international counterpart, the IUVSTA (the International Union for Vacuum 
                                                 
7 See Jim Murday’s introduction to Ratner and Ratner (2004). 
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Science, Technique, and Applications) the AVS became the primary institutional 
sponsor of the STM Conferences.  Moreover, the AVS published the proceedings of 
most of these conferences in its Journal of Vacuum Science and Technology (Feenstra 
1988; Ichinokawa 1990; Bai, et al. 1994; Colton, et al. 1991; Hamers 1995). 
By 1990, though, surface science was beginning to lose its primacy, both 
within the AVS and more broadly.  The formation of an Electronic Materials and 
Processing Division at AVS in 1979 brought in practitioners from the microelectronics 
industry and, according to the president of the AVS at the time, doubled the size of the 
society in three years [CD1, 10/30/03], leading to the splitting of the Journal of 
Vacuum Science and Technology in 1983 into JVST A (Vacuum, Surfaces, and Films) 
and JVST B (Microelectronics, Processing and Phenomena).  Through the 1980s, as 
the dimensions of integrated circuit components diminished, microelectronics began to 
eat away at surface science’s purview over angstrom- to nanometer-scale surface 
phenomena in semiconductors.  Moreover, with the break-up of AT&T and the 
collapse of IBM’s dominance of the server and personal computer markets (and even 
more so during the recession of 1991-2), the big corporate research labs that had 
sustained surface science began to demand that its practitioners orient themselves 
more to product lines than research on reconstructions and other fundamental 
phenomena.  As we’ve seen, this led many corporate STMers to shift to AFM and to 
more commercial projects. 
Within the AVS, probe microscopy itself spurred the erosion of surface 
science’s influence.  When the AVS first became involved with probe microscopy, 
almost all work was done in UHV, on samples of direct relevance to surface science 
question.  With air STM, and even more so with the AFM, the AVS found itself 
sponsoring conferences and publishing reams of articles with very little surface 
science or ultrahigh vacuum content.  The AVS wanted to maintain the prestige and 
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increased membership of its relationship with a hot field like probe microscopy, but at 
the same time the rationale for that relationship began to look like an historical 
vestige.  Moreover, even the probe microscopy work within surface science introduced 
existential questions about the direction of the discipline.  With the solving of what 
one prominent surface science theorist calls the “Rosetta Stone” of the 7x7, most other 
unsolved reconstructions fell quickly, largely with the aid of the STM (Duke 2003; 
Lagally 2003).  Reconstructions, which had once framed much of the work and culture 
of surface science, became a much simpler game through the ’80s [FO1, 10/24/01].  
LEED practitioners, in particular, felt this acutely.  Though LEED is still a useful 
technique, it is used more often to check experimental procedures than to generate 
knowledge; it has gone from being the mainstay of the discipline to an auxiliary tool, 
and those who specialized in it have had to find a new focus and new instruments. 
Also, the direction of probe microscopy itself began to turn at this time.  With 
the commercial instruments becoming more routine and more widespread, the 
character and composition of the field were changing in ways that questioned the need 
for a dedicated probe microscopy community at all.  The rationale for the STM 
Conferences, for instance, became less clear by the end of the ’80s.  Their original 
purpose had been to display new innovations to the design of the instruments and to 
get new builders up to speed on how to get started.  Commercialization could, 
therefore, have sounded the conference’s death knell; indeed, Binnig and Rohrer’s 
original conception was that the meetings would last for a few years and then when the 
technique became routine everyone would disperse back to the professional 
conferences of their home disciplines – the American Physical Society meeting, the 
Materials Research Society meeting, etc.  In many ways, the manufacturers could 
fulfill the function served by the STM Conference – they could advertise new designs, 
train new users, and absorb innovations from the few remaining builder groups. 
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For a variety of stakeholders, though, the STM Conferences continued to play 
an important role.  For the AVS, with Murday’s guidance, they were a source of 
prestige and dues.  For the manufacturers, they represented the greatest concentration 
of actual and potential customers, competitors, and builders and, hence, the greatest 
source of credibility, sales, information, and new innovations.  For builder groups, 
they were a place to cut out the manufacturers as middlemen, or at least to use the 
desires of the community of commercial microscope users to leverage manufacturers 
to commercialize builders’ innovations.  Since the manufacturers and the AVS were 
the primary sponsors of the meetings, and since builders were usually in the self-
selecting clique that ran them, the STM Conferences continued on; but the need for a 
new rubric with which to justify them had become urgent by 1990. 
That year, the STM meeting was held in Baltimore (not far from the NRL), and 
Murday and Colton were the organizers.  As such, they took the opportunity to 
reshape the direction of probe microscopy, surface science, and the AVS by renaming 
the STM Conference as the “NANO Conference” (or, to give its full name, the “Fifth 
International Conference on Scanning Tunneling Microscopy/Spectroscopy and the 
First International Conference on Nanometer Scale Science and Technology”).  From 
Murday and Colton’s vantage, “nanometer scale science and technology” was a 
natural way of tying together the now-disparate threads of the AVS and the probe 
microscopy community.  Probe microscopists, of course, had little reason to deny that 
their instruments were working at the “nanometer scale.”  Microelectronics was 
rapidly approaching the “nanometer scale,” and some both in the semiconductor 
industry and in probe microscopy were beginning to talk about replacing electron 
microscopes with AFMs on semiconductor fab lines (which, as we saw in Chapter 
Seven, resulted in the “big machines” and metrological AFMs developed in the ’90s).  
Even surface science was now cast as always already nanoscience – by definition, the 
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surface layers that interestingly differ from the bulk material are only a few 
nanometers thick, and surface scientists interest in defects and atomic structure had 
accustomed them to thinking in terms of angstroms and nanometers.  Finally, Murday 
could see that many of the hot materials of the day (fullerenes, LB films, etc.) had 
critical dimensions on the nanometer scale, and were likely to intersect someday with 
the interests of microelectronics, probe microscopy, and surface science. 
After 1990, the NANO Conference and the STM Conference alternated years, 
beginning a slow but perceptible trend away from probe microscopy and toward 
nanotechnology.  In 1991, the STM Conference was held at Interlaken, Switzerland, 
and celebrated the 10th anniversary of the invention of the tunneling microscope.8  
Many early builders, especially surface science STMers, look back on this conference 
as the high water mark of the probe microscopy community.  1991 marked the 
beginning of the discrediting of air STM and the more formal parting of STMers and 
AFMers, along with the growing regulatory role of SPM manufacturers.  1991 was 
also a recession year that kicked off IBM’s lean time, in which most of its corporate 
STMers either refocused their attention or left to take up academic jobs.  Many surface 
science STMers stopped attending the STM Conferences, and returned full-time to 
meetings like APS and ACS. 
1992 saw the second NANO Conference and, as a result of Murday’s 
presidency of the AVS that year, the founding of a Nanometer-Scale Science and 
Technology Division within the society.  Parallel to this institutionalization of the 
links between nanotechnology, probe microscopy, and the AVS, nanotechnology 
began taking on organizational complexity in other arenas as well.  In 1991, for 
instance, the National Science Foundation opened a Nanoparticle Synthesis and 
                                                 
8 The official birthday of the STM dates from Binnig and Rohrer’s first recording of a tunneling 
signature with their stationary apparatus in 1981. 
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Processing initiative, and in 1994 began sponsoring a National Nanofabrication User 
Network, modeled partly on the Materials Research Laboratories that the NSF had 
used to seed the discipline of materials science at university campuses in the ’50s.  
Some of these academic centers built on locally pre-existing, pre-nano institutions.  
For instance, at Cornell, the NSF had sponsored a National Research and Resource 
Facility for Submicron Structures (NRRFSS) since 1977; only in 1987, after Drexler 
and others had popularized the nano prefix, did the NRRFSS change its name to the 
National Nanofabrication Facility (later, the Cornell Nanofabrication Facility, and now 
the Cornell Nanoscale Science and Technology Facility), still with NSF support 
(Rathbun, et al. 2000). 
Government support for nano-ization of research began to extend beyond the 
NSF in this period as well.  The Department of Energy, for instance, began holding 
conferences on nanostructured materials as early as the late ’80s; and other research-
sponsoring organizations began taking notice of nano in the wake of Drexler’s 
increasing prominence.  According to the internal history of the National Nano 
Initiative, various grant officers (including Murday) began meeting casually in 1996, 
then formally starting in 1998 as the Interagency Working Group on Nanotechnology, 
a section of the National Science and Technology Council (an organization created by 
Bill Clinton in 1993 and in which Al Gore seems to have played a major role).9  It was 
through the IWGN/NSTC that proposals for a National Nano Intiative began to take 
shape, with Murday as the Executive Secretary of the NSET subcommittee on 
Nanoscale Science, Engineering and Technology that drafted the structure and vision 
of the NNI.  To see just how central probe microscopy has been to the framing of that 
vision, one need look no further than the subcommittee’s final report to Congress: 
 
                                                 
9 This narrative is from http://nano.gov/html/about/history.html. 
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In 1959 Richard Feynman delivered his now famous lecture, “There is Plenty 
of Room at the Bottom.”  He stimulated his audience with the vision of 
exciting new discoveries if one could fabricate materials and devices at the 
atomic/molecular scale.  He pointed out that, for this to happen, a new class of 
miniaturized instrumentation would be needed to manipulate and measure the 
properties of these small – “nano” – structures.  It was not until the 1980s that 
instruments were invented with the capabilities Feynman envisioned.  These 
instruments, including scanning tunneling microscopes, atomic force 
microscopes, and near-field microscopes [i.e., NSOM], provide the “eyes” and 
“fingers” required for nanostructure measurement and manipulation.  In 
parallel, the expansion of computational capability enable sophisticated 
simulations of material behavior at the nanoscale.  These new tools and 
techniques have sparked excitement throughout the scientific community. 
(Anonymous 2000, 20) 
That is, the subcommittee rhetorically positioned only two classes of tools – probe 
microscopes and computers – as having made the difference in bringing Feynman’s 
vision to fruition. 
Nano and Probe Microscopy Today 
 With the founding of the NNI, many probe microscopists have given up on 
hedging their relationship with nanotechnology and have speedily (if not always 
enthusiastically) converged on the new rubric.  Where in 1999 it was possible to think 
of nano as something peripheral to probe microscopy, today it is impossible to avoid 
thinking about nano in describing the experience of probe microscopists.  The funding, 
the prestige, and the community of nano have become an everyday reality for many 
STMers and AFMers, both in academic and industrial settings.  Some, of course, feel 
queasy about the changes wrought by nano.  As one surface scientist summarized: 
 
To me nano is just a buzzword used to generate money from the federal 
government.  It has no meaning.  Nano came on the scene when the 
government funded nano.  In fact I just got back from a conference where one 
guy was talking about the difference between nanotechnology and 
nanoscience.  Nanoscience is when you repackage what you were doing before 
so that you can get money for it now.  Nanotechnology is projecting the 
consequences of something that you’re already doing so that you can get 
money for that from the government too.  So the notion was, you either just 
sort of rephrase what you were doing and get money or you say that you will 
do something slightly different and get money. [CD1, 10/30/03] 
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For many probe microscopists, though, nano brings cultural as well as financial 
inducements.  Because of its unusual constitution, nanotechnology holds the promise 
for some SPMers of easing tensions within their community, of making their 
community relevant to a wider audience, and of allowing the continuation of traditions 
within their community that would otherwise have a much shorter shelf-life. 
 Most importantly, because of the variety of organizations supporting it, nano 
has a large and diverse enough ecology of participants that there is plenty of room for 
all the different kinds of probe microscopists – builders, runners, ordinary users, 
exceptional users, manufacturers.  For instance, the NSF sponsors ordinary users to 
buy commercial AFMs in order to tie different research together in a nano-coordinated 
way.  This was how I first saw the interaction of nano and probe microscopy at 
Cornell in 2000.  Different groups that had been independently doing their own thing 
in their own traditions of making nanoscale objects (which, before, they had been 
treating as too small to image) suddenly found that there was a cultural and fiscal 
rationale for them to buy AFMs (sometimes to share among groups), image their 
“epistemic things,” and build collaborations, with the AFM as a boundary object (Star 
and Griesemer 1989) that allowed them to overlap their various epistemic things (now 
with hot new labels like “nanohills” and “nanoropes”) in a generative way – for 
instance, one group would make little hills, then another would make molecules stick 
on top of each hillock in an array, then another group would magnetize each of the 
molecules. 
 At the same time, the NSF and other sponsoring agencies continue to fund 
builders to innovate designs.  There is a sense among many SPMers that closure has 
essentially been reached on what counts as a good probe microscope; or, at least, 
enough closure that future innovations are likely to be derivative on available 
commercial designs.  There is an even stronger sense, though, that closure has not 
 
 373
been reached on what counts as nanotechnology, nor on what instrumentation will be 
needed in the nano community.  Probe microscopes are clearly an important set of 
tools for nano; but builders see the nano audience as larger and more differentiated, 
and thus able to accept innovations that depart farther from the commercial designs.  
Thus, people who used to build AFMs, for instance, often now spend much of their 
time building AFM-based nano instrumentation – things like multiprobe data storage 
systems, AFM “noses,” or molecular force pullers [GB1, 9/26/01; CG1, 11/12/01; 
HG1, 11/14/01; PH1, 3/19/01]. 
 One of the most interesting characteristics of nano in its current (and perhaps 
long-term) pre-closure state, therefore, is something much like the ethic of naïveté that 
we saw attending the invention and much of the development of STM and AFM.  The 
public face of nanotechnology right now is marked by a playful, insouciant style that 
emphasizes making artful objects as much, if not more than, creating new knowledge.  
Nowhere is this clearer than in surface science.  Once, surface scientists sought 
“cleaner, flatter, colder” surfaces because those were the ones that most approximated 
tractable forms of theory, and hence could be used to generate knowledge [JM2, 
7/8/02; CD1, 10/30/03].  Now, “surface science is dead.... long live surface science in 
a different incarnation as nanoscience” [Himpsel, 5/9/01].  With the drift to nano, 
surface scientists have veered away from surfaces that are amenable to creating 
disciplined, positive knowledge, and moved toward surfaces that are amenable to 
making imaginative nanoscale objects: 
 
[Surface scientists] were interested in understanding the science base necessary 
to grow materials of interest to the electronics community....  You had to 
understand the surface in detail, and how you could grow a thin film on top of 
it while retaining a very fine, smooth surface.  A tremendous amount of work 
had to go into the preparation of the surface, understanding how things settled 
down, where they went, what structures were there, and how you varied the 
process and conditions to get the desired result.  One of the amusing things to 
me was that for many, many decades the people who were trying to grow 
superlattices worked very, very hard to get these perfectly smooth surfaces.  So 
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anytime they found processing conditions in which they got a non-flat surface, 
they would turn and run another direction.  Appropriate attitude at the time.  
Now when we get into the nanoworld, what we’ve discovered is that some of 
those conditions they were trying desperately to avoid back then were giving 
“ordered nanostructures.”  It was killing them at the time, but now becomes of 
a high degree of interest.  That prior experience is a real advantage because 
some of the things that were the poison back then now become the candy.  You 
can resurrect those conditions and say “ooh, yeah!”  We turned and ran the 
other direction back then, but let’s go back and try “what happens if we push 
harder, can we now enhance that growth rate and give us these little pyramidal 
islands which are” – so that accelerates the progress when we get into 3D 
nanostructures. [JM2, 7/8/02] 
One can speculate on the roots of this phenomenon in nano’s need for user-friendly 
publicity, or in the lightning-quick production cycles of the new economy, into which 
many corporate and academic SPMers are integrated.  Whatever the case, what 
politicians, reporters, and the general public often see of current nano research are 
nanoscale guitars, abacuses, trains, corrals, stick figures, and other playful 
nanoentities.10  As we saw in Chapters Three and Five, for as long as a community is 
expanding rapidly without significant internal frictions, this style of work can be 
extraordinarily generative.  In making nano-things, researchers can plausibly claim 
that they are both exploring the fundamental properties of small objects and 
demonstrating proofs of concept for technologically relevant techniques. 
 Thus, as in Chapter Six, researchers slide easily between repertoires of 
“nanoscience” and “nanotechnology.”  This, in turn, aids the further expansion of the 
nano community by helping newcomers cope with the phenomenon of experimental 
vertigo that plagued air STM.  If the nano community places a high value both on 
research into fundamental properties (“nanoscience”) and on playful building activities 
(“nanotechnology”), then newcomers have an easy way to avoid criticism – they can 
be seen to be contributing to the nano community, even if what they are discovering 
cannot always be represented as new, rigorous, disciplined, formal knowledge.  One 
                                                 
10 I would also argue that this kind of work has a long tradition in the microelectronics industry, where 
chip designers regularly work cartoons, signatures, and playful messages into the architectures of their 
chips.  See http://micro.magnet.fsu.edu/creatures/ for some interesting examples. 
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hallmark of nanotechnology, therefore, has been the rapid explosion of interest in 
certain “hot” materials – things like nanotubes, where researchers can begin 
constructing elaborate, technologically-relevant structures using these objects, even 
while many chemists and physicists remain perplexed about their fundamental nature. 
 Thus, instrument manufacturers love nanotechnology because it allows them to 
continue finding imaginative solutions to the boxwallah’s dilemma.  On the one hand, 
nano provides vast new markets within subcultures that will innovate on applications 
but not on designs; on the other hand, nano provides breathing room for builder 
groups, thus keeping alive one of the manufacturers’ most important sources of design 
modifications.  Builder groups, therefore, have also flocked to nano.  For those who 
have (or want) special relationships with manufacturers, the large and diverse nano 
community gives them leverage in getting their innovations commercialized.  For 
those who have stayed away from the large manufacturers, nano has enough wrinkles 
that they can start their own small companies in niches where companies like DI and 
Omicron do not compete.  For those builders who represent themselves as a craft elite, 
who embed considerable artisanry in their instrument designs and image renderings, 
nano provides a much larger community to be the elite of.  Someone like Don Eigler, 
for instance, would receive a great deal of attention under any circumstance, but with 
nanotechnology he and his former postdocs can command enormous respect because 
of the high-end, nano-relevant science they do. 
Exceptional users, too, find nano extraordinarily appealing.  These people have 
tied their interests to those of the manufacturers, and as instrument makers have 
gravitated to nano so have their stable of exceptional users.  Indeed, the exceptional 
users have probably done more work than anyone in figuring out how to turn the 
available commercial products into nanotechnology instruments.  That is, they are not 
building new nano instrumentation themselves, but they are taking commercial AFMs 
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and STMs and using them in canonically nano ways.  This can be seen, for instance, 
among people like Chad Mirkin or Charlie Lieber, who have figured out how to put 
nanotubes on commercial AFM probes in order to do sophisticated kinds of 
manipulation, or people like Ari Requicha and Rich Superfine who have figured out 
how to make an AFM more like Feynman’s original vision of a tiny “hand” that would 
respond at the nanoscale to the motions of a human, macroscale hand [AR1, 3/27/01]. 
Finally, the institutions most relevant to probe microscopy have also found 
solutions to their difficulties in nano.  The AVS, for instance, has seen its focus shift 
so much in the ’90s, that by 2003 it had dropped both the “American” and the 
“Vacuum” from its name and is now the “AVS Science and Technology Society” 
(where “AVS” no longer stands for anything).  As surface science morphs into 
nanoscience, though, nano may yet provide the AVS a way to unify its different 
constituencies.  Nano seems to have reinvigorated the National Bureau of Standards 
(now the National Institute of Standards and Technology) as well.  In the ’90s, when 
some of the remaining SPMers at the corporate labs started working on large, factory-
line instruments for semiconductor metrology, NIST started its own parallel project, 
the Molecular Measuring Machine, under Russ Young’s old protégé, Clayton Teague.  
The MMM developed closed-loop scanning that made possible ultrahigh resolution 
nanoscale measurement of surface features over macroscale lengths [JG3, 2/28/01; 
CT1, 6/28/02].11  For nanotechnologists coming from the microelectronics industry, 
the MMM represents a gold standard, the kind of ultimate metrology at the heart of 
NIST’s mandate.  Thus, NIST generally has become deeply involved in nano, and 
Teague himself has moved up to become the director of the National Nanotechnology 
Coordination Office, which handles some administrative responsibilities for the 
                                                 
11 A “closed loop” SPM is one in which there is independent verification of where the probe is, rather 
than just an assumption about its position based on the voltages put into the piezo scanner.  This is often 
done using interferometric sensors that record very small displacements of the probe during scanning. 
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Nanoscale Science and Engineering Taskforce, is involved in preparing NSET’s 
budgets, and does outreach to academia, industry, and the public. 
Finally, the rise of nano has coincided with the renaissance of IBM Research.  
Again, the builder culture of nano is more in tune with IBM’s current situation than 
the structure-obsessed surface science of the past.  Some IBMers like Don Eigler or 
Dan Rugar or Phaedon Avouris now have the freedom to play around with nanoscale 
objects in ways that marry the repertoires of “science” and “technology.”  If, for 
example, Avouris pushes nanotubes around to make a working transistor, that makes 
headlines within the nanocommunity and can be spun as presaging future IBM 
products; but if, in the process, Avouris and company learn something more 
fundamental about nanotubes, then they write more traditional journal articles and 
accrue a more disciplined kind of prestige for IBM Research. 
None of the old corporate labs, though, can play the role they once did.  The 
regulated monopoly style of capitalism, exemplified by AT&T, Xerox, IBM, GE, and 
the other research giants, is seen as a dead letter, at least in industries where surface 
science and probe microscopy are relevant.  The niche they filled in the ecology of 
research, though, is not a trivial loss.  Whole fields like surface science and 
information theory were buoyed by these organizations, in the knowledge they 
created, the technologies they developed, and in the personnel they trained.  Nano 
leaders like Murday explicitly see nanotechnology as allowing sponsoring agencies to 
fill some of the holes left by the decline of the great corporate labs. 
 
One of the problems, to which I think we in the US have to pay some attention, 
is that the industrial laboratories by and large are being scaled back....  They 
are not the dominant force they used to be globally across surface science or 
nano....  If [the big corporate labs] go away, we still have very good people 
doing basic research, they just tend to be more in the universities than in an 
industrial lab.  Universities have different strengths, they generally have a 
harder time getting the good equipment....  That says the science we do now is 
going to be a bit different.  Will this help or hurt?  I think it’ll hurt a bit.  The 
really bright people won’t have quite the ambience, they won’t be surrounded 
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by equally bright, well-equipped people....  Maybe at the federal level we need 
to think a little differently about how we fund basic research.  In the [National 
Nanotechnology] Initiative you already begin to see some evidence of that 
awareness.  The NNI is creating centers.  That’s in some sense what the IBM 
and Bell Labs did, they brought a bunch of very good people and put them in a 
central location at the same lab and equipped them well.  To an extent that’s 
what the centers are meant to do at the universities. [JM1, 7/8/02] 
Nano right now is a community of communities, held together locally on 
university campuses by large, dedicated “Nano Centers” that provide a nexus for 
different kinds of researchers, a homegrown version of differentiated ecology that we 
have seen has been vital to the growth of communities like probe microscopy.  
Whether probe microscopy is now or ever will be as central to nano as nano’s elites 
claim it to be, then, it is clear that many of the lessons of probe microscopy are visible 
once more in the development of nanotechnology.  In spreading so widely and 
garnering so much attention, probe microscopy has made itself a key part of, and a 
template for, the dreams of nano-visionaries of all stripes; and nano, in offering wider 
vistas for a community burdened by existential constraints, is slowly making itself a 
promised land for probe microscopists 
Conclusion 
The development of probe microscopy helps us understand the constitution of 
nanotechnology because many nano elites see probe microscopy both as the central 
instrument in the history of the field, and as a technique that has a promising future 
role in the nano community.  Probe microscopy can also show something more 
generally, though, about the art of invention and knowledge-creation in the late 
twentieth century.  In particular, we can use probe microscopy as a lens to examine the 
extraordinarily complex ecologies needed to create modern scientific knowledge and 
high technology.  In one sense, these ecologies support different kinds of actors.  We 
saw how the corporate labs relied on the differentiation between postdocs, staff 
scientists, group leaders, technicians, and upper-level managers to construct a kind of 
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research that would accord with corporate culture and, over the long-run, contribute to 
corporate needs.  In the Quate and Hansma labs, an even more diverse set of people – 
builders, runners, students, postdocs, on- and off-campus collaborators, afternoon 
visitors, technicians, retirees, spouses, and so on – made these groups vital and 
dynamic centers of innovation.  Later, these groups became associated with start-up 
companies that cultivated a very similar type of local ecology, which also were even 
more oriented to exporting the products of local work around the world. 
These local ecologies are a familiar story to science and technology studies; I 
have particularly tried to examine them in terms of what Robert Kohler calls a “moral 
economy of experimentation” (Kohler 1994).  In such a local moral economy, 
differentiation of types of participants produces overlapping sets of expectations and 
obligations that structure the assessment and circulation of new materials, techniques, 
and ideas; thus allowing for the transformation of grand visions into individual 
contributions, and making it possible for individual contributions to form a new and 
often unexpected basis for further grand visions.  As Kohler points out, the roles and 
expectations associated with moral economies of experimentation can undergo 
significant disruptions as the products of the local order propagate more widely.  
We’ve seen how a much wider ecology formed with the commercialization of probe 
microscopy, where builders, runners, ordinary users, exceptional users, and 
manufacturers of various stripes competed and collaborated to bring forth new 
microscopes, new applications, and entrées into new communities.  It is within this 
wider ecology that debates about the proper relationship between probe microscopy 
and nanotechnology are currently open. 
One aim of this dissertation has been to point to an interesting feature of this 
wider ecology – namely, the creativity and disruption brought on by the ability and 
need of some probe microscopists to move from one social role to another within this 
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ecology.  By now it should be clear that the line separating “producers” from 
“consumers” of probe microscopes (and the knowledge generated with or about those 
instruments) is very thin.  Throughout this story, we have seen people move from one 
position in this network to another – by, for example, starting as runners and becoming 
builders, or starting as builders and becoming buyers.  This should provide a 
corrective for the standard approach in the social construction of technology literature.  
In particular, the development probe microscopy highlights the internal differentiation 
of the “relevant social groups” that are party to a technology – for instance, “builder 
groups” are clearly a relevant formation, but they also contain within them a variety of 
actors, some of whom, crucially, are also members of other, equally relevant, social 
groups.  A Hansma postdoc like Jan Hoh, for example, might be a “runner” within that 
group, but a “pioneer” within the biophysical community; indeed, we can see how a 
technique flows outward exactly along the linkages provided by a set of individuals 
whose role is partly to manufacture the relevance of the technique for a social group. 
Examining the types and frequency of role fluidity within these ecologies can 
tell us important things about how the community functions.  For instance, we saw in 
Chapters Seven and Eight how commercialization spawns particular kinds of fluidity; 
if commercialization is successful in a subfield, it can cause “builders” to become 
“users,” while if commercialization becomes too routinized it can provoke 
“customers” to start their own companies to cater to the research niche they formerly 
occupied.  The management of this kind of role fluidity is a central point of the 
literature on trading zones; often, the ability to perform different roles (and assume the 
relevant identities) is traded among technical communities along with techniques, 
ideas, and materials.  Yet commercializers of instruments face this challenge even 
more acutely than participants in traditional trading zones; this is one important aspect 
of what I have called the boxwallah’s dilemma.  Instrument manufacturers are 
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continually on the lookout for elite microscopists whom they can coopt as exceptional 
users or conscript as applications scientists; while they are also looking for builders 
whom they can turn into buyers, and for research communities they can transform into 
“probe microscopists.”  Yet these companies also need to be aware of kinds of role 
fluidity that can work against them – as, for instance, when customers bolt to build 
their own microscopes or, even worse, found their own start-ups, or when the 
manufacturers’ own employees become so dissatisfied with the routinization of their 
work that they, too, leave to start competing firms. 
Also, as actor-network theory points out, role fluidity is not restricted to human 
participants.  Indeed, the roles and identities present within an experimental culture are 
often co-constructed with the shapes of the tools and materials important to its 
members.  We have certainly seen that probe microscopists grew and evolved along 
with the probe microscopes they were using.  We have also seen how a complex 
ecology of materials and artifacts was as important to the creation of local cultures of 
probe microscopy as a complex ecology of human participants.  Corporate surface 
science, for instance, sustained itself on the study of a regularly varying stable of 
epistemic materials and an ever-expanding stable of interlocking instrumentation and 
laboratory technologies.  Similarly, the Quate and Hansma groups were ravenous for a 
rich assortment of epistemic materials, culled from a variety of sources, and directed 
their members to create an equally diverse set of instrumentation to deal with the 
cornucopia of samples.  Later, the start-up manufacturers struggled to tame this 
surplus of materials by routinizing ways of bringing in new design innovations and 
tying them to new materials of interest. 
In this way, the probe microscopy community grew rapidly; one part of the 
story of this growth – the importance of instrumentation in the constitution and 
maintenance of subdisciplines – is well-known to science and technology studies.  The 
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triangular trade between diverse arrays of human participants, laboratory 
technologies, and important materials, however, has not been thoroughly explored 
before.  One contribution of this dissertation has been to point out a few kinds of 
materials that are central to the propagation of a technique – canonical materials such 
as the 7x7; test objects like, again, the 7x7 or, later, highly-oriented pyrolitic graphite; 
and hot materials, including DNA and high Tc superconductors – and to explore the 
interweaving of social role, technological innovation, and knowledge creation 
surrounding these materials. 
Finally, the story of probe microscopy highlights the complex ecology of 
activities necessary for the creation of modern scientific knowledge.  One recent 
picture of science and technology studies is that it is a kind of “epistemography” (Dear 
2001), a discipline dedicated to understanding knowledge creation.  I am sympathetic 
to this view, but wary that it leads us to think of knowledge creation as what science 
is.  One aim of this dissertation has been to show that knowledge (and artifacts) fall 
out of a diverse array of activities.  We have witnessed an extraordinary assortment of 
activities in this story, many of which could only dimly claim to have knowledge-
creation as the immediate goal: Chapter Three saw knowledge creation as a sometimes 
incidental outcome of a playful and naïve approach to lab work; Chapter Four saw 
knowledge creation as an upshot of institutional means for training new employees; 
Chapter Five saw knowledge creation (sometimes knowledge of uncertain quality) as a 
byproduct of teaching graduate students and preparing postdocs to become leaders of 
their own lab groups; Chapter Seven saw knowledge creation as a commercializable 
product, where the goals of the commercializers themselves often had more to do with 
accruing cultural capital or enjoying the benefits of particular places to live. 
Two types of activities have been an important part of the ecology I have 
described here – activities that participants can represent as disciplined or 
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undisciplined.  As we saw in Chapter Four, disciplined activity such as that found 
among postdocs at the corporate labs, could very quickly generate a vast amount of 
knowledge (or, at least, vast numbers of publications in reputable journals).  This is 
one classic, positivist picture of science – as an institution centered on building up 
knowledge brick-by-brick through rigorous, focused activity, with a handful of 
materials and instruments as the factories and resources of knowledge.  We also saw in 
Chapter Three how a self-consciously more naïve and less disciplined approach could 
lead to all kinds of exciting new knowledge.  This, too, is an established, empiricist 
picture of how science works – the naïve researcher ventures into a field and allows 
experience and experiment to offer up the truth.  I have hoped here not to affirm one 
or the other of these models, but rather to show the mechanisms, and necessity, of 
their interaction.  The naïveté of the early STMers prompted the rapid diffusion of the 
instrument and éclat of its first successes; yet Binnig, Quate, Hansma, and others like 
them faced enormous problems of credibility when they acted without the aid of more 
disciplined collaborators, and it was the judgment and traditions of the communities 
they spoke to that dubbed their results as successes.  Similarly, surface science had 
achieved much through professionalization and discipline formation; yet the field 
could easily have ossified had it stuck to LEED and surface reconstructions, rather 
than using the advent of the STM to transform itself and introduce the possibility of 
new kinds of knowledge. 
Organizationally, we have seen how the institutions and disciplines linked to 
probe microscopy have surrounded themselves with projects and practices that are 
only peripherally related to knowledge creation (or where knowledge creation is itself 
the sideline of another activity).  We might call this circus of activity around science 
the penumbra of knowledge-making; as we have seen, this penumbra has taken many 
institutionally- and historically-specific forms.  Knowledge is a central goal and 
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outcome of scientific work; yet so are pedagogy, entrepreneurship, the maintenance of 
communities of practice, the fostering of international alliances, the generation of 
culturally important symbols, and so forth.  If we ignore this penumbra, we diminish 
our ability to analyze and understand science; if we interfere with or occlude the 
penumbra, we may make science work less well; and if we cast our eyes only on 
knowledge creation, we miss the humor and the richness of science as a human 
process. 
We can, finally, use this deepened understanding of complex ecologies of 
people, instruments, materials, and activities to return to our central question: how do 
some laboratory technologies move from the local and eccentric to the global and 
routinized?  What allows a lab technique to move from invention to replication to 
commercialization?  What are the consequences of each of those transformations?  
One standard story – the “pipeline model” of scientific research – says that basic 
research at universities and a few corporate and national labs produces fundamental 
knowledge that then is transformed into applied knowledge and technologies that gain 
widespread use.  Usually this is seen to happen because entrepreneurs and 
corporations find the most commercially feasible fruits of basic research and, through 
the work of engineers and applied scientists, turn it into products that the market then 
disposes of.  This vision of science has, in the past two decades, become a near-creed 
of American science policy, as enacted through the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which 
gave universities greater leeway to patent research (and thus gave them an incentive to 
push research more quickly into the pipeline).12  Though many in science and 
technology studies have offered criticisms of this view (Kline 2000a), it remains a 
                                                 
12 See Shapin (2003) for a short narrative of the long history of university-industry relations and a 
critique of the adulation poured on the Bayh-Dole Act. 
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tremendously popular view among social scientists and laypeople alike in explaining 
the diffusion of high technologies. 
Yet the story of probe microscopy shows that the pipeline, if there is one, has 
many kinks and backflows.  According to the pipeline model, we would have expected 
the big corporate labs to have seized on the fruits of the basic research and quickly 
turned them into product streams.  Similarly, we would have expected academic 
researchers to stand at one end of the pipeline, offering up research and designs that, 
through the work of entrepreneurs, could flow straight out to consumers.  With probe 
microscopy, though, the cases of commercialization that have most resembled a 
pipeline have been the least successful – such as IBM’s SXM large atomic force 
microscope for semiconductor metrology.  Instead, we can use probe microscopy to 
advance an alternative to the pipeline – what we might call the penumbra model for 
the diffusion of science-based knowledge and technologies. 
In the pipeline model, the pursuit of profit, and the influx of capital that 
accompanies that pursuit, pushes technologies through the pipe; scientists and 
universities seek profits from their patents on basic research, and entrepreneurs and 
corporations seek profits from the sale of products based on the application of that 
research.  In the penumbra model, though, profit is as much an upshot of the activities 
surrounding research as the ultimate motivation for the research.  That is, the probe 
microscopy case shows that commercialization of research is more likely, and more 
likely to be successful, when it is treated as an adaptation from, or an enabler of, rather 
than the reason for other cultural activities – i.e., when commercialization sits in the 
shadow (the penumbra) of other activities.  Technologies are more likely to diffuse 
when their diffusion is a token within some cultural arena, rather than an arena unto 
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itself.13  Looking at probe microscopy with this lens, we should not be at all surprised 
that big corporations like IBM and AT&T did not commercialize the STM and AFM, 
even though their researchers were the pioneers of the techniques.  Because of the 
culture of research in these places, commercialization of probe microscopy was not an 
answer to any of the local needs (or an extension of existing product lines) of 
corporate STMers and AFMers. 
Instead, the story of probe microscopy shows us quite a wide range of 
activities from which diffusion can be an upshot.  For instance, disciplinary affiliation 
can be a crucial token for diffusion.  When members of a discipline can be brought to 
see their field’s expertise as relevant to a technology, and the technology in turn 
relevant to pre-existing and ongoing debates framed by the epistemic culture (Knorr-
Cetina 1999) of their field, then the technology may well diffuse into that community.  
Disciplines are not simply markets into which technologies can be pipelined; rather, 
the internal, differentiated activities of the discipline make it possible for external, 
personal linkages between the discipline and advocates of a technology to result in the 
active integration of the technology (where, as often as not, the activity of integrating 
is itself a prized cultural process of the discipline).  At a more micro-level, the 
cultivation of particular kinds of scientific personae may facilitate diffusion, though 
rarely in a straightforward way; for instance, we saw that the cultivation of a 
maverick, untutored persona resulted in a significant kinks, missteps, and backflows in 
the pipeline of STM development.  Yet naïvete was also a local cultural value of 
experimentation in which the peripatetic solicitation of expertise from colleagues 
eventually resulted in the rapid diffusion of the instrument. 
                                                 
13 This is somewhat like Howard Becker’s notion of the “side bet” in his study of commitment – actors 
are more committed to institutions when those institutions are tied into seemingly irrelevant aspects of 
their lives (Becker 1960).  In the penumbra model, actors will be more interested in the diffusion of a 
technology when they can stake it in “side bets” on their other activities. 
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One of the most important activities from which diffusion and 
commercialization can be produced through side bets is pedagogy.  In the pipeline 
model, pedagogy is a necessity only because new workers occasionally need to be 
brought in to replace old ones on the pipeline.  Yet this, as we’ve seen, puts the cart 
before the horse.  In the development of science-based technologies, 
commercialization is built on top of pedagogical activities; indeed, commercialization 
is often an outlet and adaptation from pedagogy, rather than the other way around.  In 
the big corporate labs, there did not need to be a pipeline for technologies because the 
labs produced a pipeline of people, and helped to maintain institutions and disciplines 
that trained future workers.  In the academic labs, the need to train successive 
generations of students in a resource-scarce but collaborator-rich environment was the 
trigger for the diffusion of the instrumentation.  Later, when diffusion had become a 
routine auxiliary to (rather than a reason for) training, commercialization became a 
natural side bet off of pedagogical practice.  Commercialization solved local cultural 
needs – it gave builders leverage in technical debates, it allowed them to find new 
collaborators (who could teach the builders’ students), it gave students a place to go 
after graduation, and it became a way to reorder the communities in which builders 
found themselves participating. 
Thus, even within manufacturers, where one might expect the pipeline model 
to be more eagerly seized upon, we find that commercialization was largely an 
outcome of, rather than an incentive for, experimental activities.  Since the start-ups 
we saw here (and many start-ups in other industries) are outgrowths of local 
experimental cultures (rather than segments of a pipeline that adjoin those local 
cultures), start-ups themselves feed on a variety of activities and values in which profit 
making and technology diffusion sit in the shadows.  Successful commercializers live 
in the trading zone, rather than just build pipelines in and through it for profit.  This is 
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why makers of science-based technologies must be continually wary of routinization; 
routinization can make diffusion easier, but it can also threaten prized cultural values, 
both inside and outside the company, that preempt the desire for profit.  Diffusion and 
commercialization can be worthy goals in themselves; but they can never be isolated, 
or even overriding, goals.  Instead, profit should be one patch in a much larger quilt; 
and commercialization and diffusion should be one kind of stitch (among many) that 
allows the patchwork of science and technology to be sewn together.
 
 
Appendix 
List of Interviewees1
 
National Bureau of Standards/National Institute of Standards and Technology 
BC1: Bob Celotta 
JD1: John Dagata 
RD1: Ronald Dixson 
BG1: Bill Gadzuk 
LH1: Lowell Howard 
JK1: John Kopanski 
JK2: John Kramar (Caltech) 
RS1: Rick Silver (University of Texas) 
CT1: Clayton Teague 
TV1: Ted Vorburger 
LW1: Lloyd Whitman (Naval Research Lab) 
RY1: Russ Young (Penn State) 
 
IBM Zurich 
SA1: S.F. Alvarado 
AB1: Alexis Baratoff (Uni Basel) 
GB1: Gerd Binnig 
UD1: Urs Dürig 
CG1: Christoph Gerber 
                                                 
1 Locations listed in bold are the institutions with which interviewees were associated while they were 
doing the work most relevant to this study.  Locations listed in italics are other relevant institutions to 
which the interviewees have belonged.  Interviews were conducted between June 2000 and February 
2004, the majority taking place in 2001.  Explicit permission has been given by interviewees for all 
direct quotes in this dissertation; in some cases, quotes have been slightly modified or anonymized at 
the interviewee’s request. 
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JG1: Jim Gimzewski (University of California – Los Angeles) 
HL1: H.-P. Lang (Uni Basel) 
OM1: Othmar Marti (University of California – Santa Barbara, Uni Ulm) 
BM1: Bruno Michel 
DP1: Dieter Pohl (Uni Basel) 
HR1: Heinrich Rohrer 
 
IBM Yorktown 
PA1: Phaedon Avouris 
DB1: Dawn Bonnell (University of Pennsylvania) 
JC1: Julian Chen 
TC1: TC Chiang (University of Illinois) 
JD2: Joe Demuth 
RF1: Randy Feenstra (Carnegie Mellon) 
BH1: Bob Hamers (University of Wisconsin – Madison) 
FH1: Franz Himpsel (University of Wisconsin – Madison) 
JK3: John Kirtley 
NL1: Norton Lang 
JS1: Joe Stroscio (NIST) 
RT1: Ruud Tromp 
JV1: John Villarrubia (NIST) 
KW1: Kumar Wickramasinghe (University College London, Stanford) 
 
IBM Almaden 
SC1: Shirley Chiang (University of California – Davis) 
JF1: John Foster (Stanford, Innovative Microtech) 
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JF2: Jane Frommer 
BJ1: Barbara Jones 
JM1: John Mamin (University of California – Berkeley) 
MM1: Matthew Mate 
GM1: Gary McClelland 
DR1: Dan Rugar (Stanford) 
BT1: Bruce Terris 
PW1: Paul Weiss (Bell Labs, Penn State) 
BW1: Bob Wilson 
AY1: Ali Yazdani (University of Illinois) 
 
Bell Labs 
SB1: Steve Buratto (University of California – Santa Barbara) 
DE1: Don Eigler (IBM Almaden) 
JG2: Jene Golovchenko (Harvard) 
JG3: Joe Griffith 
DH1: Don Hamann 
JK4: Joel Kubby (Xerox) 
BS1: Brian Swartzentruber (University of Wisconsin – Madison, Sandia National Lab) 
BW2: Bob Wolkow (IBM Yorktown, National Research Council – Canada) 
 
Other corporate researchers 
GC1: Gordon Chao (Charles Evans Associates) 
DC1: Don Chernoff (Standard Oil – Ohio, Advanced Surface Microscopy) 
CD1: Charles Duke (Xerox) 
BJ2: Bob Jaklevic (Ford) 
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BK1: Bill Kaiser (Ford, University of California – Los Angeles) 
MP1: Mike Pashley (Philips, Cambridge) 
 
Other government researchers 
NB1: Nancy Burnham (Naval Research Lab, Worcester Polytechnic Institute) 
RC1: Rich Colton (Naval Research Lab) 
BD1: Bob Dunn (Battelle National Laboratory, University of Kansas) 
RG1: Reinhard Guckenberger (Max Planck Institute – Martinsreid) 
GL1: Gil Lee (Naval Research Lab, Purdue) 
JM2: Jim Murday (Naval Research Lab, Office of Naval Research) 
FO1: Frank Ogletree (Lawrence Berkeley National Lab) 
MS1: Miquel Salmeron (Lawrence Berkeley National Lab) 
HW1: Hollis Wickman (National Science Foundation) 
SX1: Sunney Xie (Battelle National Laboratory, Harvard) 
 
Stanford 
TA1: Tom Albrecht (Park Scientific Instruments, IBM Almaden) 
TK1: Tom Kenny 
GK1: Gordon Kino 
SM1: Steve Minne (Nanodevices) 
HM1: Howard Mizes (Xerox) 
KM1: Kathryn Moler (IBM Yorktown) 
JN1: Jun Nogami (University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Michigan State) 
 
University of California – Santa Barbara 
JC2: Jason Cleveland (Digital Instruments, Asylum Research) 
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BD2: Barney Drake (Imaging Services) 
SG1: Scot Gould (Claremont McKenna College) 
HH1: Helen Hansma 
PH1: Paul Hansma 
JH1: Jan Hoh (Johns Hopkins) 
CP1: Craig Prater (Digital Instruments) 
JZ1: Joe Zasadzinski 
 
Other Hansma collaborators 
CB1: Carlos Bustamante (University of Oregon, University of New Mexico, University 
of California – Berkeley) 
HG1: Hermann Gaub (Ludwig-Maximilians Universität) 
AG1: Andy Gewirth (University of Texas, University of Illinois) 
SL1: Stuart Lindsay (Arizona State University, Angstrom Technology, Molecular 
Imaging) 
 
Digital Instruments 
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